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Abstract 
This thesis examines the social psychological process underlying social 
cooperation. Reviews are presented of (a) the interdependence account of social 
cooperation; and (b) the structure of and solutions to social dilemmas, the paradigm 
through which social cooperation is studied. Based on these reviews, two assumptions 
in this literature are then elaborated on: (i) the primacy of the individual self and (ii) the 
conceptualization of the group. Building on this critique, a theoretical review of the 
social identity account is then presented, through the development of social identity and 
self-categorization theories. While both the interdependence and social identity accounts 
grew from the work of the early interactionists -- Lewin, Asch and Sherif-- these 
accounts are now fundamentally distinct. Interdependence theorists understand social 
cooperation as a function of interdependence structure and transformational processes of 
individuals; while, social identity theorists understand social cooperation as a function of 
social context and categorization processes of individuals. While the latter approach 
does not discount the role that objective interdependence can play in social identification, 
it argues that interdependence, per se, can not account for the necessary and sufficient 
conditions underlying social cooperation. 
The empirical work of this thesis aims to build support for the social identity 
approach to the understanding of social cooperation. Specifically, the hypothesis to be 
tested is that social cooperation is the product of a salient social identity. The empirical 
strategy is to build a systematic account of social cooperation from a self-categorization 
perspective while targeting the fundamental theoretical constructs of interdependence 
theory, specifically the role of objective interdependence and the transformational 
processes of social value orientations. The role of objective interdependence is examined 
in Experiment 1, 3, and 4, and social value orientations in Experiment 2. Finally, 
Experiment 5 directly tests the hypothesis that social cooperation is the product of a 
salient social identity through a manipulation of salience of social identification. 
These findings are considered in relation to the theoretical approaches reviewed, 
with the conclusion being reached that interdependence, per se, can not account for the 
necessary and sufficient conditions underlying social cooperation. In contrast, the 
findings show general support for the self-categorization account of the social 
psychological mechanism underlying social cooperation. This theoretical analysis allows 
us to re-define the self in self-interest. 
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-Chapter 1-
Introduction: The social psychology of social cooperation 
1.1 Introduction 
The study of cooperation has long captured the interests of academics and lay-
persons alike. Broadly speaking, it can be defined as individuals working together to 
accomplish shared goals and tasks. It is the pursuit of mutual interests by individuals and 
is a pervasive and ubiquitous aspect of human nature. Indeed, we cooperate with others 
at many different levels of society: within our family and work life, as well as with an 
ever increasing expanse of regional, national and global communities. To briefly 
illustrate, consider a small rural village, called Tharwa, in the Australian Capital 
Territory. Residents of this community cooperate together in many ways, such as 
putting on the annual fair and participating in the volunteer bushfire brigade. As 
volunteers for the brigade, community members regularly take part in meetings and 
training sessions, and while Tharwa has been fortunate not to have experienced a major 
fire for a number of years, this brigade has helped to fight many different fires. For not 
only do these volunteer citizens help to fight bushfires within their own community, they 
also work together with other brigades to fight bushfrres in other areas of Australia. A 
salient example would be the extensive bushfires of the summer of 1994 that raced 
through the greater Sydney area, attracting international attention. Thus, not only do 
we, as individuals, cooperate with our community, our community as a whole cooperates 
with other communities. We cooperate for a greater good than may be immediately 
apparent. Cooperation is the heart of many systems of collective life - legal, economic, 
humanitarian and otherwise. Further, individuals have a good sense of when they are 
cooperating, that is, pursuing mutual interests with others, and when they arc not. 
For social psychologists, the analysis of the pursuit of mutual interests, in other 
words the study of social cooperation, has been built on the assumption that individuals 
must sacrifice their personal self-interest for the good of the collective. This doctrine is 
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pervasive not only in social psychology but also in the social sciences in general and in 
other related disciplines. It is explicitly clear in the social dilemma paradigm. the 
paradigm through which social psychologists have studied social cooperation for nearly 
four decades. To highlight this, a recent definition states: "Borrowing terminology from 
game theory, we say that such behavior, intended to benefit the group at a cost to the 
individual, represents cooperation" (Boyd & Richardson, 1991, p. 111). Typically 
individuals' behavior in social dilemma situations is studied through the use of 
experimenter created laboratory situations in which two (or more) participants must 
decide separately on a course of action which jointly effects both (or all) of their 
outcomes. As a consequence of this methodological approach, social dilemmas are now 
defined as the "problem of interdependence," based on the finding that in these 
objectively defined situations of interdependence, levels of cooperation are particularly 
low between individuals. This has led researchers to find "solutions" to situations of 
interdependence, that is to identify variables that increase the level of cooperation in 
these situations. 
All in all, insofar as cooperation is defined as the pursuit of mutual interests, from 
this perspective these mutual interests are viewed as being opposed to individual 
interests. As such individual self-sacrifice must be made when collective interests arc 
pursued. This analysis of the relationship between the individual and the group is 
inherent in the meta-theory, theory and methodology that we use to study social 
cooperation. Yet, despite the plethora of research in this area, researchers are not 
satisfied for a number of reasons (see Grzelak, 1991, 1994) which include: lack of theory 
guiding this research, little understanding of the complex relationship between variables, 
and uncertainty regarding the applicability of simulated findings to the real world. 
Overall the paradox remains: given that individuals can and do cooperate to a remarkable 
degree, why is it that within these situations of objective interdependence, such low 
levels of cooperation are found. 
Through coming to terms with these findings many researchers in this field have 
subsequently acknowledged that often there is not a conflict of interest between the self 
and collective (see Caporeal, Dawes, Orbell and van de K.ragt, 1989; Grzelak, 1994). 
Often the interests of the individual and the collective are one and the same. This 
phenomenon has been accounted for in two different ways in the literature: intrapersonal 
transformational processes and an intergroup analysis of collective behavior through a 
cognitive re-definition of the self. 
In line with the latter analysis, this thesis will challenge the assumption that 
conflict between individual interests and the interests of the group is an inherent aspect 
of social cooperation. To this end, the conceptual understanding of the self, as defined 
by self-categorization theory, will be used to re-define the self in self-interest. This 
analysis will provide a systematic descriptive and prescriptive functional mechanism that 
allows for the variable and adaptive differentiation of others in terms of "us" and 
"them," respectively those we cooperate with and those we do not. 
1.2 The issue: Defining the research problem 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a systematic account of the social psychology 
of social cooperation. In essence this thesis will address a long standing problem of the 
social sciences; specifically, what are the explanatory constructs underlying conflicts of 
interest? That is, how can we explain the underlying construction of group aiiiliations 
that can define whose interest we are acting in terms of, and in whose interest we are 
not. Indeed this question goes beyond the boundaries of social psychology, as Luce and 
Raifia (1957) point out: 
In all of man's (sic)' written record there has been a preoccupation with conflict nf interest; 
possibly only the topics of God, love, and inner struggle have received comparable attention. 
(p. 1) 
Not only has this question been a central problem for social theorists, it has also 
become an increasingly urgent international problem. For it is evident that social change, 
highlighted by changing group affiliations and interests, looms in many nations -- ethnic 
groups, in many forms, are emerging and fighting to maintain the essence of themselves 
as a distinct people. The security of the identity, as a collective, seems to be the primary 
aim despite the high costs: Hutu and Tutsi face each other with murderous contempt in 
their eyes; Northern Irish Catholics mobilize themselves internationally against the 
British, as represented by the Northern Irish Protestants; the Quebecois rally for their 
self-determination in Canada with little concern for the loss of economic security. In 
each of these cases there is a clearly differentiated "us" and "them." Yet differentiating 
"us" and "them" can also be variable, as witnessed in the ongoing conflicts within the 
former Yugoslavia. The striking reality is that Serbs and Croats, Serbs and Muslims, and 
1 In this thesis the use of non-sexist language is endorsed. However in the interest of readability the 
practice of noting such language will not be continued. 
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Croats and Muslims have each defined the conflict of interests at times. Clearly, the 
process of defining "us" and "them" has the adaptive capacity to be both specific and 
variable. Further, conflict and cooperation have a close affiliation with the understanding 
of the group -- cooperation with the ingroup; competition against the outgroup. What 
underlies this relationship? To understand this relationship, we must understand the 
functional mechanism that determines these respective conceptualizations. What 
theoretical and empirical evidence do we have that can systematically account for this 
variability and stability in perceived group membership? Further, through systematically 
accounting for this variability of group memberships, can this account for an effective 
understanding of cooperative behavior of individuals? These questions form the central 
core of this thesis. 
Sumner (1906) was interested in these questions at the turn of the century when 
he coined the terms ethnocentrism, ingroup and outgroup -- terms that are now central 
to the social psychological study of conflicts of interest. Today, while there are 
numerous theoretical and methodological positions which aim to explain the underlying 
mechanism involved, a review of the social psychological literature reveals two general 
answers: functional interdependence, as explained by interdependence theory (Kelley & 
Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) and the behavioural interaction model (Rabbie, 
Schot & Visser, 1989), and social identity, as explained by social identity theory (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979; 1986) and, more recently, by self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). Both these approaches emerged from the 
interactionist perspective of the 1950's, through the work of Asch, Lewin and Sherif--
gestalt theorists who acknowledged both the individual and social elements of 
psychology. And while both emerged from this body of literature there are fundamental 
differences in the assumptions and meta-theoretical principles that each of these 
approaches brings to the study of social cooperation. 
Following on from the work of Lewin (1939, 1951), Deutsch's (1949) theory of 
cooperation and competition remains a benchmark in the field and clearly takes a 
functional interdependence approach, in line with interdependence theory which has 
systematically been developed by Thibaut and Kelley (1959; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). 
This work provides the theoretical platform for the social dilemma paradigm which 
subsequently adopted a game theoretical perspective to the analysis of conflict of 
interest. In contrast, social identity theory, formalized by Tajfel and Turner ( 1979, 
1986), and now self-categorization theory (Turner eta!., 1987) carried on from Sherif's 
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intergroup studies (see Sherif, 1967, for review). However, as this thesis will reveal, 
there is a certain irony to the contrast outlined, for today it is self-categorization theory 
that most clearly embodies the field theory that Lewin (1952, for review) argued for (see 
Turner & Bourhis, 1996). 
The paradigms that grew ti'om each of these approaches are now fundamentally 
distinct. Interdependence theorists understand cooperation in terms of the outcome 
interdependence structure and transformational processes of individuals (see Kelley, 
1991; Rusbult & van Lange, 1996, for review). Self-categorization theorists understand 
cooperation in terms of the normative and comparative aspects of social context and 
categorization processes of individuals (see Turner et al., 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam 
& McGarty, 1994, for review). And while both are social cognitive theories, the former 
emphasizes individual processes that are constrained by the interdependence structure of 
the social world, while the later emphasizes the relevant social structural variables that 
influence individual cognition. Simply put, the emphasis turns from understanding an 
individual within a social system to understanding how the social system transforms the 
individual. The following brief history of the study of social cooperation from these two 
persepectives aims to illuminate and clarify the distinctions between these approaches. 
1.3 A historical overview of the social psychology of social cooperation 
In 1906, William Sumner, a sociologist, articulated a functionalist approach to 
the nature of intergroup relations. This work has had a longstanding influence in social 
psychology, through Sumner's exposition of the concepts of ethnocentrism, ingroups and 
outgroups. His grounding premise was that society is made up of groups that have some 
relation to one another, and that these groups are psychologically relevant to individuals. 
Group affiliations form the basis for individuals to perceive "us" and "them" -- the basic 
building blocks of intragroup cooperation and intergroup competition. In other words, 
it has now long been understood that we cooperate with ingroup members and compete 
against outgroups. As Sumner (1906) states: 
differentiation arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the 
others-group, out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in relations of peace, order, law, 
government, and industry, to each other. Their relation to all outsiders, or other-groups, is one 
of war and plunder, except so as agreements have modified it. (p. 12) 
Further, sentiments within and between the groups arc correlative, in that there is: 
loyalty of the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, 
warlikeness without-- all groups together, common products of the same situation. (p. 12) 
Sumner understood this process as a universal syndrome of ethnocentrism -- a "view of 
things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all are scaled and 
related with reference to it" (p. 13). These terms -- ingroup, outgroup and 
ethnocentrism -- have remained central elements in the study of social psychology. 
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The social psychological study of conflict emerged at the turn of the century and 
was influenced by the writing of key figures in social theory -- Darwin, Marx, Freud, and 
Hobbes before them-- each of whom, in their own way wrote about the struggle in life 
for existence. It was commonly assumed that survival in the hostile environment to 
which we are born can only be afforded through functional competition. This intellectual 
work, with the prevailing social conditions of that time, such as economic depression and 
world wars, influenced the thinking of many disciplines. Their work continues to be 
influential (see Granovetter, 1985; Lynn & Oldenquist, 1984, 1986; Mansbridge, 1990). 
Since this time, the social psychological understanding of the relationship 
between the individual and the group has had a varied history, moving from the group 
mind theorists of the early century, as seen in the work of the pre-experimentalist LeBon, 
McDougall and Freud, to the behaviorists, of whom F. Allport is notable, through to the 
interactionists or gestalt theorists, of whom Lewin, Asch and Sherif were the early 
pioneers. Yet despite the obvious significance of clearly defining the conceptual nexus 
between the individual and the group, in order to further develop our understanding of 
group functioning such as social cooperation, this literature has had a short and iterated 
history of failed theoretical development. In 1937, May and Doob said: "It is quite 
plain that existing research on competition and cooperation is scattered, spotty, and 
even chaotic" (p. 141). And in 1949 (see also 1968), Deutsch reiterated: "There has 
been little in the way of explicit theorizing and virtually no experimental work with 
respect to the effects of co-operation and competition upon social process" (p. 129). 
More recently, Pruitt and Kimmell (1977) as well as Grzelak (1991) have made similar 
comments. 
In 1937 two reviews of the early work on cooperation were published, one by 
May and Doob (1937), the other by Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb (1937). The latter 
defined social psychology as "the study of the way in which the individual becomes a 
member of, and functions in, a social group" (p. 16). In other words, understanding the 
7 
way individuals cooperate with, or act in terms of, social groups is a fundamental 
question of social psychology. This early work was, in part, a reaction to the instinctivist 
doctrines of that time and will not be reviewed here as it is generally accepted that it 
lacked empirical rigour and conceptual clarity and breadth (see Deutsch, 1980). 
However, it is interesting to note that to a large extent the focus of the research was on 
the effect of competition and cooperation on task output. Researchers were interested in 
testing the hypothesis that competition fostered greater productivity, an inherent aspect 
of American ideology and ethos. May and Doob (1937) were primarily interested in the 
social and psychological factors initiating cooperation and competition and also had a 
goal orientation approach to explaining these influences. 
Subsequently, social psychologists have taken up an interactionist perspective; in 
other words, a dynamic approach to the study of group life. Lewin, in particular, has 
been very influential in the field of social psychology and group dynamics (sec also 
Festinger 1950, 1954). Lewin was convinced that a better understanding of human 
groups could help solve some of the world's serious social problems and he was the first 
to study complex social phenomena in the laboratory. For this reason, he is often called 
the father of modern experimental social psychology. For Lewin a group was defined by 
its interdependence of members. He stated that it is: "[n]ot similarity, but a certain 
interdependence of members that constitutes a group"· (1939, p. 147, 1952). It was 
Deutsch (1949), one of Lewin's graduate students, who extended Lewin's reasoning 
about social interdependence and formulated a theory of cooperation and competition 
(Deutsch, 1949, 1962) that remains a benchmark today. 
Deutsch (1980) describes his "theorizing and research [as J concerned not only 
with the individual and group outcomes of cooperation and competition but also with the 
social psychological processes which would give rise to these outcomes" (p. 58). As 
with previous research the focus is again on objective outcomes and goals; however, 
Deutsch's further aim was to account for underlying processes as well. Two basic ideas 
are central to his theory: goal interdependence and individual action towards goals. 
Deutsch understood these two aspects to be reciprocal processes. Interdependence 
between individuals is defined as either promotive (positive) or contrient (negative), and 
actions are defined as either effective (positive) or bungling (negative) to achieving goals. 
Together these aspects of social interaction are said to affect three basic social 
psychological process: substitutability, cathexis and inducibility. Deutsch argued that 
these processes affect many levels of social dynamics: intrapersonal, interpersonal, 
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intragroup and intergroup relationships. He later drew strong parallels between his work 
and the classic field experiments of the Sherifs (see 1967 for review), concluding that 
"[there] is a marked parallel in the results of the research on both cooperation and 
competition within groups and between groups; the same theory appears to be applicable 
to the relations between individuals and the relations between groups" (Deutsch, 1980, 
p. 61). 
In a recent tribute to his work it is stated that "Deutsch's theory has served as a 
major conceptual structure for this area of inquiry for the past forty-five years" (Bunker 
& Rubin, 1995, p.208). And, as Johnston and Johnston (1989, 1995) have pointed out, 
Deutsch's theory has yet to be challenged. The interaction of interdependence 
structures and individual actions (or orientations) remains the predominant approach to 
the study of social cooperation. 
In the 1950's Deutsch became excited by the work of Luce and Raiffa and game 
theory. N; Deutsch (1981) states: "Game theory has made a major contribution to social 
scientists by fi:Jrmulating in mathematical terms a problem which is central to the various 
social sciences: the problem of conflict of interest" (p.61). Game theory intrigued 
Deutsch both theoretically and methodologically. Theoretically, it buttressed his 
developing view that conflict was a mixture of both cooperative and competitive 
clements -- thus, the notion of a mixed motive game, as exemplified by the prisoner 
dilemma game. Methodologically, the matrix structures lean! themselves easily to 
experimental research, as the structure and the outcomes could be systematically 
manipulated. 
Game matrices have now become the dominant experimental device for 
examining conflict and cooperation. In 1977, Pruitt and Kimmel estimated that well over 
1,000 studies had been published based on experimental games. However, even 
Deutsch (1981) concurs that much of this work has been "mindless -- being done 
because a convenient experimental format was readily available" (p. 63). Withstanding 
some early critiques, game theory remains a dominant force in the study of social cont1ict 
and cooperation. Game theory, through the social dilemma paradigm, by and large, now 
defines cooperation, as seen in the recent definition by Boyd and Richardson (1991) 
presented in the introduction to this chapter. The continuing thrust in the study of 
cooperation has been on the outcome or goal interdependence of individuals. The group 
has been reduced to the default status of a mere aggregate of individuals pursuing a 
common goal. 
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As Turner (1987) notes, in the introduction of self-cateogorization theory, by the 
1970's the gestalt interdependence perspective that Lewin argued for had been re-
structured. Rather than groups being characterized as a functional whole, different from 
the sum of its parts, groups had come to be conceptualized objectively as an aggregate of 
individuals pursuing a common goal or outcome. 
The work on self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) grew from social 
identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Together, these theories define an 
intergroup perspective of the analysis of group life and processes, wherein social 
cooperation is understood as a function of group level processing in a truly gestalt sense. 
Hence, it is argued that the group is more than the sum of its objectively defined 
interdependent individuals. Building on the work of Sherif, the evidence implied that 
identification with the gruup was the key intervening factor that allowed group level 
processes, such as cooperation, to emerge. For while Sherif conceptualized groups in 
terms of their common fate, creating superordinate goals to resolve conflict in his famous 
intergroup field studies, he also said: "Whenever individuals belonging to one group 
interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their 
group identification, we have an instance of intergroup behavior" (1967, p.12). This 
observation lay the ground work for re-conceptualizing the group. Instead of the group 
being defined by macro social goals through objective interdependence, the group is 
reconceptualized in predominantly cognitive terms as a "collection of individuals who 
perceive themselves to be members of the same social category" (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, 
p. 15). The importance of social identity and the process of identification through self-
categorization is stressed. This analysis reconceptualizes the self and thus has 
implications for the understanding of self-interest and therefore the conceptual 
underpirmings of the analysis of conflicts of interest. 
As Turner (1984) states, the social identity perspective "reinstates the group as a 
psychological reality and not merely a convenient label for describing the outcome of 
interpersonal processes and relations" (p. 535). Early in this line of reasoning it was 
hypothesized that group formation may be the basis for perceived cooperative and 
competitive interdependence (Turner, 1981, pp. 97- 98). In other words, self-
categorization theory hypothesizes that psychological group formation is the intervening 
mechanism that allows social cooperation, as a form of collective behavior, to emerge. 
Put simply, social cooperation is the product of a salient social identity. In this light, 
inclusive self-categorizations with others, in terms of higher order group memberships, 
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qualitatively transform the self and social behavior of individuals. Self-interest becomes 
collective interest through a transformation of the self. Through the process of self-
transformation, social cooperation can be explained as a product of a salient social 
identity, as this thesis aims to show. In terms of this conceptual analysis, there is no 
longer a conflict of interests between the individual and collective. The interests of the 
individual and the collective are one and the same. As such, cooperation is no longer 
defined as self-sacrifice. In contrast, social cooperation is defined as the product of a 
salient social identity, wherein self-categorizations vary systematically in terms of levels 
of inclusiveness with others, as well as degree of salience of group membership. In 
summary, social cooperation is re-conceptualized as a product of identification processes 
with other individuals and broadens the conceptual umbrella to include other prosocial 
acts such as helping behavior and altruism. 
1. 4 Aims of the Present Work and an Overview of the Chapters 
A~ suggested in the historical overview above, two main approaches to the study 
of social cooperation have emerged since the interactionist approach to the study of 
social behaviour was introduced: functional interdependence and social identity. The 
functional interdependence approach which understands social cooperation as a product 
of interdependence structure and transformational processes of individuals will be 
reviewed in Chapter 2. This Chapter will begin with the work of Deutsch, who 
conceptualized the dynamic relationship between the typology of interdependence and 
psychological orientations, through Deutsch's Crude Law of social relations. Game 
theory will then be reviewed as it was quickly adopted by interdependence theorists as a 
significant methodological tool for conceptualizing interdependence structurally, such 
that the reward structure could be modified systematically. This will lead to an overview 
of the development of interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thihuat & 
Kelley, 1959). The basic premise of interdependence theory is that the way 
interdependence among goals is structured determines how individuals interact, which in 
turn largely determines individuals' outcomes (see Johnson & Johnson, 1998). 
Chapter 3 will review the findings of the social dilemma literature, as this 
paradigm directly tests the interdependence approach to the study of social cooperation. 
Social dilemmas are defined as situations of outcome interdependence in which 
individuals are better off acting in their own self-interest, regardless of what other 
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interdependent individuals do. However, each self-interested action creates a negative 
outcome or cost to the others involved. In the end, pervasive self-interested action of 
individual group members results in an accumulation of negative outcomes and everyone 
gets less. Within this literature, the general finding has been that individuals fail to 
cooperate to any significant extent in simulated situations of objective interdependence. 
This analysis has been defined as the "problem of interdependence" and a plethora of 
research has provided "solutions" to this problem. At the same time, there is a certain 
level of ambivalence about the thrust and direction that this research is taking and, as a 
consequence, researchers are seeking further understanding and development in a variety 
of conceptual areas (see Kelley, 1995; Kormorita & Parks, 1995; Liebrand, 1992; 
Rusbult & van Lange, 1996). 
It is then argued that this ambivalence reflects two trends that emerged in the 
1960's and which continue to this day in social dilemma research; (1) a decline in interest 
in group process and a move to a more individual level of analysis and (2) the 
interpretation of interdependence as a function of utilitarian social interdependence of 
self-interested individuals (see also Festinger, 1980; Turner, 1987). In this light, two 
fundamental assumptions in this body of literature will be examined in Chapter 4: the 
nature of self-interest, narrowly conceived in terms of individual interests and, leading on 
from this, the nature of the psychological reality of the group. The overall analysis will 
argue that whilst game theory has provided a paradigm which enables social dilemmas to 
be recognized, theoretically it has been only moderately successful in explaining people's 
behavior in objectively defined situations. This suggests that the strongly individualistic 
model may be usefully modified to a more social model or theory. Interestingly, Dawes 
(1975, 1980), the researcher responsible for defining social dilemmas, has reported one 
key conclusion after working in the field for over 25 years: "findings suggest that 
developing a group's identity is central to willingness to act in the group's interest rather 
than one's own" (Tyler & Dawes, 1993, p. 93). 
The identity perspective developed in social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979; 1986) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) will be outlined in 
Chapter 5. Following Turner (1975, 1981), it is argued that outcome interdependence of 
individuals is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for cooperative behavior. An 
alternative account of group level processes, such as social cooperation, can he found in 
social identity theory and self-categorization theory. This analysis begins by 
acknowledging that groups have both social and psychological reality; however, it is 
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psychological group membership, based on self-identification as a group member, that 
transforms individual behavior into collective behavior. In light of this theoretical 
perspective, this thesis argues that self-categorization transforms the nature of sell~ 
interest, such that, as social identities become salient, individual self-interest becomes 
collective sell'-interest, through a transformation of the perception of self. Our needs and 
interdependencies are variable, changing as a function of the self, which is conceptualized 
as a fluid and adaptable process and product that responds to contextual variables. More 
simply, on the basis of self-categorization theory, the process of social identification 
redefines self-interest at variable levels of inclusiveness with others. 
There is now growing evidence for the social identity perspective in the study of 
intergroup relations (see Spears, Oakes, Ellemers & Haslam, 1996) and Chapter 6 will 
review the evidence that supports a social identity analysis of social cooperation. In 
particular the work of Brewer, Gaertner and their respective colleagues will he reviewed 
(see Brewer, 1991; Anastasio, Bachman, Gaertner & Dovidio, 1996) as they provide the 
most systematic program of research in this area. Interestingly, Rahbie and colleagues 
have been the only interdependence theorists to directly challenge the social identity or 
self-categorization approach. Their critique, as well the work of Rahhie's student, Pawel 
Mlicki, will also he outline in this chapter. 
The empirical work, which begins in Chapter 7, has two broad aims: (a) to 
compare the social identity and interdependence analysis of social cooperation in terms 
of broad theoetical constructs; (b) develop a self-categorization theory analysis of social 
cooperation. The latter aim will be the predominant focus. 
The initial experiment will respond to Rabbie's critique of the social identity 
analysis and will extend and replicate a study by Gagnon and Bourhis (1996). While this 
study does not directly examine social cooperation, it is important to the development of 
this thesis as it addresses the fundamental distinctions between the interdependence and 
social identity analysis of group life. 
Chapters 8 to 11 present the formal empirical analysis of self-categorization 
theory's explanation of social cooperation. The first two studies empirically address the 
two underlying constructs of the interdependence approach: social value orientations 
and outcome interdependence, while the final two studies examine the context specific 
nature of self-categorization processes that underlie identity formation and cooperative 
behavior. The second to last study will examine how comparative context, or frame of 
reference, effects cooperative behavior. The final study examines both normative and 
13 
comparative aspects of self-categorization, identity formation and cooperative behavior. 
Each of the final four studies aims to illustrate the dynamic active process of identity 
formation that is argued to be the basis for social cooperation. 
The first of these studies, in Chapter 8, tests the stability of social value 
orientations, that is the general intrapersonal qualities of cooperativeness or 
competitiveness that are said to be predictive of levels of social cooperation within any 
given interdependence structure. Social value orientations are the most rigorously tested 
transformational process of individuals within the interdependence perspective, and 
systematically account for most of the variation found in levels of social cooperation. 
This theoretical account argues that not all individuals are indifferent to the outcomes of 
others in much the same way that Deutsch argued in his initial studies. Social value 
theory states: "Recent evidence indicates that the expression of a particular value 
orientation within a given context remains relatively stable over time" (McClintock & 
Liebrand, 1988, p. 398). This initial field study will test this assumption within a stable 
objective interdependence structure. The question addressed is: Do levels of cooperative 
behavior amongst individuals, within an objective situation of outcome interdependence, 
remain stable across individuals over time; or will cooperation reflect emergent 
properties of psychological group formation, such as the extent to which individuals 
represent group norms? 
The study that follows in Chapter 9 examines the gestalt indices of common fate 
and similarity to examine the relationship between interdependence and social 
cooperation. Interdependence theorists take the functional approach to the definition of 
group membership, wherein objective common fate of individuals produces the outcome 
interdependence of players and subsequent cooperative behavior of individuals. In 
contrast, self-categorization theory argues that perceived similarity is the basis for self-
categorization and psychological group formation, which subsequently predicts 
cooperative behavior. This study will examine if the process of social identification 
with superordinate others, who are not defined within the immediate outcome 
interdependence structure, can account for the cooperative behavior of these individuals. 
In Chapter 10, the hypothesis that social cooperation is the product of a salient 
social identity is directly tested in a study that manipulates the variable social identities of 
participants within comparable objectively defined situations of interdependence in a 
resource dilemma. This study highlights the interplay between psychological group 
formation, perceived interdependence and social cooperation. 
14 
Following on from the work of Oakes on the salience of category membership 
(1987), it is argued, in Chapter 11, that variability in cooperation rellects identity 
salience. In line with the "accessibility x fit" hypothesis (Oakes, 1987; Oakes, Turner & 
Haslam, 1991) salience is argued to be a function of both normative and comparative fit. 
It is thus hypothesized that levels of social cooperation will vary with perceived fit. 
Finally, Chapter 12 will examine the principle findings to emerge from the 
empirical work of this thesis. The aim is to examine the extent to which self-
categorization theory makes a distinct explanatory contribution in contrast to 
interdependence theory. Broader theoretical and metatheoretical implications of the 
thesis are then examined, and final comments presented. 
In summary, this thesis will begin with a presentation of the contemporary 
approach to the study of social cooperation, as explained by interdependence theory and 
studies through the social dilemma paradigm. This theory and paradigm will then be 
examined from the broader perspective of the history of our conceptual understanding of 
the social group and self-interest. Picking up on other developments within this history, 
social identity theory and self-categorization theory will then be presented. Following 
this theoretical overview, work that has challenged and developed the theoretical 
premises of the social identity approach will then be presented. The empirical work of 
this thesis will then follow. 
-Chapter 2-
Social cooperation: The history and theoretical development 
of the analysis of individuals' outcome interdependence 
2.1 Introduction 
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This chapter outlines the development of the most influential theoretical 
approach to the study of social cooperation, namely the functional or outcome 
interdependence approach. The development of this theoretical framework will begin 
with the work of May and Doob (1937) and then moves onto Deutsch's (1949) 
inf1uential, and uncontested, theoretical developments. Game theory (Luce & Raiffa, 
1957) is then introduced, as it provided the means through which a formalized 
paradigm was developed to study cooperation, competition and conl1ict resolution. 
Deutsch (1958) was instrumental in the process of establishing the paradigm. Finally, 
interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) is presented 
-- a theory that has int1uenced an entire generation of social psychologists and underlies 
research areas from stereotyping, to interpersonal and intergroup relationships. Indeed, 
these theoretical developments outlined above represent our current conceptual 
understanding of the topic of this thesis -- social cooperation. 
A continuing theme of this approach has been the emphasis on outcome (or 
goal) interdependence of individuals. Predominantly, this approach rests on the seminal 
work of Lewin (see 1952 for review). Specifically, this work builds on Lewin's (1939, 
1951) conceptualization of a group, that emphasizes the interdependence of members, 
and has greatly inl1uenced the field of social psychology. Building on Lewin's formula 
- B = .f{PE) - cooperative behavior (B) is understood as a function of an intra personal 
variable (P), such as social value orientation, and the situational environment (E), as 
specified through the outcome interdependence structure that defines the social group. 
The literature to be reviewed has only emerged within this last century. 
However it is worth noting that it has been influenced by key figures in the social 
sciences at the turn of the century, such as Darwin, Marx and Freud. Interestingly each 
of these figures, in their own way, emphasized individuals' struggle for existence and 
16 
prosperity. The harsh reality of individual survival remains a key theme in 
contemporary social psychology. Further, through the course of this last century other 
social ideology that has been influential includes the rise of capitalistic market systems 
and the strategic analysis of deterrence and security to protect the rising nation states. 
2.2 May and Doob's early theoretical account of cooperation and competition 
The work of May and Doob (1937) provides the best theoretical summary of the 
early literature of this century. Their approach was strongly eclectic, drawing on a 
number of the social sciences. The theory states 8 postulates, inductively deriving 24 
propositions and draws out 68 problems, involving cooperation and competition, to be 
addressed. The approach was influence by the work of Gordon Allport, who along with 
Gardner Murphy, was a" personologist" reacting to what he viewed as a mcchanistic-
behaviouristic tradition that was growing in America. 
In this same vein, May and Doob (1937) provided a multidisciplinary review of 
the literature culminating at that time on cooperation and competition, which includes a 
small amount of social psychological experimental research. While they emphasised 
that cooperation and competition mdst be understood in terms of their psychological 
determinants, the theory is far from a psychological account of social cooperation. 
Rather, it was a descriptive account of the conditions for and the forms of cooperation. 
Building on the Latin derivation of the terms cooperation (working together) and 
competition (striving together), the terms are defined as follows: 
Competition or cooperation is behavior directed toward the same social end by at least two 
individuals. In competition, moreover, the end sought can be achieved in equal amounts by 
some and not by all of the individual thus behaving; whereas in cooperation it can be achieved 
by all or almost all of the individuals concerned. (p. 6) 
In their introduction they state "the fundamental problem of personality and culture is 
to determine the process by which the individual, with its basic equipment of 
undifferentiated organic drives, becomes socialized in a culture and thereby achieves a 
personality" (p. 1 ). Thus, the emphasis is on how the individual internalizes culture in 
developing a personality. Similarly, the group is understood in terms of its external 
cultural inl1uence on individual personality. 
The theory states that the individual competes and cooperates in "order to close 
the gap between his level of achievement and that of his aspirations by achieving 
certain goals" (p. 9). If there is no discrepancy between these levels then competition 
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and cooperation will not ensue. The theory also makes a distinction between social and 
psychological levels of cooperation: 
On a social level, individuals cooperate with one another when: (1) they are striving to achieve 
the same or complementary goals that can be shared; (2) they are required by the roles of the 
situation to achieve this goal in nearly equal amounts; (3) they perform better when the goal 
can be achieved in equal amounts; and (4) they have relatively many psychologically 
affiliative contacts with one another. (p. 17) 
On a psychological level, an individual cooperates with others when: (1) there is a discrepancy 
between his level of achievement and his level of aspiration; (2) his knowledge of the goal that 
he seeks indicates that it can be reached by striving with others; (3) his attitudes produce 
within him a state in which his attitudes toward cooperating overbalances possible conflicting 
attitudes toward potential cooperators, toward the rules of the situation, toward competing 
rather than cooperating, etc.; and (4) his skill is of such a nature that under the roles of the 
situation he has a reasonable chance of success by cooperating. (p. 18) 
The early experiments on groups reviewed by May and Doob examined 
different effects of group structure on the functioning of groups: group size (South, 
1927; Watson, 1928); sex-composition (South, 1927); degree of participation (Belyaeff, 
1930; Jenness, 1932a; 1932b; Shaw, 1932; Watson, 1928). However, the evidence is 
mixed and far from conclusive. Deutsch (1981) was critical of these early studies, 
citing lack of methodological rigor and conceptual clarity. He stated that: "They 
focused almost exclusively on the effects of" competition" versus "cooperation" on 
individual task output; individuals worked separately and had no interaction and no 
interdependence with one another in terms of their activities" (p. 53). In summary, he 
stated that the studies lacked an understanding of the social and psychological processes 
underlying these behaviors, as the researchers simply assumed that output is directly 
related to the motivation that cooperation, versus competition, induces. By and large 
these early studies aimed to support, or reject, the growing American work ethic of 
building prosperity through a competitive free market. 
The theory never evolved from this point but its first proposition, and its 
corollary, are still explicit in the literature today: 
Human beings by original nature strive for goals, but striving with others (cooperation) or 
against others (competition) are learned forms of behavior. (May & Doob, 1937, p. 23) 
Since the tendencies to strive with others, or against others, for desired goals are not 
represented in original nature by specific instincts or drives, neither one nor the other can be 
said to be he more genetically basic, fundamental, or primordial. (May and Dooh, 1937, p.25) 
In reviewing this early work, as well as the work of Barnard (1938), Lewis (1944), 
Maller (1929) and Mead (1937), Deutsch (1949) concluded that: "Implicit in most of 
these conceptualizations has been the notion that the crux of the difference between co-
operation and competition lies in the difference in the nature of the goal-regions in the 
two social situations" (p.131 ). Deutsch's own conceptualization of cooperation and 
competition follows these goal distinctions. However, for Deutsch it was the 
interdependence of group members that was an essential aspect of cooperation and 
competition, and it was this conceptual framework of functional interdependence that 
Deutsch introduced to the study of social cooperation. 
2.3 Deutsch's theory of cooperation and competition 
Deutsch (1949a, 1949b) worked with Lewin's ideas of group dynamics and 
interdependence in his analysis of the effects of cooperation and competition on group 
processes. Like the theories of other students of Lewin (e.g. Festinger, 1957; Thibaut 
& Kelley, 1959), Deutsch's theory of cooperation and competition has been highly 
influential; however, at the same time Johnson and Johnson (1989) conclude: 
Despite the hundreds of research studies that have been conducted on social interdependence, 
Deutsch's theory has not been refined, enriched, or crossbred with other theories. A rival 
theory of similar magnitude and quality has not been formulated, and the area of inquiry has 
suffered as a consequence. (p. 8) 
Given this, it important to assess critically the essence of Deutsch's work. Deutsch's 
(1949) aim was to" sketch out a theory of the effect of co-operation and competition 
upon small (face-to-face) group functioning" (p. 129). Deutsch made a distinction 
between cooperative and competitive situations. Cooperative social situations were 
characterized by the situational ability of individuals to work towards a common goal. 
These are called promotively interdependent goals. Competitive social situations are 
characterized by contriently interdependent goals. Deutsch (1949, p. 132) noted that 
the nature of goal relations is complex and seldom pure; further, he noted that 
individuals can be interdependent with others" without that individual in any sense 
being aware of, or psychologically affected by, this interdependence" (p. 132). 
Overall, the crux of Deutsch's work emphasizes the impact of cooperative or 
competitive situations on groups of individuals that are either promotively or 
contriently interdependent. 
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Deutsch's thesis of cooperation and competition capitalized on Lewin's concept 
of locomotion-- basically, a change in a person's position in reference to the group. 
The logical implication of locomotion, for Deutsch (1949), was that: "Any person X 
who has promotively interdependent goals with persons A, B, C, etc., will come to have 
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promotively interdependent locomotions in the direction of his goal with persons A, B, 
C, etc." (p. 133). As Deutsch points out these locomotion occur within" objective 
social space, not to locomotion in the individual's life space. That is ... no inference 
should be drawn as to whether the individual is aware of, or even affected by, his 
locomotion in the objective social space." (p. 133). Thus, the key factor that Deutsch 
has capitalized on is the objective situational locomotion of an individual and the 
implications of this behavior in situations of interdependence. 
Deutsch outlines three psychological effects that are assumed as products of 
locomotion in promotively interdependent situations: (1) substitutablity - a willingness 
to allow someone else's action to be substituted for one's own, thus encouraging 
specialization; (2) cathexis - the development of positive attitudes towards other 
individuals, such as trust and openness; (3) inducibility - the readiness to be influenced 
positively by another. These three principle assumptions are used to explain the 
psychological impact of a number of situational variables in cooperative and 
competitive situations. However, Deutsch (1973) later warned that these same 
dynamics that are necessary for cooperation also have the potential to cause the 
deterioration of cooperation through their reciprocal influences. 
Deutsch's early theorizing on cooperation (1949a, 1962) involved the simple 
ideas of interdependence and interpersonal attraction that arise from positive cathexis 
within the group. The basic tenet was to explain the effect of positive and negative 
interaction on individual's pursuit of goal attainment. Within a given situation of 
interdependence, if the actions of the other person facilitate the advancement of one's 
own goal, liking (or interpersonal attraction) for that person is increased; however, if 
the actions of another person deterred the advancement of one's own goal, liking for 
that person is decreased. As such, the actions of others could be effective (positive) or 
bungling (negative) to achieving any one individual's goal. Thus, two basic ideas are 
central to his theory: goal interdependence of individuals and individual action towards 
goals. Deutsch (1973) understood these two aspects to be reciprocal processes through 
"Deutsch's crude law of social relations" which states that "the characteristic processes 
and effects elicited by a given type of relationship tend also to elicit that type of social 
relationship" (p.365). This approach became the basis for the predominant analysis of 
cooperative behavior, specifically the approach examines the relationship between 
interdependence structures and interpersonal relations (orientations). Deutsch argued 
that these processes affect many levels of social dynamics: intrapersonal, interpersonal, 
intragroup and intergroup relationships. 
Deutsch was influenced by the work of the gestalt theorists Koffka ( 1935) and 
Lewin (1935). He built on Lewin's definition of a group which emphasised the 
interdependence of group members. Deutsch makes a distinction between a 
psychological group and a social group. The basic definition being (Deutsch, 1949, p. 
150): 
1. A sociological group exists (has unity) to the extent that the individuals or suh-units 
composing it are pursuing promotively interdependent goals. 
2. A psychological group exists (has unity) to the extent that the individuals composing it 
perceive themselves as pursuing promotively interdependent goals. 
3. A psychological group has cohesiveness as a direct function of the strength of goals 
perceived to be promotively interdependent and of the degree of perceived interdependence. 
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In each of the three definitions there is an emphasis on goal interdependence between 
individuals, and it is interesting to note that the conceptualization of the social group 
and the cooperative situation are identical. Deutsch argued that it was then logical to 
draw the conclusion that individuals in a cooperative situation will "possess more unity 
as a sociological group" than will individuals in a competitive situation. He goes on to 
propose, based on his hypothesized psychological impingements of group membership -
- substitutability, cathexis and inducibility-- that the same will be true for a 
psychological group; that is, that individuals who are promotively interdependent will 
have more unity as a psychological group than individuals who are contriently 
interdependent. In other words, promotive (cooperative) interdependence produces 
perceived. or psychological. group membership. Thus the psychological group is 
situationally imposed through the functional nature of the interdependence structure that 
facilitates or inhibits individual's goal attainment. This interdependence analysis of 
cooperation remains dominant in the literature. Deutsch (1949) concludes: "through 
creation of a co-operative and a competitive situation it becomes possible to test 
empirically the effect of variation in degree of unity or strength of membership motive 
of a psychological group upon the functioning of the group" (p. 151 ). In other words, 
cooperation is understood as social action, the means through which a group emerges. 
The essence of cooperation is co-action towards a common goal: "No individual, by 
his choice alone, can successfully initiate cooperation. Cooperation is a mutual 
endeavour, and for cooperative interaction to occur, the choice to cooperate must be 
reciprocated" (Deutsch, 1985, p. 54). 
Deutsch's first study examined the effects of cooperation and competition upon 
group process. The aim of the study was to: (1) provide evidence for his theoretical 
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hypothesis; and (2) apply the experimental method to the study group dynamics. The 
design involved two experimental groups, cooperative and competitive, each being 
represented through their respective outcome interdependence structures. For example, 
the reward for groups in the cooperative condition was based on the performance of the 
group as a whole, with the best performing group being exempt from one assessment 
item. In contrast, performance in the competitive condition was assessed individually, 
with one individual within each group receiving exemption from one assessment item. 
Ten groups of five students took part. For comparability of results, trained observers 
were used to pair the groups on the basis of their performance as a group on solving a 
human relations problem. The rationale of group matching, rather than individual 
matching, was that "if we accept the notion that a group is not merely the sum of its 
parts, it is evident that matching individuals (parts) is not a sufficient basis for matching 
groups -- groups have to be matched as functional entities" (p.201 ). The experiment 
ran for five weeks. Each week groups representing both experimental conditions were 
given a puzzle problem and human resource problem to solve, as well as a series of 
questionnaires. As expected, perceived promotive interdependence was greater in the 
cooperative groups than the competitive group. The hypotheses of substitutability, 
cathexis and inducability, in the cooperative situation, were also supported. It was 
observed that cooperative groups were more helpful to each other, while competitive 
groups were more obstructive to other individuals' goal attainment. The theory of the 
effects of cooperation and competition put forward by Deutsch received general support 
in the early literature (see Back, 1951; Berkowitz, 1957; Gerard, 1953; Gottheil, 1955; 
Grossack, 1954; Mintz, 1951; Mizuhara & Tarnai, 1952; Raven & Eachus, 1963; 
Thomas, 1957). 
Deutsch (1958) then became interested in motivational orientations of 
individuals and he explained these orientations through his conceptualization of trust. 
He made the" customary assumptions about individual motivation" (Deutch, 1960, p. 
123). Specifically, he assumed that when each individual is individually oriented, each 
"is out to obtain the best outcome for himself' (p. 123). For Deutsch, it was then 
difficult to understand why, and how, cooperation arises in certain instances. He used 
the example of a group of five men taking turns building each other's houses. Who 
could be trusted to help build the last house? He argued that the initiation of 
cooperation required "mutual trust" and the inducement of trust was understood both 
as a "situational" as well as a "personality" characteristic. 
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Deutsch studied the effects of three motivational orientations on trusting (and 
suspicious) behaviour: (1) cooperative- wherein mutual welfare and concern for each 
other was induced; (2) individualistic - wherein mutual concern for only the individual 
person was induced; (3) competitive - wherein mutual concern for defeating the other 
was induced. Two hypotheses are developed: the simultaneity and commitment 
hypotheses. The former hypothesis suggests that "mutual exchange can develop that is 
profitable to both parties, even when there is no socialized basis for trust and the 
participants arc solely interested in their own welfare" (p. 127). But this requires 
"psychological simultaneity - the mutual awareness of what the other is doing as one 
decides what to do" (p. 127). The latter hypothesis suggests that socialization 
processes induce individuals to make social commitments, whereby there is the ability 
to undertake the committed behavior and the individual will "experience a greater gain 
(or lesser loss) by doing it than by not doing it" (p. 128). It was thus expected that 
communication would give participants an opportunity to make commitments, and 
cooperation would increase particularly for individualistic oriented individuals. To test 
these hypotheses a 3 x 2 x 2 design was developed: 3 (cooperative, competitive, and 
individualistic orientation) x 2 (simultaneous/nonsimultaneous choice) x 2 
(communication/no communication). A two-person matrix game was used (to be 
explained further in the following section on game theory), wherein each individual can 
make either a cooperative or competitive choice. The general findings were that 
cooperative orientations led individuals to trust the other and induced more cooperative 
behavior, while competitive orientations had the inverse effect. Individualistic 
orientation was variable across experimental conditions, with communication and 
simultaneous choices increasing cooperation. Thus there was support for the 
hypothesis. This early study was important in setting a precedent for future research of 
social cooperation. Specifically, this study set the experimental parameters as an 
interaction between intrapersonal differences (through individuals' social value 
orientations) and interdependence structure. As will be seen this approach, while now 
more refined, is still dominant today. 
Deutsch, and others, have continued to emphasize the interplay between 
intrapersonal psychological processes and wider social system of interdependence. The 
psychological aspects included the perceptions, beliefs and values of the conllicting 
parties (which may or may not correspond) and the social system is defined in terms of 
different types of interdependence. Deutsch specified this functional relationship 
through his Crude Law. Further, Deutsch recognized that there may be a discrepancy 
between objective reality and subjective (or perceived) reality, and thus suggested a 
typology of conflict (Deutsch, 1973, Chapter 1) to map the objective possibilities of 
interdependence, from which the perceived realities would emerge. 
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Building on this analysis, Wish, Deutsch and Kaplan (1976) specified five 
fundamental dimensions of interpersonal relationships and devised a taxonomy of 
sixteen types of social relations of interdependence. Specifically, a set of 4 bi-polar 
situational dimensions, each of which could vary in intensity (the fifth dimension). The 
first dimension is based on Deutsch's (1949) original conceptualization of cooperative 
(promotive) and competitive ( contrient) interdependence. Interestingly, other 
researchers have made similar distinctions: correspondence - noncorrespondence of 
outcomes (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978); association- disassociation (Triandis; 1972); 
negative- positive interdependence (Johnson & Johnson, 1991). Second, a power 
distribution dimension (equal versus unequal) is emphasized, which is similar to what 
Kelley (1979) conceptualizes as a continuum of mutuality of interdependence, and 
Triandis (1972) as superordination- subordination. Third, is a task-oriented versus 
social-emotional dimension, as per Deutsch's (1949) initial differentiation between task 
functions and group maintenance functions. Kelley (1979) understands this as a 
personal dimension, while Triandis (1972) and Marwell and Hage (1970) conceptualize 
this as an intimacy dimension. The fourth dimension is characterized as a formal versus 
informal dimension, just as in Marwell and Hage (1970) and Wish and Kaplan (1977). 
Lastly, the intensity or importance dimension relates to and extends each of the 
previous dimensions. Kelley (1979) characterizes this as reflecting the degree of 
interdependence in the relationship. Taken together, many different types of 
relationships can be placed in this taxonomy. For example, a caring mother-child 
relationship involved in a nursing activity is characterized in terms of the taxonomy as 
cooperative, unequal, social-emotional and informal. In contrast, a police officer 
helping a child would be characterized as cooperative, unequal, social-emotional but 
formal. While Deutsch regretted the simplicity of the dichotomies that make up the 
taxonomy, he believed that it was a good starting point to begin to determine the 
relationship between situation and the individual. Thus, together with typologies of 
individual differences, taxonomies of interdependence structures now underpin the 
interdependence approach to the understanding of social cooperation. 
Individual differences are acknowledged through what Deutsch conceptualizes 
as psychological orientations. He does not believe that these orientations arc 
personality traits or character orientations; moreover, his emphasis is on the 
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situationally induced nature of temporal predispositions. He assumed that a" causal 
arrow concerning psychological orientation and types of interdependence is bi-
directional: a psychological orientation can induce or be induced by a given type of 
interdependence" (1985, p. 74). The relationship can also be seen as follows, in that: 
"people orient themselves differently to different types of social relations and that the 
different orientations reflect and are reflected in different cognitive processes, 
motivational tendencies, and moral dispositions" (1985, p. 79). Following Neisser's 
(1976) conception of the perceptual cycle, Deutsch (1982) drew out a model of the 
cyclical relations between psychological orientations and social relations. Orientation 
involved cognitive, motivational and moral aspects. The cognitive aspect involves the 
development of basic cognitive schemata of cooperation and competition, through 
individual life experiences within different social relations. The motivational aspect is 
more dynamic: it "gives rise to the cathexis of certain regions of the cognitive 
landscapes, making them positively or negatively valiant, and highlights the pathways 
to and from valiant regions. It gives the cognitive map a dynamic character" (1982, p. 
26). Thus, through cathexis individuals move towards, or away from, cooperation. 
The moral orientation implies that social relationships have both a person and social 
perspective. In terms of cooperation and competition - a moral orientation fosters either 
mutual respect or equality (cooperation) or sanctions in-equality (competition), 
legitimating a win-lose struggle. 
Through Deutsch's crude law of social relations the two aspects of cooperative 
and competitive behavior merge, that is the nature of the interdependence relationship 
and the psychological orientation of the individual. Through this law Deutsch 
emphasizes the dynamic nature of the person and the environment in a Lewinian style --
behaviour is explained as a function of the person and the environment (B = .f{PE)). 
Deutsch (1980) summarized his research work as follows: 
A good deal of our early research on the conditions affecting the course of conflict was done 
on an ad hoc basis. We selected independent variables to manipulate on the basis of our 
intuitive sense of what would give rise to a cooperative or competitive process. (p. 69) 
These variables included: motivational orientation; communication; perceived 
similarity of opinions and beliefs; size of conflict; threats; power differences; third-
party interventions; etc. Over time this research vein came to be described as one of 
conflict resolution. And, Deutsch's crude law of social relations seemed to be the 
assumption that each of these future studies rested on (see Deutsch, 1980). This law 
became his baseline of his understanding of group dynamics. Deutsch reasoned that 
while his early theory is one that examine the effects of cooperative and competitive 
processes, through emphasizing the reciprocal hypothesis underlying the crude law of 
social relations, this relational emphasis could provide insights into the condition that 
give rise to cooperative and competitive processes. 
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It was Judd (1978) who looked more critically at the relationship between types 
of interdependence and psychological orientation. He came to the conclusion that the 
perceptions of similarity/dissimilarity of positions induced by one's orientation 
(competitive or cooperative) to a conflict will be mediated by conceptual changes in the 
way we look at the issue under dispute. Deutsch (1985) believes that this conclusion 
can be deduced from his crude law of social relations. He concludes: "Thus, 
cooperation induces and is induced by a perceived similarity in beliefs and attitudes, a 
readiness to be helpful, openness in communication, trusting and friendly attitudes, 
sensitivity to common interests and de-emphasis of opposed interests, and orientation 
toward enhancing mutual power rather than power differences, and so on." (p. 69 -70). 
The key question is: psychologically, why is this so? While Deutsch began with 
an emphasis on the psychological and social forces underlying cooperative and 
competitive behavior, he became more and more focused on initiating situated 
conditions of cooperation, especially through his work on conflict resolution and 
systems of distributive justice. His concepts of cathexis, inducability and 
substitutability were never further developed beyond the initiall949 paper. Rather the 
focus turned to the dynamic relationship between the intrapersonal orientations and 
situations of interdependence. 
In summary Deutsch's work picked up on Lewin's emphasis on interdependence 
of group members in his definition of a group. In his work, Deutsch developed a 
structural analysis of interdependence through which different interdependent situations 
could be described, the basic foundation being promotive (positive) and contrient 
(negative) interdependence. These situations were said to induce specific intrapersonal 
orientations for individuals, which describes an individuals psychological orientation in 
that instance. Thus, by and large, the real value of Deutsch's analysis is a descriptive 
account of individual's pursuit of goals and outcomes, which defines a number of 
taxonomies of interdependence and typologies of individuals. Interdependence of 
individuals remained the key foundation of his work. Deutsch's work, like others, was 
further influenced by game theory, t* strategic analysis of outcome interdependence, 
which will be reviewed in the next section. 
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2.4 Game theory and interdependence 
While at the New York University, Deutsch was influenced by Raiffa and Luce 
(1957), who were working on game theory. Initially, through Deutsch's work on trust, 
he was intrigued by the prisoner dilemma game. The influence of game theory on what 
came to be known as the social dilemma paradigm will be discussed in this section, as it 
has had a significant impact on this field of research. As Deutsch states: 
Game theory has made a major contribution to social scientists by formulating in 
mathematical terms a problem which is central to the various social sciences: the problem of 
conflict of interests .... its core emphasis [being] that the parties in conflict have interdependent 
interest, that their fates are woven together. (1980, p. 61) 
For interdependence theorists game theory represented a formal and systematic approach 
to the study of conflict of interests, wherein individuals are instrumentally outcome 
interdependent, and this structure can be systematically specified and manipulated. 
Game theory was developed to address the problem of conflicts of interest, 
particularly in the areas of economics, sociology and political science (see Luce & Raiffa, 
1957, p. 1). However, given its breadth of appeal and psychologists' long interest in 
conflicts of interest (see Sumner, 1906), it was subsequently adopted by psychologists. 
Today game theory underlies the contemporary understanding of social cooperation, as 
highlighted in that first quote presented in Chapter 1 (Boyd and Richardson, 1991, p. 
111 ), wherein cooperation is explicitly defined in terms of game theory, specifically as 
cost benefit analysis for individuals. 
Game theory intrigued Deutsch and others both methodologically and 
theoretically. Methodologically, the matrices the theory specified became a very useful 
tool for studying the interdependence properties of dyadic relationships. Theoretically, it 
buttressed Deutsch's view that cooperative and competitive relations often co-existed--
seldom would one find an instance of pure competition or cooperation. With the similar 
theoretical focus on outcome interdependence, the gaming matrices became an 
influential experimental device as they facilitated a precise definition of the reward 
structure that accrued to the individuals and thus the nature of the interdependence. 
Deutsch (1969) was quick to argue that not only could gaming research contribute to 
our understanding of dyadic relationships but also intergroup relations at the 
international level. 
Game theory is based on the observation that individuals are often in situations 
of interdependence, wherein their outcome preferences are controlled not only by each 
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individual, but also by interdependent others. Thus, conflicts of interest are inevitable, as 
individuals seldom have consistent unilateral control over their own outcomes and must 
compete with others to sustain and develop their interests. It was the authors' aim to 
devise a theory to account for this long standing social problem. 
Their work was guided by a mathematical approach introduced by von Neumann 
(1928) which led to the classic book: Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (von 
Neuman & Morgenstern, 1944). The grounding premise of this theoretical approach is 
the minmax theorem, wherein von Neuman demonstrates mathematically that within any 
one situation there is always a rational course of action for games of two players, 
assuming that each individual is motivated to maximize their own outcomes. Given this, 
the principle then is that each rational player will act to maximize the minimum (hence 
the minmax principle) payoff she or he would accrue, assuming the other player would 
be acting rationally and be doing the same. In other words, each player expects the 
worst from the other and, as such, is then motivated to maximize what they are left with. 
The solution to these games has been called the saddlepoint (Rapoport, 1966) --the 
point where risk to the individual is minimized. 
Like other theories of social exchange, game theory is based on the underlying 
assumption that individuals are motivated to maximize their expected utility. As such not 
only is the outcome, per se, taken into account but the expected utility of that outcome 
as well. In other words, each outcome is assigned a probability. Taken together, game 
theory is based on a number of specific assumptions, derived from the mathematical 
theorem that underlies it; specifically, the assumptions are: (l) that each individual is 
striving to maximize their respective utility, (2) in a known (specified) situation, (3) 
where each individual's preference is constant, and (4) the precise value of each player's 
preference is known by all players. There are of course many instances where the precise 
value of each player's outcomes are not known by all players. Thus, as the authors 
correctly point out, this analysis accounts for only "one formulation of a class of conllicts 
of interest" (Luce & Raiffa, 1957, p. 5); more precisely, the theorem on which the theory 
is based only applies to zero-sum games, that is situations of pure competition where 
players' interests are completely opposed. This coincides with Borel's papers of the 
1920's, which pre-dated von Neuman's work. Borel, a mathematician, understood the 
minmax theorem only as a special case; in general, he believed it to be false. Despite 
this, as von Neuman intended, the theorem became the cornerstone of a theory of human 
conllict, its aim to explain any type of conflict of interest, and it was first applied to the 
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field of economics -- situations of zero-sum. In the context of the strategic ideology of 
the atomic age, the theoretical premises of game theory took root in a deluge of research 
and practice (see Poundstone, 1993). It was hailed as "one of the major scientific 
achievements of the first half of the twentieth century" (see Poundstone, 1993, p. 33) 
and lay the foundation for thousands of future studies using the gaming matrices. At the 
same time, the work of Nash can not be forgotten, for it was the establishment of Nash 
equilibrium that opened up the theory from its restriction to zero-sum games (see 
Poundstone, 1993). In a series of remarkable papers, Nash was able to mathematically 
establish the conditions under which equilibrium arises in the game, that is when each 
·player's strategy choice is a best reply to the strategy choice of the other players. In 
other words, any pair of strategies with the property that each player maximizes his or 
her payoff given what the other player does is called a Nash equilibrium. Thus, all 
solutions are necessarily Nash equilibriums. 
These mathematical premises now underlies a large body of work in the social 
sciences. Interestingly, Luce and Raiffa (1957, p.3) thought it was worth emphasizing 
that the theory is a product of mathematics and not the empirical sciences, noting that: 
Game theory does not, and probably no mathematical theory could, encompass all the diverse 
problems which are included in our brief characterization of conflict of interest. (p. 3) 
The matrices, despite this, are now well established in the literature, defining the 
situational properties of interdependence and subsequently the development of 
transformational analysis (as will be seen in the following section). The individual payoff 
structure is the primary unit of analysis, with collusion and conciliation between 
individuals being the two principle modes of resolving conflicts of interest (see Luce and 
Raiffa, Chapter 1 ). Many different structural matrices were developed to define a 
taxonomy of situations that ran from situations of pure cooperation to pure competition, 
accounting for a large class of what are now called mixed-motive games. 
Schelling (1960), an economist, first introduced the term "mixed-motive game" 
to define a situation in which there is a clear motive to compete (defect) and a clear 
motive to cooperate, hence the phrase "mixed-motive." The essence of the choice is to 
either act in term of individual self-interest (defect) or in terms of collective interest 
(cooperate). The dilemma is based on the fact that individual rationality leads to 
collective irrational behavior, and vice versa. If each could trust the other to cooperate, 
both would be better off; however, it is taken as a given that individuals will maximize 
their utility gains and, as a general principle, can not be trusted. Thus, the social dilemma 
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is conceptualized. It was this situational dilemma, specifically the prisoner's dilemma, 
through which Deutsch (1960) initially studied trust and motivation. Discussion of the 
specific properties of some of the prominent situational gaming matrices will now follow. 
Besides these matrix games, other games were developed in this tradition: Vinacke and 
Arkotf (1957) developed a three-person coalition game; Siegel and Fouraker's (1960) 
"buyer-seller" negotiation game; Deutsch and Krauss's (1960) "Acme-Bolt trucking 
game" has become well known; as well as, Deutsch's (1973) "allocation" game. 
Together they define an entire genre of research into the strategic analysis of social 
relations. 
2.4.A Situational matrices of game theory 
Each matrix game represents a situation in which two players make one of two 
choices; hence a two-by-two matrix (see Figure 2.1 ). The two horizontal rows represent 
the two strategies available to one of the players, while the two vertical columns 
represent the two strategies that are available to the other player. Thus, two players, 
making two choices, results in a matrix of four cells in which the outcomes to each 
player are represented. By convention, the row player's payoff is given first in each of 
the four cells. 
Rapoport and Guyer (1966; see also Rapoport, 1974; Rapoport, Guyer & David, 
1976; for a full classification of these games) catalogued all the simple games, in terms of 
their respective ordinal rankings of the four outcome cells, determining 78 distinct 2 x 2 
games, believing, as others continue to, that the 2 x 2 dyad is the most important and 
common form of individuals' interaction with others. James (1953) argued that 73% of 
naturally formed groups are dyads (see also Rusbult and Van Lange, 1996). There have 
been a number of conceptually dominant objective interdependence structures used to 
elicit a particular social decision-making environment. Rapoport has distinguished four 
archetypal games: prisoner's dilemma, chicken, leader and hero games. 
Below arc the ordinal outcome matrices for the first three of the four games that 
Rapoport highlighted. These three games are also the most established games in the 
literature. The trust game - a so called "trivial" but nonetheless well established game 
(see McClintock & Liebrand, 1988) is also outlined. It should be noted that one defining 
feature of these classic games is that each of them is symmetrical in structure, in other 
words the outcome contingencies for both players are the same. There are of course 
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many situations in which outcomes would not be symmetrical for each player. In the 
ordinal rankings below, "1" denotes the least preferred outcome and "4" the most 
preferred outcome. Beside each ordinal matrix, a typical example of an outcome matrix, 
which specifies the absolute outcome values, is also given. 
Below (Figure 2.1) is the structure for the Chicken game. In this case, for Player 
one (the row player) the preferential ranking order is: DC> CC >CD> DD. Liebrand 
(1983) uses the following analogy: two teenagers are in a fast car, moving along but 
with no hands on the steering wheel. The chicken is the person who first takes the 
steering wheel. Both prefer not to be the chicken (2, 4 and 4, 2); however, if they both 
chose not to grab the wheeL both are worse off (1, 1) than if both simultaneously took 
the wheel (3, 3). Thus, either player must unilaterally shift towards loss to win. This 
dilemma has also been used to characterize the nuclear stalemate of the cold war; as, 
temporally, the dilemma increases over time and is often only solved at the last possible 
moment. 
A: Chicken game Player two 
Column player 
Choice C Choice D Exam vie 
Choice C 3,3 2,4 40,40 20, 50 
Player one 
Row player 
Choice D 4,2 1, 1 50,20 0, 0 
Figure 2.1. Ordinal payoff structure and example for a chicken game 
In a Leadership game (Figure 2.2) the preferences are ranked for Player one such 
that: DC> CD> CC > DD. The game can be characterized simply as follows: two 
canoeists are paddling down stream in heavy water enjoying the negotiation of the rapids 
(2, 2), when a jagged submerged rock appears just below the surface. One paddler 
quickly negotiates the obstruction and they continue down stream, excited by their 
success (4, 3; 3, 4); however, if they both suddenly corrected for the rock, they would 
have swung too wide and capsized (1, 1 ). This dilemma has been used to characterize 
the importance of leader-follower relationships. 
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B: Leader game Pla)'er two 
Column player 
Choice C Choice D Example 
Choice C 2,2 3,4 20,20 40,50 
Pla)'er one 
Row player 
Choice D 4,3 1, 1 50,40 0, 0 
Figure 2.2. Ordinal payoff structure and example for a leader game 
This classic game, the trust game (Figure 2.3), has the following preference 
ranking: CC > DC> DD > CD. Liebrand (1983) again provides an anecdote: Two long 
distance runners are competing to win a prestigious marathon. While both would prefer 
an honest race ( 4, 4), one would take a stimulatory drug if the other did (3, I; 1, 3), so 
not to decrease their chances of winning. However, if they both take it, both are worse 
off (2, 2) than if they chose not to take it. Thus, as the name of the dilemma denotes, a 
conceptual understanding of trust is developed. 
C: Trust game 
Pla)'er one 
Row player 
Choice C 
Choice D 
Player two 
Column player 
Choice C Choice D 
4,4 1, 3 
3, 1 2,2 
Figure 2.3. Ordinal payoff structure and example for a trust game 
Lxample 
50,50 0, 40 
40, 0 20,20 
Finally, in a prisoner's dilemma game (Figure 2.4) the payoffs are symmetrical 
and for Player one the preferential ranking order is: DC> CC > DD > CD. The 
anecdote typically used to describe this situation is the classic case of the district 
attorney, who has two well known felons in custody for a minor crime and is tempting 
them to confess to a major crime. If neither confesses both will get a lighter sentence (2, 
2 above). If one confesses, and the other doesn't, the one that confesses will get off for 
turning state's evidence while the other will get a heavy sentence (1, 4; 4, 1 ). However if 
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they both confess the payoff is worse (3, 3) than if they both kept quiet (2, 2). It was 
Albert Tucker of the RAND corporation who dubbed this the prisoner's dilemma game, 
using this anecdote to explain the situation. This is also explained in terms of the classic 
example of a replenishable resource dilemma (see Chapter 3). 
D: Prisoner's dilemma game 
Player one 
Row player 
Choice C 
Choice D 
Player two 
Column player 
Choice C Choice D 
3,3 1, 4 
4, 1 2,2 
Example 
40, 40 20,50 
50,20 20,20 
Figure 2.4. Ordinal payoff structure and example for a prisoner's dilemma game 
The first three games - chicken, leader and trust - are characterized by the fact 
that a player achieves a greater individual payo!I by unilaterally shifting to another 
strategy when both have been playing the joint minmax strategy; however, if both shift 
simultaneously both suffer considerable loss in outcomes. The opposite is the case in the 
prisoner's dilemma game: a single unilateral shift decreases ones own outcome (and 
increases that of the other player), while a simultaneous shift increases the gains for both. 
The prisoner's dilemma game defines the most intense situation of the mixed motive 
games and has received the most attention in the literature (see Komorita & Barth, 1985; 
Orbell & Dawes, 1981). 
Game theory is a theory of social exchange, the basic assumption being that "all 
social interaction involves a bargaining relationship in which people exchange rewards 
and cost (punishment)" (Kormita and Parks, 1994, p. 3). The most well developed and 
influential theory of social exchange in social psychology has been interdependence 
theory (Kelley 1991; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). As Horwitz and 
Rabbie (1982) state: "Kelley and Thibaut have undertaken the most systematic effort to 
date to develop a theory of social interdependence" (p. 262). This is still true in 1997. 
For these interdependence theorists, just as in game theory, social interaction is 
conceptualized and operationalized as a matrix of outcomes and is based on the 
assumption that individuals are motivated to maximize their own outcomes or utility, 
which may also include the outcomes of others. However, given that individuals are 
socially, and thus functionally, interdependent the amount of control an individual has 
over their own outcome varies. 
2.5 Kelley and Thibaut 's interdependence theory 
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Kelley and Thibaut's interdependence theory is based on the structure and 
properties of a 2 x 2 AN OVA model, which is said to define the nature of interpersonal 
dyadic relationships. Further, the dyad is believed to be the predominant form of 
individuals' social interactions and relationships (see James, 1953), acting as a 
cornerstone through which other forms of social relationships are understood. Thus, 
while the theory is formally based on this simple 2 x 2 model, its principles are applied 
to interactions within larger groups of interdependent individuals, as well as to 
intergroup behaviour. By and large, this is based on the work of Hamburger (1979), 
who has shown through formal mathematics that the logic of dyadic relationships can be 
applied to groups, specifically aggregates of individuals. In summary, the theory 
defines an interaction between individuals, in which they pursue control over the 
maximization of their own outcomes (or payoffs) within the structure and function of 
interdependence. 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) have put much of their work 
into defining a theory of interdependence processes: first in their book The psychology 
of groups (1959); and then in the revised conceptualization Interpersonal relations: A 
theory of interdependence (1978). Working from a Lewinian tradition, they 
endeavoured to distil the essence of interdependence from Lewin's work. Today, many 
would argue for their success in this endeavour, as this theoretical position now defines 
the dominant position in the representation of the situation in social psychology, 
influencing research on topics from stereotyping to social cooperation. Indeed their 
analysis has now influenced an entire tradition in psychology. 
Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) first book outlines a theory of the nature of 
interpersonal situations, presenting a structure for understanding patterns of 
interdependence in the form of 2 x 2 matrices. The book develops a theoretical 
taxonomy of situations of interdependence, classifying the nature of interdependence in 
terms of four underlying properties -- degree of dependence, mutuality of dependence, 
correspondence of outcomes, and basis for dependence (to be reviewed in the next 
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section). The subsequent revision of the theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) outlines how 
this objective structure of interdependence, as defined by the given outcome matrix, is 
transformed into an effective, or subjective, matrix through transformational processes of 
individual motivational dispositions. Transformational processes are understood as 
intrapersonal aspects of the individual that transform the nature of the perceived 
interdependence structure. Kelley (1984) describes the development of these two 
domains of analysis as shift to include the domain of the individual within the domain of 
the situation. Thus, to account for the subjective understanding of the given 
interdependence structure they "explicitly moved the boundary of [the] analysis back into 
the realm of individual psychology" (Kelley, 1984, p. 5). This is similar to Deutsch's 
development of social value orientations. As Kelley (1984, p. 6; see Figure 2.5 below) 
outlines the early theory iocused on the outcome matrix to examine interdependence 
structure of interpersonal interaction (which occurred through some unspecified 
individual antecedents); while the later theory included transformation processes that 
arose from an interpersonal motivational disposition. These transformational processes 
turn a given matrix into a subjective (or effective) matrix and again the interaction 
pattern is the unit of analysis. 
1959 
1978 
Individual Interpersonal 
(Antecedents) Outcome Matrix 
Given Matrix --- Transformation --- Effective Matrix 
(Interpersonal 
Disposition) 
Interaction 
Interaction 
Figure 2.5. Description of the developments of the domains of interdependence theory, 
to include the domain of the person and the domain of the situation. 
Thus, like Deutsch's theory, Kelley and Thibaut's interdependence theory emphasizes 
two underlying aspects of social behaviour: outcome interdependence and interpersonal 
dispositions. Kelley and Thibaut's analysis of the structural properties of 
interdependence, which interestingly also includes the matrices of game theory, will now 
be reviewed. A review of transformational process of individuals will then follow. 
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2.5./\ Structural properties of interdependence 
Thibaut and Kelley (1959) state: 
The theory that we propose seems on balance to be primarily a functionalistic one. The central 
concern is with the solutions that must be found to problems created by interdependency ... 
[assuming] that if we can achieve a clear understanding of the dyad we can subscguently extend 
our understanding to encompass the problems of larger and more complex social relationships 
(p. 5-6). 
The structural properties of the matrix that they develop provide a technical instrument 
for the strategic analysis of outcome interdependence. They argued that the 2 x 2 matrix 
simplified the awkwardness of Lewin's conceptualization of interdependence by 
decomposing the sources of influence over an individual's outcome into systematic 
structural components. Fundamentally, interdependence theory is a theory of power and 
control over quality of outcomes to an individual, with the central assumption being that 
individuals are motivated to maximize rewards and minimize costs. Thus, as with game 
theory, it is a theory of utility maximization by individuals. 
Game theory's influence is apparent; however, it should be noted that there were 
some differences in the early conceptions of game theory and interdependence theory. 
Generally, Thibaut and Kelley (1959, p. 24- 30) argued that their matrices were more 
dynamic and less static than the game theorists'. Specifically, Thibaut and Kelley (1959) 
were inspired by the fact that their given matrices could be systematically constructed to 
reflect relevant social influences in instances of social exchange, while game theoretical 
matrices were theoretically determined. In fact the theory's initial development was 
influenced more by the structural properties of the analysis of variance model than game 
theoretical models. The constructive process of the matrices will be discussed below. 
However, before going on, it is important to outline interdependence theory's 
conceptual understanding of how group goals relate to individual goals and outcomes, 
which will thus provide a basis for their understanding of cooperative behaviour (see 
Thibaut and Kelley, 1959, Chapter 14). Basically the ontology of perceived group 
membership develops as follows: (1) individual acceptance of a group goal; (2) 
perceptions of positive interdependence (or common dependence/predicament) to 
increase individual outcomes; (3) motivation to cooperate; ( 4) perception of group 
membership through common locomotion towards the group goal. The parallels with 
Deutsch's theoretical understanding of cooperation (see Chapter 2) are evident in this 
conceptual analysis. The crux of this line of argument is: As individuals' fates in society 
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are interwoven, individuals pursuing common goals will perceive positive 
interdependence with others, and thus cooperate. It is because individuals cooperate in 
pursuit of common goals that group membership is perceived. The individual is primary, 
the group secondary, to this conceptual analysis of interdependence and cooperation. 
Specific defining elements of interdependence will now be reviewed, beginning with the 
structural components of interdependence and followed by the elements that define the 
classification of patterns of interdependence. 
2.5.A1 Components of interdependence: Power over outcomes 
Interdependence theory, as stated above, is a theory of power and control over 
the outcomes that accrue to individuals. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) conceptualized the 
power dynamic of individuals as follows: "Generally, we can say that the power of A 
over B increases with A's ability to affect the quality of outcomes attained by B" (p.101). 
In developing this theoretical line: "The approach ... takes as its independent variables 
that possibilities for reciprocal control possessed by the members of a collectivity. [Such 
that] only that control mediated by the ability to affect another person's outcomes is 
considered" (p. 4, emphasis mine). Three components of control (power over outcomes) 
are conceptualized, paralleling the main and interaction effects of a 2 x 2 analysis of 
variance: (1) reflexive control -- RC; (2) fate control -- FC; and (3) behavior control --
BC. The figure and discussion below aims to ill!lstrate the relationship between these 
constructs. 
Player one 
Row player 
Player two 
Column player 
Choice C Choice D 
Choice C 20, * 8 * 
' 
Choice D 15, * -2, * 
Column Means 17.5 3.0 
Row Means 
14.0 
6.5 
Figure 2.6. A 2 x 2 outcome matrix: two players making one of two choices. The 
outcomes of player one are displayed, as are the row and column means. 
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The 2 x 2 matrix presents the following (see Figure 2.6): two players (one 
and two) making two choices ("C" or "D"), resulting in four cells in which the outcomes 
to each player are represented. By convention, the row player's payoff is given first in 
each cell. Note the parallels with the game theoretical model. This example is taken 
from Rapoport and Guyer (1970) and is called a threat game. For the sake of simplicity 
only the row player's outcomes are illustrated; the same pattern would follow for the 
column player. 
Using the outcomes specified in Figure 2.6, each of the three types of control can 
be defined by a matrix derivative (as seen in Figure 2.7, below). Re11exive control 
ref1ects the degree of control an individual has over their own outcome (i.e., the main 
effect of the row players action- choice "C" or "D"- on their own outcome); player 1 's 
RC = 7.5 (dilTerence of the row means: 14.0- 6.5). Fate control rellects the degree of 
control the partner has over the outcome of the other (i.e. the main e!'fect of the column 
player's actions on the outcome of the row player); player 1's FC = 14.5 (dillerence in 
the column means: 17.5 - 3.0). Behavior control ref1ects the joint inlluence of both 
players acting together (i.e. the interaction effect of both players on the row player's 
actions); player 1 's BC = -2.5 (essentially the variance not accounted for in each cell: 20 
- 7.5- 14.5, for the top left cell). These numbers, parameters of control, are of course 
not absolutes but are relative to each other and to the other player's levels of control. 
For example, if Player 2's levels of controls were: RC =- 6.5, FC = 15.5 and BC = 1.5 
(compared respectively to 7.5, 14.5, -2.5 for Player 1), both players would have more 
control over each other's outcomes than they do over their own. At the same time, 
Player 1 does have more control over their outcome than player two; while, Player 2 has 
more behavior control. 
Rellexive control 
7.5, * 
0 * , 
7.5, * 
0, * 
Fate control 
14.5, * 0, * 
14.5, * 0, * 
Behavior control 
-2.0, * 0.5, * 
0.5, * -2.0, * 
Figure 2. 7. Analysis of variance for the components of reflexive, fate and behavior 
control for player one's outcomes. 
This analysis is the basis for outlining a number of power strategies to gain 
control over an individual's outcome. Thus, through the use of these three components, 
interdependence theory is able to provide a unique analysis for each pattern of 
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interdependence. The resultant pattern of each matrix describes the correspondence 
(Do each person's outcomes correlate positively?) and concordance (How well do the 
three components of control mesh together to achieve favourable outcomes?) of 
outcomes in terms of their relative magnitudes. For a situation to be characterized as 
one of interdependence, both players must have some sort of control over the other's 
outcomes, such that there is mutual dependence -- interdependence -- rather than 
unilateral dependence -- dependence. Interdependence exists only when there is a mutual 
basis of fate and/or behavioral control, and that the control evaluations are differential 
for the two players. 
2.5 .A2 Classification of patterns of interdependence 
Four properties are used to classify patterns of interdependence within the 
domain of simple 2 x 2 relationships: (1) mutuality of dependence; (2) degree of 
dependence; (3) basis of dependence and; ( 4) correspondence of outcomes. Thus, while 
the components of interdependence determine the pattern of interdependence - in essence 
construct the composition of the matrix - the properties are used to classify and 
understand the nature of the relationship of interdependence. The properties, and how 
they relate to the components of interdependence, are presented in the revised version of 
interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) and provide a comprehensive typology 
of the domain of interdependent relationships. The property of correspondence of 
outcomes relates directly to whether there is commonality or conflict of interest to 
individuals in situations of interdependence, and this property relates directly back to 
combinations of the three components of control (see Chapter 4 and 5, Kelley & Thibaut, 
1978). Kelley and Thibaut (1978) argue that mapping the domain of matrix games in 
terms of these four properties is a practical strategy for tapping into patterns of a 
potentially infinite array of interdependent relationships, particularly as the matrices vary 
continuously rather than discretely. In their words: 
[The] approach is to consider the domain of all possible patterns as a large terrain to be 
explored while the salient features and landmarks along the particular trails followed are noted. 
Because we can select these trails in a systematic manner and because the terrain has regular 
features, we can more or less fill in the unexplored portions of the map hy extrapolation from 
our limited observations. (p. 78) 
To this end, a taxonomy of situations of interdependence is derived in terms of four 
properties: Mutuality of dependence -are actors mutually or unilaterally dependent?; 
Degree of dependence - to what degree arc each of the actors dependent on one 
another?; Bases of dependence: is the dependence based on fate and/or behavior 
control?; Correspondence of outcomes: the degree to which the outcomes of the two 
actors correspond. Rusbult and Van Lange (1996) provide a recent review of the 
empirical support for these properties, largely in terms of interpersonal relationships; 
however, a review of the literature related to correspondence of outcomes will now be 
included, as this property relates specifically to Deutsch's (1949a, 1949b) work on 
cooperation and competition. 
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The degree of correspondence is defined by a continuum of correspondence, 
ranging from perfectly correspondent outcomes -- situations of pure coordination -- to 
perfectly noncorrespondent (conflicting) outcomes-- situations of pure conllict, as in 
zero sum games. This distinction is congruent with Deutsch's (1949a) conceptualization 
of promotive (cooperative) versus contrient (competitive) interdependence. ;\s it has 
been recognized that situations of pure cooperation and competition are rare (Deutsch, 
1949; Rapoport eta!., 1976), the vast majority of research using outcome matrices has 
incorporated mixed motives games; that is, situations in which the interests of players 
partially coincide, such as in the classic prisoner's dilemma. Deutsch (1982) posits that 
this mixed-motive dimension of social structure is "so fundamental to social life that one 
would assume a well-developed innate predisposition to develop abstract cognitive 
orientations to help an individual define quickly whether 'what's going on here? is 'good' 
for him or 'bad' for him" (p. 27). This observation relates to the development of 
interpersonal orientations that will be discussed shortly. For Kelley and Thibaut, it is the 
perceived correspondence of outcomes within the situation that defines the positive or 
negative structure of interdependence, which will thus determine if the relationship will 
be one of congeniality or conflict, that is one of working with or against another 
individual. For example, non-correspondence has been shown to elicit distrust and 
hostile attitudes towards the other (e.g., Gottman & Krokoff, 1989; Surra & Longstreth, 
1990) and Kelley and Grzelak (1972) have shown that correspondence of outcomes and 
cooperation are positively correlated. 
Interdependence theory can be summarized up to the 1978 book in the following 
way. The objective structure of the situation is conceptualized as a matrix, constructed 
from three components of control that each actor has over their respective outcomes: 
rellexive, fate, and behavioral control. Through the matrix, the correspondence and 
concordance of outcomes to each individuals is defined, thus providing a basis for 
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understanding the nature of interdependent relationships. The theory classifies patterns 
of interdependence in terms of four properties: (1) mutuality, (2) degree and (3) basis of 
dependence, and ( 4) correspondence of outcomes. On this basis interdependence theory 
systematically defines a taxonomy of dyadic interdependent relationships. 
Kelley (1984b, p. 10) set out three further goals for interdependence theory. The 
first was to develop a taxonomy of interaction scenarios, generated through mapping the 
taxonomy of situations onto the taxonomy of interpersonal dispositions (transformational 
analysis, reviewed below). By an interaction scenario Kelley means: "a particular 
sequence of interaction between two persons" (p. 10). The aim is to build an "atlas of 
scenarios." 
The second goal is to develop transition lists, such that "there is a blending of 
game theoretic description with Lewinian topological description. [The result being that) 
two persons' interdependence in their locomotion through the topological structure is 
clearly specified by the list method, something that Lewin's life space analysis had not 
accomplished" (Kelley, 1984b, p.ll). Kelley's (1984a) work on transition lists 
essentially replaces the outcome matrix with a set of lists that read like a set ofif-then 
commands. 
The list method substitutes for the outcome matrix a set of lists, each of which specifies each 
person's options ... and the consequence for each person of each combination of their respective 
selection among their options. (p. 960) 
The lists specify how individual's actions (choices) (a) effect subsequent outcomes; thus, 
a temporal dimension is added, such that different sequences of choices and their 
respective outcomes (and consequences) for each individual can be compared. This 
development was to overcome the static nature of the theory, given that patterns of 
interdependence would constantly be changing and evolving. However, it is assumed 
that interdependence is maintained in this sequencing of events. As Kelley (1984) states: 
The method assumes that people are interdependent not only in how they control their own and 
each other's immediate outcomes, but also in their movement through a network of 
interdependence situations .... [T]he list method retains the analysis of outcome control made 
possible by matrix analysis and combines it with analysis of control over the sequential and 
temporal course of action. (p. 960) 
The third goal was to develop the total set of human tendencies; that is, for example, 
tendencies towards balance and dissonance reduction as originally outlined in Kelley and 
Thibaut (1978, p. 327-328). 
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Throughout these further developments, the conceptual emphasis on the situation 
is increasingly apparent (see Kelley, 1983, 1984a, 1984b, 1991, 1995) for Kelley asserts 
that: "Interdependence theory is ... a type of theory that is essential if social psychology 
is to be truly "social" and focus on interpersonal process" (1994, abstact, p.l7). Thus 
the theory now emphasizes the social over the psychological aspects of social 
psychology, becoming a theory of the situational dynamics of individuals. For example, 
Kelley (1991) proposes that the person (P) interacts with what is now calls a "geo-
behavioral" environment -- previously called the objective matrix. Kelley then restricts 
his analysis to this "geo-behavioral" domain, as it is asserted that we can assess the 
achievements of dyadic relationships through observing the adequacy of each set of 
behavior as solutions to the problems posed by the geo-behavioral environment (as first 
denoted by Koflka, 1935, see Leeper, 1943). Kelley (1991) now states that "Thibaut 
and I obviously departed in a major way from Lewin's use of the life space" (1991, p. 
220). However, he believes that this work contributes to and builds on the work of 
Lewin through his (and Thibaut 's) analysis of the geo-behavioral environment, while 
Lewin proposed the analysis of the person. Thus, the situation has become the 
cornerstone of Kelley's (and Thibaut's) approach to the analysis of group life. 
Kelley (1995) maintains this view in his recent address advising a "return to the 
'situation' as the core concept of social psychology" (p. KN2), and hence proposes a 
theory of situations. In keeping with the three components that Lewin specified - the 
person, the situation and the behavior - the anyalysis now focuses on the interaction 
between the environment (E) and each person (P1), (P2), etc. The analysis is one of 
abstract individuals interacting within a common geographic environment. It is Kelley's 
hope that his comprehensive framework is able to define "all possible" situations, "all 
possible" scenarios and thus account for all success and failures of interpersonal 
behavior. For he believes that this AN OVA model of interdependence "has implications 
for how people "should" process the information, i.e., for how the complete patterns 
should logically be analyzed to get their inherent, distal meanings" (p. KN12), and thus 
bring understanding and practice to the social world of interdependence. Thus, the early 
working assumption of Kelley and Thibaut (1978) continues to hold: 
It is our working assumption, then, that the total set of outcome matrices-- those correctly and 
those incorrectly understood --account for all of social behavior. They account for everything 
that is or can be learned about social interdependence. Thus, in their total effect they are 
responsible for both the successes and the failures in social interaction. (p. 5) 
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In summary, interdependence theory takes a strategic problem solving approach 
to the domain of interdependent relationships between individuals, producing a 
conceptual taxonomy of interpersonal relationships to provide answers to the problem of 
interdependence. The unit of analysis is the individual, and the individual solves his or 
her problems through coordinated or joint solutions (see Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). As a 
theory of social exchange, solutions are based on exchanges between individuals or 
coordination of individual activity. It is a functional analysis of the adaptation of 
individuals to situations, through which all social phenomena can be understood. As 
Kelley and Thibuat state: 
Adaptation to situations of social interdependence is viewed as the source of both social norms 
and individual rules. Adaptation is seen to result from multiple processes. In his own direct 
experience in interdependent relationships each individual has opportunities to learn useful 
rules, including both the prosocial, moral concepts and the more egocentric, practical rules of 
thumb for "getting along with people." This experience is often preceded by and accompanied 
by social instruction in the moral and practical aspects of social relationships, which involve 
both explicit teaching and the provision of exemplars of social behavior. (p. 319) 
Kelley and Thibaut (1978) mapped the domain of the situational taxonomy of 
interdependence and identify 22 distinctive situational matrices, as defined by unique 
combinations of the components and properties of interdependence. Interestingly, this 
list includes a few of the classic gaming matrices, such as chicken, hero, threat, 
maximizing difference, battle of the sexes and the prisoner's dilemma. For, despite the 
conceptual richness of the interdependence approach as a systematic research tool, game 
theory maintained an influential stance, both in terms of its influence on interdependence 
theory itself (see Kelley, 1991), but more particularly on the developments of social 
dilemma research (see Kormorita & Parks, 1994, for review) which will be developed in 
the next chapter. 
Despite the fact that interdependence represents the cornerstone of this approach, 
it was only moderately successful in predicting individuals' behavior. To address this, it 
was necessary for Kelley and Thibaut to develop a further explanatory construct, 
specifically transformational processes, to deal with the growing body of contentious 
work that questioned the strict rational actor model of strategic interdependence of 
individuals. Thus, taken together, interdependence theory, like Deutsch's understanding 
of cooperative behavior, understands behavior as a function of interdependence 
structures and transformational processes of individuals. The role of these processes in 
the theory will now be reviewed. 
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2.5.B Transformational processes of interdependent individuals 
Kelley and Thibaut (1978) understood the person as the causal agent through 
which transformation of the given matrix to the effective matrix occurs. Their analysis of 
transformational processes "examines the shifts in matrix pattern generated by applying 
various mathematical operations and sequential rules to certain given patterns" (p. 26). 
Again the analysis, like the situational determinants, is mathematically derived. 
However, this analysis of transformational process has always been secondary to the 
analysis of interdependence of individuals, but was deemed to be necessary to introduce 
as it was found that that: "There is no close causal nexus between the given matrix and 
the behavior it elicits" (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978, p. 17). However, Kelley and Thibaut 
(1978) make explicit that their interest lies with the matrices, which were thought to 
provide a "conceptual device for moving from the psychological and situational bases of 
interpersonal relations to the processes and structures characteristic of successful 
relationships and the conflict and disruption in the unsuccessful" (p.3). And it is argued 
that for any transformation of an individuals own outcomes, in terms of the given matrix, 
is represented and accounted for in the transformation. 
In general, it seems likely to us that the untransformed outcomes in the given matrix have, in 
some final or ultimate way, an impact on the interaction. They cannot, forever and completely, 
be disregarded even if only because certain of them are basic to the individual's hiological 
survival. ... We find it difficult not to believe that at some level he keeps an account of the 
consequences of such action for his own personal welfare (p. 23). 
Kelley and Thibaut's conceptual analysis of transformation was influenced by the 
work of McClintock and Messick (McClintock & McNee~ 1967; Messick & Thorngate, 
1967). Their transformational analysis assumes "that the person learns a repertory of 
transformational tendencies and their conditional application" (Kelley & Thihaut, 1978, 
p. 23); however, they continued to have misgivings about the value of this approach. 
This is reflected in Kelley's (1984) later work where he wondered "whether there might 
not be some more logical way to derive a list of transformations or dispositions" (p. 8). 
Kelley (1984) brings the analysis back to the taxonomy of situations, arguing that a 
"person reveals an interpersonal disposition by responding to the specific [given] 
situation "as if' it were a different one [given situation]" (p. 8). Given this, Kelley then 
argues that as the situational taxonomy accounts for all situations, "dispositions can only 
refer to shifts from one pattern to another. ... [Thus], the taxonomy of interpersonal 
dispositions is fully specified by the features of the taxonomy of interdependence 
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situations" (p. 9). Having noted this emphasis on the situational constraints on individual 
behaviour, the analysis of transformational processes will now be reviewed, as the 
analysis remains important to the social dilemma literature, specifically through its 
relation to game theory. 
Within the gaming research, Rapoport and Orwant (1962) and Rapoport and 
Chammah (1965) provided the first reviews of experimental games and conclude that 
game theory itself could not account for the fmdings of the research in this area (e.g., 
Deutsch,1960; see Rapoport, 1966; Colman, 1982). They point out that while game 
theory provides insight into the logical analysis of social interdependence and into 
rationality, given individual differences there was no room for the "psychological make-
up of the participants" (Rapoport, 1966, p. 206). It was believed that the 
transformational properties of individuals would account for the findings that game 
theory formally could not. 
It seemed evident that partners not only consider their individual outcomes, but 
also the outcomes of others -- in other words individuals do not always act in their 
immediate self interest (see Campbell, 1965; Caporeal et al., 1989; Griesinger & 
Livingston, 1973; MacCrimmon & Messick, 1976; McClintock & McNeel, 1967; 
Messick & Thorngate, 1967). Theoretically, an infinite number of transformations can 
be conceived; however; there exists a growing body of literature that accounts 
systematically for how different individuals process patterns of interdependence. 
Recall that, early in his work, Deutsch (1949b) argued that not all individuals 
are indifferent to the outcomes of others. He argued that the attitude that an individual 
has toward another would influence their response. Deutsch found support for his claim 
by inducing cooperative, competitive and individualistic orientations in subjects and, 
not surprisingly, subjects behaved as they were instructed to. 
Messick and McClintock (1968) proposed a motivational basis for choice 
behavior in experimental games. The point that they argued was that while it is assumed 
that subjects' aim is to maximize payoffs as defined by the given matrix, the findings 
clearly show that this has not been the case. Often the emphasis has been to gain more 
relative points (McClintock & McNell, 1966a, 1966b, 1966c, 1967; Messick & 
Thorngate, 1967). McClintock and Messick (1965) assumed three motivational 
orientations: joint gain -- cooperation ; relative gain -- competition ; and own gain --
individualism. As Messick and McClintock (1968) state: 
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Although there have been numerous conceptual departures from the theoretical considerations 
that gave rise to game research, comparable changes have not been evident in the experimental 
methods employed to study this behavior. The traditional method of displaying the inter-
dependence of outcomes in the form of a payoff matrix is not dictated by any psychological 
theory and would seem to be widely in use either because there are no alternative procedure for 
displaying such information or because of historical inertia. (p. 7) 
Decomposed games were thus conceptualized, using a methodology that maintained the 
properties of the payoff matrix, while ascertaining interpersonal motives (see also Pruitt, 
1967). Their aim was to differentiate clearly between motivation (goals) and strategy 
(instrumental acts). Using decomposed games (explained below), Messick and 
McClintock (1968) developed the first measures of these three orientations that Deutsch 
identified. In line with McClintock and Messick (1965) it was assumed" that subjects 
have motivational orientations to maximize the sum of the payoffs to both players (joint 
gain), the difference between their gain and that of the other (relative gain), and their 
own payoffs (own gain). These goals can be identified as cooperation, competition, 
and individualism, respectively" (p. 2). Many techniques have been used to 
differentiate between strategies and goals (see Kormorita & Parks, 1994, for a recent 
review). Decomposed games have been the dominant method used to determine goals 
of individuals (two are featured below in Figure 2.8). While there is still a choice 
between outcomes received by the players involved, there is no situational 
interdependence. In other words, players' choices are independent. 
Example 1: Choices (2) Example 2: Choices (3) 
X y X y z 
Pa:toffs Own 5 8 Pa:toffs Own 6 5 7 
Other 2 6 Other 6 1 4 
Figure 2.8. Two types of decomposed matrices used to discriminate between the 
motivational goals used by players. 
In Example 1, the player will choose "Y" both if the goal is to maximize own 
payoff (8 > 5) or maximize joint payoff (8 + 6 > 5 + 2), but will choose "X" if the goal 
is to maximize relative gain (5 - 2 > 8 - 6). In Example 2, a decomposed prisoner's 
dilemma (DPD) can discriminate more finally between the different social value 
orientations: a cooperator (joint gain) would choose "X" (6 + 6 > 7 + 4 > 5 + 1), a 
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competitor (relative gain) would choose" Y" (5 - 1 > 7- 4 > 6- 6), and a individualist 
(own gain) would choose" Z" (7 > 6 > 5). It is important to note that within each of 
the three goal specified categories the underlying premise remains in line with the game 
theoretical principle of outcome maximization. 
McClintock (1972) concluded that players do not assess the value of their 
outcome in absolute terms, but in relative terms, through comparing own self and 
other's outcomes. The empirical evidence suggested four outcome orientations: 
maximization of own gain (MaxOwn, or individualism); joint gain (MaxJoint, or 
cooperation); relative gain (MaxRel, or competition); and others gain (MaxOther, or 
altruism). From this point the question became: are there perhaps more than four social 
value orientations? In response, Griesinger and Livingston (1973) developed a model 
of eight archetypal orientations through completing the circle of the self-other outcome 
matrix. As can be seen in this diagram (Figure 2.9) own and other's outcomes are 
orthogonally opposed. 
Other's Outcome 
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:::> 
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Figure 2.9. A typology of outcome transformations (McClintock, 1978, p. 122, Fig.!). 
The three original social value orientations are situated on the vector plane, with 
cooperation and competition set on either side of individualism, the only orientation 
consistent with game theory's (and interdependence theory's) grounding assumption. 
With this development, social value orientations became a vector point on a continuum 
of possible orientations. Liebrand (1984; Liebrand & McClintock, 1988) developed the 
ring measure to substantiate this model, using a measure that consisted of a series of 24 
decomposed games. Using this instrument, a vector value is computed for each player 
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which places each individual on the self-other outcome plane, which subsequently 
relates to one of the eight orientations specified by this typology. Within this 
continuum of possible orientations, it is interesting to note that the majority of subjects 
are classified into the three original orientations that Deutsch began with (Kuhlman & 
Marshello, 1975; Liebrand & McClintock, 1988; McClintock, 1978; McClintock & 
Liebrand, 1988; McClintock & van Avermaet, 1982; Messick & McClintock, 1968; 
Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991 ). The measurement of social value orientations is now a 
dominant tool in the literature, the evidence indicating that, within any given context, 
the expression of a particular value orientation remains relatively stable over time 
(Kuhlman, Camac & Cunha, 1986; McClintock & Allison, 1989). This typology of 
transformational processes is applied in the same manner to the interdependence 
matrices. Taking, for example, the classic prisoner's dilemma game, Kelley and Thibaut 
(1978) proposed that the different transformational process act on the given matrices as 
follows: 
Prisoner's dilemma Player two (Column) 
Player one 
(Row) 
MaxOwn 
40,40 0,50 
50,0 20,20 
Choice C 
Choice C 40,40 
Choice D 50,0 
MaxDiff 
0, 0 -50, 50 
50, -50 0,0 
Choice D 
0,50 
20,20 
MaxJoint 
80,80 50,50 
50,50 40,40 
MaxOther 
40,40 50,0 
0,50 20,20 
Figure 2.10. Four transformational processes of the given prisoner's dilemma matrix. 
For each case, the resulting effective matrices results from the assumption that both 
players use the same transformation. 
Other transformational strategies have been suggested: minimize difference 
between outcomes (MinDiff); minimize other's outcomes (MinOther); minimize joint 
outcomes (MinJoint); minimize own outcomes (MinOwn). However, these strategies 
have been found to be less prevalent in the populations studied (see MacCrimmon and 
Messick, 1978). 
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A recent model (see Figure 2.11) shows the ontology of the transformational 
process involved as they relate to the matrices: the given, or objective, matrix being 
changed through transformational processes into an effective, or subjective, matrix --
which then predicts behavior. Recall that transformational process were introduced 
insofar as the outcome interdependence structure alone was only moderately successful 
in predicting individuals' behavior. Transformational processes of individuals account 
for the variance in behavior that the outcome structure could not. While social value 
orientations represent the most systematic development of transformational processes, 
and account for a large amount of variance within situations of interdependence, there 
are other transformational processes that have been developed in the literature as well. 
Given 
Matrix 
Preferences 
Transfonnation 
- of -Motivation 
T 
Emotional 
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Cognitive 
lnteq>retation.s 
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Individual 
Dispositio~s 
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Social Roles 
and Norms 
Effective 
Matrix - Behavior 
Preferences 
Figure 2.11. The proximal and distal determinants of transformation of motivation as 
they relate to the given and effective matrices. (Rusbult and van Lange, 1996, figure 5) 
As can be seen, as well as social value orientations there are a list of other 
factors and antecedents that inl1uence transformational processes. Rusbult and van 
Lange (1996) have proposed two motivational categories of transformational tendencies: 
distal and proximal. Distal determinants - interpersonal dispositions, relationship 
macro motives and social norms - are "embodied in stable interpersonal orientations" (p. 
41) and mirror earlier proposed distinctions (see Deutsch, 1982; Kelley & Thibaut, 
1978). Proximal determinants are understood as cognitive interpretations, emotional 
reactions and self-presentation. 
2.5.8.1 Distal determinants of transformational processes 
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Interpersonal Dispositions: The research on social value orientations represents 
the bulk of the research in this area. In terms of the three dominant social value 
orientations, on average, the empirical research finds that for a given sample: 30 - 40 % 
are individualists; 45 -55 % are cooperators; and 10- 20% are competitors (see 
Liebrand & van Run, 1985). And again, these interpersonal dispositions (orientations) 
arc found to be relatively stable over time (Kuhlam, Camac & Cunha,1986; McClintock 
& Allison, 1989; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). In this same line, these dispositions 
have also been found to be predictive of the probability of a particular response 
(Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). It has also been found 
that these orientations shape perceptual processes: cooperators expect cooperation from 
others; competitors expect competition from others; etc. Further, when these responses 
are not found in another player they are often viewed or looked upon with derogation 
and distrust. For example, competitors often view responses of cooperation as "stupid" 
or "sneaky". (e.g., Kelley & Stahelsk, 1970; van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). 
A number of further distinctions have been made between what can broadly be 
called instrumental (task-focused) and social-emotional (interpersonal) orientations: 
idiocentrics and allocentrics (Triandis, 1989); psychological masculinity and femininity 
(Bern, 1974); exchange and communal orientations (Murstein, Cerreta & MacDonald, 
1977). Other orientations that have been found to influence choice behavior have been 
trust and Machiavellianism (see Christie & Geis, 1970; Gurtman, 1992; Yamagishi, 
1992). 
Relationship-Specific Macromotives: As the classification denotes, these 
macromotives are relationship-specific interpersonal orientations (Holmes, 1981). 
Commitment level within a given situation is said to reflect possible underlying 
macromotives that represents three key features of the interdependent relationship: 
satisfaction level; quality of alternatives; and investment size (Rusbult, 1983). 
Commitment level has been found to be the strongest predictor of relationship stability 
and maintenance (Rusbult, 1983). In other words a broader macromotive links a person 
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to a particular relationship, such as the case in intimate, vocational and professional 
relationships. In these relationships, the evidence from the empirical work at the dyadic 
level has found that maintenance mechanisms are promoted (Johnson & Rusbult, 1989); 
poor behavior of a partner is accommodated rather than retaliated against (Rusbult et al., 
1991); and there is a willingness to make sacrifices (Van Lange, Rusbult, Drigotas & 
Arriaga, 1994). 
Social Norms: This is a third type of orientation that is influential at a social or 
group level. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) have acknowledged the importance of social 
norms in situations of interdependence. Norms are understood as " ... a uniform set of 
directions which the group induces on the forces which act on the members of the 
group" (Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950, p. 166). Norms are thought to be 
influential because there is observed regularity in behavior; appealing to norms can 
regulate behavior; and normative inconsistent behavior (norm-breaking) often is found to 
induce guilt. Many studies have examined the formal and informal normative systems 
that govern reward and resource distribution to group members (see Greenberg and 
Cohen, 1982; Insko et al., 1980; Lerner, 1980; McClintock & Keil, 1982; Mikula, 1983). 
Further, it has been found that norms govern situational procedural justice, specifically 
that normative social process is often as important as outcome distribution, per se, in 
social dilemmas of resource and reward allocations (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & 
Walker, 1975; Tyler & Degoey, 1994). 
In summary, the distal determinants make up a set of orientations that become 
increasingly abstract from the individual: interpersonal, to specific dyadic relationships, 
to general social norms. These distinctions parallel those made by Deutsch ( 1982) and 
Kelley and Thibaut (1978). The following review of proximal determinants, examines 
the underlying processing mechanisms in terms of the individual both as actor and 
observer: the actor engages in self-presentation mechanisms; the observer engages in 
meaning analysis in terms of cognitive interpretations and emotional reactions to the 
actor. These mechanisms are argued to contribute to the transformation of motivation. 
2.5.B.2 Proximal determinants of transformational processes 
The sense making or meaning analysis of behavior is explained in terms of the 
proximal determinants of transformational processes and relates to the control of 
individual's social environment, and thus outcomes. Kelley (1979, 1984) stated that 
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"meaning analysis" is the underlying process that would render the social world 
predictable, and therefore controllable. This is in line with Fiske (1992) who suggested 
that "thinking is for doing", and thus acknowledges the importance of cognitive 
processing to behavioral outcomes. Riley and Fiske (1991) apply the continuum model 
of impression formation (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) to Kelley's (1979; Kelley & Thibaut, 
1978) interdependence framework for: "It is proposed that that perceivers do not 
typically form impressions of others in a vacuum; rather, they often do so because these 
impressions are integrally related to their interactions with others" (Riley & Fiske, 1991, 
p. 173). Specifically, 
... forming impressions of the other person's motives and dispositions bears on the perceiver's 
(effective) self-interest in virtually any interdependent relationship. It has been a theme of all 
our research that forming impressions of people's motivations and dispositions is the impetus 
behind impression formation under interdependence. (p. 185, italics mine) 
These cognitive interpretations, or impressions are thus believed to be important 
determinants of behavior and behavioral control of others. For example, the 
stereotyping and interdependence literature has also been linked to the control over 
outcomes. Recall that the interdependence literature is explicitly about the power of 
control over outcomes, and more recently Fiske (1993) has discussed the in1pact of 
power on stereotyping in controlling other people. Indeed the interdependence literature 
has been broad and influential. 
As well as making cognitive interpretations, proximal determinants are also 
argued to reflect emotional reactions. As Kelley (1984) states: "For each ... situation, 
[individuals] have psychological systems that enable quick recognition of their relevance 
to the person's interests and that stimulate action promoting those interests" (p. 91 ). It 
is believed that these reactions, in part, would be emotional. A review of the literature 
related to cognitive interpretations, emotional reactions and self-presentation is offered 
by Rusbult and van Lange (1996), generally adopting a social cognition approach to 
information processing (cf. Oakes & Reynolds, 1996). 
Rusbult and van Lange (1996) summarize additional proximal determinants as 
follows: dispositional attributions can be implied from the effective matrix that an 
individual adopts (see Holmes, 1981; as does Kelley, 1984); there arc consequences that 
results from making internal and external attributions (Weiner, 1986); repeated 
experience in the same situation leads to relatively more automatic (shallow) processing; 
cognitive biases, such as heuristic information processing, is likely to result in 
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irrationality; that six emotional prototypes exist and are situationally established as a 
result ofrepeated experience (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson & O'Connor, 1987): and that 
individuals engage in self-presentation strategies to influence other's behaviors in aid of 
one's own preferences. 
To conclude, transformational processes account for the biasis and errors that a 
strict rational actor model of interdependence could not account for. The analysis takes 
us from a given -- rationally objective -- matrix to an effective -- subjective, sometimes 
irrational-- matrix of interdependence. It is interesting to note that it is only a person 
with a social value orientation of an individualist that perceives the given objective matrix 
as given (i.e., does not transform it). An individualist is thus the rational actor. This is 
consistent with Rapoport (1973), who states: "A rational player is defined as one who 
wants to get as large a payoff as possible, and to whom the payoff that accrues to his co-
player is of no consequence" (p. 5). Further, acting in terms of any other orientation 
implies some "loss" or "cost" to the individual, as the direct self-interest of the individual 
is not being maximized. These same principles of individual rationality and self-interest 
underlie the social dilemma research. 
2.6 Summary of interdependence theory 
While interdependence theory focuses on dyadic relationships, the theory has 
been applied to triads and larger groups, where the matrix analysis quickly becomes less 
practical and appropriate. However, the principles of interdependence theory have been 
applied to a larger class of social problems -- social dilemmas -- as the properties of 
degree of dependence, mutuality of dependence, correspondence of outcomes and basis 
for dependence are still purported to be relevant (see Rusbult and van Lange, 1996). 
Social dilemmas, understood through the interdependence analysis, now ground our 
understanding of social cooperation. 
The functional interdependence approach has yielded overwhelming support in 
the literature. In line with the functional approach to interdependence, realistic conflict 
theory (Campbell, 1958) posits that real conflict of interest causes intergroup conflict. 
The theory "assumes that group conflicts are rational in the sense that groups do have 
incompatible goals and are in competition for scarce resources" (p. 287). Numerous 
field studies have supported this view (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 1961; Deridder & Tripathi, 
1992; Diab, 1970; Haney, Banks & Zimbardo, 1973; Sherif, 1966, 1967). In fact 
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Deutsch (1981, p. 61) has noted marked parallels between his own work and many of 
these classic field studies. Goal expectation theory (Pruitt and Kimmel, 1977) also posits 
that goal interdependence is paramount to social cooperation. Similarly, value 
expectancy theory (Feather, 1982) posits that individuals' behavior is a function of the 
value of the expected outcomes of behavioral choice. Collective behavior theory 
(Oberchall, 1973; Olson, 1965) draws a distinction between collective and selective 
incentives which are distinguished by excludability. Finally, Rabbie's Behavioral 
Interaction Model (1991) also upholds the outcome interdependence model of 
individuals and groups. Each of these theorists builds on the earlier conceptualizations 
of the group outlined in this chapter, specifically the functional interdependence of 
individuals. 
The chapter to follow examines the paradigm and research that grew !rom the 
interdependence approach to understanding social cooperation - the social dilemma 
paradigm. in line with the theoretical analysis of Deutsch, as well as Kelley and Thibaut, 
this paradigm establishes the situational interdependence that becomes the conceptual 
link to an analysis of social cooperation. The researchers have argued that outcome 
interdependence of individuals provides the basis for cooperation, and that cooperation 
produces psychological, or perceived, group membership. Overall, the interdependence 
approach understands social cooperation through the outcome interdependence of 
individuals and each individual's transformational processes. 
-Chapter 3-
The social dilemma paradigm: The strategic analysis of 
functional interdependence and social cooperation 
3.1 Introduction 
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A~ outlined in the previous chapter game theory, the abstract analysis of strategic 
social interdependence, underlies social dilemma research (Van Lange eta!., 1992). As 
such, the formal structural properties of game theory constitute the paradigm through 
which we currently study social cooperation. As with defining conflicts of interest in 
game theory, social dilemmas are defined in term of their respective interdependence 
structure and their relationship to the outcomes of individuals. This chapter will begin 
with a description of intragroup dilemmas, which sets the framework for addressing the 
"problem of interdependence." For within these objectively defined situations of 
interdependence, researchers have found remarkably low levels of cooperation. Indeed, 
the interesting finding has been that in these situations of positive interdependence 
individuals cooperate, on average, a mere 30% of the time. Thus, for the last 30 years or 
so, researchers have been endeavouring to identify factors that increase cooperation in 
structurally defined social dilemmas (see Turner eta!., 1987, p. 31-32). These factors 
fall into the broad class of what are known as solutions to social dilemmas, which will be 
reviewed later in the chapter. 
Social dilemmas are defmed in terms of structural situations in which private and 
collective interests are at odds. The dilemma arises through players' realization that 
acting in terms of individual self-interest leads to less for everyone involved, including 
themselves. While the outcome structure tempts players to act in their individual self-
interest, as this action results in the highest individual payoff, the situational 
interdependence with other players establishes this action as a deficient outcome for each 
individual involved in the end. A typical example of a social dilemma is the 
establishment of labour unions. An individual could choose not to join the union and still 
reap the benefits of union action while accruing no financial loss; or an individual could 
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pay the membership fee and participate fully in the union. However, if everyone chose 
not to join the union, there would be no union benefits to any of the individuals involved, 
and all would be worse off due to lack of collective representation. This is the character 
of a social dilemma. Other types of social dilemmas will be presented in the sections to 
follow; however, the character of the situation remains the same: a conflict or interest 
must be resolved one way or the other, typically in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. 
3.2 The fonnal structural definition of social dilemmas 
Yamagishi (1988) defines social dilemmas as situations in which there is an 
incentive structure of interdependence that encourages individual actors to opt for a 
course of action which produces a collectively undesirable outcome. Dawes (1975, 
1980), a mathematical psychologist, was the frrst to formally define, and then revise, a 
social dilemma in game theoretical terms. The revised definition reads (Dawes, 1980): 
[Dilemmas] are defined by two simple properties: (a) each individual receives a higher payoff 
for a socially defecting choice (eg. having additional children, using all the energy available, 
polluting his or her neighbors) than for a socially co-operative choice, no matter what the other 
individuals in society do, but (b) all individuals are better off if all cooperate than if all defect. 
(p. 169). 
To act in terms of individual self-interest is to defect (compete) against the collective, to 
cooperate is to act in terms of the collective. Cooperation is currently defined in terms of 
exchange principles; that is, a benefit to the group necessarily accrues a cost to the 
individual (Boyd & Richardson, 1991 ). In other words, collective welfare emerges from 
a cost -benefit analysis by the individurL Implicit in this definition is that collective 
welfare is a byproduct of individual welfare in situations of social interdependence 
(Liebrand, 1983). 
The literature on social dilemmas is now vast, approaching the study of conflicts 
of interest through many dispersed conceptual frameworks. A recent review (Schroeder, 
Sibicky & Irwin, 1995) states: "the extant literature in the field ... seems to represent a 
loose confederation of research pursued within a common context rather than a truly 
unified body of work" (p. 185). Thus, various researchers have suggested various 
organizational schemes to rectify this growing problem( see Cross & Guyer, 1980; 
Messick & Brewer, 1983). For example, Messick and McClelland (1983) have defined 
dilemmas in terms of both social traps, a conflict between individual and collective 
interest (e.g. Kramer & Brewer, 1984) and temporal traps, a conflict between long term 
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and short term individual interest (e.g. Platt, 1973). Other categories of social dilemmas 
have been more prominent; specifically, the commons dilemma and public goods 
dilemma, both of which represent what is known as intragroup dilemmas -- conflict 
between the individual and the collective. As this latter class of social dilemmas remains 
a dominant conceptual distinction within this body of research, it will be reviewed in the 
following section. Intergroup dilemmas, which are much less established in the 
literature, will be reviewed later in the chapter. 
3.2.A Structural properties of intragroup social dilemmas 
While commons dilemmas and the dilemma of the provision of public goods have 
the same incentive structure, it is argued that they are not psychologically equivalent (see 
Brewer & Kramer, 1986). These are both instances of common-pool resource dilemmas 
and can be distinguished in terms of two principles: exclusion and subtractability (see 
Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1997). Exclusion refers to the difficulty of excluding 
individuals from benefiting from a common good; while, subtractabilit y refers to the loss 
of the resource to all individuals concerned when consumed by those utilizing access. In 
both types of resource dilemmas exclusion is difficult but subtractibility is low for public 
goods dilemmas but high for commons dilemmas. This will become clear in the 
following two sections. In terms of behavioral differences, the general finding has been 
that cooperation is attained more easily in commons dilemmas than public goods 
dilemmas. As such, a psychological discrepancy in the perceived nature of these two 
types of dilemmas is forwarded. This finding will be discussed in the following section 
on intragroup dilemmas. 
3.2.A.1 Commons dilemma 
The commons dilemma has the same structure as anN-person prisoner's dilemma 
game (where N specifies the number of players). The conceptual analysis of a commons 
dilemma grew from Hardin's (1968, based on Lloyd, 1833) analysis of the "tragedy of 
the commons." Hardin (1968) saw little cause for optimism regarding the prospect of 
cooperation in situations where individuals share a common pasture or resource. "Ruin," 
he stated "is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best 
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons" (p. 1245). Dawes 
(1973) initially developed these ideas in terms of anN-person social dilemma and then 
defined the dilemma formally (Dawes, 1975, 1980). Commons dilemmas arc indeed 
ubiquitous. Dawes and colleagues (1974) state the commons problem as follows: 
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With the world as our commons, each of us may believe he stands to gain (fulfilment, "eternal 
life," companionship and perhaps wealth) by having children, while the loss of each 
"consummatory and polluting agent" to the commons is clearly distributed among all the living 
creatures in it, and particularly the other people. That this one type of pollution may underlie 
most other pollution problems makes the study and resolution of the class of such problems 
particularly timely. (p. 3) 
Commons dilemmas are typically situated in the maintenance of a shared 
resource, such as the common pastures that Hardin refers to. By definition, all 
interdependent actors are reliant on the shared resource, have a zero starting point of 
individual resource revenue and must decide on each round (and sometimes there is only 
one iteration of the game) how much to take for themselves (see Brewer and Kramer, 
1986). This conceptualization has been applied to many different environmental 
dilemmas (e.g. Edney & Harper, 1978; Hardin, 1968; Kramer & Brewer, 1984). The 
socially defecting choice is the continued unrestrained utilization of resources, while the 
socially cooperative choice is the use of restraint to curb the depletion of the resource, 
whether that be fossil fuels, clean air, food, water or minerals. Dawes (1975) argues 
that such situations induce defection, as gain (reward) for defection accrues directly to 
individual; while loss, defined as quantitatively greater than gain, is spread out over all 
group members. 
Recall the ordinal rankings for the prisoner's dilemma game (Figure 2.4, p. 32): 
unilateral defection gave the highest outcome to the individual. This is consistent with 
Hardin's conceptualization of "tragedy of the commons" wherein the consumers, acting 
in their individual self-interest, deplete the resource through maximizing their own 
interests. Hardin notes the paradox: it is the very actions of rational individuals making 
defecting (consuming) decisions that results in long term "ruin" for all, as all actors will 
receive a lower payoff (through the depletion of a common resource) than if they acted 
to maximize their collective interest in the first place -- that is, preserve the resource. 
This type of situation has also been conceptualized as a social trap. !'Ia!! (1973) 
understands a social trap as a situation where " ... each individual ... continues to do 
something for his individual advantage that collectively is damaging to the group as a 
whole" (p. 1 ). In a trap situation the short term consequence is positive while the long 
term consequence is negative. Hamburger (1973) differentiates commons dilemmas from 
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public goods dilemmas, in terms of take some versus give some games respectively; in 
other words, individuals can take from a common resource or give to maintain a public, 
while still common, resource. Later, Dawes (1980) formulated the problem in terms of a 
dichotomous choice between "C" (cooperation) and "D" (defection) in which an 
outcome is received. "D", unto itself, is worth more than "C", thus it is individually 
rational to chose "D"; however, "D" is associated with a negative externality which 
incurs a penalty. The consequence of the penalty is that all will receive less if all choose 
"D", the unilateral rational choice of the individual. 
3.2.A.2 Public goods dilemma 
In contrast to a commons dilemma, where a group of individual must share a 
common resource, a public goods dilemma is characterized by how much of a personal 
resource individuals are willing to contribute to a common pool for everyone to 
consume. Thus, public goods dilemmas do not have a zero starting point, as do the 
commons dilemmas. The public goods dilemma grew from the work of Olson (1965) 
and the "free rider problem" (Brubaker, 1975). A public good is a public provision 
available to be consumed by all members of the collective. The dilemma is based on the 
premise that some individuals will fail to contribute to the provision, counting on the 
others within the collective to do so, and thus will "free ride." However, if all individuals 
choose to "free ride" then the provision will cease to exist as it is no longer being 
maintained by the contributions of the individuals who make up the collective. Olson 
(1965) defines a public good as follows: 
A common, collective, or public good is here defined as any good such that, if any person Xi in 
a group Xl, ... , Xi, ... Xn consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others in that 
group. In other words, those who do not purchase or pay for any of the public or collective 
good cannot be excluded or kept from sharing in the consumption of the good, as they can 
where non-collective goods are concerned. (p. 14- 15) 
Yamagishi (1986) explains that as the provision of the good is not immediately 
conditional on individual payment then individuals can be opportunistic and enjoy the 
good without payment. Thus, the dilemma arises through the realization that the benefits 
of the good will cease to be provided, if all individuals fail to contribute. Libraries, 
schools, public transportation, public radio and public television are classified as 
problems of public goods provision, often through the payment of taxes which 
individuals must contribute to the institutional body that provides the public resource. 
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However, it is conceptually the same as a group of individuals bringing a plate of food to 
a communal dinner. If everyone "free rides," everyone starves. 
A~ the analog to the social trap described above, this type of social dilemma has 
been called a social fence (Platt, 1973). In a fence situation the short term consequence 
is negative (we have to give-up something) while the long term consequence is positive 
(the public good is provided for), hence the phrase "fence-sitter." Platt (1973) explains: 
"The consideration of individual advantage prevents us from doing something that might 
nevertheless be of great benefit to the group as a whole" (p. 1). Platt (1973) gives the 
infamous murder of Kitty Genovese as an example of a social fence. Given that the 
weightings of the action and consequences are the converse of social traps these 
situations have also been called countertraps. Hamburger (1973) called these give-some 
games, as individuals first have to give to then receive the common benefit. Later, 
Dawes (1980) formulated the problem in terms of another dichotomous choice between 
"C" (cooperation) and "D" (defection) in which an outcome is received. "D", unto itself, 
is worth more than "C" thus it is individually rational to choose "D"; however, "C", in 
this case, is associated with a positive externality which incurs a bonus. The 
consequence of the bonus is that all will receive more if all choose "C", the individual 
irrational choice. 
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) has recently been applied to 
commons and public goods dilemmas to account for the finding that the former induces 
more cooperation than the latter (see Brewer & Kramer, 1986). The theory argues that 
individuals are risk-seeking in situations of loss and risk-adverse in situations of gain. 
Thus, based on the distinction between "take-some" (commons) and "give-some" (public 
goods) dilemmas, it is argued that public-goods dilemmas are perceived to be more risk 
adverse as they incur initial loss. As such, individuals will take more risky decisions, 
such as not fully paying taxes, when loss is initially perceived. Thus, deficient 
cooperation with the collective is conceptualized, as individuals fail to provide for the 
collective as a whole. 
3.2.A.3 Overview of the structure of intragroup social dilemmas 
Some researchers have found Dawes' (1980) definition of social dilemmas to be 
too restrictive, for the definition assumes that each player has a constant dominating 
strategy. Given that this is rarely the case, Liebrand (1983) defines a social dilemma as: 
a situation in which (!)there is a strategy that yields the person the best payoff in at least one 
configuration of strategy choices and that has a negative impact on the interests of the other 
persons involved, and (2) the choice of the particular strategy by all persons results in a 
deficient outcome. (p. 124) 
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Following from this definition, Liebrand argues that the more strictly defined 2 x 2 mixed 
motive games (e.g. prisoner dilemma, chicken and trust games) become subsumed in a 
more inclusive range of social dilemmas. Dawes (1980) has also argued that 2 x 2 
games are distinctive in the sense that in most dilemmas between an individual and a 
collective, defection does not focus harm on only one other player, as it does in a 2 x 2 
game. It is argued that as behavior in dyadic games is not as anonymous, this can be 
used to influence the behavior of others more directly. A large amount of research has 
examined the anonymity effect of social dilemmas through the diffusion of responsibility 
(Latane & Darley, 1968). This distinction gave rise to theN-person prisoner's dilemma 
(N-PD) games, where N > 2. 
Social dilemmas reflect the fact that defection by an actor results in a better 
individual payoff than cooperation in all instances where the player unilaterally defects. 
In game theoretical terms, the strategies of players are considered to be in equilibrium if 
neither player gains by unilaterally altering their respective strategy (Davis, 1970). An 
equilibrium point is established through these concurrent strategies and is identified 
through the outcomes corresponding to this pair (Davis, 1970). For example the 
prisoner's dilemma game has only one equilibrium point-- universal defection that results 
in a deficient outcome for both (the chicken and leader games have two equilibria). This 
deficient outcome interdependence is the essence of a social dilemma. If the D payoff 
function is plotted against the C payoff function, the D function will always lie above the 
C function; however, the right extremity of the C function will be higher than the left 
extremity of the D function (Dawes, 1980). This contrast defines the collective 
deficiency of universal defection in a social dilemma. 
One last distinction that Dawes (1980) made is between uniform and variable 
games. In a uniform game the resource is depleted by some set amount in each iteration, 
while in variable games the resource can regenerate or replenish itself depending on how 
much is taken, or given, in each round. 
It should also be noted that not all experimental games can be classified as social 
dilemmas. Liebrand (1983) has developed the following criteria to define games that 
induce a social dilemma: (1) both players have a strategy that, if chosen, threatens the 
other player through a deficiency in outcome accrued; (2) the choice to threaten is 
attractive to at least one rational player as it provides a higher outcome payoff; (3) a 
deficient outcome to all players results if all player chose the most-threatening strategy. 
Drawing on the work of Hamburger (1974), Licbrand (1983) then argued that the two-
person and N-person forms of the prisoner's dilemma game, the chicken game and the 
trust game satisfy these criteria. Liebrand (1983) explains theN-person form, 
respectively, in terms of decision to pollute, ride a bike (and not drive a car). and 
hoarding goods. 
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TheN-person prisoner's dilemma has been the most frequently used paradigm in 
the study of social dilemmas (see Dawes, 1980; Komorita & Barth, 1985) as they are 
thought to be more threatening through the increased anonymity. They are also argued 
to have more ecological validity; indeed, Dawes (1980) has argued that the 2-person 
prisoner's dilemma game is not representative of a social dilemma as all harm of 
defection is focused on one other player and thus can potentially also include forms of 
coercion. 
A number of indices have been formalized in drawing conclusions from this 
literature. For example, Kelley and Grzelak (1972) have plotted a payoff curve from 
which individual interests, gains and losses can be assessed. Following Rapoport (1967), 
Komorita (1976) has developed an index of cooperation, from which estimates of two 
motivational factors can be derived: greed (the temptation to defect and gain) and fear 
(the anticipation of cooperating and being exploited, thus losing). However, the findings 
of the research into these two motivational forces are, as yet, inconclusive (see Van 
Lange, Liebrand, Messick & Wilke, 1992 for overview): Komorita, Sweeney and Kravitz 
(1980) have found that greed was the more highly rated motivational factor, while 
Yamagishi and Sato (1986) found fear to be, and Liebrand, Wilke, Vogel and Wolters 
(1986) found them both to be equally motivating. 
3.3 Individual transformational processes within social dilemmas 
As previously highlighted, one theoretical analysis that has received considerable 
support for its ability to account for individual variability in choice dilemmas is social 
value theory (Kelly & Thibaut, 1978; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Liebrand & van Run, 
1985; McClintock, 1972). Traditionally the theory examines the subjective weighting of 
outcomes that accrue to each individual and from this inferences about each individual's 
transformational process of the objective situation are established. The conceptual 
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analysis of social value orientations has also been defined in terms of a temporal 
dimension. It is argued that these orientations emerged because individuals learnt that 
they "paid off'. In this sense, individuals' social value orientations achieve a certain 
functional autonomy (Bern & Lord, 1979; Kuhlman, Camac & Cunha, 1986; McClintock 
& Allison, 1989). It is further argued that these temporal constructs are relatively stable 
over time within any given context (Kuhlman eta!., 1986; McClintock and Liebrand, 
1988). As Kuhlman and colleagues point out: 
In addition to demonstrating the importance of social orientation to social judgements of 
behavior in social dilemmas, we also hope to [contribute] to a growing body of evidence 
demonstrating that social orientation can be regarded as a temporally stable personality variable 
that covaries with a variety of behaviors in interdependent contexts. (Kuhlman, Brown and 
Tela, 1992,p.116). 
Social norms have also been shown to affect transformational processes of 
individuals, through socialization processes, although there is some ambivalence 
regarding the significance of norms and normative explanations (see Kerr, 1995). 
Schwartz (1977) argues that when norms becomes internalized actors reward and punish 
themselves for norm adherance or violation. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) note norms 
"provide a means of controlling behavior without entailing the costs, uncertainties, 
resistances, conflicts and power losses involved in the unrestrained, ad hoc use of 
interpersonal power" (p. 147). 
Most of this work has been done in relation to norms of cooperation and 
competition. Thus, more generally, the effect of norms can be understood in terms of 
expectations that others will cooperate or compete. There is consistent evidence, across 
a variety of social dilemmas, that expectations of others' cooperation and one's own 
cooperation are strongly interrelated (Dawes, McTavish & Shaklee, 1977; McClintock & 
Liebrand, 1988; Messick, Wilke, Brewer, Kramer, Zemke & Lui, 1983; Schroeder, 
Jensen, Reed, Sullivan & Schwab, 1983; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1989). 
Another general class of norms is called interaction norms (Kerr, 1995). These 
include: the commitment norm (to carry out those actions which one has promised or 
committed oneself to perform), equity norm (that payoffs are distributed in proportion to 
contributions, inputs or costs) and the norm of reciprocity (for each benefit received one 
should return the benefit in some equivalent way). The commitment norm is argued to 
underlie the effectiveness of communication in solving social dilemmas and will be 
discussed below. The equity norm (McGrath, 1984) has had mixed support (see Kerr, 
1995). The norm ofreciprocity (Gouldner, 1960) will be discussed in relation to the 
work of Rabbic (1991) and colleagues in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Roles are argued to be very closely related to norms, in that they reflect 
situational specific norms such as sex roles and leadership roles. Schwartz ( 1977) 
argues that mere role occupancy can trigger the responsibilities of these roles. For 
example Kerr and MacCoun (1985) and Vancouver, Rubin, and Kerr (1989) have shown 
that sex roles have an effect on cooperative behavior. The leadership role has been 
found to be more complex. However, one of the most robust findings is that when the 
leader's role is differentiated from other group members leaders typically take less from 
the pool as a whole, but then award more to themselves (Messick et al., 1983; Rutte & 
Wilke, 1984). 
Camac (1992) has recently pointed out that while we have looked at the effects 
of a number of transformationals variables, such as social value orientations, on choice 
behavior in dilemma situations, only a small minority of studies has addressed the 
problem of the cognitive processes underlying decision making. The few that have 
addressed this issue have, for the most part, restricted their analysis to expectations of 
others (see Kelley and Stahelski, 1970; Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee, 1977; Kuhlman 
and Wimberley, 1976; McClintock and Liebrand, 1988; Messe and Sivacek, 1979). 
Following the work of Fiske and Taylor (1984) and Markus and Zajonc ( 19H5), Camac 
(1992) posits that the cognitive process of an information search needs to be examined, 
in terms of the cognitive structures (or schemas) which organize "our beliefs, knowledge, 
motivations, and behavioral tendencies" ( p. 147). The dominant cognitive motivations 
that have been examined have been fear and greed. Following this emphasis, Camac 
(1992) examines whether or not subjects search out greed or fear information, using 2 x 
2 matrices, and concludes that cooperators seek out different information from non-
cooperators and concludes that different schemas are activated in each instance. 
Fear and greed, and their absence, have long been thought to be underlying 
motivational causes and it has been shown (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman & 
Wimberley, 1976) that cooperators show a strong preference for information along the 
diagonal of a 2 x 2 matrix, that is contrasting mutual cooperation with mutual 
competition. Competitors, on the other hand, show a strong preference for contrasting 
information along the defection axis of the matrix. It has been shown that cooperators 
will expect either mutual cooperation or competition, hence these two cells are 
compared. However, competitors expect only competition from the other player (see 
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Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; Kuhlman, Camac & Cunha 
1986) and thus contrast payoffs that would allow for exploitation. This is understood as 
fear and greed information seeking strategies, and supports earlier findings that non-
prosocials have little interpersonal trust (Kuhlman et al., 1986). 
Other work on transformational analysis considers behavior in social dilemmas in 
terms of a further mediating domain - might and morality. Using post-hoc semantic 
differential items, might (power/potency as strong versus weak) and morality (evaluation 
of good and bad) constructs are examined in terms of their moderating effect on social 
value orientation. Cooperators use more moral constructs to distinguish between non-
social and prosocial behavior, while individualists and competitors rely on power 
constructs to distinguish the two. This has been called the Might over Morality effect 
(Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken & Suhre, 1986; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988), as it has been 
found that competition (Might) wins out over cooperation (Morality) in many of the 
findings of social dilemma games. 
Van Lange and colleagues have worked with the construct of morality further, 
building on earlier work on intelligence (Van Lange, Liebrand and Kuhlman, 1990) and 
have examined transformational analysis in terms of both these dimensions in extending 
the Goal Prescribed Rationality Principle (Van Lange et al., 1990; Van Lange and 
Liebrand, 1991). Their premise is that rationality is not fixed but relates to individuals' 
social goals and motives. Thus, in regard to the relationship between rationality and 
cooperation in social dilemmas, this relationship is positive for pro-socials and negative 
for individualists and competitors. Building on the work on intelligence, this research 
has tound that pro-socials expect more cooperation from another player seen as 
intelligent rather than unintelligent; while individualists and competitors expect those 
seen as unintelligent to be more cooperative. 
As Camac (1992) points out, more work on the underlying psychological process 
of outcome transformation needs to be carried out, for now the analysis is more 
descriptive than prescriptive. 
3.4 Solutions to social dilemmas 
As Kormorita and Parks (1994) state in their summary and integration of work 
on social dilemmas, much of the research carried out in this area is occupied with the 
question: "How can we encourage people to be more cooperative" (p. ix). In other 
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words the thrust of social dilemma research has been to find solutions to social dilemmas, 
the solution being to increase social cooperation in situations of interdependence. The 
implicit assumption is that individuals, in their own right, will fail to act for the collective 
good. The interesting paradox is that in the course of our everyday lives we do 
cooperate with each other to a remarkable degree (see Etzioni, 1988). However, recall 
that, on average, individuals only cooperate 30% of the time in a prisoner's dilemma 
game and this individually self-serving behavior is a robust fmding in much of the social 
dilemma literature. What are the factors that have increased cooperation in situations of 
social dilemmas, given that most people fail to cooperate within this paradigm? This 
section will examine factors that have been shown to increase cooperation in the social 
dilemma paradigm. Liebrand eta!. (1992) have identified 14 different factors that aiTect 
cooperation levels in pri&oner's dilemma (and similar) settings, but as they point out it "is 
not an exhaustive taxonomy. It is more a list of convenient headings ... as a integrative 
framework guiding such research does not exist at the moment" (Liebrand, 1992, p. 
286). For the present purposes, the review of solutions to social dilemmas have been 
classified into three groupings. The first two arc in line with the theoretical domains 
outlined above, structural and transformational solutions, and includes Yamagishi's 
(1986) broad theoretical summary of this approach. A third class, group process 
solutions, will follow. 
3.4.A Structural solutions to social dilemmas 
The payoff structure, that is the outcome interdependence structure, has 
consistently been shown to affect cooperation in social dilemmas. Following the early 
work of Kelley and Grzelak (1972), many studies have shown that changing the reward 
structure of the matrices can both decrease and increase the incentive associated with 
cooperation (see also Bonacich, Shure, Kahan & Mekker, 1976; Komorita, Sweeney & 
Kravitz, 1980). The extent to which interdependent others can all benefit has also been 
shown to increase cooperation (Caldwell, 1976; Komorita, Sweeney & Kravitz, 1980). 
Other research evidence has found that the belief that non-cooperators can be punished 
and cooperators rewarded within the interdependence structure, will further increase 
cooperation (Kormorita & Barth, 1985; Kormorita, 1987). 
Field studies have given further support to this finding. For example, Maki, 
Hofman and Berk (1978) have shown that monetary reward can induce electricity 
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conservation (see also Winett, Kagel, Battalio and Winkler, 1978; Winett, Kaiser and 
Haberkorn, 1978; Winett and NietzeL 1975). The motivating factors of fear and greed 
have also been examined with respect to reward structures, fear being related to loss, and 
greed to gain (Coombs, 1973; Rapoport, 1966). Harris (1972) has included these 
parameters with Rapoport's (1967) index of cooperation. As indicated above these 
findings are inconclusive, with fear and greed both producing higher and lower levels of 
cooperation. 
The symmetry of access and endowments of individuals to shared resource has 
also been shown to affect cooperation levels (McGuiness, 1986; Samualson and Messick, 
1986). However, the results are mixed: Rapoport, Bornstein and Ercv (1989) found that 
those with high endowments gave less to the maintenance of a public good than those 
with lower endowments; while other studies have found that those with high- interest 
contributed more (see van Dijk and Wilke, 1993 for overview). Marwell and Ames 
(1979, 1980) have examined group size and the distribution of resource in a public goods 
dilemma finding no systematic account for why such high levels of investment in the 
public good were found. van Dijk and colleagues (1994) have examined asymmetry in 
social dilemmas in terms of coordination rules. The findings show that in public good 
dilemmas participants give relative to their endowments and interests, while in commons 
dilemmas participants behave in a manner that minimizes the difference of final 
outcomes. They conclude that there are differences in give-some and take-some 
dilemma games, with the latter more easily evoking a social norm of equality. They 
concluded, in line with Schwartz-Shea and Simmons (1995), that: 
The study of coordination rules in asymmetric dilemmas may be particularly promising since 
the concept of coordination rules circumvents the 'methodological individualism· of social 
dilemma research by incorporating the notion that group members do not only focus on their 
own outcomes, but also on the outcomes of their fellow group members. (p. 37) 
Despite the fact that there have been strong arguments (see Dawes, 1 980; Olson, 
1965) for why n-person games are different from two person games, group size has heen 
found to have little or no systematic effect on cooperation levels. More cooperation has 
heen found in two person than three person games (Marwell and Schmitt, 1972), and in 
three person compared to seven person games (Hamburger, Guyer and Fox, 1975). 
However, Bonacich, Shure, Kahan and Meeker (1976) found higher levels of 
cooperation in six-person groups than nine-person groups. Fox and Guyer ( 1 977) found 
that cooperation decreases as group size moves from three-person to seven-person 
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groups, with no difference between seven and twelve person groups. Liebrand (1984) 
found no difference in levels of cooperation between groups of seven and twenty 
persons. Thus the results are equivocal and seem to vary with other moderating 
variables such as identifiability and responsibility. Brewer and Kramer (1986) studied the 
effects of group size, identifiability and decision framing. As briefly indicated above, 
decision framing was manipulated in line with prospect theory (Kahncman & Tversky; 
1984). The results showed support for the prospect theory analysis: give-some (public 
goods) dilemmas being more risk averse than take-some (commons) dilemmas. Group 
size only had an effect in the public goods dilemma condition and identifiability only 
became important when depletion of the common resource became severe. Thus, the 
results regarding group size are equivocal; however, there is general support for the 
asymmetry analysis of social dilemmas. 
Notwithstanding these results, some researchers (see Kormorita, Parks & 
Hulbert, 1992) believe that the implementation of structural solutions is often impractical 
in the "real" world and advocate behavioral solutions. Kormorita and colleagues (1992) 
have thus returned to an examination of the role that the "norm ofrcciprocity" could 
play, building on the postulate "that reciprocity is one of the basic norms of social 
interaction (Blau, 1964; Holmans, 1961; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959)" (p. 608). Given 
this, individual behavioral solutions are now reviewed. 
While outcome interdependence, as understood through game theory, is a 
defining characteristic of social dilemmas, it has long been observed, casually and 
informally, that not all individuals are indifferent to the outcomes of others (e.g., 
Campbell, 1965; Caporeal, Dawes, Orbell and van de Kragt, 1989; Grisinger and 
Livingston, 1973; Lynn and Oldenquest, 1986; MacCrimmon and Messick, 1976). In 
fact there is considerable variability in the relative concern for own and other's 
outcomes. Building on the theoretical developments addressed in Chapter 2, this 
variability is explained through transformational processes of individuals and is reviewed 
in the following section. 
3.4.B Individual transformational solutions in social dilemmas 
Pro-social motivation derived from the work examining social value orientations, 
has been shown in numerous studies to increase co-operation (Liebrand et al., 1986; 
McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Kramer, McClintock & Messick, 1986; Liebrand, 1984; 
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Liebrand & van Run, 1985; Liebrand, 1986; van Lange & Liebrand, 1989). This 
individual difference variable has made a significant contribution to this literature, 
showing that not all individuals are indifferent to the outcomes of others, in other words 
that not all individuals are motivated purely by immediate individual self-interest. 
Following on from the research on social value orientations, trust has been examined as a 
influential variable with high trust relationships inducing more cooperation (Messick et 
al., 1983; Brann & Faddy, 1987; Yamagishi, 1986; 1988). 
Perceptions of the other player have also been found to be in11uential, with co-
operation being greater with those that have similar, rather than dissimilar attitudes 
(Kaufman, 1967; Tornatzky and Geiwitz, 1968). Others' morality and intelligence has 
also been shown to be a moderating factor (see van Lange and Liebrand, 1989, 1991; 
van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994). Feelings of responsibility have also been shown to be 
positively correlated with contribution size (Fleishman, 1980). Relatedly, cooperation is 
found to be greater in social dilemmas which are perceived to be moral issues, as it is 
believed that moral issues induce feelings of responsibility to others (Dawes, 1980; 
Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee, 1977; van Lange, Liebrand and Kuhlman, 1990). At the 
same time, some researchers argue that there is a diffusion of responsibility in larger 
groups, which then can moderate this effect (e.g. Latane and Darley, 1968; Latane and 
Rodin, 1969; Schwartz and Gottlieb, 1981). This issue is related to the factor of 
perceived efficacy. Olson (1965) argued that perceived efficacy declines as group size 
increases, thus leading to low levels of cooperation (see also Kerr, 1989). Individuals 
will also cooperate more if their contribution is seen to be critical to the provision of a 
public good (van de Kragt, Orbell and Dawes, 1983). 
Expectations of others' cooperation and one's own cooperation are strongly 
interrelated (see Dawes et al., 1977; Messick, Wilke, Brewer, Kramer, Zemke and Lui, 
1983; Schroeder, Jensen, Reed, Sullivan and Schwab (1983); van Lange and Liebrand, 
1989) and there is evidence that this relationship is bidirectional (see Abric and Kahan, 
1972; van Lange and Liebrand, 1991). Further, individuals learn from their experience 
playing the game, as has been shown in research on the effect of others' strategy. 
Rapoport and Chammah (1965) have found aU-shaped function in iterated games, with 
cooperation levels first declining and then increasing over time. 
The effect of mutual influence on transformational processes is also borne out the 
strategies individuals adopt. Axelrod (1984) has shown that the strategy of Tit-For-Tat 
induces higher levels of co-operation than the pure strategies of cooperation and 
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competition. There is also research that suggests that the strategy of Tit-For-Tat is seen 
as more intelligent (McClintock and Liebrand, 1988). Kuhlman and Marshelo (1975) 
have shown how Tit-For-Tat can increase both own and joint benefit, but not the relative 
benefit that competitors strive for. Building on Tit-For-Tat, Osgood's (1962) GRIT 
(Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-Reduction) strategy has heen very 
effective in inducing cooperation (Lindskold, 1978; Lindskold, Walters and Koutsourais, 
1983). The protocol of this strategy begins with the expression of cooperative 
intentions, encouragement of other cooperation, the act of cooperative behavior and 
retaliation only when the other does not cooperate, but never making a non cooperative 
choice twice in sequence. This research suggests that the initial prosocial communication 
is extremely important in determining subsequent cooperation. The research related to 
group process solutions, such as the role of communication, will be reviewed shortly. 
Before that, Yamagishi's broad theoretical framework of the two types of solutions just 
reviewed will be presented. 
3.4.C Overview of structural and transformational solutions to social dilemmas 
While past theoretical approaches to the solution of social dilemmas tended to 
emphasize either structural or individual variables, Yamagishi (1986) emphasizes the 
"rational nature" of actors. He defined the two broad theoretical approaches to finding 
solutions to social dilemmas as the rational-structural approach and the goal/expectation 
approach. For Y amagish~ the approaches differ in the extent to which they emphasize 
the "rational nature" of actors or "more psychological aspects of the problem" (p. 66). 
The rational structural approach assumes that individuals strive to maximize their self-
interest, and thus the only solution would be to modify the structure of the dilemma (see 
Cass & Edney, 1978; Kelley & Grzelak 1972; Messick & McClelland, 1983; Sheppard & 
Wright, 1989). The goal expectation approach, presented by Pruitt and Kimmel (1977), 
assumes that each and every individual is dually aware of the long-term consequences of 
cooperation and defection. Solutions are found by creating perceptions of 
interdependence between individuals. In other words, cooperation rests on individuals 
feeling a sense of interdependence with others. Thus, the solution rests on the individual 
-change an individual's perception of the interdependence situation and a solution can be 
reached. These changes in perceptions can be induced by developing mutual goals in 
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which there is an expectation that others can be trusted, and will reciprocate cooperative 
actions. 
Broadly speaking, the conventional social dilemma research, understood through 
the functional interdependence of individuals, rests on these two approaches. For the 
most part, social dilemmas and their solutions are understood in terms of the 
interdependence structures and transformational process of individuals, or the interaction 
of these two variables, as the the literature on group size would suggest. However a 
third general solution can also be identified -- group process solutions. 
3.4.0 Group process solutions in social dilemmas 
A recent review by Hogg and Moreland (1994) highlights that social psychology 
has seen a dramatic upswing in research into group processes. Indeed, this is true for 
the social dilemma literature, with the research on group decision making and social 
identity being particularly relevant. 
Public and private decision making has been examined in terms of individuals' 
ability to "hide in the crowd" (Bixenstine, Levitt and Wilson, 1966; Jerdee and Rosen, 
1974). The issue is now seen as one of identifiability, as the results show that co-
operation levels are higher in public rather than anonymous situations (e.g., Fox and 
Guyer, 1978; Kahan, 1973). Research on communication in resource dilemmas has 
found that identifiability only has an influence on cooperation when individuals are not 
allowed to communicate (Jorgenson and Papciak, 1981). 
Communication in intergroup cooperation has been studied (Bornstein, 
Rapoport, Kerpel and Katz,1989), comparing the collective (both groups) outcomes 
when either within-group communication or between group communication was allowed. 
The findings revealed that communication between groups significantly increased the 
collective outcome. Bornstein and colleagues (1989) suggests that: 
Within group discussion promotes co-operation by enhancing group identity and group 
regardingness ... [and] ... in the absence of separate group discussion, between-group discussion 
may promote collective identity while blurring or eliminating sub-group boundaries. This 
would lead players to substitute concern for the welfare of the larger society for sub-group 
interest as a value guiding their choice (p. 433). 
Indeed, one of the most robust fmdings in the literature is that when 
communication between players is permitted intragroup cooperation increases (Bornstein 
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and Rapoport, 1988; Dawes et a!., 1977; Dawes eta!., 1988; Jerdee and Rosen, 1974; 
Jorgenson and Papciak, 1981;). Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994) provide an excellent 
review of the relevant literature. In line with Dawes and colleagues (see Dawes et a!., 
1990 for a review of this research program) they conclude that only two explanations for 
the effect of group communication are viable: (I) induced commitments to cooperate; (2) 
enhanced feeling of group identity. The former attests to the existence of a commitment 
norm (see Braver, 1995; Janis and Mann, 1977; Kerr, 1995; Leventhal, 1976: Ostrom, 
Walker and Gardner, 1992; Stults and Messe, 1985; Tedeschi, Lindskold, Horai and 
Gahagan, 1969 for theoretical and empirical argument) and draws on recent work by 
Bonacich (1972) and Orbell eta! (1988) in which there is evidence of solicitations of 
commitment to cooperate. Braver (1995), Kerr (1995) and Ostrom eta!., (1992) are 
strong proponents of this approach. The latter argues that group identity is enhanced 
through communication (see Kramer and Brewer, 1984, 1986; Tajfel, 1980; Tajfel and 
Turner, 1986; for theoretical and empirical argument). The suggestion is that through 
enhancing one's sense of group identity, the utility of the group's outcomes is also 
enhanced over personal utility. Dawes, Orbell and colleagues (Dawes et a!., 1988; 
Dawes eta!., 1990; Orbell eta!., 1988, 1990, 1991) as well as Kramer (see Kramer and 
Goldman, 1995) are strong proponents of this latter approach. 
Recently, Bouas and Kormorita (1996) further examine why relevant face-to-face 
communication in a social dilemma increases the level of cooperation. They tested the 
two general explanations: group identity, understood as concern for fellow group 
members' outcomes, and perception of consensus, the degree of agreement perceived 
among group members in their response to the dilemma. Dawes eta!. (1977), as well as 
Brewer and Kramer (1986, to be reviewed in Chapter 6), provided the early support for 
the group identity explanation; while Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliand (1994) and Orbell et 
a!., (1988) provided the consensus explanation. The former builds on the conclusion 
"that group identity should be aroused if group members feel they are all recipients of 
some common fate rather than if they each experience events as individuals" (Bouras and 
Kormorita, 1996, p. 1145). While the latter builds on Pruitt and Kimmel's (1977) goal-
expectation hypothesis and argues that through communication "perceived consensus 
may be important because it reduces the risk associated with the cooperative choice" 
(Bouras and Kormorita, 1996, p. 1146). To test these explanations, Bouras and 
Kormorita (1996) conducted a study that involved a common fate (similar to Kramer and 
Brewer, 1984) and a relevant, and irrelevant, group discussion condition, as well as a 
control condition (no common-fate or communication). The findings reveakd that the 
only condition to significantly affect the cooperation level was the relevant discussion 
group condition. This led Bouras and Kormorita (1996) to concluded that: 
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Assuming that the group reaches consensus on the goal of mutual cooperation, there will be 
strong pressures to conform to this norm. Moreover, this consensus will evoke expectations of 
reciprocal cooperation and reduce fear that others will exploit one's cooperative choice (the 
sucker's payoff). These two conditions, of course, coincide with the two conditions prescribed 
by Pruitt and Kimmel's (1977) goal-expectation hypothesis. (p. 1150) 
Clearly some group level process enhances cooperation in a social dilemma as 
evidenced by the literature reviewed here. However, while the evidence implies that 
variables such as public commitment, identifiability and communication can increase the 
level of cooperation, it is not clear why this is the case. In other words it is not clear 
what exactly these variables facilitate in inducing cooperative behaviour in a social 
dilemma situation. 
3.5 Intergroup dilemmas 
Up to this point, social dilemmas have been dealt with as an intragroup problem-
a conflict between the individual and the collective. However, more recently a second 
class of dilemmas has emerged -- intergroup dilemmas. This section will briclly examine 
a small but growing literature on intergroup dilemmas. This body of literature, by and 
large, was established through the work of Thibaut (see Insko et al., 1987; Insko and 
Schopler, 1987), who initiated a program of research examining differences between 
intergroup and interpersonal relations. However, despite its infancy, one of the most 
robust findings is what is called the individual- group "discontinuity" effect (Insko, 
Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis and Graetz, 1990) --the observation that groups tend to be 
more competitive than individuals (see Insko eta!., 1990; McCallum eta!., 1985; Rabbie, 
Visser and van Oostrum, 1982). This observation underlies important distinctions in the 
conceptualization of group process in social psychology and Insko and colleagues have 
done the most consistent work on what is now called the individual-group discontinuity 
effect. 
Beginning with McCallum, Harring, Gilmore, Drenan, Chase, Insko and Thibaut 
(1985), these researchers built on Turner's (1981) conclusion that states: 
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there is some consistent evidence that social groups seem to be more competitive and perceive 
their interests more competitively than individuals under the same functional conditions. (p. 97) 
Through a series of experiments McCallum and colleagues conclude that groups are 
more competitive than individuals because groups transform individuals through 
providing an important opportunity for self-evaluation. They argue that through 
intergroup social comparison processes, groups are motivated to protect and maintain 
their social identity; however, this is at a cost to individual or personal reward. Given 
these high stakes, groups thus become highly motivated to gain superiority over 
outgroups. As such, groups subsume the pursuit of individual self-interest and thus 
intensify intergroup conflict. McCallum et al. (1985) conclude that: 
the absolute level of outcomes becomes less important to the group than "winning'' or "not 
losing" in comparison with the out-group .... the competitive choice achieves these goals. As 
reported in Turner (1981), this attention to relative gains persists even when it appears to 
conflict with an individual's self-interest and reduces his or her actual outcomes, which is 
another indication that the competition is motivated by self-esteem concerns than by greed. 
(p.317) 
It is further argued that group behavior leads to the development of astute hypocrisy of 
individuals which resulted in more deceitfulness and lying by individuals in intergroup 
situations. It is argued, in line with LeBon (1895) and McDougall (1921), that groups 
are "more aggressive, competitive, or barbaric" (Insko et al., 1993) than individuals. 
Insko and colleagues (1990) conclude that groups are entities that evoke irrational 
behavior, inducing "stupid, barbaric, or any other undesirable behavior" (p. 419). As 
such, the "challenge for future research is to discover ways to induce intergroup 
interactions to be similar to interindividual interactions" (p. 431). 
Further studies have examined the role of intergroup contact (Insko, Pinkley, 
Hoyle, Dalton, Hong, Slim, Landry, Holton, Ruffm and Thibaut, 1987) and consensus 
rule (Insko, Hoyle, Pinkley, Hong, Slim, Dalton, Linn, Ruffin, Dardis, Bernthal and 
Schopler, 1988) on the individual-group discontinuity effect to explain this phenomenon. 
Three hypotheses are put forward: (1) the altruistic-rationalization hypothesis (the 
individual hypocritically defers competitive behavior in groups to group altruism - action 
for the sake of fellow group members); (2) the group-schema hypothesis (when 
entititivity of group membership is elevated a group-schema is evoked which elicits 
"intragroup loyally and cooperation and intergroup distrust and competition" (Insko et 
al., 1987, p. 265)); and (3) the social-support-for-shared-self-interest hypothesis 
(individual greed is socially supported and thus solicited in the group condition). As the 
fear and greed hypothesis has received the most systematic support in the literature, 
more recently, Insko, Schopler and colleagues (1993) have applied the fear and greed 
motivational analysis to this observed effect. 
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It is our contention that the discontinuity effect is mediated by a fear of the out-group's 
competitiveness and, when this fear is less salient, by a greedy desire to exploit the out-group's 
expected co-operativeness. (p. 419) 
Lindskold et al., (1986) have found this effect to be particularly apparent in the 
first stage of a social dilemma. This chronology was also found in a study by Insko and 
colleagues (1992), in which they contrasted two theoretical models to account for this 
effect: realistic group conflict theory (Campbell, 1965) and social identity theory (Tajfel 
and Turner, 1978, 1982). They used a three choice matrix to examine the relative 
dominance of two strategic choices: maximizing individual outcome and maximizing 
relative outcome. These two strategies are interpreted to reflect the predictions of the 
two respective theories. They conclude that they have found support for both theories: 
Campbell is correct in that the conflict must be real (relevant) to both parties, based on 
the fact that the initial strategy chosen was to maximize individual outcome; however, 
support for the social identity approach grew as the conflict escalated, based on the fact 
that parties chose the strategy of maximizing relative payoffs more often as the game 
progressed. 
Other research involving intergroup dilemmas follows Hardin (1982), who 
observed that "It is often ... the case that collective action is of interest to the group 
primarily because some other group has an ongoing interest that is being served to the 
detriment of the first group" (p. 15). In this vein, Bornstein and colleagues have 
examined social dilemmas in situations involving intergroup conflict. This program of 
research has used the intergroup prisoner's dilemma (IPD), with each group being 
treated as a unitary player. Initial research (Bornstein, 1992; Bornstein et al.. 1990) 
found a positive correlation between intragroup cooperation and intergroup competition. 
For example, it was demonstrated that "free-riding" decreases within the group when 
intergroup competition is evident. Bornstein (1992) concludes that: 
Individuals tend to keep their promises. Groups, however, do not! ... Our findings suggest ... 
that groups may benefit from restricting intergroup contact in times of conflict. Such 
restrictions will make each group more effective in solving its internal problems of "free 
riding." But society as a whole will have to pay the price of collectively deficient outcomes. 
(p. 259 -260) 
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This observation is consistent with further work of Bornstein and Ben-Y osscf ( 1994 ), 
who conclude that "individuals may be more likely to cooperate in an intergroup conl1ict 
than in a single-group dilemma, not because they are more altruistic, but because they are 
more efficacious" (p. 64). This observation is consistent with Kerr's Burnstein, 
Kitayama and Abboushi (in press) summarize their arguments as follows: 
Groups decide to compete because their members calculate that more is to be gained (or less to 
be lost) from this course of action than from [intergroup] co-operation [and in this sense] 
groups are merely vessels of individual interest. 
These researchers concluded that it is real intergroup conflict, as it relates to 
collectives of individuals, that increases intragroup cooperation. They assume, with 
Campbell (1965) and Rabbie, Schot and Visser (1989) that it is the interdependence of 
individuals through common fate that induces perceived group membership. Likewise, 
van Lange concludes that "the presence of an outgroup per se is not the key to 
promoting ingroup support; rather, the key to understanding ingroup support is the 
underlying interdependence between ingroups and out groups (c.f. Rabbie and Horwitz, 
1988)" (p. 59). 
This section, with the previous, has highlighted the many ways that social 
dilemmas are conceptualized and operationalized in the literature. The one basic premise 
that underlies each of these classifications and definitions is that the individuals involved 
are outcome interdependent, and this has been objectively defined through the 
interdependence structure in each of these games. In the words of Deutsch ( 1980), 
through structural interdependence "their fates are woven together" (p. 61). Further, 
the views presented in this chapter predominantly argue that group level behavior leads 
to irrational processing. This conclusion is in line with Campbell (1965) who offered a 
similar observation: 
We have tended to see the altruistic as moral, as the imposed achievement of civilization. 
Under a broader framework we must now, in some cases, be willing to see altruistic social 
motives as irrational and immoral, or a least amoral. (p. 307). 
The irrationality of group level behavior is a conceptualization of group life that the 
social sciences have continued to struggled with, not only over the last century in social 
psychology but in the social sciences In general (see Hardin, 1995). 
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3.6 Summary and synopsis of the social dilemma research 
A fundamental question that arises in this chapter is: what determines "rational 
choice'' in a social dilemma? What role do group level processes play? Are groups 
necessarily more deceitful than individuals, as the intergroup research reviewed in this 
chapters argues? Social dilemmas, in effect, pit individual rationality against collective 
interest. However, is the serving of individual self-interest, short and long term, always 
the rational choice in situations of interdependence? On this point, do individual utility 
functions, such as cooperators, competitors and individualists, also serve this end, in that 
they provide for the maximization of individual self-interest in the long term. Or does 
the functioning of group level processes, such as the role of communication, question 
this premise of rationality and self-interest? In terms of the contemporary analysis, the 
formal answer lies within the foundations of the social dilemma research -- game theory, 
wherein rationality is defined through the minmax principle. Individual self-interest is 
assumed to be the rational choice. 
Rapoport (1966) has long suggested that the notions of individual and collective 
rationality be separated, recognizing that rationality can have more than one meaning. 
Rapoport (1974) understands the problem as follows: 
It turns out that in the context of non-constant-sum games like Prisoner's dilemma actually two 
concepts of 'rationality' compete for attention, namely individual rationality, which prescribes 
to each player the course of action most advantageous to him under the circumstances, and 
collective rationality, which prescribes a course of action to both players simultaneously. It 
turns out that if both act in accordance with collective rationality, then each player is better off 
than he would have been had each acted in accordance with individual rationality (p. 18). 
This concurs with Poundstone's (1993) recent review of prisoner's dilemma games in 
which he agrees with Shubik (1970): "The paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma will never 
be solved - or has already been solved - because it does not exist" (p. 277). For Shubik, 
the game demonstrates one thing well, that individual interest can overturn collective 
interest, given the right circumstances, in other words rationality may not be fixed. He 
draws the analogy of a feather and a lead weight being dropped in a vacuum. What we 
fmd is that they fall at the same rate, defying what we believe to be true. The prisoner's 
dilemma game also defies what we know to be true. For within the social dilemma 
paradigm we have been endeavouring for years to increase the rate of cooperation. It 
has perplexed us, as researchers, that individuals fail to cooperate in these experimental 
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dilemmas. As a consequence, the rational pursuit of individual self-interest, has become 
our base line for understanding human nature. But human rationality does not exist in a 
vacuum, what we know to be true is that humans do cooperate to a remarkable degree 
(see al~o Etzioni, 1988; Tajfel, 1972; Turner, 1981). As Poundstone states: "Real-world 
dilemmas are built of subjective valuations of the welfare of one's self and others ... the 
ability to see "opponents" as fellow beings frequently transforms a nominal prisoner's 
dilemma into a much less troublesome game" (pp. 277-8). The question is, 
psychologically, by what mechanism do we come to see opponents as fellow beings - as a 
collective? Empirically, Dawes,' van de Kragt and Orbell (1990) suggest: 
Our experiments have lead us to conclude that co-operation rates can be radically affected by 
one factor in particular, which is independent of the consequences for the choosing individual. 
That factor is group identity: Such identity- or solidarity- can be established and consequently 
enhance co-operative responding in the absence of any expectation of future reciprocity, current 
rewards or punishment, or even reputational consequences among other group mcmbers.(p.199) 
A recent review of the literature (Tyler and Dawes, 1993) questions the premises of an 
individual's motivation to maximize individual self-interest, recognizing that often an 
individual's self-interest is consistent with the group interest. They suggest "that 
developing a group identity is central to willingness to act in the group's interest rather 
that one's own. The key psychological question is why this effect occurs." (p. 93). 
Thus, the question can be asked: what role does identification play in addressing 
intragroup and intergroup processes? Can the paradigm assist us in answering these 
questions? Or does it restrict us? 
In their review of the literature Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) have suggested that the 
gaming paradigm can lead us to the theoretical core of behavior in social dilemmas: 
The question in our minds is not whether to develop theory, but how? Can we build on the data 
already collected or must we start anew? Our inclination is toward the former. We are 
attracted by the metaphysical assumptions of the gaming paradigm-- that behavior should be 
viewed as a set of decisions aimed at achieving valued outcomes. If their assumplions are valid, 
then we can view past research as rough ''outcropping'' or surface phenomena that can guide us 
to the underlying veins of theoretical core. (p. 370) 
Inherently the use of this paradigm embeds us in the notion that rationality, as defined by 
von Neuman and Morgenstern (1944, 1947), is the pursuit of individual utility 
maximization. This literature is clearly embedded in a meta-theory that favours the 
individual: groups are defined in terms of the outcome interdependence of individuals 
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and rationality is defined at the individual level. The bias is clearly towards human 
rationality as viewed by homo-economicus (see Grezlak, 1991; Stroebe and Frey, 1982). 
Yet this body of literature is at a stalemate, as evidenced by its numerous 
equivocal results. Researcher are looking for further understanding: some press for the 
return to the roots of interdependence theory (Kelley, 1991; Van Lange, 1994; Rusbult 
and Van Lange, 1996); others state that "social psychologists have largely ignored 
economic principles and concepts" (Kormorita and Parks, 1995, p. 200) and advocate 
cross disciplinary collaboration; and others argue for the application of artificial 
intelligence (Liebrand, 1992). For each agrees that the "elegant mathematical world of 
decision making obviously does not sufficiently match reality. [And] we currently lack a 
comprehensive theory of decision making in interdependent settings, which integrates the 
variety of theoretical and empirical research findings" (Liebrand, 1992, pp. 279-280). 
Yet this may not be enough. Before adopting yet another trajectory for this 
research to encompass, it seems prudent to take even a wider step back, beyond the 
roots of interdependence theory, to the very roots of our discipline and examine the 
assumptions and meta-theory that are embedded in this body of literature. For a 
consistent pattern emerges within this literature on social cooperation. We have 
established an ongoing history of failed theoretical development. In reference to the 
theoretical developments reviewed in Chapter 2, each of the key researchers highlighted 
has noted this: 
May and Doob (1937): It is quite plain that existing research on competition and cooperation is 
scattered, spotty, and even chaotic. (p. 141) 
Deutsch (1949): There has been little in the way of explicit theorizing and virtually no 
experimental work with respect to the effects of co-operation and competition upon social 
process. (p. 129) 
Pruitt and Kimmell (1977): Gaming research has a peculiar status. On one hand, it has been 
immensely popular, with over 1000 published studies. But on the other hand, the results of 
these studies have been largely ignored by the broader field. Our diagnosis of this situation 
stresses an undesirable method bound approach, lacking in theory and with little concern for 
external validity. (p. 363) 
Each of these approaches emphasizes the goals or outcome interdependence of the 
individuals involved. As presented, this approach addresses the problem through the 
analysis of outcome interdependence structures and the transformational processes of 
individuals within these situations. 
Ironically, this research has moved away from the dynamic theory of the person 
and the situation that Lewin (1935) argued for. We've now categorically classified every 
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aspect of this literature into taxonomies, typologies, strategies and solutions. It seems 
that a paradigm shift would be a reasonable extension, moving from a classification 
system of individuals and situations towards a fuller understanding of the social 
psychological processes that subsume the dynamic relationship between the individual 
and the situational. Through our classificational analysis the social psychological study 
of social cooperation has become more descriptive than prescriptive. This is in line with 
Lewin's (1935) early arguements: 
Finally, it means for psychology, as it did for physics, a transition from an abstract 
classificatory procedure to an essentially concrete constructive method. (p. 42) 
For Lewin the "dynamics of the process" were essential to understanding behavior, in 
accordance with momentary aspects of the individual and momentary aspects of the 
environment. In Lewin's (1935) own words: 
What a thing is at any time depends upon the total situation and the momentary condition of 
the [individual]. Similar considerations hold also for the social factors. In this dependence 
there becomes clear a matter of fundamental psychological importance, namely, the direct 
relationship between the momentary state of the individual and the structure of his 
psychological environment. That the psychological environment, even when objectively the 
same, depends not only upon the individual character [of the individual] concerned but also 
upon its momentary condition becomes clear when we consider the relation between 
environment and needs. (p. 76, italics mine) 
In other words, behavior is a product of a dynamic social psychological system. Hence, 
in order to further develop our understanding of social cooperation, it is essential that we 
study the social psychological process involved, as it relates to the social field of 
interaction that is psychologically relevant to the individual. In particular the process of 
social identification with others seems conceptually ripe to pursue, as highlighted by the 
conclusions reached by Dawes et a!., (1990) and others working within the 
interdependence literature that defines social dilemmas and their solutions. 
This thesis will argue that it is now time to step aside from this structured 
paradigm of interdependence to study these social psychological processes underlying 
social cooperation. For as Grzelak (1991) concludes in speaking to the interdependence 
literature on social dilemmas: "in studying social orientations, social justice and traps, 
we are in a kind of trap ourselves, a trap of our own experimental paradigms and [meta] 
theoretical (pre) conceptions .... We still lack a good psychological theory of conllict 
between individual and social interest" (p. 234). This issue will be examined in the 
following chapters. To begin, Chapter 4 will review two important assumptions in this 
literature: our conceptual understanding of self-interest and the reality of social group. 
Chapter 5 will present a different theoretical approach that can be applied to the 
understanding of social cooperation: social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfcl & 
Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner ct al., 1987). 
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-Chapter 4-
Us and Them: Self-interest and the reality of the social group 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted the fmdings of literature that has emerged from 
the social dilemma paradigm - a paradigm designed to study the abstract analysis of 
strategic social interdependence and to find rational solutions to these scenarios. Given 
the mixed empirical findings raised in the previous chapter, as well as the active pursuit 
of researchers in this area looking for answers, this chapter aims to examine two 
important underlying assumptions of this body of literature: self-interest, narrowly 
conceived in terms of rational actor models, and functional interdependence, as the 
defming conceptual nexus between the individual and the group. This chapter will begin 
with a brief account of our implicit understanding of the self, and rational action, in the 
social sciences, which will be followed by a short history of how social psychologists 
have conceptually understood the relationship between the individual and the group. The 
aim of this review is to re-examine basic theoretical assumptions that have been made 
when addressing research questions that relate to social dilemmas and social cooperation. 
The primary assumption of this body of literature is that behavior in social 
dilemmas is motivated entirely by individual self-interest, short and long term; the main 
premise being that all individuals aim to increase their respective utility functions. 
However it has been widely argued that this assumption needs to be re-examined (Edney, 
1980, 1981; Granovetter, 1985; Kramer & Brewer, 1986; Lynn & Oldequist. 1986; 
Messick, 1974). Recently Caporael (1995) has argued: 
Most behavioral and social sciences assume human sociality is a by-product of individualism. 
Briefly put, individuals are fundamentally self-interested; "social" refers to the exchange of 
costs and benefits in the pursuit of outcomes of purely personal value, and "society" is the 
aggregate of individuals in pursuit of their respective self-interest. To this view of "economic 
man," which long pre-dated Darwin, sociobiology added the idea that individual advantage 
could be measured in the currency of genes. (p. I) 
This embedded assumption, as well as other concerns, have prompted the following 
review of the history of self-interest and the principle of rationality. Following this 
review, the history of the conceptual relationship between the individual and the group 
will be outlined. 
4.2 A brief history of self-interest 
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The prevailing doctrine of this age defines self-interest in terms of the benefit to 
me, an isolated individual. This doctrine has influenced the course of social psychology 
significantly, with the debate on the nature of self-interest having a long and varied 
history-- back to the fourth and fifth centuries B.C. in Athens (see Mansbridge, 1990). 
At that time, self-interest was a topic of debate between the sophists and others, 
as documented in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, who opposed the sophists' 
arguments. The sophists believed that it was our nature, as human beings, to act in 
terms of our individual self-interest, so to gain maximum power and reward to ourself 
at the minimum of personal risk; mutual individual defence was the primary aim of 
group life. Plato and Aristotle opposed them on strong humanitarian grounds, arguing 
that we inherently, as individuals, have collective interests-- the basis of state 
representation. By the mid-seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes, following the 
advancement of the scientific method, reduced the world to its analytic components --
individuals -- deducing a universal, irreconcilable conflict that, if not controlled, would 
lead to "the war of all against all." In his most influential work, Leviathan, he argued 
through deductive reasoning the necessity of obedience to a sovereign state to control 
the ultimate destructive nature of individuals. Hobbes (1651) argued that all individuals 
are involved in a struggle against others, all of us have: 
a perpetual and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death. And the cause 
of this, is not always that a man hopes for more intensive delight, than he has already attained 
to; or that he cannot be content with moderate power: but because be cannot assure the power 
and means to Jive well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more. (p. 61) 
With the rise of capitalism in the late 17th century, the legitimation of the rational 
"economic man" developed this perspective further. Hobbes' influential model of 
individuals pursuing power, ultimate power, pits man against man, nation against 
nation, all for the sake of the security of the isolated individual. Historically, as man 
went exploring and conquering new lands, legitimising conflict went hand in hand with 
legitimising self-interest. Theorists, such as John Locke (1689), began stressing the 
necessity of accepting conflict. Today, self-interest, narrowly conceived, prevails and 
flourishes, as the world powers ride out the ultimate perils of economic self-interest. 
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As outlined, social cooperation has predominantly been studied through the 
social dilemma paradigm, where the outcomes that are good for each group member 
acting individually are bad for the group as a whole. Effectively, the paradigm pits the 
individual against society, wherein individuals are understood to sacrifice some of their 
outcomes for the collective good, or all are worse off. The underlying motivation is to 
maximize personal interests. The similarity with Hobbes' conceptual analysis is 
striking. Hardin (1968) also saw little cause for optimism regarding the prospects for 
cooperation in commons resource dilemmas. The conceptualization continues to be that 
the state of nature resides in the pursuit of individual self-interest. Individual control 
over outcomes has thus become the dominant paradigm, as seen in the theories outlined 
in Chapter 2. 
As shown in the previous chapter, the evidence is mixed, sometimes ambiguous, 
and lacks consistency; the jury is still out on how to solve social dilemmas. It is not 
hard to find evidence from laboratory experiments (Allison & Messick, 1985), field 
studies (Wilson, 1977), or computer simulations (Meadows, Randers & Behrens, 1972) 
that seems to support Hardin's gloomy view of the 'tragedy of the commons.' In many 
experiments, even when small groups of individuals are allowed unrestricted access to 
scarce resource pools, they often fail to exercise the restraint necessary to preserve 
them. At the same time, outside the formal structure of the gaming research, there are 
many situations in which individuals do cooperate to a surprising degree in everyday 
life. Given such productive levels of cooperation, it is hard to reconcile these findings 
with the assumption that behavior in social dilemmas, and otherwise, is motivated 
entirely by individual self-interest. People have been observed to reduce water 
consumption during droughts, curtail their driving during gasoline shortages, and 
donate blood when public supplies run low (see Etzioni, 1988; Hornstein, 1976; Organ, 
1988; Talarowski & McClintock, 1978). 
Given such evidence, several researchers have argued that the assumption that 
individual decision making in social dilemmas is motivated primarily by egoistic 
motives, or concern about self-interest alone, needs to be re-examined (Edney, 1980, 
1981; Kramer & Brewer, 1986; Lynn & Oldenquist, 1986; Messick, 1974; Mansbridge, 
1990). There is a growing recognition, by a number of social psychologists, that it is 
invalid to assume that all human behavior is driven by selfish individualism. Recently, 
there have been several cogent and diverse critiques of this Hobbesian assumption (e.g., 
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Etzioni, 1986, 1988; Grzelak, 1991; Lerner, 1980; Mansbridge, 1990; Schwartz, 1986; 
Wallach & Wallach, 1983). Edney (1980), for example, suggested that the 
development of theory regarding cooperative solutions to resource dilemmas has been 
impeded by "Hobbesian assumptions that social conflict is natural and ubiquitous in 
groups" (p. 145). Similarly, Granovetter (1985) observed more generally that recent 
research on economic and social behavior has been dominated by an "atomistic, 
undersocialized conception of man in the utilitarian tradition of which Hobbes was part. 
Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social contex~ nor do they adhere ... 
(to] ... social categories that they happen to occupy. Their altern pts at purposive action 
are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations" (p. 483, 487). 
Lynn and Oldenquist (1984, 1986) have mooted this argument directly at the social 
dilemma literature. In their 1984 paper, American Social Psychologists: 1lle Children 
of Hobbes, they state: 
If social psychologists did not feel they could explain human behavior independently of social 
context, there would be less of a gulf between them and sociologists, who have long been less 
atomistic than the psychologists, less haunted by the ghost of Thomas Hobbes, and more 
willing to see Gemeinschaft as something that informs and creates the behavior, indeed, the 
very i£/entity, of individuals. (p. 47, emphasis added) 
Sahlins (1976) argues that "economic man" is an idiom of Western culture, not a fact of 
human nature. Caporael eta!., (1989) are in agreement, offering an alternative 
explanation that: 
Group living bas been a central characteristic of the human species through human evolution 
(Foley, 1987). Yet psychologists, anthropologists, and evolutionists have rarely considered 
what psychological characteristics might have evolved as adaptations to living in small groups. 
Instead, most theorists assume that human nature is basically selfish and individualistic. (p.l) 
As this summary outlines, there are converging arguments from a number of perspectives 
that we re-think our conceptualization of human nature. 
On the other hand, recent theorizing continues to support the now centuries old 
notion of "homo-economicus". Dawkins (1976) has forwarded the selfish gene theory. 
Axelrod (1984) has forwarded his "reciprocal altruism" hypothesis; Alexander (1987) 
"kin altruism". Not denying the increasing evidence on the role of identification with 
groups, there is also a growing interest in the social sciences (Hardin, 1995) in the 
relationship between self-interest and identity. Hardin (1995) has recently written 
extensively about this and summarizes: 
The argument of "the logic of collective action" is that self-interest typically runs counter to 
group interest. This is commonly thought to be distressing conclusion: Because we are self-
seeking, we fail collectively and, therefore, individually. (pp. 4-5) 
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Hardin goes on to argue that through identification processes "self-interest can often 
successfully be matched with group interest. And when it is, the result is often 
appalling" (p. 5). In other words, while self-interest can be matched to the group 
interest, this processes often leads to irrational behavior. The double-edged sword 
(Brewer and Schneider, 1990, to be reveiwed in Chapter 6) of individual and group life is 
borne out; specifically, the dichotomy of individual rationality and collective irrationality 
induced through identity processes. 
Despite this growing body of literature which support these "egoistic incentive" 
theories, Caporael eta!. (1989) offer an alternate explanation that "sociality was a 
primary factor shaping the evolution of Homo sapiens" (p.1) In discussing social 
dilemma research and self-interest, they state that "a critical assumption in the human 
sciences is that people's choices in such dilemmas are individualistic, selfish and 
rational" (p.l). Their analysis shows that the 'egoistic incentive' notion is a heuristic 
convenience, organizing a variety of behaviors under a single explanatory umbrella, and 
that it is pre-emptive to write off all human behavior as only a means to an end for the 
satisfaction of self-interest, narrowly conceived. They provide sociobiological 
theoretical arguments, with supporting empirical evidence, in which the results cannot 
be explained in terms of egoistic incentives (i.e. individual self-interest). They propose 
a 'sociality hypothesis' that human nature is instinctively social rather than individually 
selfish. 
Caporael et a!. (1989) cite a number of recent studies that manipulate our social 
identity as a primary factor of social cooperation, acknowledging that our identity can 
have a social rather than economic basis. These studies explicitly manipulate social 
identity in social dilemmas (and will be described in Chapter 6), arguing that 
individuals inherently act in terms of multiple social identities. These researchers 
manipulate the social identity of the participants so as to give either ingroup or 
outgroup identities (differential group identity) or a superordinate group identity 
(inclusive group identity). The results indicate that social identity does affect the 
individual's decision making in a social dilemma. Generally, individuals were more 
cooperative when there was a shared social identity and less so when there was a 
differentiated group identity. Thus, the assumptions that cooperation is a pursuit of 
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rational individuals for the benefit of their isolated self-interest needs to be re-examined 
in terms of the psychological reality of group level processes. 
In summary a large assumption within the behavioral and social sciences is that 
human sociality is a by-product of the resource interdependence of individuals. The 
simple (untested) assumption is that individuals are fundamentally sell~interested; our 
"sociality'' is merely a default mechanism that results from social exchange systems, 
wherein individuals accrue costs and benefits in pursuit of maximizing their personal 
outcomes. Society, as such, is a by-product of an aggregate of individuals pursuing 
their respective self-interests. 
Many social psychologists would recognise this model of the individual as 
grossly simplified and many other social scientists would concur with this assessment. 
Thus, whilst economics, through game theory, provides a language and structure that 
allows a certain type of a social dilemma to be defined it has been only moderately 
successful in explaining people's behavior in these situation of objective 
interdependence. This suggests that the strongly individualistic model may usefully be 
modified or replaced with a more social model or theory of group behavior (see also 
Chase, 1992). Thus, our historical understanding of the conceptual nexus between the 
individual and the social group is important to this endeavour, and will be reviewed in the 
following section. It is telling to consider the implicit nature of the self that is taken in 
each of these accounts. 
4.3 The conceptual nexus between the individual and the group 
Given that social dilemma research has found that objective interdependence, per 
se, does not create essentially group type behavior, such as cooperation, the aim of this 
section is to examine the debate over the social and psychological reality of the group - a 
debate that has been called the 'essential problem' of social psychology (F. Allport, 
1924; Asch, 1952; Oakes et a!., 1994; Turner & Oakes, 1986). While the objective or 
social reality of groups has, for Jhe most part, been taken as a given, the psychological 
reality of groups as meaningful, and thus motivating, entities, has been debated 
throughout the history of social psychology. It seems prudent to review this history in 
light of the findings of the previous chapter. Perhaps this history will offer insights into 
this literature and bring direction to this body of literature for it seems that this literature 
is not only discordant with its own findings but it has also grown apart from the a large 
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body of work on intergroup relations. As Messick and Mackie (1989) state: "It strikes 
us as curious that the immense literature on conflict management, a literature large 
enough to support two scholarly journals ... remains by and large apart from the 
literature on intergroup relations and vice versa" (p. 69). This section will review three 
main traditions in the conceptual relationship between the individual and the group, each 
of which have influenced developments in social psychology: (1) group mind theorists 
(pre-experimentalists); (2) behaviourists; and (3) interactionists. 
4.3.A Group mind theorists: The pre-experimentalists 
Broadly speaking the pre-experimentalists such as LeBon (1895), McDougall 
(1921) and Freud (1921) took up a group mind thesis. Generally, it was understood that 
society existed apart from the primal individual; however, to enjoy the benefits of 
society individuals adopted social doctrines of law and order to function effectively 
together as individuals. Society existed to impose peace and order on the individual; in 
other words, for the individual to become civilized and thus benefit from it. The 
influence of Thomas Hobbes is immediately apparent in this thesis. Society was not 
understood as a group, as such, and for the most part group behavior was understood to 
be irrational, driven by primitive instincts and emotions (see Asch, 1952; Turner eta!., 
1987 for a more extensive review). 
LeBon (1896) explained the mental unity of a crowd as group behavior, 
specifically it was the mental unity rather than the physical proximity that defined a 
group. His general thesis was that the crowd induced anonymity, wherein individuals 
experience a loss of self and personal responsibility. Behaviour was then dictated by a 
collective radical unconscious which operates from the primitive state of the uncivilized 
human being, whereby intellect is lost and atavistic emotions predominate. LeBon 
summarizes group behavior as "the special characteristics of crowds such as impulsivity, 
irritability, incapacity to reason, absence of judgement or critical spirit, exaggeration of 
emotions and more besides are also observed amidst lower forms of evolution such as 
the savage and the child" (1895, p. 23). 
Interestingly, LeBon's analysis of crowds reflects his contempt of collective 
protest in the late 1800's in France and he explicitly adopts the individual self-interest 
model of human nature. 
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In a group every sentiment and act is contagious to such a degree than an individual readily 
sacrifices his personal interest to the collective interest. This is an aptitude very contrary to his 
nature, and of which a man is scarcely capable, except when he makes part of a group" (p. 33) 
For LeBon, individuals arc transformed by groups, such that, however different the 
individuals that makeup the group up may be, they act very differently than they would 
do as isolated individuals. 
McDougall (1921) highlighted an inherent contradiction in LeBon's work- while 
groups can sometimes bring out a destructive nature in the individuals who make them 
up, groups also have an amazing capacity to do good. As McDougall (1921) states a 
group "has ideals and aims and traditions loftier than any principles of conduct the 
individual can form himself unaided" (p. 20). The recognition of this paradox acted as a 
catalyst for him to re-examine the relationship between individuals and groups, 
specifically he made the distinction between organized and spontaneous groups. 
McDougall was influenced by the work of Darwin through his interest in the 
problem of the genesis of the human mind. His approach incorporated the instinct of 
the individual with the social environment provided by society. While rejecting 
scientific inquiry as being too abstract from reality, he developed an analysis of the 
mind within society. In his own way he was an interactionist who believed that: 
We can only understand the life of individual and the life of societies, if we consider them 
always in relation to one another. It was realised that each man is an individual only in an 
incomplete sense; that he is but a unit in a vast system of vital and spiritual forces which, 
expressing themselves in the form of human societies, are working towards ends which no man 
can foresee; a unit whose chief function it is to transmit these forces unimpaired, which can 
change or add to them only in infinitesimal degree, and which, therefore, has not little 
significance and cannot be accounted for when considered in abstraction from that system. 
(1921, p. 6) 
For McDougall (1921) society had a spirit of its own-- a supernatural force with 
metaphysical powers that subsumed the individuals within. Society had a group spirit 
that united individuals. Social cooperation was understood as acting in accordance with 
the society's group spirit. Human society could only exist through" faithful self-
sacrificing co-operation" (p. 79) of individuals: 
The group spirit destroys the opposition and the conflict between the crudely individualistic 
and the primitive altruistic tendencies of our nature .... This is the peculiar merit and efficiency 
of the complex motives that arise from the group spirit; they bring the egoistic self-seeking 
impulses into the service of society and harmonise them with the altruistic tendencies. The 
group spirit secures that the egoistic and the altruistic tendencies of each man's nature, instead 
of being in perpetual conflict, as they must be in its absence, shall harmoniously co-operate 
and re-enforce one another throughout a large part of the total field of human activity. (p. 79) 
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Through the essence of a group spirit individuals come to identify themselves with the 
group and to work for the welfare of the group. The power of the group spirit 
overcomes purely individualistic egoistic motives. In this view the honour and glory of 
society or group becomes that of the individual, transcending individualistic motives. 
Like Sumner (1906), McDougall saw society as being made up of many 
different groups and thus each individual could share in multiple group consciousness. 
This conceptualization is important to his analysis for: 
it allows the formation of a hierarchy of group sentiments for a system of groups in which each 
larger group includes the Jesser; each group being made the object of the extended self-
regarding sentiment in a way which includes the sentiment for the Jesser group in the sentiment 
for the larger group in which it is comprised. Thus the family, the village, the county, the 
country as a whole, form for the normal man the objects of a harmonious hierarchy of 
sentiments of this sort, each of which strengthens rather than weakens the others, and yields 
motives for actions which on the whole co-operate and harmonise rather than conflict. (1921, 
p. 80) 
Thus an individual can come to cooperate with an ever increasing chain of inclusive 
groups, each movement outwards increasing the strength of those it includes. One 
comes to identify with the group in terms of self-regarding sentiment, a process through 
which the group becomes primary to the individuaL As one acquires the group spirit, 
loyalty and devotion to the group increases as do acts of self-sacrifice. As with the 
other pre-experimentalist, cooperation is seen as an act of self-sacrifice for a common 
good that exists above and beyond the reality of the individual -- that being the reality 
of the group mind which individuals must submit to, in order to reap the rewards of 
society. 
Freud (1945, p. 84, first translated 1922) understood LeBon to be primarily 
concerned with spontaneous or transient groups, McDougall with stable associations of 
group life, while Freud himself was concerned with identification processes that are 
related to attachment to objects of desire to satisfy innate emotional needs and desires. 
He took a developmental approach. He argued that children first attach themselves with 
their mother and identify with fellow siblings. This same pattern further develops in 
the school setting, with teachers being the attachment (authority) figures, and then to 
other domains of life. Justice within these attachment groups can only be held up 
through the object of attachment giving equal treatment to all. To uphold this equal 
treatment individual must sacrifice certain things, which can evoke hostile feelings of 
resentment. In this same way, throughout the life span, individuals attach themselves 
to leaders through the same attachment and identification process. As Freud (1945) 
states: 
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Thus social feeling is based upon the reversal of what was first a hostile feeling into a 
positively-toned tie of the nature of an identification ..... The preliminary condition [of group 
membership] is that all their members should be loved in the same way by one person, the 
leader. Do not let us forget, however, that the demand for equality in a group applies only to 
its members and not to the leader. All the members must be equal to one another, and a single 
person superior to them all -- that is the situation that we find realised in groups which are 
capable of subsisting. (p. 88 - 89) 
Freud uses the army as an analogy: 
It is obvious that a soldier takes his superior, that is, really, the leader of the army, as his ideal, 
while he identifies himself with his equals, and derives from this community their egos the 
obligations for giving mutual help and for sharing possessions which comradeship implies. 
But he becomes ridiculous if he tries to identify himself with the general. (p. 110) 
This led Freud to concluded that human nature led individuals to be horde animals, 
through the manner in which they were led by a chief, and that this hording behavior 
was the basis of cooperative relations. Cooperation is then understood as a product of 
identification with a uniting leader, through which all individuals are equal and thus 
cooperate in pursuit of pleasing the common leader (opposed to goal). This analysis 
assumed that "this prodigy as meaning that the individual gives up his ego ideal and 
substitutes for it the group ideal as embodied in the leader" (p. 102). 
Interestingly, a common theme to emerge across the work of each of these group 
mind theorists was the role of emotions and loss of one's individual identity or 
rationality to the group. While each recognized the reality of a group mind, this was 
seen as a quite separate entity to the rational, intelligent or civilized individual. 
4.3.B Behaviourism: The sole reality of the individual 
In reaction to the group mind thesis, Floyd Allport (1924) developed a 
theoretical synthesis within the framework of Watsonian behaviourism. His quest was 
to bring social psychology back into the science of psychology and away from the 
metaphysical, and thus intangible notions, of a group mind. It was in this context that 
his individualistic doctrine emerged (Allport, 1962), its aim to debunk the "group 
fallacy" of attributing reality to groups and social institutions. For J\llport the 
individual is the only point of analysis: "if we take care of the individuals, 
psychologically speaking, the groups will be found to take care of themselves" 
(Allport, 1924, p. 9). 
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As a social scientist opposed to the group mind thesis, he was inl1uenced by the 
zeitgeist of biological determinism, favouring behaviourism and the experimental 
method. Allport (1924) summarizes his approach as follows: 
There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of 
individuals. Social psychology must not be placed in contradistinction to the psychology of 
the individual; it is a part of the psychology of the individual, whose behavior it studies in 
relation to that sector of his environment comprised by his fellows. His biological needs are 
the ends toward which his social behavior is a developed means. (p. 4) 
As an individualist, Allport (1924) defines a group as" any aggregate consisting of two 
or more persons who are assembled to perform some task, to deliberate upon some 
proposal or topic of interest, or to share some affective experience of common appeal" 
(p. 260). And while never defining cooperation, per se, Allport (1924) discusses 
cooperative behavior as follows: 
Within the larger groups in which the interests of the whole transcend the narrower family 
responses, animals afford many examples of cooperation, and often, like humans beings, make 
real sacrifices for the welfare of the group. One of the simplest forms of cooperation ... is the 
taking of positions in such a way as to allow the best coordination among the individuals of the 
group .... Cooperation in the stricter sense [is] each doing his share in a common labor. (p. 165) 
Cooperation, in this sense, is nothing more than co-action with other individuals. His 
experiments examined the influence of face-to-face groups on individuals concluding 
that there is a "phenomenon closely allied to cooperation ... known as esprit de corps" 
(1924, p. 283). This observation became incorporated into his theory of social 
facilitation, one of two processes that accounts for the accelerating effects of groups on 
individual performance. It is thought that other co-actors serve as contributory stimuli 
through performing the same task and thus accelerate our responses. At the same time 
groups can also detract from our performance as "we are confused and distracted 
whenever we feel our reaction to be at variance with or inferior to the average behavior 
of those about us" (1924, p. 285). In this light groups induce conformity and are 
conceptualized as the sum of their individual co-actors. 
Allport did not deny the existence of social groups or communities of 
individuals and he understood cooperation as labouring for the good of the community 
of which you are a member. He believed that it was our public institutions that 
maintained the cooperative good of society. Thus the insitutionalization of cooperative 
behavior maintained the common good. Allport (1924) states: 
The school therefore should be an institution, not merely for endowing the individual with 
abstract knowledge, but for so modifying his responses of avoidance, hunger, and love that 
they shall serve as means to cooperative social living .... The classroom itself affords a 
valuable setting for the inculcation of moral attitudes. The submission and conformity of the 
individual in the co-acting group is here brought to play. (p. 402-3) 
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Thus cooperation is learnt through institutionalized reforms, and hence through the 
prosperity of advancing cycles of needs fulfilled. Through social continuity, each 
successful generation inherits the prosperity of the one before. As Allport states: "We 
thus live on in the habit systems of succeeding generations in proportion to the value of 
our contribution to the social order ... Progress which is the achievement of the 
individual becomes the heritage of the ages" (p. 430). As such the social order of 
succeeding generations must be maintained. 
In not denying the intergroup nature of our existence, Allport (1933) states: 
Let us begin with the psychology of national boundaries. Aside from making out areas of land 
belonging to a certain group, a boundary has the function of including within it a large number 
of people who can be counted upon to act cooperatively toward certain ends .... People within 
a boundary will cooperate, moreover, in the establishment of armies and navies, in enlistment 
for war, in policies of immigration, in treaties, in tariff regulations, and in foreign relations 
generally. Many of the actions in which the individuals within the boundary cooperate are 
designed for the common defence and the fortifying of the boundary itself. National 
organization, in modern times, practically always implies definite boundaries; yet it is the very 
nature of these boundaries to mark off areas within which people will join in conflict against a 
common enemy. (p. 161) 
For Allport, nations themselves are sources of war. In reply to McDougall's concept of 
the 'self-regarding sentiment' of national consciousness, Allport (1924) states: 
"National honour is located solely in the individuals of the nation. Insults to the flag 
bring personal resentment because this emblem has become a conditioning stimulus for 
the individual's attitudes of self-esteem and personal security" (p. 388). 
Thus at every level Allport is consistent in his argument for the sole reality of 
the individual. And despite the consistency of his rigorous scientific arguments, it was 
the classic and important work of Kurt Lewin that brought the reality of the group into 
the domain of scientific inquiry. However, the full impact of the Lewinian tradition 
was not entirely felt until after his death, through the work of his students: Deutsch, 
Kelley, Thibaut etc. This influential tradition will be discussed later in this chapter, for 
at the same time other interactionists, Specifically Asch (see 1952 for review) and Sherif 
(see 1967 for review), were reacting against individualism in their own distinct ways. 
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4.3.C lnteractionists: The dynamic nature of the individual and the group 
It was the classic work of the early interactionists, Lewin, Asch and Sherif, that 
established a more dynamic understanding of the nature of the nexus between 
individuals and groups. While the work of these thinkers is rich in depth and relates to 
many areas of group relations and processes, for present purposes the focus will be on 
their coneptualization of the group and their understanding of social cooperation. In 
general this approach can be understood as a gestalt approach to these social 
psychological processes, whereby the whole is perceived as greater than the sum of its 
parts. In other words, the group is conceived as more than the sum if its parts -
individuals. 
4.3.C.1 Asch- The socially structured field within the individual 
Asch (1952, p. 257) argued for the" distinctiveness and inseparability of the 
individual and the group." In reviewing the group mind and individualistic premises 
that came before him, Asch states: 
For an adequate formulation of the individual-group relation, we need a way of describing 
group action that neither reduces the individual to a mere target of group forces of mystical 
origin, nor obliterates the organized character of group forces in the welter of individual 
activities. We need a way of understanding group processes that retains the prime reality of 
individual and group, the two permanent poles of all social processes .... We must see group 
phenomena as both the product and condition of actions of individuals. (p. 250 -251) 
Through his simple yet powerful experiments, Asch (1956) showed how objective 
reality became subjectively veridical through group life. He contended that through 
group life, we engage in mutual reference through the presence of a "socially 
structured field within the individual" (Asch, 1952, p. 253). This perceptual field is 
shared by individuals through group life and thus refers to the group as a whole -- a 
powerful yet less tangible entity than the discrete individual. Collective goals and 
pursuits of individuals are thus shared through similar cognitive representations; the 
goals of the individual are one and the same with the goals of the group. Through this 
shared perceptual field, the individual acts in terms of the group and coordinated group 
action develops. Hence an individual becomes more than a discrete individual, they 
come to understand themselves in terms of their group memberships. Thus, the reality 
of the group becomes the reality of the individual. 
0Joperation, in this sense, is simultaneous acts by individuals towards a single 
group goal, that is enabled through a shared socially structured psychological field. 
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Mutual or reciprocal action is not the means by which group life emerges but this action 
is the consequence of simultaneous action towards one goal -- a product of this shared 
socially structured field. Cooperation can thus be explained as a product of 
psychological group formation. As Asch states: "the essential factor is the presence of 
different and complementary actions executed simultaneously and with reference to 
each other . ... Cooperative action is therefore identical with group formation. The 
group and the task form a system, a change in each part alters the other parts" (p. 175). 
Through the salience of a shared perceptual field, personal inclinations are subsumed by 
the dynamics of achieving group goals -- cooperation is the end, not the means, of 
group formation. 
Asch elaborates further in explaining what he calls extended cooperation. In 
this form of cooperation the group situation or goal is not fully understood hy all 
members, but the mere action of other group members steers individuals towards the 
goal. In other words the group, at times, can be primary to the individual -- it becomes 
the psychological force behind the action at that time. As such, the action is not 
individually oriented but emerges through group level processes. 
Asch's understanding of the relationship between the group and the individual is 
rich and complex. A single definition of the group is not distilled. The following 
paragraph will suffice to give the reader an understanding of how Asch conceptualizes 
the relationship between the individual and the group: 
Our task is to understand both the distinctness and inseparability of group and individual. 
Group conditions can act on individuals only because individuals have very definite properties. 
The individual possibilities of conversation must precede the actuality of conversation; the 
individual possibilities of a self precede the actuality of a self that is socially related. We must 
understand also how group conditions penetrate to the very center of individuals and transform 
their character. In particular, we must urulerstand that once a group is functioning, the unit is 
not an individual but a social individual, one who has a place in the social order as a child, a 
husband, or a worker. Therefore, we may not separate the individual from the group for the 
same reason that we may not separate him from his surroundings. To understand the 
individual we must study him in his group setting; to understand the group we must study the 
individual whose interrelated actions constitute it. (p. 257, emphasis mine) 
As with other writers, a sense of group identity is pivotal to Asch's conceptualization of 
the self, in its relationship to the group. He states: "The self is not only a private 
percept; it is also part of the shared social-psychological field" (p. 282). Further these 
identities are not summative but function in terms of structural relations -- they emerge 
as ordered parts within the whole. The perception of the whole necessitates the 
perception of its parts. Asch's ideas can not be underestimated. He brings a holistic 
view to our understanding of the process and products of the self, identity, groups and 
individuals that must be understood in terms of the context in which they emerge. To 
fully understand social cooperation we must clearly conceptualize each of these 
properties and their relationship to each other. 
4.3.C.2 Sherif- Identification processes: Emergent properties of group life 
In contrast to Asch, Sherif's classic field studies were more goal oriented in 
explaining intergroup relations; however, in a similar way to the work of Asch the 
process of identification with the group was central to his understanding of the 
relationship between the individual and the group, and how this relates to the 
development of cooperation and conflict. As with Asch the individual and the group 
inform each other, and thus can not be understood in abstraction from one another. 
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And unlike Lewin, Sherif (1967) was interested in the products of social interaction; the 
"rounded study of human interaction has to go beyond the study of a process at a point 
in time. It entails study of the products of interaction (structure and norms)" (p. 2). 
Sherif (1966) brings the concept of self, identity, individual and group together 
in this statement: 
Any unit of people ... has some unique sense of self-identity or of common predicament. But 
this sense of identity as a unit of people is not a primitive intuition that unfolds spontaneously. 
The sense of self-identity emerges with all its unique characteristics and shadings when a 
people are shaping the unit itself. 
There is no predetermined or immutable blueprint for the formation of a given number of 
persons into a new human unit. People form and re-form human groupings when they feel the 
necessity of participating together in toil toward common objectives, or as they share success 
or failure, glory or humiliation. During the process of formation, the experiences shared by 
people result in a sense of identity differentiating themselves as a unit. (p. 2) 
Sherif (1966) wrote at length about the sequence of self-other differentiation and 
classifications. In general he argued that "the mere awareness of other groups within 
the range of our desires generates a process of comparison between "us" and the 
others. This tendency seems to be one of the fundamental facts in the psychology of 
judgement. Through this comparison process, we evaluate and categorize other 
groupings of people, comparing them with our notions of ourselves, our conceptions of 
our place in life and the places of others." (p. 3). Given this, Sherif (1966) states: 
Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with 
another group or its members in terms of their group identification, we have an instance of 
intergroup behavior. (p. 12) 
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Sherif's work was described in a number of publications (Sherif, 1951,1966; Sherif, 
Harvey, While, Hood & Sherif, 1961; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Sherif, White & Harvey, 
1955). Through his emphasis on the products of social interaction, the field studies, in 
general, are a descriptive account of cooperative and competitive processes of 
intergroup relations, as established through the implementation of subordinate and 
superordinate goals. 
Sherif states that "the appropriate frame of reference for staging intergroup 
behavior is the functional relations between two or more groups, which may be negative 
or positive" (1966, p. 12). In Sherif's experiments, "functional relations" are 
equivalent to complementary-noncomplementary group interests. !\group is defined: 
as a social unit that consists of a number of individuals (1) who, at a given time, have role and 
status relationships with one another, stabilized in some degree and (2) who possess a set of 
values or norms regulating the attitude and behavior of individual members, at least in the 
matters of consequence to them. Shared attitudes, shared sentiments, shared aspirations and 
goals that characterize the closely identified members are related to these properties, especially 
to the common values or norms of the group. (1970, p. 12) 
He maintained that to understand the etiology of both conflict and cooperation it is 
important to define the precise framework, or context, in which they arise. For Sherif, 
it is the context that defines the "sense of we-ness" that is established and upheld by 
the individual group members. 
In time. the standards shared in the" we" feeling become personally binding for individual 
members. The members who are worthy and true justify or condemn events within the sphere 
related to their" we-ness" in terms of their sense of identification with the group. Thus, the 
sense of solidarity, loyalty, personal accountability, and their "do's" and "don'ts" in relevant 
matters become part of the consciences of individual members. (Sherif. 1966, p. 157) 
An important implication of this latter definition is that intergroup behavior need not 
necessarily involve the physical presence and interaction of entire groups, but can 
simply mean individuals from two different groups interacting in terms of their 
respective group identities. Group process and behavior is understood in terms of a 
psychological motivation, through identification. 
Group identification and intergroup attitudes are the dependent variables in his 
three classic field studies, the intergroup nature being manipulated through task and 
goal orientation. Each study was carried out in the context of a boys' (11-12 years, 
white, middle-class, Protestant) summer camp. The four experimental stages 
progressed as follows: (1) spontaneous interpersonal friendships formed and then were 
purposefully broken in the forming of two groups, so as to not confound the results with 
explanations of interpersonal attraction. The result of this division was the formation of 
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new ingroup friendships. Sherif (1966) concluded that" friendship choices shift 
steadily from strictly interpersonal attractions toward ingroup exclusiveness, as a part of 
group formation and functions" (p. 75); (2) the two groups carried out a number of 
ingroup tasks through which a status hierarchy and leadership structure emerged. Each 
group also develop a strong group identity; (3) intergroup conflict and rivalry began, 
and escalated, when the outgroup was made evident. Attitudes toward ingroup 
members became more positive and those toward outgroup members more negative. 
Notions of justice and fairness became evident and events were perceived in a manner 
that favoured the ingroup; ( 4) intergroup cooperation emerged through the use of a 
series of superordinate goals which required the aid of both groups for achievement. 
Sherif's experiments are an important landmark in social psychology since they provide 
an empirical demonstration of the discontinuity between individual and group 
processes. 
Specific to cooperation, the two general hypothesis that were put forward and 
supported were (Sherif, 1967, p. 452): 
1. When groups in a state of conflict are brought into contact under conditions embodying 
superordinate goals, which are compelling but cannot be achieved by the efforts of one group 
alone, they will tend to co-operate toward common goals. 
2. Co-operation between groops, necessitated by a series of situations embodying 
superordinate goals, will have a cumulative effect in the direction of reducing existing conflict 
between groups. 
The application of superordinate goals to achieve harmonious group relations has also 
been used in a number of applied settings: industrial conflicts (Blake and Mouton, 
1962; Blake, Shepard, and Mouton, 1964); international conflict (Frank, 1964); and 
education (Aronson, 1978; Johnston and Johnston, 1995). 
Thus, Sherif induced cooperative behavior through imposing superordinate 
goals that have "a compelling appeal for members of each group, but that neither group 
can achieve without participation of the other" (Sherif, 1966, p. 89). It, thus, could be 
argued that the cooperation Sherif achieved in the fourth stage was not between two 
different groups, but between individuals who had to act as one group in order to 
complete the tasks, and that psychological group formation at the superordinate level 
was the intervening process that allowed cooperative behavior to emerge. 
Sherif's work was contextually rich and inspirational to many, the studies 
constituting a functional theory of intergroup relations that related to prejudice, 
stereotyping, conl1ict and cooperation. The field studies were based on positive or 
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negative interdependence of members which then produce equivalent relationships with 
their respective group members. For Sherif stated that "the appropriate frame of 
reference for staging intergroup behavior is the functional relations between two or 
more groups, which may be negative or positive" (1966, p. 12). Given this emphasis, 
we can see the direct relationship between Sherif's work and the work of Morton 
Deutsch (1980, p. 58) through the concepts of positive (promotive) and negative 
(contrient) interdependence. At the same time, to emphasize the positive and negative 
inter-dependence of group members is to miss important aspects of Sherif's work; 
however, Sherif's field studies are, by and large, used as a representation of the 
functional interdependence approach to conflict resolutions (recall the earlier quote by 
Deutsch in chapter 1) and also realistic group conflict theory (Campbell, 1975). 
4.3.C.2.a Realistic group conflict theory 
In line with other interactionists of his time, Campbell (1965) raised" a self-
directed protest against the overly individualistic assumption as to human motivation 
which is dominant in social psychology today. This assumption can be called skin-
su~face hedonism" (p. 285). Using Thibaut and Kelley (1958) as an example, he was 
concerned that numerous social psychologists were "deriving group processes and 
structures entirely from the self-centered concern of the actors as to "What's there in it 
for me?" --a mutual back scratching on the part of fundamentally selfish organisms" 
(p. 285). Campbell (1965) took refuge in Asch (1952), applauding his efforts to" put 
accuracy of description ahead of theoretical simplicity" (p. 286). He clearly takes a 
systems approach: 
One of the long-standing observations of biology, and one of the theoretical achievements of 
cybernetics, is the observation that larger-system parameters can control subsystem variables, 
can" cause'' them in the same sense that a change in the setting of a thermostat can" cause') a 
change in room temperature. This kind of systems-theory perspective, most relevant to the 
study of human group behavior, makes traditional psychological reductionism untenable. 
(1972, p. 27-28) 
Campbell picked up on the original work of Sumner (1906) and others (Bernard, 1957a; 
1957b; Boulding, 1962; Coser, 1956; Davie, 1929; Newcomb, 1960; Sherif, 1951; 
Sherif et al., 1961; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Sherif et al., 1955; White, 1949, 1959) in 
conceptualizing Realistic-Group-Conflict Theory. Like Sherif, it is largely a 
descriptive analysis of group conflict (p. 287): 
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1. Real conflict of group interests causes intergroup conflict. 
2. Real conflict of interest, overt, active, or past intergroup conflict, and/or the presence of 
hostile, threatening, and competitive outgroup neighbors, which collectively may be called 
"real threat," cause perception of threat. 
3. Real threat causes hostility toward the source of threat. 
4. Real threat causes ingroup solidarity. 
5. Real threat causes increased awareness of own ingroup identity 
The theory is dearly group based and assumes that group conflicts are rational in the 
sense that groups, in competition for scarce resources, do have very realistic goals that 
are incompatible. In addressing the individual-group problem, Campbell ( 1965) 
interprets "altruistic, self-sacrificial ethnocentric motives as ambivalently balanced with 
the own-skin-saving self-centred ones" (p.306). This reasoning was influential in the 
development of Brewer's ambivalent sociality model (reviewed in Chapter 6). 
Despite Campbell's initial concerns with the functional interdependence 
approach (e.g. Thibaut & Kelley), many researchers today note that gaming research 
shares the normative and theoretical underpinning of realistic conflict theory. As 
Taylor and Moghaddam (1994) state in their review of theories of intergroup relations: 
"Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT) is essentially an economic theory of intergroup 
behavior." (p. 35). It is often highlighted that each adopts the assumption that conflict 
is bad as their point of departure; thai the conflict is "realistic"; and that control over 
resources, that affects individual's utility, is the motivating factor. In fact, in one of this 
later papers Campbell (1983) drew on concepts from game theory to explain the 
interplay between biological and cultural evolution to re-assess the appropriateness of 
kin-selection theories. Campbell argues, as does game theory, that cooperation, 
sometimes in the form of coalition formation, is a biproduct of competition. It has also 
been noted that the sentiments of this approach can be traced to the work of another 
sociologist, Sumner (1906, see Chapter 1), through his articulation of the concept of 
ethnocentrism. 
In line with the other interactionists of the day, Campbell (1958) began 
exploring the gestalt principles of entitativity of social aggregates, examining 
Wertheimer's (1923) elassification system based on principles of perceptual 
organization: proximity, similarity, common fate and pregnance, good continuation or 
good figure. His purpose was to examine "the possibility of a sociology at a level of 
analysis separate from psychology" (1958, p. 14) to build objective concepts about 
systems that individuals behave within. 
Campbell examined the indices of common fate, similarity, proximity and 
pregnance. Each of these indices was described in terms of the relationships between the 
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elements (individuals) and it was concluded that each "represent by and large objective 
or operationally specifiable aspects of the stimulus field" (p. 18). For example, common 
fate was described as "clements that move together in the same direction, and otherwise 
in successive temporal observations" (p.17). While not discounting a similarity based 
principle, Campbell believed that the entity "boundaries drawn by similarity seem 
somewhat secondary than those based upon common fate" (p. 20). He used the example 
that based on objective similarity "red heads" could be argue to be a more defined group 
than "Negroes;" however, because the latter group also shares a sense of common fate, 
they are more "real." Clearly this analysis understands social grouping as external 
entities to the individual and objectively definable. This reflects the common fate of 
individuals perspective adopted in interdependence theory and, thus, the social dilemma 
paradigm. Interestingly, the study of the entitativity of social aggregates is receiving 
revived attention these days ( eg. Brewer & Harasty, 1996; McGarty, Haslam, 
Hutchinson & Grace, 1995; Yzerbyt, Rocher & Schadron, 1996). Realistic conflict 
theory remains an influential theory in the literature, particularly through the "realistic" 
assumptions that underlie gaming research and evolutionary models. 
4.3.C.3 Lewin- Field theory in social psychology 
Lewin was influenced by the great scientific enquiry of his time, specifically 
that of field theory in physics (Einstein & lnfeld, 1938; Maxwell, 1923) as well as the 
scientific philosophy of Ernst Cassirer (see Schilpp, 1949). In addition, while Lewin is 
known for a number of contributions to the field of social psychology, his group 
dynamics research is most relevant here, as it refers to his theoretical analysis and 
experimental study of group processes. When Lewin first wrote about group dynamics 
(1936, 1939) it was in reaction to the commonly denied (e.g. F. Allport) existence or 
reality of groups to the individual. 
One of Lewin's most significant contributions was that he made the concept of 
the group acceptable and significant to the experimental study of social psychology. 
While often critisized he never wavered from his conviction: "I am persuaded that it is 
possible to undertake experiments in sociology which have as much right to be called 
scientific experiments as those in physics and chemistry" (p.71, 1948; reprint of 1939 
paper). His innovative experimental group studies brought the understanding of the 
group back to the reality of the individual. The early experimentalists (Festinger, 1947; 
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French, 1941; Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939; Lippitt, 1940) were instrumental in 
demonstrating that experimental social psychology could further our understanding of 
group processes and human relations. In other words, he showed that groups per se 
influence the nature of the individuals that define them. As Lewin summarizes: 
"Generally, in every situation the person seems to know what group he belongs to and 
to what group he does not belong. He knows more or less clearly where he stands, and 
this position largely determines his behavior" (1948, p. 146). Thus, in contrast to F. 
Allport, Lewin might say: There is no psychology of individuals which is not 
essentially and entirely a psychology of groups. Lewin (1948, p. 54) conceptualized the 
group as a gestalt: 
The essence of a group is not the similarity or dissimilarity of its members, but the 
interdependence. A group can be characterized as a" dynamical whole": this means that a 
change in the state of any subpart changes the state of any other subpart. The degree of 
interdependence of the subparts of the group varies all the way from a" loose" mass to a 
compact unit. 
He makes a direct contrast with another gestalt principle, that of similarity. For Lewin: 
" ... similarity between persons merely permits their classification, their subsumption 
under the same abstract concept, whereas belonging to the same social group means 
concrete, dynamic interrelation between persons" (1948, p. 184). 
Unfortunately, apart from his early papers Lewin wrote relatively little on the 
theory of group dynamics. However, he has produced an influential tradition in social 
psychology and a myriad of conceptual ideas that have become influential through the 
work of his students and colleagues. His conceptualization of the group has been 
immensely influential. Gordon Allport distills the essence of Lewin's thesis in 
introducing the compiled papers of Lewin (1948): 
The unifying theme is unmistakable: the group to which an individual belongs is the ground 
for his perceptions, his feelings, and his actions. Most psychologists are so preoccupied with 
the salient features of the individual's mental life that they are prone to forget it is the ground 
of the social group that gives to the individual his figured character. Just as the hed of a stream 
shapes the direction and tempo of the flow of water, so does the group determine the current of 
an individual's life. This interdependence of the ground and the figured flow is inescapable, 
intimate, dynamic, but it is also elusive. (p. vii) 
Lewin's aim was to build a bridge between concrete social action and abstract 
social theory. His approach was systematic yet dynamic, employing three main classes 
of explanatory concepts: (1) topological; (2) those expressing the dynamics tension of 
individual psychology and (3) those expressing the tension system imposed by the 
surrounding field. The topological concepts were used to define and map the two 
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tension systems, examples being the space offi·ee movement, life space, and region. 
While the second class of concepts are anchored in the individual as a system of tension 
(such as need, aspiration/eve/, satiation), they are in dynamic tension with the third 
class of forces outside the individual, which include concepts such as field forces, 
barriers and locomotion. These last concepts are important as they are group referent 
sources. For example, field forces emerge from group life, which can place barriers 
that restrain and influence an individual's locomotion- a change in an individual's 
position with reference to the group. Recall that locomotion was the sole Lcwinian 
concept that Deutsch (1949a, b) capitalized on. However, these three classes of 
explanatory concepts are not separable; they form a gestalt-- a single well-integrated 
system. Lewin (1936) summarises that together they form the: 
Totality of facts which determine the behavior (B) of an individual at a certain moment. The 
life space (L) represents the totality of possible events. The life space includes the person (P) 
and the environment (E). B = f(L) = f(P,E). It can be represented by a finitely structured 
space. (p. 216) 
Thus, as defined, an individual's life space encompasses both function and structure of 
the dynamic system; thus, it is both process and product. Lewin states that: "forces 
control the course of a process ... [and] In every process the forces of the inner and 
outer environment are changed by the process itself' (1935, p. 48). The system forms 
an ongoing dynamic entity and the individual can only be understood in interaction with 
the environment at any given time. In other words the person and the environment can 
not be abstracted from one another, as each event brings about change in the dynamic 
whole. The cognitive structure constantly evolves, through an underlying functional 
mechanism. 
Lewin was most interested in accounting for the functional relationship between 
the person and the environment; that is, building a systematic account of the underlying 
social psychological mechanisms and he argued that this system would necessarily 
function in terms of an interaction between the person and the environment. As such the 
person and the environment must be understood as a dynamic whole -- not in abstraction 
from one another. In other words, for Lewin, it was not sufficient to simply describe the 
interdependence structure and the psychological state of the individual; to advance the 
discipline, the job of social psychology is to understanding the functional relationship 
between the individual and the environment. As Lewin (1943) further states: "Field 
theory is probably best characterized as a method: namely, a method of analyzing 
causal relations and of building sciemific constructs" (p. 45). 
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Lewin viewed field theory not as a formal theory but more of a map of 
conceptual ideas-- a critical yet holistic approach to psychology. Deutsch (1988) 
states that: "There was a feeling that Lewin was in touch with the richness of common 
sense psychology and was concerned with trying to transform that into science" (p. 90). 
Cartwright (1959) and de Rivera (1976) saw field theory as an approach to 
conceptualization; Jones (1985) as a point of view. What he developed was a 
theoretical approach to social psychology that has been highly influential in the theory 
building of his students and colleaugues: D. Cartwright, A. Zander, J. Thibaut, H. 
Kelley, A. Pepitone, P. Zimbardo, J. Singer, L. Ross, S. Schachter, L. Festinger and M. 
Deutsch (see Festinger, 1980; Patnoe, 1988 for review). These theoretical 
developments of group processes, based on the interdependence of group members, 
ground a significant body of research in social psychology, from stereotyping to social 
cooperation. However, it is also evident that contemporary social psychology has 
moved away from Lewin's original perspective. 
Lewin (1935) stated that to systematically build our conceptual understanding of 
human behavior" .. .it means for psychology, as it 'did for physics, a transition from an 
abstract classificatory procedure to an essentially concrete constructive method" (p. 42). 
This transition marks a move from Aristotelian classification to a Gaillean field dynamics 
conceptualization. Classification was of critical importance for Aristotelian physics 
"because ... the class defined the essence or essential nature of the object and thus 
determined its behavior in both positive and negative respects." (1935, p. 4). However, 
interdependence theorists continue to classify variables in terms of taxonomies of 
situations and typologies of individuals. For example, just as Aristotle describes an 
object as having an essence that is distinctly its own, social value theorists describe 
individuals as having an essence that is distinctly their own, such as cooperators, 
individualists, competitors. For Lewin, the essence of an individual will change with the 
environment and, thus, a classification approach is somewhat restrictive. 
Thus in the psychological fields most fundamental to the whole behavior of living things the 
transition seems inevitable to a Galilean view of dynamics, which derives all its vectors not 
from single isolate objects, but from the mutual relations of the factors in the concrete whole 
situation, that is, essentially, from the momentary condition of the individual and the structure 
of the psychological situation. The dynamics of the process is always to be deril'ed from the 
relation of the concrete individual to the concrete situation, and, so far as internal forces are 
concerned, from the mutual relations of the various functional systems that make up the 
individual. (Lewin, 1935, p. 41) 
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In arguing for a constructivist's method, Lewin in essence is arguing for a dynamic 
systems analysis of social psychological processes and products that mediate the 
relationship between individuals and groups. Recall that he further emphasised that "the 
whole situation changes with the process" (1935, p. 33), thus understanding the process 
is the critical element. 
Lewin stressed his interdependence definition of a group to differentiate it from 
the objective similarities criterion often used as a way of objectively classifying 
individuals (by sex, race, economic position, attitude similarity) in terms of group 
membership. He argued that having similarity in this objective sense does not necessarily 
imply interdependence within "one social whole." It was for this reason that he stated 
the often cited definition of the group: "Not similarity, but a certain interdependence of 
members constitutes a group" (p. 147). However he goes on to clarify his position: 
One should realize that even a definition of group membership by equality of goal or equality of 
an enemy is still a definition by similarity. The same holds for the definition of a group by the 
feeling of loyalty or of belongingness of their members. However, such an equity, as well as the 
equity of goal or of enemy, constitutes sometimes, also, a certain interdependence of the persons 
who show these similarities. Therefore, if one wishes to use the feeling of belonging as the 
criterion of a group, one can do so if one points to the interdependence established by this 
feeling . ... The kind of interdependence of the members (what holds the group together) is 
equally as important a characteristic of a group as the degree of their interdependence and the 
group structure. (p.l48, italics mine) 
Our social psychological understanding of interdependence has had a slippery history, 
since Lewin's (1952, p. 146, orig. 1939) early formulation. Lewin, preferred a definition 
of a group in terms of a certain interdependence of members to distinguish it from an 
objective classificatory analysis of similarity. Again, for Lewin "Stressing similarity or 
dissimilarity, rather than interdependence, is typical of the descriptive [Aristotelian] 
"classificatory" epoch, which can be observed in a relatively early stage of development 
in practically every science" (p. 148). Recall that Lewin argued that is was important to 
the development of psychology that it move away from this approach. 
Taken together, the point that Lewin stressed was that a group had a reality of its 
own, a reality that is qualitatively different from a mere aggregate of individuals. His 
conceptualization of the group was as a dynamic whole that emerged in an individual's 
life space. He states that: "It took psychology many steps before it discovered that a 
dynamic whole has properties which are different from the properties of their parts or 
from the sum of their parts .... Both whole and parts are equally real. ... the whole has 
definite properties of its own". This statement, in fact, goes beyond the Gestalt doctrine 
that the "whole is greater than the sum of its parts" to the "whole is different than the 
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sum of its parts" thus making it clear that the parts and the whole each have a reality of 
their own. Just as individuals and groups each have a distinct reality of their own, 
neither having primacy over the other but function in relation to one another. 
4.4 Summary and synopsis of self-interest and the reality of the social group 
As this last section has shown, our conceptual understanding (and opcra-
tionalization) of the nexus between the individual and the group has continued to change 
through the course of history in social psychology (see Turner eta!., 1987, Chpt 2). In 
contrast to the contemporary interdependence approach reviewed in Chatpers 2 and 3, 
the early interactionist perspectives of Asch, Sherif and Lewin understood the 
psychological reality of the group in quite a distinctive way; specifically, that the group 
had a psychological reality of its own that could not be understood in terms of the 
objective interdependence of individuals. 
The social identity and self-categorization analysis, to be introduced in the 
following chapter, carries on from the work of these early interactionists. The theories' 
approach is similar to a Lewinian analysis, emphasizing the development of theoretical 
constructs to explain underlying process and mechanisms. Further, like Lewin, this 
approach recognized that groups have a distinct psychological reality that is differellt 
from the sum of its individual members. The theory also has historical overlap with some 
of the conceptual ideas put forward by McDougall (1921). 
Rather than understanding groups in terms of goal interdependence of 
individuals, self-categorization theory holds that group identification is the basis for 
perceived interdependence between individuals. In other words, as has emerged in the 
work discussed above, group identification could be the psychological intervening 
variable that allows perceptions of interdependence to emerge. This is similar to the 
conceptualization of the group that Lewin argued for when he stated (Lewin, 1952, p. 
146, quoted above) that it is the "feeling of belonging" that establishes the 
interdependence. Given this, interdependence, in certain instances, could be construed 
as both cause and effect. 
For example, the Sherif summer camp studies quite clearly showed that 
individuals who were positively interdependent, that is had a common goal, functioned in 
terms of those interdependent relationships and thus, moreso than not, came to identify 
with their group. As Sherif (1966, p. 12) has stated whenever individuals act in terms of 
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their "group identification" this provides the basis of intergroup behavior. The key point 
is that identifying with the group may be the key psychological variable that allows for 
group based behavior to emerge. And, in this case, objective outcome interdependence 
did lead to psychological group formation and thus perceived interdependence. 
Likewise Asch (1952) has stated that the dramatis personae of society itself are 
its human characters. From an interactionist's perspective he states: 
It blunts thinking to speak of the participants in the social scene as "individuals." ... The 
meaning of["!" and "you"; "we" and "them"] goes far beyond the identification of separate 
individuals. Their content is relational and mutually dependent. ... Of course, the categories to 
which these bare designations refer occur in very concrete contexts .... But these concrete 
categories are themselves the product of specific social processes." (Asch, 1952, p. 180). 
The psychological reality of the group is both a concrete and emergent property of group 
life and processes. 
The question then is: Can an identity based approach account for the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of group-based behavior, such as social cooperation, given the 
failings of the functional interdependence approach (as described in chapter 2 and 3)? 
As Lewin stressed, social psychology must as some point move from a descriptive 
analysis of group processes to a more dynamic analysis of group life. Further, as Camac 
(1992) points out more work has to be done on the underlying process that allows for 
social cooperation to emerge. While the interdependence approach has been limited in 
this regard, this is the explicit focus of the social identity approach. 
It could also be argued that objective positive interdependence is only one of 
many variables that allows for group-based activity to emerge. While, Campbell (1958) 
identified gestalt variables such as common fate, similarity, proximity and prcgnance, 
others could be shared threat or shared interests. Each of these variables could lead to a 
common identification, and social identity theorists argue that it is the process of 
identification that is the intervening variable that allows group based action, such as 
social cooperation, to emerge. At the same time, this does not deny the role that 
individuals' objective interests play (see Turner, 1981). The point is that this perspective 
"reinstates the group as a psychological reality and not merely a convenient label for 
describing the outcome of interpersonal processes and relations" (Turner, 19R4, p. 535). 
While this approach follows a Lewinian tradition, it has more fully developed the 
underlying mechanism for predicting social behavior. For as Kelley (1991) quite rightly 
acknowledges, many of Lewin's early ideas were poorly developed in his models. 
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Brieily, self-categorization theory offers a model of human nature that is radically 
opposed to the idea that society is made up of discrete individuals who are selfish utility 
maximizers and, thus, must be controlled through effective social systems. Instead of 
self~ interest being the exclusive domain of the individual, this theoretical perspective re-
defines the self such that acting in terms of a group membership is re-conceptualized as 
acting in terms of self- a self that is inclusive of others at a social or group level. A~ 
Coleman (1961) has noted: 
Classic economic theory always assumes that the individual will act in "his" [or her] interest: 
but it never examined carefully the entity to which "his" [or her] refers .... in many situations 
men act as if the "his" [or her] refers to some entity larger than themselves. That is, they 
appear to act in terms, not of their own interest, but in the interests of a collectivity. (p.24) 
Tajfel (1966) argued, three decades ago, that cooperation and conflict could not be 
explained on the basis of calculations of utility or broad assumptions about the role of 
instinct in social behaviour (p. 77). As he states: 
The possibility to co-operate in most human situations is based on the ability to perceive a 
situation from the point of view of another individual, and then to make use of the information 
so obtained as a guide for subsequent actions. If co-operation were not based on the implicit or 
explicit use of this ability to become allocentric as distinct from egocentric, it could happen only 
sporadically, by chance encounters of parallel or complementary actions, and it could never 
form the basis of a complex and co-ordinated sequence of behavior originating from many 
individuals .... 
In addition the more an individual perceives other people as similar to himself, the more will 
his behavior be determined by his perception of their behavior. The importance of this 
phenomenon in the determination of human reactions to all kinds of events in the environment 
is sometimes not sufficiently appreciated. It will be obvious that under conditions of "common 
fate", such as shared threats, dangers or goals, this convergence of behaviour is bound to 
become more marked. But is can also be found in cases where the function of concerted 
behaviour does not appear at all obvious. (pp. 80 - 81) 
In summary Tajfel argued that social cooperation can only be enacted through some 
cognitive mechanism that allows for: "man's capacity to see others as men like himself, 
however different they may be from him " (p. 84). As we will see, the development of 
social identity and self-categorization theories led to the specification of the 
psychological mechanism that can account for the functioning of this capacity. 
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-Chapter 5-
Social cooperation and self-interest: The history and theoretical 
development of the analysis of social identity and self-categorization 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter made two important points. It argued for the importance 
of the distinctive psychological reality of the group and questioned the prevailing 
doctrine of the primary motivation of individual self-interest, in favour of a more social 
model of psychological motivation. This chapter, through social identity (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979; 1986) and self-categorization (Turner et al., 1987) theories, aims 
systematically to address these two points and provide an explanatory perspective that 
integrates them into a unified analysis that is both descriptive and prescriptive of the 
social psychological process underlying social cooperation. 
The approach to the understanding of social cooperation that will be argued for 
can be understood as having a similar aim to the original approach that Lewin argued for: 
to build a systematic account of processes that mediate the functional relationship 
between the individual and the group. Specifically, in the context of this thesis, this 
relationship will be used to explain the social psychological process of social 
cooperation. Unlike the interdependence perspective, which aims to describe the 
interaction between a number of intrapersonal psychological states and situations of 
interdependence, this analysis aims to identify an underlying social psychological 
mechanism that is predictive of social cooperation. In other words, this chapter 
represents a conceptual shift from a descriptive taxonomy of situations and typologies of 
orientations, as presented by the functional interdependence approach, to a dynamic 
systems analysis of social psychological processes that result in the product of social 
cooperation. 
Interestingly, while both of these theoretical models of social cognition can be 
explained in terms of Lewin's classic formula, B=f(PE), these two approaches are 
fundamentally distinct and thus use different explanatory constructs. As highlighted, the 
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interdependence approach explains social cooperation through the interaction of 
functional interdependence structures and transformational processes of individuals. The 
social identity analysis explains cooperation as a function of an integrated system of 
social context and categorization processes of individuals. In other words, social 
behavior is understood in terms of categorization processes that provide relevant social 
meaning to the perceiver through emergent social identities that reflect the individual's 
place within the perceived social structure or situation. As with Lewin, the social 
context, or environment, is an inseparable aspect of this analysis, in that this analysis 
addresses the context specific nature of self-categorization that produces a salient social 
identity. In summary, the interdependence analysis emphasizes individual processes that 
are constrained by functional interdependence with other individuals, while the social 
identity approach emphasizes the relevant social structural variables that influence 
individual cognition. Simply put, the emphasis turns from understanding an individual 
within a social system to understanding how the social system transforms the individual. 
This chapter will begin with an examination of the meta-theory that underlies the 
theoretical perspectives of social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1986) and 
self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987). Each of these theories will then be 
discussed. Given the breadth of this theoretical approach, the emphasis will he on the 
explanation of social cooperation. The conceptual understanding of the psychological 
reality of the group, the self and self-interest will be central to this analysis of social 
cooperation. These two theories are important in reference to the two points raised in 
the previous chapter. For it was social identity theory that provided the initial analysis 
that allowed for the reinstatement of the psychological reality of group, that is the group 
in the mind of the individual, and it is self-categorization theory that accounts for the 
underlying processes of identity formation, through the social psychological mechanism 
of the self. Thus self-categorization theory provides a more social model of the self and 
self-interest that can define and predict the psychological motivation underlying social 
cooperation. 
5.2 Meta-theory: A social psychological "field theory" approach 
An important distinction between the interdependence perspective and the self-
categorization perspective is the approach that these two theories take to the analysis of 
the problem of explaining social behavior, that is the meta-theory adopted. Thus, the 
meta-theoretical approach that Henri Tajfel argued for is important to the development 
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of this thesis. Tajfel's approach, from the beginning, informed his understanding of 
behavior in a manner that remains distinct from other contemporary approaches. Indeed, 
Tajfel's (1958) first paper, Metaphysicians of behavior, argued against mechanistic 
theories of human behavior, such as those put forward by Hobbes and Hull. Hobbes 
crudely adopted Galilean mechanistic principles and then applied deductive reasoning to 
legitimate the individualistic self-interest model of man that is still pervasive today (see 
Mansbrige, 1990; Lynn and Oldenquist, 1984; 1986). As Tajfel (1958) points out: 
"Hobbes ruthlessly extended Galileo's assumptions into the innermost sanctuaries of 
human thought and decision" (p. 30). In other words, overt "macro" social processes 
were applied to the understanding of human nature and behavior, in which the role of 
"micro" psychological processes was dismissed. Hobbes took the individual as a unitary 
closed system. And while the simplistic deductive logic underlying this analysis can be 
questioned on many levels, Hobbes' analysis remains prevalent in the social sciences 
today (see Curley, 1994; Rogers, 1995). Tajfel charged the social sciences with over-
simplifying, that is "psychologizing", human interaction and behavior. His point was that 
all human behavior occurs within a wider social system that in itself influences and is 
influenced by individual cognition. To explain and understand individual behavior as if 
an individual is a discrete mechanism is to deny wider reciprocal social influences. 
Tajfel (1958), as did Lewin (1935), argued against individualistic accounts of 
human behavior for: "[This] model forms a kind of explanatory ceiling in understanding 
human behavior just as the mechanical model of bodies pushing other bodies formed an 
explanatory ceiling in the seventeenth-century understanding of nature" (p. 3S). As 
Tajfel (1982) later stated: 
The [ 1958] article attempted to present a case against certain forms of reductionism in 
psychology. I now know what outraged me about Hull was his bland indifference to all that one 
knew about human society while he was weaving his web of 'hypothetico-deductive' over-
simplifications, claiming at the same time that they provided the basis for insights about the 
complexities of human social behaviour" (p. 2) 
This chapter will present the theoretical development of the social identity and self 
categorization perspectives, both of which represent the interactionist meta-theory of 
human behavior that Tajfel argued for in his approach to the science of understanding 
human behavior. 
This meta-theoretical perspective brings a dynamic - neo-Galilean - approach to 
the central paradox of social psychology -- the problem of systematically accounting for 
the nexus of individual and collective realities of behavior. In other words, to understand 
the distinctive psychological properties and processes of individuals and how those 
relate to and influence distinctive higher order collective behaviors (see Turner and 
Oakes, 1986). For while there exists a certain synchronicity between individual and 
group life there is also an inherent paradox: cognitive systems affect individual activity 
while higher order political, culturaL economic and historical systems affect collective 
activity. What underlies the theoretical relationship between psychological and 
sociological contributions to social behavior? Social psychology's raison d'etre is to 
systematically account for this paradox. No social psychologist would deny this 
relationship. It is how each approaches and represents the problem that is telling. 
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In contrast to the interdependence perspective, the social identity and self-
categorization approach to be developed takes a contemporary "field theory" approach 
(c.f. Lewin, 1940/1951, pp. 24- 29): the person and the environment are understood as a 
dynamic whole, wherein the person and the environment mutually inl(Jrm each other 
simultaneously. Further, this approach does not merely aim to describe the independent 
and dependent variables, and then systematically catalogue them in a framework typical 
of Aristotle, that is in terms of typologies and taxonomies. The approach aims to 
account for the underlying psychological processes and properties of behavior that can 
account for the independent and dependent variables. Simply put, the person and the 
environment cannot be understood in abstraction from each other. To understand the 
functioning of society, one must understand the cognitive functioning of the individual; 
to understand the functioning of the individual, one must understand the social structure 
and processes of society, and these must be understood concurrently. Society is part of 
the individual just as much as the individual is part of society. As Tajfel states in the 
development of social identity theory: 
The focus of the theory is not the individual but the explanation of uniformities of inter-group 
behaviour. No one would deny that 'ultimately' we are concerned with 'individuals' who 
behave in one way or another. But a clear distinction must be made between patterns of 
individual behaviour. ... [An individualistic] approach can get us nowhere very far in under-
standing those crucial uniformities of social behaviour which pertain to the psychological 
aspects of the social systems in which we live .... The point is that we shall never be able to 
formulate adequate guidelines for research on collective social behavior if we do not go beyond 
constructing sets of independent variables seen as functioning in a social environment which is 
assumed to be psychologically unstructured in its homogeneous and all-embracing 'inter-
individuality' (Tajfel, 1979, p. 187-189). 
This thesis aims to identify the underlying mechanism of cooperative behavior, and thus 
go beyond the taxonomies and typologies of other approaches. 
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The effect of wider social processes on individuals' psychological processes is 
assumed in the interactionist meta-theory of social identity and self-categorization 
theories (Oakes and Turner, 1986; Tajfel, 1979; 1981; Turner and Oakes, 1986; Turner 
and Oakes, 1996). In the same way that Lewin (1935, 1952) emphasized a dynamic 
interactionist theory that sought to understand the functional psychological mechanism 
that regulates the interaction between the person and the environment, the social identity 
approach addresses how psychological processes and products can only be conceived in 
terms of the context of social reality. This dynamic approach is very different from an 
interdependence approach that isolates a number of independent variables, such as any 
number of macro-social factors interacting with micro-psychological factors, to 
understand social behavior. This could only serve to understate the complexity and 
inter-relatedness of the dynamic system of interaction between the individual and the 
collective. Tajfel (see 1981, 1982 for review) emphasized these points continually: 'The 
processes of social categorization, social identity and social comparison ... cannot be 
conceived to originate outside of their social context" (Tajfel, 1979, p. 185). Each of 
these processes can only be understood in terms of a wider social system. Within this 
dynamic system emerges a psychological field that defines the frame of reference within 
which the individual perceiver is placed (see also Asch, 1952; Lewin, 1935; Sherif, 
1936). 
As the previous chapter highlights, these ideas are not new to social psychology 
(see Asch, 1952; Lewin, 1935, 1948; McDougall, 1921; Moscovici, 1976; Sherif, 1936, 
1967). However, social psychology continues to labour with its approach to the problem 
of the relationship between the individual and the group. As Smith (1991) reiterates: "In 
social and personality psychology, we are still struggling to regain and substantiate in 
research the interactionist approach that Lewin formulated so clearly, which lor so long 
was misinterpreted in social psychology as a mere situationism" (p. 164). This thesis 
aims to recover this ground. Like Lewin's approach (see 1952for a good overview), 
social identity theory and self-categorization theory represent a field theory, not only in 
the sense that they represent "interactionist" theories but also in the sense that they 
represent an approach to the quintessential problem of social psychology. For Lewin 
also emphasized that his field theory is "best characterized as a method: namely, a 
method of analyzing causal relations and of building scientific constructs" (Lewin, 
1943, p. 45); the theoretical analysis to be built in this chapter not only represents a 
distinctive approach to the study of group life and process, but also systematically 
presents a parsimonious account of these social psychological processes that is both 
descriptive and prescriptive of social behavior. 
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This chapter will argue for a dynamic conceptualization of intergroup processes 
and the self from which group level processes, such as social cooperation, and self-
interest can be re-defined. The result will be a distinctive conceptualization of the social 
group, the self, and what it means to act in one's self-interest. As Mansbridge (1990) 
points out "As evidence mounts that even the biological self is socially constituted, the 
very concept of self-interest becomes more complex" (p. 18). In this light, this thesis 
will work towards specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions that can account for 
social cooperation. The aim is to build theoretical guidelines that could provide a 
parsimonious framework through which to explain the growing number of divergent 
findings in the social dilemma literature and to provide a unifying theoretical basis to the 
study of social cooperation. This process will begin in this chapter, where we will lay 
out the theoretical basis for re-defining the self in self-interest. 
5.3 Social identity theory and the psychological reality of the group 
Tajfel's interest in intergroup relations led to the development of social identity 
theory (Tajfel, 1972; Turner, 1975a; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). The theory draws on 
the intergroup studies of the Sherifs and colleagues (see 1966, 1967, for review). Tajfel 
(1970, Tajfel, Flament, Billig and Bundy, 1971) was intrigued by the findings of the 
summer camp studies; specifically, the extent to which the conflict escalated, the 
enhancement of ingroup morale and the importance of group membership, particularly 
after friendship groups were dehberately broken. For while Sherif (1967), as seen in 
Chapter 4, conceptualized groups in terms of their functional interdependence, creating 
superordinate goals to resolve conflict in these famous intergroup field studies, he also 
stated that: "Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or 
individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group ident(ficalion, 
we have an instance of intergroup behavior" (Sherif, 1967, p. 12). These classic field 
studies constitute an important landmark in social psychology as they provided an 
empirical demonstration of the discontinuity between individual and group processes. It 
was this observation that lay the ground work for the development of social identity 
theory. Sherif's thesis (1967) was built on the premise that: "We cannot extrapolate 
from the properties of individuals to the characteristics of group situations" (p. 8). 
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Recall that Sherif made the point that individuals can and do act in terms of group 
identifications. It was this observation that lay the ground work for the development of 
social identity theory. 
5.3.1 Intergroup behavior and the minimal group paradigm 
The minimal group paradigm was developed from Tajfel and colleagues' (Tajfel 
et al., 1971) decision to see just how little it took to create intergroup discrimination. 
The findings of the studies using this paradigm are intriguing, for while groups were 
stripped down and chosen by arbitrary means, and hence group membership was not 
value laden, subjects still discriminated in favor of their ingroup. This occurred despite 
the lack of group goals (such as an objective current conflict of interests between 
groups), personal reward (that may lead to a simple assertion of individual self-interest 
for instrumental gain), history of hostility between groups, and face to face interaction. 
This surprizing "empty, almost 'kafkaian' situation" (Tajfel, 1972, p. 298) of intergroup 
behavior established the importance of social categorization as a primary psychological 
process. However, while there is consistent evidence that mere categorization can 
produce ingroup bias, it is important to emphasize that the theory acknowledges that 
individuals do live in a world where group membership is value laden and that 
categorization itself will not necessarily result in ingroup bias. As such, this analysis 
understands the significance of social identification through both an understanding of 
social context, such as social structure and norms, and categorization processes of 
individuals as important properties of the social psychological processes underlying 
intergroup behavior and relations. 
The minimal group situation was originally conceptualized to act as a neutral 
baseline of intergroup behavior. The intent was then to incorporate other variables 
systematically to establish the necessary preconditions for ingroup favouritism in an 
intergroup situation (Tajfel, 1978a, pp. 10 -11). While trivial intergroup classifications 
were defined, such as under or over estimation of dots or artistic preference for an 
abstract painter (Kiee or Kandinsky), assignment to group was actually random. Also, 
the groups were neither positively or negatively interdependent; in other words, there 
was no cooperative or competitive goal interdependence as defined by group 
membership. Subjects were simply to allocate reward points to anonymous others, and 
never themselves, based solely on their group membership. As there was no social 
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interaction between individuals, subjects did not know who the members of each group 
were and given the arbitrary nature of group membership there was no historical or 
normative component of group membership that could act as a source of intergroup 
definition. Subjects were reliant on members of both groups for the reward allocation 
that they would receive; thus, individual self-interest could not be linked to group 
membership. An important aspect of the design was that individuals never allocate to 
themselves. Given this reasoning, why would participants do anything but act fairly to 
participants in both groups? Why would individuals have any reason to discriminate on 
the basis of group membership? As stated these conditions were to act as a neutral 
baseline of intergroup processes, a foundation to systematically build an understanding of 
intergroup behavior. However, individuals' behavior in this paradigm did not reveal 
neutrality, mere categorization of individuals into ingroups and outgroups led to 
intergroup discrimination that favoured the ingroup. 
These initial findings remain significant for the analysis of intergroup relations to 
this day, as the results indicated a seemingly dehberate strategy of ingroup favouritism 
despite the arbitrary nature of the groups. Tajfel and colleagues (1971) concluded that: 
"Social categorization is not just an 'organizing principle' used in the absence of other 
guideposts; it is capable of creating deliberate discriminatory behavior" (pp. 162-163). 
These findings were also replicated in a second study which used a different intergroup 
distinction (preference for Klee or Kandinsky). Further, to extend the first study, the 
design also aimed to test the strategies that participants were adopting in the allocation 
task. Different matrices were designed to test the relative "pull" of four different 
strategies on each other. These were: (a) maximizing joint profit (MJP); (b) maximizing 
ingroup profit (MIP); (c) maximizing difference in favour of the ingroup members (MD); 
and (d) fairness (F). This second study revealed that not only was there a tendency to 
favour the ingroup but also to discriminate against the outgroup; indeed, the strategy of 
maximizing the difference, in favour of ingroup members, exerted a significant pull on 
the other strategies. Interestingly, in adopting this strategy, participants had to forego 
absolute ingroup gain, either in the form of MIP or MJP. In other words, in order to 
ensure relative ingroup status or gain, participants were willing to have less overall, as 
long as they had more than the other group. As such, individuals did not adopt an 
absolute maximizing outcome strategy, as rational actor or economic self-interest model~ 
would predict, they adopted a relative intergroup strategy that favoured their ingroup. 
116 
To account for these results a normative explanation was originally offered that 
suggested participants, who were schoolboys, adopted a competitive team perception of 
the situation. The appropriate social behavior, in this context, would then be to beat the 
other team; as such, the choice of a maximum difference strategy is rationalized as a 
normative aspect of team competition. As well as pointing out the implication for our 
contemporary modes of education and socialization, Tajfel and colleagues (1971) 
concluded that the results: 
... also point to the possibility that discriminatory intergroup behaviour cannot be fully under-
stood if it is considered solely in terms of an 'objective' conflict of interests or in terms of deep-
seated motives that it may serve .... The crucial aspect of this situation was that it contained a 
socially derived and discontinuous categorization of people into an in group and an outgroup. 
(p. 176) 
The minimal group studies lay the groundwork for further theoretical interest in the 
cognitive and normative explanations of social behavior. However, the original 
normative explanation of the minimal group findings was soon discarded as it was 
reasoned that this explanation quickly becomes circular, as it merely redescrihes the 
experimental findings in terms of a contextual norm -- a simplistic analysis that could 
explain any and all experiments. 
Tajfel (1972) thus became interested in just how and why these socially imposed 
categorizations become psychologically motivating. He suggested that the requirements 
of the minimal group paradigm evoke an essentially meaningless situation for 
participants. The only resource that engages participants' action is that of categorization 
processes that result in identification with a group and subsequent behavior. As Tajfel 
(1972) states: 
Meaning was found by [participants] in the adoption of a strategy for action based on the 
establishment, through action, of a distinctiveness between their own 'group' and the other, 
between the two social categories in a truly minimal 'social system'. Distinction from the 
'other' category provided ipso facto an identity for their own group, and thus some kind of 
meaning to an otherwise empty situation. (pp. 39-40) 
This passage highlights three points that will become important to the approach 
advocated in this chapter: the importance of the social systems that inform individual 
behaviour; categorization processes underlying identity formation; and the sense making 
-- meaning analysis -- of social categorization into social groups. 
The intriguing results found in these initial minimal group experiment have since 
been replicated in other contexts (Brewer, 1979; Brewer and Kramer, 1985; Doise et al., 
1972; Doise and Sinclaire, 1973; Messick and Mackie, 1989; Tajfel and Billig, 1974; 
Turner, 1981). Even in a seemingly absurd experiment, where subjects were explicitly 
told that they would be randomly assigned to groups, subjects favoured their ingroup 
(Billig, 1972; Billig and Tajfel, 1973). Further, when the allocation task was not 
explicitly group based, that is no explicit categorization of individuals into groups was 
introduced, the findings indicated little evidence of discrimination (Chase, 1971; 
Hornstein, 1972, Tajfel, 1970). 
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The consistent finding has been that social categorization, per se, of individuals 
into groups, in the minimal group paradigm, leads to ingroup bias. As Tajfel (1981) 
states the "empty" group condition "illustrates the reductio ad absurdum of this process, 
but it also shows how easily it can be set in motion" (p. 237). As Turner (1983) later 
noted, and despite some ongoing critiques (see Bornstein, Crum, Wittenbraker, Harring, 
Insko and Thibaut, 1983a; Bornstein, Crum, Wittenbraker, Harring, Insko and Thibaut, 
1983b, Brewer, 1979), "a decade's research, including the two experiments of Bornstein 
et al., has strengthened the inference from the original study by Tajfel et al. ( 1971) that 
within FAY [MIP + MD] both MD and MIP tend to be important (since FAY> MD), 
but that overall MD> MIP" (p. 364). In other words, maximum differentiation in the 
minimal group paradigm has been an effect consistently found across a number of 
studies. These fmdings provided initial evidence for a social psychological mechanism 
through which individuals define themselves, relative to others, through maximum 
differentiation. Through this process individuals are able to achieve social distinctiveness 
in terms of group memberships. 
Tajfel (1978, 1981, 1982) wrote extensively about these findings arguing that 
social categorization allows the perceiver to structure the causal understanding of the 
social environment. This process allows an individual's psychological processing to 
functionally adapt to the perceived social context, providing a point of relevant self-
reference to guide appropriate behavior. This context specific psychological reference 
point can be understood to be self-defining, in that it situates self-relevant meaning for 
the perceiver. Given that social structure specifies and embodies a number of social 
groups which individuals can identify with, this point of self-reference emerges through 
categorization processes that can functionally reflect the variable nature of perceived 
group memberships. Given that these psychological references reflect perceived group 
membership, they are similar to what Allport (1954) called a reference group. 
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The psychological reality of group membership brings distinct social meaning and 
significance to the perceiver, and thus brings a unique understanding to the nature of 
intergroup relations. Indeed, this analysis led to the development of the social identity 
critique of intergroup relations. A social identity is conceptualized as the psychological 
link between the self and the collective that emerges through the psychological process 
of categorization. In other words, social identification is the mechanism that defines 
where an individual is situated in a specific social context. As stated by Tajfcl (1978), 
social identity is "that part of an individual's sell~concept which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership" (p. 63). This concept later became 
a basic building block of social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1986), which 
provides a theoretical analysis of intergroup behavior. The basic hypothesis is "that 
pressures to evaluate one's own group positively through in-group/out-group 
comparisons lead social groups to attempt to differentiate themselves from each other" 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1986, p. 16; see also Tajfel, 1978a; Turner, 1975). There are three 
defining classes of variables that are important to this analysis: (a) categorization; (b) 
identification; and (c) social comparison. Due to the distinctive aspect of each of these 
three variables, Tajfcl (1982) preferred an alternative name for the theory- C. I. C. theory. 
The conclusion was drawn that social categorization of oneself, even in terms of a 
minimal group, led to an identification process that resulted in intergroup comparisons 
which were self-evaluative and thus became the basis for social competition. 
These minimal group studies make a critical point: social competition, as 
exhibited by subjects in these studies, is conceptually different from instrumental (zero 
sum) cooperation and competition. Intra and intergroup processes are relational not 
absolute (see Turner, 1975). In other words, social cooperation and competition arise 
out of the perceived intergroup situation; they do not create intergroup cooperation and 
intergroup conflict. Thus social cooperation and competition are not necessarily 
individual's competition for a goal or outcome attainment which exists a priori to the 
intergroup situation. Objective goals arc not absolute ends in themselves, they are 
relative and emerge in terms of relevant social comparisons that are based on social 
identifications that reflect social structure. Thus, social behaviour is not based on 
individual's motivation to attain absolute or instrumental ends, as the economic self-
interest model would argue. The minimal group findings suggest that social 
categorization, per se, can provide a sufficient basis for the psychological reality of group 
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formation; while not questioning the importance of other group level processes. Thus, 
social identity theory reinstates the psychological reality of the group in terms of an 
cognitive mechanism that involves social categorization, identity, and comparison 
processes. Further, this mechanism reflects relevant social structure and brings meaning 
to the situation. 
5.3.2 The continuum model of social identity theory 
A:; work on the development of social identity theory progressed, Tajfel (1978) 
made the point that "the concept of social identity ... is not an attempt to describe the 
identification for "what it is" in a static sense. Social identity is understood here as an 
intervening causal mechanism in situations of "objective" social change" (p. R6). The 
point Tajfel was making is that merely situating an individual in terms of an objective 
social category or identity, such as black/white or male/female, is not the point of the 
theory. Of course there is a myriad of dimensions of objective identities that occur in 
society. The point is that subjective identification is the causal mechanism which enacts 
objective social change within the collective life of individuals. The question that social 
identity theory posed was: how does social identity influence the behavior of individuals 
and collectives, and what makes up their social psychological construction? Tajfel 
(1979) explains: 
the aim of a theory of inter-group behavior is to help us to understand certain selected 
uniformities of social behaviour. In order to do this, we must know (i) something about the 
ways 'groups' are constructed in a particular social system, (ii) what are the psychological 
effects of these constructions; and (iii) how the constructions and their effects depend upon, and 
relate to, forms of social reality (p. 185) 
Taken together, the theory aimed to reinstate the psychological reality of the group to 
the social psychological analysis of intergroup behavior. 
Tajfel argued that, as a theory of intergroup behavior, it was important to make a 
qualitative distinction between inter-group behaviour and inter-individual behavior. 
Tajfel (1981) suggested a continuum model with each pole representing one of these 
extremes, such that all behavior at the inter-individual level was determined hy 
interpersonal relationships, and all behavior at the inter-group level was determined by 
intergroup relationships. However, Tajfel (1981) argued that "one of these extremes-
the interpersonal one - is absurd, in the sense that no instance of it can conceivably be 
found in 'real life' (p. 240). To some degree, an interpersonal encounter (even within the 
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most familiar relationships) will be determined by the various social groups that the 
individuals belong to. For Tajfel, the intergroup extreme was less absurd; thus, there 
was a certain asymmetry to the continuum. For social identity theory, the emphasis was 
on the real social implications that carried on from categorizing a person at an intergroup 
level of abstraction, vis a vis an interpersonal level. Tajfel's original continuum model 
was a descriptive analysis of a dynamic continuum of interpersonal and intergroup 
behavior. It also lay the basis for the understanding of groups as both social 
psychological process and product. 
Asch (1952) had also emphasized this relationship when he stated that individual 
minds contain a "socially structured field" (p. 253) that represents collective relations of 
individuals and enables joint action through the mutual reference of the field for the 
individuals involved. Recall, Asch (1952) stated that a sufficient representation ofjoint 
action required: 
... an adequate formulation of the individual-group relation ... we need a way of understanding 
group processes that retains the primary reality of individual and group, the two permanent 
poles of all social processes .... We must see group phenomena as both the product and 
condition of actions of individuals .... Once the process ... is in motion it is no longer the 
individual "as such" who determines its direction, nor the group acting upon the individuals as 
an external force, but individuals working with, for, or against each other. (p. 250- 251) 
Social identity theory provided a conceptual framework for an analysis of group level 
psychological processes to proceed. 
5.3.3 Individuals and groups: Social mobility and social change 
Tajfel (1978) developed a number of other continua that carried on from the idea 
that social identity provided the conceptual link between the individual and the group. 
The social continuum put forward in social identity theory also provided a framework 
through which to explain social mobility and social change, as well as variability and 
social uniformity. The inter-individual end of the continuum underpins the process of 
social mobility and variability, while the inter-group end underpins the process of social 
change and uniformity. Given that identity processes involve the evaluative dimension 
of social comparison, which in turn mirrors social structure, group status is a meaningful 
subjective measure that differentiates group identities. Thus status is not an absolute 
measure, that refers to the amount of wealth or power an individual or group has, but a 
relative measure that emerges as a product of comparative identification processes. 
121 
When an identity is perceived to be negative or threatened in relation to relevant 
comparison groups, different strategies can be adopted to resolve this unease. An 
individual solution is to seek social mobility into a higher status group; a group solution 
would be to unite and put pressure on the system for social change. These latter 
solutions are thus socially creative. Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986) cite a number of 
creative solutions: (a) changing the dimension of comparison. For example blacks often 
defined themselves in terms of their musical talents in comparison to whites; (b) changing 
the values assigned to the attributes. The classic example being the "Black is beautiful" 
phrase that arose during the civil rights movement of the 1960's; (c) change the 
comparative outgroup. A recent example would be the race riots of L.A. that emerged 
between blacks and lower status ethnic groups after the acquital of a white policeman 
who had been shown beating a black motorist. Finally, the group can also unite to 
change the social structure itself through social competition to change the objective state 
of affairs, which, in turn, has consequences for the maintenance of the status quo. Of 
course, these strategies are not mutually exclusive. 
This discussion highlights the "causal spiral" between objective and subjective 
states of affairs in intergroup relations; however, it is always relational and comparative, 
thus the objectivity adopted by rational actor models is lost. Further, whether or not 
individual or group level strategies are chosen relates to issues such as real and perceived 
permeability of boundaries and social status (see Doosje, Ellemers and Spears, 1995; 
Ellemers, van Knippenberg and Wilke, 1990; Ellemers, Wilke and van Knippenberg, 
1993; Simon, Pantaleo and Mummendey). 
Kelly and collegues (Kelly, 1993; Kelly and Kelly, 1994) have carried out some 
relevant studies that examine group identification, intergroup perceptions and collective 
action. They conclude that: 
strong group identification brings the social world into sharper focus by promoting clear 
distinctions between "us" and "them", and facilitates participation in collective action by 
promoting sharp perceptions within the ingroup concerning the desirability and possibility of 
social change. (1993, p. 76- 77) 
Clearly there is mounting evidence that collective action is the product of social 
psychological group level processes. Social identity theory emphasises the importance 
of social structure in these processes as society comprises social categories which stand 
in power and status relations to one another. While social structure precedes the 
individual, it is individuals' capacity to act as a collective that shapes social structure. 
Indeed society is not a static monolithic entity but constantly in a state of t1ux which 
mirrors individuals' perceived social reality and their place in it. This discussion 
highlights the psychological reality of both individual and group life, wherein acting in 
terms of a group membership facilitates individual and collective welfare concurrently. 
5.3.4 Dynamic nature of group life: Groups as processes and products 
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Tajfel (1982) made the important point that "social groups arc not 'things'; they 
are processes .... they are cognitive constructions shared by the individuals involved., 
and/or result from a perception of shared interest. ... In the dynamic conception, groups 
(and intergroup relations) come to life when their potential designations as such have 
acquired a psychological and behavioural reality" (p. 485). This theme was developed in 
his work on group processes (see Tajfel, 1981, Chapter 11). From this perspective 
group facts achieve objective expression because their social psychological represent-
ation can be shared in the minds of individuals, as such social identifications are socially 
construed. This builds on the earlier work of Asch (1952, pp. 240- 72; see also Sherif, 
1936) where it is argued that group behavior by individuals is made possible through 
individuals' capacity to engage in a shared psychological field. In other words 
individuals acting collectively can do so because of each individual's capacity to engage 
in a mutual reference. 
While the above paragraph emphasizes the process by which social groups 
achieve objective reality, the psychological reality of groups can not be underestimated. 
The theory argues that there is a continual dynamic interaction between the 
psychological construct of social identity, which reflects a meaningful social reality for 
the individual, and groups as a social product of their psychological reality. Turner and 
Giles (1981) made this point very clear: 
[The] group is both a psychological process and social product ... the psychological hypothesis 
is that group behaviour and relationships are mediated by a cognitive redefinition of the self in 
terms of shared social category membership and associated stereotypes. 
On the other hand, however, the group is a social reality. It refers to real interrelated people 
engaged in concrete social activities as a function of their social relationships and goals ... The 
cognitive processes instigate collective interaction and thus the emergence of social processes. 
The latter produce social structures, roles, norms, values, purposes, etc. which in turn become 
determinants of individual psychological functioning. The same also applies to I he develop-
ment of social identity itself ... This is apparent in that the theory takes for granted that real 
intergroup relations presuppose shared social categorizations and stereotypes, with a specific 
sociocultural content, elated to members' collective purposes and the explanation, justification 
and evaluation of concrete political and historical contexts ... the group product of social 
influences as well as cognitive and motivational processes (Turner and Giles, 19R!, p. 27) 
In summary, group life is a creative emergent process and product through group's 
inherent social psychological reality in the minds of individuals. 
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Turner (1982) made the point that while social categories or groups can be 
objectively defined in terms of similarity criteria such as ethnicity, socio-economic status 
etc., (the type of classificatory approach that Lewin argued against), social categories 
can also be self-defining in terms of a shared cognitive representation by a collective of 
ingroup members. In this sense a group of self-defming individuals can be similar across 
certain contextually relevant dimensions, as Asch, Sherif and Lewin also argued in their 
respective analyses of group process and individual identification. The group can be 
understood as a social psychological process in the sense that these shared cognitive 
representations are fluid and adaptive and thus reflect the dynamic and emergent 
properties of group life. This mechanism allows for the reciprocal nature of groups as 
psychological reference point and objective social product. This process accounts for the 
dynamic of objective social categories becoming relevant psychological groups, and hH 
the dynamic and changing character of groups and their memberships. As Turner (1982) 
has stated: 
We are concerned here with group membership as a psychological and not a formal 
institutional state, with the subjective sense of togetherness, we-ness, or belongingness which 
indicates the formation of a psychological group. What are the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for some aggregate of individuals to feel themselves to be a group and act 
accordingly?" (p. 16) 
To understand groups in any static, or objective, sense is to fail to capture the dynamic 
nature of groups and group life. Thus, to define groups objectively is to conceptually 
limit our understanding of individual behavior in society. It is argued here that, behavior, 
individual and collective, can most clearly be understood in terms of the functional 
dynamic between social context and the categorization processes of individuals, rather 
than through their objective interdependence. 
As Turner and Oakes (1996) argue, the process of social identification is a 
primary psychological mechanism; in their words: "our mind and our selves are socially 
structured, and social identity provides the psychological link between social structure 
and large scale collective behavior" (p. 363). Groups, as such, are defined in terms of 
individuals' relationships with groups; that is, as "a collection of individuals who perceive 
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themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional 
involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social 
consensus about the evaluation of their group and their membership in it" (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1986, p. 15). Groups, as such, must be understood in terms of the "total field" 
of their existence for the individual. 
5.3.5 Social identity theory: In summary 
To summarize, social identity theory has been described by Tajfel (1979; see also 
Turner, 1996) as resting on a conceptual tripod that incorporates three important aspects 
of his approach to understanding the nexus between the individual and the collective. 
The first point is that groups are both processes and products, and as such group life not 
only informs an individual of his or her place in society but can also be used to induce 
change though the dynamic nature of group processes. Through this dynamic, positive 
distinctiveness of social groupings can emerge and recede in a continual redefinition of 
the social structure, as has been shown throughout history. Secondly, individual 
behavior ref1ects both interpersonal and intergroup level processing. Collective action 
does not ref1ect a group of interdependent individuals pursuing personal self-interest, 
rather the action reflects a shared social reality that is group based not only functionally 
but also psychologically. Finally, there is a continual interplay between individual 
cognition and social context, each can not be fully understood through an analysis of 
these two variables independently. Self-categorization theory grew out of an interest in 
further developing this third point. Social identity theory is then a social-cognitive 
theory of intergroup behavior that "reinstates the group as a psychological reality and not 
merely a convenient label for describing the outcome of interpersonal processes and 
relations" (Turner, 1984, p. 535). In other words, the group is best defined and 
understood in terms of its psychological reality. While intergroup relations can be 
described in terms of objective social structure, this approach can not account for how 
and why individuals act in terms of objective social groups. In conclusion, while social 
identity theory highlighted the motivational aspects of the psychological reality of group 
life, self-categorization theory, which will now be reviewed, further developed the 
psychological mechanism through which identification with groups occurs. Further, 
while social identity theory was launched as "An integrative theory of intergroup 
conflict" (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), conceptual constructs relevant to the area of social 
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cooperation were always implicit in this analysis of group life and process. In line with 
Sumner (1906), conflict and cooperation continue to be understood as reciprocal 
processes. Evidence in support of these conclusions, will be presented after the 
introduction of self-categorization theory, which quite explicitly addresses the area of 
social cooperation. 
5.4 Self-categorization theory: Re-defining the self in self-interest 
The development of Turner's (1982, 1984) 'self-stereotyping hypothesis' within 
the social identity framework placed self-identification (self-categorization) at the core of 
theoretical developments of social identity theory. It was this hypothesis that led onto 
self-categorization theory. Turner (1984) argued that "it is the cognitive redefinition of 
the self - from unique attributes and individual differences to shared social category 
memberships and associated stereotypes - that mediates group behavior" (p. 528). 
Importantly, as this analysis re-defines the self, it defines the context in which self-
interest can also be redefined. This section will present the underlying process of identity 
formation that redefines the self in self-interest. To begin, self-categorization theory was 
introduce by Turner (1987) as: 
The product of a distinct European tradition of research on social categorization processes and 
social identity ..... (It] is an attempt to spell out in explicit fashion the assumptions we need to 
make about psychological group formation .... In doing this it makes use of and develops .... 
the concept of social identity itself and the assumption of an 'interpersonal-intergroup 
continuum' of social behavior (p. viii). 
While the role of social identity remains central there are some important conceptual 
differences between these two theories. 
Turner (1987) notes that while the former emphasized "positive ingroup 
distinctiveness [as] the major explanatory notion (p. viii), the latter explains "social 
identity as the social-cognitive basis of group behavior, the mechanism that makes it 
possible (and not just the aspects of the self derived from group membership)" (p. ix). 
Second, the theoretical position of the self in the continuum model changes. As Turner 
explains in reference to the early work on the model 'the interpersonal-intergroup 
continuum was conceptualized as varying from "acting in terms of self' to "acting in 
terms of group" ... as if the latter were not an expression of the former' (pp. viii-ix), 
while for seU~categorization theory, the self is conceptualized as both process and the 
product. In other words, the self is expressed through all levels of the continuum, both 
interpersonal and intergroup, and acts as a process through which perception is 
conceived in concert with the environment. 
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Depersonalization is the process that shifts perception towards more inclusive or 
collective self-definitions or categorizations. It is the psychological mechanism that takes 
an individual from the interpersonal level to the intergroup level. Self-stereotyping (or 
categorizing) is social psychological process through which individuals categorise 
themselves at all levels of abstraction of the continuum model. A~ Turner (1984) states: 
Self-stereotyping produces the depersonalization of the self, i.e., the perceptual inter-
changeability or perceptual identity of oneself and others in the same group on relevant 
dimensions. It is this cognitive redefinition of the self- from unique allributes and individual 
differences to shared social category memberships and associated stereotypes- that mediates 
group behavior. (p. 528) 
Thus, in light of the earlier analysis of group processes, not only do social identifications 
reflect group affiliation, self-categorizations are both cause and effect of group 
phenomena. This analysis marked an important theoretical shift from the social identity 
perspective of group behavior to the self-categorization perspective of individual and 
collective behavior. A~ such, social identifications (categorizations) developed from 
reflecting group memberships to being the basis for group behavior, such as social 
cooperation. In other words, when individuals self-categorize in terms of a common, 
and thus inclusive group membership, this becomes the psychological basis of group 
behavior and processes. The assumption is that self-stereotyping reflects context specific 
self-definition. And just as the group is not conceptualized as an objective entity in 
social identity analysis, the self is defined not as a static entity but as an emergent and 
dynamic process and product. The following section will explain the self-categorization 
perspective of identity processes of the self. 
5.4.1 The Self: Process and Product of the Identity Continuum 
The psychological process of self-categorization is the dynamic mechanism 
underlying identity formation. It is the fluid and dynamic self-process that adaptively 
makes sense of the social world at different levels of inclusiveness with others. As 
Turner (1996) states: 
[The theory] supposes that the self-process works to socialize cognitive functioning and 
individual behaviour and ensure that cognitive activity is closely tied to the current realities of 
individual's social environment. (p. 8) 
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In other words, the self is reflexive, responding to the social environment. As such the 
self has the capacity to function adaptively through a wide range of social environments, 
responding through one underlying mechanism of self-categorization. 
As with categorization of natural objects (Rosch, 1978), self-categories are a 
cognitive grouping of stimuli (others) that are identical (thus interchangeable) in terms of 
some comparative dimension. For example, an individual can self-categorize as a 
psychologist, and not a physicist, and within this category of membership an individual 
will be identical to other psychologists along some relevant dimensions, in comparison to 
physicists. Self-categories can also vary in level of inclusiveness for an individual can 
also self-categorize as a scientist and this category would be inclusive of both 
psychologists and physicist, as well as other scientists. A more inclusive category, 
defined as moving away from the individual extreme of the continuum, is understood to 
be a more abstract classification. A continuum of three levels of abstraction are defined 
within seli~categorization theory: subordinate (personal identity); intermediate (social 
identity); superordinate (human identity). Further, at any level of abstraction, or 
inclusiveness, these identities are equally real and accurate self-definitions which emerge 
as a function of the social context. 
Identity formation, or self-categorization, involves, at least, an interaction 
between three properties of the categorization process: specifically, the normative and 
comparative dimensions of the perceived social context, together with the accessibility of 
any given category of membership to the perceiver (Oakes, 1987). Each of these will be 
discussed in detail later in this section. Further, the theory proposes that there is a 
constant functional antagonism between individual and group level processing. 
Functional antagonism produces the tension system that enables the appropriate self 
category to emerge that is relevant to the individual in the perceived social context. Self-
categories vary on a dynamic continuum defined by the functional conflict between 
different levels of abstraction. Movement through this continuum determines whether 
behavior is based more or less in terms of either end of this continuum, that is, whether 
behavior is interpersonal or intergroup. In must be made clear though .that to say that 
seli·-categories vary on a continuum is a conceptual simplification. The continuum is by 
no means a linear conceptualization of the self with ultimate uniqueness as an individual 
at one end and an all inclusive category of human being at the other. There is not one 
unique self at the interpersonal end of the continuum but a potential array of unique 
selves that arise in relation to the superordinate context. Recall that Tajfel understood 
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the interpersonal end of the continuum to be absurd. However, the continuum illustrates 
the cognitive capacity of the self to vary in level of inclusiveness of others, that is 
through a range of individual and collective identifications. 
As mentioned, categorization processes have both comparative and normative 
dimensions. Both dimensions interact to produce the categorization but can be 
understood in their own right as well. The social comparative dimension is specified 
through the meta-contrast principle. It is a meta-contrast because it defines a contrast (in 
the form of a ratio) of contrasts for a given social psychological field. Take the above 
example of psychologists and physicists, who also belong to the more inclusive category 
of scientists. When will one self-categorize as a psychologist, as opposed to a scientist? 
The meta-contrast principle dictates tpe following classification criterion: if nne perceives 
the differences between physicists and psychologists to be greater than the differences 
between individual psychologists, then the likelihood of perceiving oneself as a 
psychologist is greater (see Turner & Oakes, 1989). At the higher level of abstraction, 
one is likely to self-categorize as a scientist when the differences between scientists and, 
for example, artists are perceived to be greater than differences between individual 
scientists. Thus, the comparative frame of reference is important. This process of 
categorization describes only the comparative dimension, while the normative dimension 
describes the normative content of the category. The normative dimension brings 
comparative social meaning to the difference between the social categories. In other 
words the normative dimension describes the similarities and differences in normatively 
fitting directions (e.g. Oakes et al., 1991). Taken together these two dimension make up 
the concept of perceiver's "fit," which builds on the work of Bruner (1957) on 
perceptual readiness. 
To briefly illustrate the concept of normative and comparative fit take the 
following example. A social psychologist walks into a room containing some 
psychologists and some physicists. The psychologists are drawing vectors all over the 
boards, as physicists usually do, while the physicists are explaining the design of Sherif's 
autokinetic experiment. The social psychologist then walks into another room. Again 
there is a group of psychologists and physicists; however, this time the psychologists are 
explaining Sherif's experiment and the physicists are drawing vectors. In the first room 
the normative fit between the social psychologist's knowledge of what the group 
psychologists should be like is low, while in the second room there is congruent 
normative fit. Thus, in the second room the basis for social identification will be stronger 
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than in the first room, hence the salience of the self-categorization "psychologist" will be 
stronger in the second. 
This example highlights another important point, that of accessibility. For some 
individuals the category psychologists will be accessible, while for other individuals the 
category physicists would be accessible. This would depend on individual's hackgroup 
experience and thus knowledge of their place in the world. Building on the work of 
Bruner (1957), it is understood that "fit" interacts with accessibility (that is the 
perceptual readiness of an individual to use a category). Of course, some categories are 
more accessible than others across individuals and thus this imposes a certain amount of 
variance in the salience of any given category across individuals. The interactive 
dynamic of category salience is defined by the "accessibility x fit" hypothesis (Oakes, 
1987; Oakes et al., 1991). Oakes et al., (1994, Chapter 5) provide a detailed review of 
categorization and selective perception. 
In conclusion the social variability of the self can be understood in terms of two 
key points. Firstly, self-categorizations are not arbitrary but vary systematically in 
relation to the perceived normative and comparative aspects of social context; second, 
self-categories reflect social definitions of an individual's place in society, not as fixed 
representations, but momentary representations that make the situation meanful from the 
point of view of the perceiver. Taken together, self-categorizations are veridical in that 
they relate to systematic changes in social reality (see Turner, Oakes, Haslam and 
McGarty, 1994). In summary, self-categories are reflexive judgements that enable 
individuals to functionally adapt to social reality at many levels of inclusiveness, such that 
both the reality of the group and the individual is maintained as a functional and dynamic 
aspects of society. 
5.4.2 Social cooperation: The systematic variability of self-interest 
As has been highlighted, self-categorization theory offers a model of human 
nature that is radically opposed to the idea that society is made up of discrete individuals 
who are selfish utility maximizers, who must be controlled through effective social 
systems. Instead of self-interest being the exclusive domain of the individual, this 
theoretical perspective re-defines the self such that acting in terms of group membership 
can also be conceptualized as acting in terms of self - a self that is inclusive of others. 
Recall Coleman's (1961) critique of classic economic theory, wherein it is assumed that 
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an individual acts in term of their discrete self-interest, observing that individuals often 
act in terms of entities larger than themselves. They act in terms of the collective. In 
contrast with the pervasive literature on individualist self-serving humans, Dawes et al., 
(1990) recently conclude: 
Theorists have recently been concerned with speculating about what leads to sociability--
usually in the form of some individual incentives for becoming social (see Axelrod, 1984: 99). 
In contrast, we don't speculate. We only point out that there have been no findings indicating 
that humans ever lVere not social. It is fun and somewhat romantic to speculate ahout how 
isolates developed our most cherished characteristic, our ties to other humans. But once again, 
such speculations must be evaluated in terms of our knowledge of how humans behaved 
without such ties, and there is no evidence we ever did. (p.109 -110) 
Self-categorization theory offers a theoretical perspective that accounts for our social 
nature in terms of a psychological mechanism. The emphasis is on building explanatory 
constructs to account for the variable nature of social identification; in other words, to 
explain how the social structure transforms the individual. This is different to an 
approach that emphasized how different individuals behave within different social 
systems. A~ Caporeal, Dawes, Orbell and van de Kragt (1989) have concluded in their 
review of selfishness and cooperation: "[individualistic] notions are really untested meta-
theories; they seem to be based on cultural beliefs about "human nature" rather than on 
reasoned argument" (p. 683). 
Sell~categorization theory lays out a number of assumptions and hypotheses that 
relate to group processes, such as social cooperation. A number of direct hypotheses 
derive from the statement that: "To the degree that the self is depersonalized, so too is 
self-interest" (Turner, 1987, p. 65). To make this point conceptually clearer, self-
interest, from this perspective, can be re-defined at a higher level of abstraction, that is 
inclusive of other group members, and not conceptualized in terms of discrete individual 
self-interest. It is assumed that where mutual perceptions of common interests are 
collectively salient, the interests of group members are interchangeable. Simply put, to 
cooperate is to act in terms of a group membership. The formal hypotheses, that relate 
to social cooperation, read as follows (Turner at al., 1987, p.65): 
H. 15 That the perception of identity between oneself and in group members leads to a 
perceived identity of interests in terms of the needs, goals and motives associated with in group 
membership. 
H. 16 That factors which tend to enhance the salience of shared ingroup memberships will tend 
to increase the level of intragroup co-operation (and intergroup competition). 
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H. 17 That factors which tend to personalize or individuate intragroup relations (or lead to the 
categorization of others as outgroup members) will decrease mutual co-operation (and increase 
interpersonal competition). 
Each of these hypotheses follows on from the primary hypothesis that social cooperation 
in the product of a salient social identity. In other words, psychological group 
formation, through self-categorization, is the intervening variable that allows social 
cooperation to emerge. As Turner (1985) states: 
Whereas ... interdependence theory states that positive interdependence leads to cooperation, 
which in turn leads to the formation of a psychological group (e.g., see Sherif, 1967), the 
evidence implies that psychological group formation may be the necessary intervening process 
before objective interdependence can be translated into cooperative activity (p. 8R). 
Thus instead of cooperation producing the group, as has long been assumed, it seems 
that psychological group formation is the basis of cooperative behavior. This resonates 
with the views of Asch (1952) who stated: "Cooperative action is therefore identical 
with group formation" (p. 175). Thus, self-categorization theory offers an ontology for 
social cooperation that may bring parsimony to the social dilemma and cooperation 
literature. A~ has been evident from the gaming research alone, interdependence of 
individuals, per se, does not induce cooperative behavior. It has long been observed that 
subjects are not governed by a single motive of maximizing their gain, hence the 
theoretical development of transformational processes, such as social value orientations. 
However, even with the inclusion of transformational processes within the 
interdependence analysis, there is still little systematic understanding of the underlying 
social psychological mechanism involved. The interdependence analysis merely describes 
the state of affairs: objectively in terms of the interdependence structure and subjectively 
in terms of a typology of social value orientations. 
This theoretical perspective has fulfilled the two points that were raised at the 
beginning of this chapter: specifically (a) the distinctive psychological reality of the group 
has been reinstated and questions the functional interdependence analysis of groups; (b) a 
social model of self-interest has been introduced that questions the simplistic tautology of 
the motivation analysis prescribed by rational actor models. Given that the two premises 
raised in the previous chapter and addressed in the present chapter, underlie the social 
dilemma paradigm and our contemporary understanding of social cooperation, it seems 
productive to discuss these two premises directly in light of self-categorization theory. 
Specifically, the next two sections will examine how self-categorization theory 
conceptualizes interdependence, in contrast to the former model. And second, how 
would rational sell~ interest be re-conceived in the social dilemma paradigm. 
5.4.3 Psychological group formation and interdependence 
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Given the foregoing analysis, is there a functional relationship between 
interdependence and the group from the perspective of seli~categorization theory? The 
simple answer is yes. The self-categorization approach is essentially in line with Lewin's 
original conception, explaining interdependence as a product, or consequence, of some 
group-level process. For while many researchers who follow the Lewinian tradition 
conceptualize interdependence as the precondition for cooperative behavior, and thus 
operationalized it as such, Lewin clearly stated that: "if one wishes to use the feeling of 
belonging as the criterion of a group, one can do so if one points to the interdependence 
established by this feeling" (p. 148). In other words the group is a psychological 
reference point for individuals and this leads to a feeling of interdependence with others. 
Despite this, many of Lewin's contemporaries conceptualize groups in terms of 
their social reality, as opposed to their psychological reality, for individuals. For 
example, Campbell (1958) understood entitativity in terms of social aggregates 
objectively defined. Recall, he preferred common fate, over similarity, for describing the 
entitativity of groups. Likewise, common fate of individuals, defined by their objective 
social reality, establishes the mutual fate of individuals in the social dilemma paradigm. 
In contrast, for self-categorization theory, the primary perceptual index is context 
specific perceptions of similarity, opposed to raw or absolute similarity (c.f. Medin, 
Goldstone and Gentner, 1993). And, in a certain sense, the seli'-categorization analysis 
is, thus, inclusive of the common fate analysis, as individuals can be similar in terms of 
their common fate. Self-categorization theory argues that the intervening process 
between objective interdependence and social cooperation is identification with the social 
group, based on perceptions of similarity, which could be understood as perceived 
similarity of fate. It is psychological group formation that leads to perceived 
interdependence with others. 
The dynamic process between the self and the groups is lost in the objective 
analysis of interdependence, based on common fate of individuals. The point that must be 
made clear is that groups defined in terms of objective similarity or common fate 
misplaces the conceptual framework through which to understand group process and 
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behavior. Lewin argued against this approach, and now, so too, does self-categorization 
theory. 
For self-categorization theory common fate is not defined by the objective 
outcome interdependence of individuals. Common fate is induced by perceptions of 
identification with a group that arises from a feeling of "we-ness" for the individual. 
Social identity is then the basis for perceived interdependence and social cooperation. 
In other words, social cooperation is the product of a salient social identity, and 
perceptions of interdependence follow this psychological construct. From this 
perspective it is redundant to first establish the interdependence structure that defines the 
social dilemma. And, given that situations of objective interdependence have never 
produced high levels of cooperative behavior, it seems fruitful to develop alternative 
means to examine the processes of social cooperation. 
5.4.4 Self-interest and rationality: The reality of the individual and the collective 
A fundamental aspect of the interdependence approach can now be questioned. 
Within these objectively defined situations of interdependence, rationality, and self~ 
interest, remains to be defined as an individual level process in the social dilemma 
paradigm. Poundstone (1993, pp. 277-278) recently pointed this out in his review of the 
gaming literature, arguing that game theory only recognizes a very fixed notion of 
rationality. His conclusion after reviewing the literature extensively was that he hoped 
that rationality could be conceptualized more flexibly than currently mandated in the 
social dilemma paradigm. Recall that rationality, within the paradigm, is defined by the 
minmax principle; that is, rational individuals are motivated to maximize their minimum 
payoff. Further recall that the interdependence that the prisoner dilemma game evokes 
elicits very low levels of cooperation. How would self-categorization theory explain the 
low levels of cooperation? 
First, consider the continuum model and recall that, in part, the social context 
determines the appropriate level of abstraction of self-categorization. Given that the 
paradigm explicitly pits one (often anonymous) player against the other (often in a 
competitive university environment), the assumption is that players are likely to be 
categorizing themselves at an individual level as there is little basis for group behavior. 
Thus, it is a rational choice to act as a discrete individual. Given this individualizing 
context, if players were to act in terms of the group and cooperate, they would run the 
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risk of being exploited -- not a good way to maintain one's self-esteem! -- and would in 
all likelihood change their behavioral choice. As many early researchers in this field 
have noted, the motivation has been "not to lose", as opposed to winning, or "to avoid 
ego-deflating experiences." 
It, thus, seems appropriate and rational in this experimental context to perceive 
oneself as an individual, and act in accordance with this self-categorization. Individuals 
are thus motivated to maintain positive social distinctiveness in terms of this category of 
membership. Competition, through maximizing differences strategies, maintains 
individual distinctiveness. In this same manner, individuals maximize category 
differences at a group level in the minimal group paradigm. In line with self-
categorization theory, individual and group based behavior is conceptualized as rational 
behaviour. Thus, overall, at both the individual and the group level the strategy seems to 
be to maximize the difference between self (defined at the individual or group level) and 
other. 
Having said this, if a player did identify with the other player in a social 
dilemma, perhaps through relevant communication (as shown to be effective in Chapter 
3), and thus perceived themselves as interchangeable on some relevant dimension, a 
positive sense of self could be maintained by choosing the cooperative, in other words 
collective, choice. As stated by an early research group: 
In our games ... the necessity to avoid an ego-deflating experience that could result from 
attempted collaboration that is not reciprocated could very well account for the prevalence of 
[competition]. In [the prisoner's dilemma] this need to maintain self-esteem so dominated 
the monetary values in the matrix that subjectively players are not really in a dilemma. The 
choice is between doing as well as or better than the other person and running the risk of doing 
worse. (as cited in Poundstone, 1993, p. 176) 
Turner (1985, 1987) has made the point that the prisoner dilemma paradigm 
"directly tests the hypothesis that positive interdependence for the maximi7.ation of self-
interest leads to cooperation" (p. 85). As shown in Chapter 2, the consistent findings do 
not support this hypothesis. As Eiser (1978, p. 151) states, the basic assumption 
underlying the interdependence perspective is that individuals would cooperate when it 
was in their objective interest to do so. As the purpose of the game is to get as many 
points as possible, then it would be in each individual's self-interest to cooperate. Yet 
individuals do not (as Eiser, 1980, p. 201, points out), hence the "problem of 
interdependence" and for the last 30 year researchers have continued to test numerous 
variables that will increase cooperation within the interdependence structure that 
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constitutes the social dilemma paradigm. On the whole the results of this approach are 
largely inconclusive, as was demonstrated at the conclusion of Chapter 3. Clearly, the 
rationality of economic self-interest is not the whole of the explanation, rational self-
interest has been misconstrued in terms of economic models of human nature. In 
contrast, there is building evidence within social identity and self-categorization theory 
that individuals are motivated to maintain a positive and distinctive self-perception, 
whether that be individual or group. 
Dawes (1980) may have been on the right track when he concluded that it is the 
payoffs that lead players to defect (p. 191 ). As highlighted, an important and interesting 
aspect of this body of literature is the assumption that acting in terms of the group 
interest, by definition, means less for (or a cost to) the individual. Indeed, the payoff 
structure of individual's outcomes specify this in a dilemma game. Indeed, the matrices 
structurally define this assumption, as can be seen through a comparison of the outcome 
cells below in Figure 5.1. As can be seen competition, the "D" choice, accrues the most 
individual gain. The cooperative "C" accrues less. However, when all individuals 
compete to maximize their own gain, the irony is that collectively, all individuals get less. 
Player 1 
Row player 
Choice C 
Choice D 
Player two 
Column player 
Choice C Choice D 
40,40 0,50 
50,0 20,20 
Figure 5.1 The outcome structure of the prisoner's dilemma game 
Thus, the assumption of the primacy of the individual, by definition, is embedded in the 
paradigm. Game theorists, and thus social dilemma theorists, have sold themselves short 
by rigorously adopting untested (economic) assumptions about human nature. As 
Helmreich and colleagues summarize: "The sheer bulk of PD studies and the absence of 
notable theoretical integration and advance seem to demonstrate that an attempted via 
definitiva may become a via dolorosa" (p. 343). Research within this paradigm has lost 
its theoretical focus, instead we have a growing list of factors that increase cooperation 
in this paradigm. This raises the question of the relevance and importance of the 
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construct of objective interdependence and the sole rationality of individual self-interest. 
Self-categorization theory allows for rational action of the self at both the individual and 
the group level. 
5.4.5 Self-categorization theory: In summary 
Self-categorization theory has never implied that awareness of interdependent 
goals, common fate, or overt cooperation do not lead to harmonious group relations. 
However, the theory does maintain that these are neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
formation of groups and subsequent group level processes, such as cooperative behavior 
that benefits the group as a whole. The point is that, given that groups transf(Jrm 
individuals (and it doesn't seem that researchers are disputing this proposition), group 
formation will directly affect what individuals perceive to be in their interests. Our self-
interests are not intrinsically personal, they emerge in terms of relevant self-
categorizations, that can be inclusive of others. They vary with the normative and 
comparative aspects of the perceived social reality. Thus, while social identity and self-
categorization theories built on Sherif's analysis of objective interdependence of the 
group, the two theories in many ways are now incommensurable, not only in terms of 
theoretical constructs but also in meta-theory and paradigm. Building on the previous 
summary of social identity theory, the following summary will highlight the distinctive 
aspects of the sell~categorization approach. 
The meta-theory that underlies this approach is entirely an interactionist account 
of social behavior, wherein the individual and the environment are not defined and 
explained in abstraction from one another but inform one another in terms of a dynamic 
whole. In other words, in terms of a shared social psychological field. As such the 
approach is neo-Galilean in that it emphasises the process or system over the discrete 
parts of the system. Social identity theory provided an initial conceptual framework that 
allowed for a distinctive analysis of the psychological reality of group life. Within this 
dynamic conceptual framework, social conflict and cooperation were conceptualized to 
underlie social change and stability. 
It was sell~categorization theory that specified the psychological mechanism 
through which identification with groups occurs. Through the cognitive re-definition of 
the self, an adaptive functional mechanism was put into place that could account for the 
fluid nature of behavior -- interpersonal through to intergroup. Depersonalization is the 
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process that shifts perception towards the group level end of the continuum. Along the 
continuum individuals can self-stereotype in terms of a number social identifications 
wbicb reflect group memberships. And in the same way that a group is thought of as 
both process and product, the self is thought of as both process and product. Self-
processes thus socialize cognitive functioning. 
This re-conceptualization of the self also re-defines self-interest. As the self 
becomes de-personalized, so too is self-interest. As group level categorizations become 
salient, sell~ interest is transformed to a collective level. To act in our self-interest is to 
act in terms of collective interests. In this same way social cooperation is re-defined. 
Cooperation is defined as a product of a salient social identity, as an inclusive 
categorization of self, and no longer defined as a sacrifice to self. In the chapter to 
follow we will examine some preliminary evidence that social cooperation can be 
understood as the product of a salient social identity. The empirical work of this thesis 
will then follow, the aim to establish further support for this re-definition of self-interest, 
through social identification with others, that is predictive of cooperation. 
-Chapter 6-
Cooperation as a product of a salient social identity: 
6.1 Introduction 
An overview of current evidence, a retort, 
and a framework for development 
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This chapter will begin with an overview of the early evidence that supported the 
self-categorization analysis of social cooperation (Turner et a!., 1987). Since this time 
many of the ideas mooted in social identity and self-categorization theories have become 
widely accepted. This is reflected in the work of many researchers who have picked up 
the social identity analysis of group life and applied it to the analysis of intergroup 
relations, particularity in the area of stereotyping (see Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; 
Spears et a!., 1996). In terms of the literature addressing social cooperation, the work of 
Brewer (e.g. Brewer & Schneider, 1990) and Gaertner (e.g. Anastasion, Bachman, 
Gaertner & Dovidio, 1996), and their colleagues, is particularly noteworthy. Their 
work, and others', will then be presented. 
Following this review of evidence supporting a social identity analysis of social 
cooperation, Rabbie and colleagues' retort will be presented. This retort represents the 
only systematic attempt by interdependence theorists to challenge the social identity 
perspective and thus defend the interdependence analysis of group life. Rabbie and 
colleagues criticisms are based largely on the social identity explanation of the findings of 
the minimal group paradigm and they counter the social identity explanation through the 
introduction of the Behavioural interaction Model of interdependence. 
The final section will outline the empirical framework of this thesis, building on 
and responding to the work outline previously. The primary aim is to develop a self-
categorization analysis of social cooperation; however, particularly in the initial studies, 
the aim will be to establish the relationship between variables important to both 
theoretical accounts. As such, the role of the objective interdependence of individuals 
and transformational processes, specifically social value orientations, will be addressed. 
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6.2 Social cooperation as a product of a salient social identity: Initial evidence 
In developing the self-categorization analysis of social cooperation, Turner drew 
on a number of early studies. This included early work by Wilson and colleagues 
(Wilson, Chun and Kayatani, 1965; Wilson, Kayatani and Chun,196R). They conducted 
a series of studies comparing intra and intergroup cooperation, using contrived teams 
playing a prisoner's dilemma game. Interestingly, intragroup choices were twice as 
cooperative as intergroup choices. Thus, within the same reward structure, group 
membership had a significant effect on levels of cooperative behavior, just as is found in 
the minimal group studies. 
Dion (1973, 1979) conducted a similar group of experiments using the prisoner's 
dilemma game, with players making both ingroup and outgroup choices. Again, 
cooperative intragroup choices were significantly greater than intergroup choices. These 
researchers discussed their findings in terms of the cognitive differentiation hypothesis; 
specifically that cooperation and competition enhanced the salience of "us" and "them", 
describing groups as "perceptual units". It was argued that competition enhances 
feelings of common fate and similarity (positive interdependence) with the ingroup, while 
enhancing feelings of opposing fate or dissimilarity (negative interdependence) with the 
outgroup. Thus cognitive differentiation was induced through perceived homogeneity 
with the ingroup and perceived heterogeneity with the outgroup. However, it could be 
argued that these "perceptual units" (or psychological groups) may have been the basis 
of cooperative or competitive behavior rather than being a consequence of it. This same 
argument could be made for many of the findings within the social dilemma literature. 
Worchel and colleagues have worked on decreasing intergroup conflict by 
decreasing the salience of group boundaries (Worchel, 1979; Worchel, Andreoli, and 
Folger, 1977; Worchel, Axsom, Ferris, Samaha, Schweitzer, 1978; Worchel and Norvell, 
1980). They suggest a number of variables which may maintain intergroup boundaries 
even though a superordinate goal has been introduced: distinct visible differences 
between group members; cooperative failure; history of intense intergroup conflict; 
sporadic cooperative intergroup encounters; differential intergroup status and power, 
etc. Worchel et al. (1977) suggested that the imposition of a superordinate goal in 
Sherif's summer camp studies reduced intergroup tension because the goal was met with 
success. 1\s such, it was not cooperation towards reaching the superordinate goal but 
the successful outcome that reduced the tension. It was also reasoned that prior history, 
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such as cooperative or competitive relations between the groups would have an effect on 
subsequent relationships. A two phase experiment was designed. In the first phase 
cooperative, independent and competitive group relations were initiated. In the second 
phase all groups took part in a cooperative task in which failure or success was 
manipulated. The dependent variable was liking for the outgroup. Interestingly, in all 
conditions except one, liking for the outgroup increased in the second phase. Liking for 
the outgroup decreased when the group failed, after having a prior history of competition 
in phase one. The groups continued to behave as if they were separate entities, with 
participants making comparative judgements that would distance themselves from the 
outgroup. Thus, cooperation can have the effect of reducing the salience of group 
boundaries, even despite the eventuality of failure, but this is not necessarily so. Overt 
cooperation does not necessarily enhance group harmony. Thus, again the li1rmation of 
a psychological group may be the intervening variable that must be salient for 
cooperation to occur. Instead of cooperation producing the group, the evidence implies 
that the group is the basis for cooperative behavior. 
These findings were replicated and extended in a study by Worchel and Norvell 
(1980). In this experiment the researchers manipulated the ostensible conditions, either 
"ideal" or "ill-productive," in which failure occurred after intergroup cooperation, while 
in fact both conditions were the same. In the ideal condition, liking for the outgroup was 
again found to decrease after failure; however, where the environment could be blamed, 
liking increased. Again cooperation, per se, did not produce a feeling of group 
membership 
Worchel et al. (1978) examined another factor that was expected to maintain the 
salience of group boundaries: distinctive visible differences. A similar design as 
described above was used with the addition of lab coats that either defined group 
membership (red or white) or were non-differentiated (all white). While similarity of 
dress produced a strong main effect for the decrease of the salience of the group 
boundary, distinctiveness of dress served to maintain the salience of group boundaries 
when the group failed. These studies confirmed the hypothesis that positive and 
negative intergroup relations are a function of salient intergroup differences. This study 
also supported the earlier finding that cooperation, per se, does not necessarily lead to a 
higher order group formation. Two case studies also make related points. Blake, 
Shepard and Mouton (1964) report how a chemical plant imposed company-wide 
superordinate goals to reduce interdepartmental rivalry; however, this friction was not 
successfully eliminated in all cases. Similarly, Brown (1978) has noted that 
interdepartmental rivalry in an aircraft engineering factory was not reduced when a 
superordinate threat was imposed. 
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Two other studies (Deschamps and Brown, 1983; Brown and Wade, 1987) show 
just how quickly the importance of subgroup identities can emerge. In both studies a 
cooperative intergroup situation was established. Joint success could lead to 
considerable fmancial reward. The manner in which the two groups worked together 
was manipulated; they were either given distinctive roles or similar roles to complete the 
task. In a second study a "no roles" condition was also included. Interestingly, while all 
groups were working towards the same superordinate goal, those groups with distinctive 
roles showed greater friendliness toward the outgroups. These studies provide evidence 
that social structure that embodies super and subordinate identities is important in 
understanding intergroup relations, further that the imposition of objective superordinate 
cooperative goals can not fully account for intergroup behavior. 
These studies, and others (e.g. Brewer, 1979; Wilder, 1986; Allen and Wilder, 
1975), provided the early evidence for the hypothesis laid out by self-categorization 
theory that relate to social cooperation. They also provide further evidence that overt 
cooperation does not necessarily lead to psychological group formation. Interestingly, 
many of these researchers have continued to develop the original ideas of the social 
identity and self-categorization perspectives. Brewer's (1991; 1996) work has 
developed towards an optimal distinctiveness model of social groups. Further, recent 
work by Gaertner (Gaertner et a!., 1990; 1993; 1995) on the development of the 
Common Ingroup Identity Model, builds on Brewer's and Wilder's early work. And 
work by Insko and colleagues (Insko eta!., 1987; 1988; 1993) on the Individual Group 
Discontinuity Effect (reviewed in Chapter 3) developed from ideas put forward by 
Turner (1981 ). While each of these researchers developed the self-categori7.ation 
analysis within a functional interdependence perspective, they produce findings 
consistent with the idea that psychological group formation may be the intervening 
variable that allows social cooperation to emerge and be sustained. 
The following section will examine the work of Brewer and Gaertner, with their 
respective colleagues, as they provide the most systematic development of the self-
categorization perspective of social cooperation, while, at the same time working within 
an interdependence framework. To conclude this section some preliminary work that 
emphasises process over outcome is introduced. 
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6.3 Further evidence of support for the social identity analysis of group life 
To begin, the evidence is apparent in the social literature itself. As Dawes 
suggests after working with the social dilemmas literature for over 20 years: "group 
identity appears to be a crucial factor in eschewing the dominating strategy 
[competition]" (Dawes and Thaler, 1988, p. 195). And as Tyler and Dawes (1993) state 
"fmdings suggest that developing a group identity is central to willingness to act in the 
group's interest rather than one's own. The key psychological question is why this eliect 
occurs" (p. 93). 
For example, in a simple experiment based on the work of Tafjel and Turner 
(1986) and Turner eta!. (1987) on social identity, Wit and Wilke (1992) investigated the 
effect of social categorization on cooperation using three different social dilemmas -
prisoner's, chicken and trust dilemmas. Participants were induced to self-categorize at 
an individual or a group level, and as predicted group level categorization elicited more 
cooperation than personal level categorization in each of three dilemma situations. Thus, 
within a situation of objective interdependence, social categorization at a group level 
induced higher levels of cooperation. Wit and Wilke conclude that: "In sum. this 
experiment clearly shows that the level of cooperation is not only affected by the 
objective interdependence structure (i.e. the type of game), but also by group members' 
subjective transformations of their interdependence as a function of level of 
categorization" (p. 150). 
Based also on the work of Tajfel and Turner, Brewer and colleagues· work has 
undoubtedly been very influential to the field of intergroup relations as a whole. Initially, 
Brewer and Silver (1978; see also Doise et al. 1971, 1972), examined both intragroup 
and intergroup reward allocation in a situation of no anticipated (nor actual) race to face 
social interaction. Participants were instructed that the allocation task would either have 
a cooperative, competitive or indepeljdent reward structure. Participants' allocations 
were in line with the reward structure; however, trait ratings were always biased in 
favour of the ingroup, indicating some kind of underlying group level process. 
Building on this earlier work (see also Brewer, 1979), Kramer and Brewer 
(1984) carried out some of the first studies within the social dilemma !ramework where 
social identity was directly manipulated. These studies systematically manipulated 
intermediate and superordinate levels of identification. Kramer and Brewer ( 1984) 
stated that: 
143 
... one effect of group identification may be that individuals attach greater weight to collective 
outcomes than they do to individual outcomes alone. Inclusion within a common social 
boundary reduces social distance among group members, making it less likely that individuals 
will make sharp distinctions between their own and others' welfare. As a result, outcomes for 
other group members, or for the group as a whole, come to be perceived as one's own. (p.1045) 
In these studies, the objectively shared resource was the basis for the interdependence 
structure as well as the superordinate group identity of the individuals involved. Three 
studies were run in which identity (subordinate or superordinate) was manipulated. The 
experiments consisted of two phases: one in which the resource level remained stable; 
the other in which the resource was being depleted. The second phase of the experiment 
was designed to create greater conflict between individual self-interest and collective 
welfare. The primary prediction was an interaction between identification and resource 
status; specifically, that as the resource became depleted individuals in the subordinate 
condition would take more resources for themselves than those in the superordinate 
condition. While identity was manipulated in different ways across experiments, either 
through the use of natural groups or a common fate induction, it was found that across 
all experiments the prediction was supported. The researchers suggest that "it is 
possible that individuals with a superordinate identity are willing to compensate for the 
selfish and destructive acts of others as long as they are not alone in so doing" (p. 1056). 
Brewer and Kramer (1986) conducted a follow up study in which they 
manipulated social identity, group size and decision framing (public goods or commons 
dilemma) in a social dilemma. The fmdings indicated that in a public goods dilemma 
group identification did not have a significant effect when the group size was large, but 
did when the group size was smaller (n = 32 versus n = 8). It was concluded that: 
"When a choice was framed as a public goods dilemma ... individuals appear to be more 
sensitive to diffusion effects, so that large groups undermined the positive effects of 
collective identity" (p. 549). The findings are argued to be consistent with Kahneman 
and Tversky's (1984) prospect theory. Specifically that public goods dilemmas induce a 
loss frame and commons dilemmas induce a gain frame; thus, less cooperation would be 
expected in the former. This work led Brewer to conclude that group size is an 
important moderating factor, and provided the initial basis for her later work on the 
Optimal Distinctiveness Model (Brewer, 1991). 
While this approach acknowledges that group identification can form a basis for 
solving collective-choice dilemmas, it is based on an assumption that: "The shared 
resource, and associated interdependence, must, in effect, form the basis for a 
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superordinate group identity, which encompasses all of the individuals in the commons" 
(Kramer & Brewer, 1984, p. 1045). In other words, interdependence is an a priori 
condition that lays the basis of group formation; that is, perceived interdependence 
produces the group and identity is a biproduct of the interdependence structure. Social 
identity is thus conceived as a secondary variable within an interdependence structure. 
Brewer and Schneider (1990) conclude in their review of social identities and 
social dilemmas that: "Subgroups large enough to have an impact on the collective, yet 
small enough to provide a unique identity, seem to be the most effective at inducing co-
operative social motives .... Groups that define their existence in terms of their unique 
contribution to an interdependent collective will maximize co-operation" (p.184). This 
work led to the development of Brewer's Optimal Distinctiveness Model. She states 
that: 
My position is that social identity derives from a fundamental tension between human needs for 
validation and similarity to others (on the one hand) and a countervailing need for uniqueness 
and individuation (on the other) .... Group identities allow us to be the same and different at the 
same time. (Brewer, 1991, p. 477) 
The model argues for and incorporates the opposing processes of needs to assimilate and 
differentiate in terms of group memberships. It is hypothesized that there is a negative 
correlation between these two needs; that is, an increase in the satisfaction of one, relates 
to a decrease in the satisfaction of the other. Thus, only at a certain intervening point 
will equilibrium be reached and both be optimally satisfied. It is argued that the "primary 
implication of this model of social identity is that distinctiveness per se is an extremely 
important characteristic of groups, independent of the status of evaluation attached to 
group memberships" (Brewer, 1991, p. 478). Brewer also cites the fragmentation of the 
former Yugoslavia and U.S.S.R as evidence that these larger inclusive group identities 
are not sustainable. 
A recent study by Bettencourt, Brewer, Croak and Miller (1992), which builds on 
Brewer and Miller's work on the contact hypothesis (Brewer & Miller, 1984, 1988), 
clarifies their conceptual understandiqg of the psychological implications of cooperative 
behavior. Specifically they propose that cooperation "produces more positive 
intragroup interactions and interpersonal acceptance than does competition" (p.303). As 
such, cooperation is understood to individualize relationships. However, it is suggested 
that these positive effects can be undermined by a task oriented structure. Building on 
work by Erber and Fiske (1984), as well as Neuberg and Fiske (1987), it is reasoned that 
a task focus promotes category-based responding as it interferes with the attcntional 
resources that could be used to characterize fellow group members. Cooperation is, 
thus, understood as behavior that decreases intergroup tension through individuating 
perceptions in situations of interdependence. 
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More recently Brewer ( 1996) has argued for the "ambivalent sociality" of human 
nature. Brewer's arguments build on a sociobiological model (see Capo rae! & Brewer, 
1995), wherein interdependence with other individuals at a group level is understood as 
obligatory as it enhances the survival of the group. As the survival of the group is vital 
to the survival of one's own offspring, individuals are motivated to act in terms of the 
group interests and cooperate with others. It is argued that for groups to survive they 
must meet certain structural requirements, including mobilization and coordination of 
individual efllJrt, communication, internal differentiation, optimal group size, and 
boundary dei1nition (Brewer, 1996, pp. 57-58). In this light, it is stated that: 
Human beings are clearly vested with self-interest, but this view of evolutionary history 
contends that self-interest is naturally mitigated by identification with groups .... When 
individual self-interest and collective interests are placed in opposition, the innate 
ambivalences in human nature are revealed. "Social dilemmas" constitute a special set of 
interdependence problems in which individual and collective interests are at odds. (p. 66) 
Taken together these studies show that for Brewer and colleagues groups arc objective 
realities, dei1ned in terms of cooperative and competitive interdependence structures. At 
best social identity is a secondary variable that moderates individual responses in a 
situation of interdependence. Brewer further argues that rational action occurs at the 
individual level in a social dilemma; thus, this model is essentially a dual process model 
which favours individuated responses (see Brewer, 1988). These earlier conclusions 
have lead to an ambivalent sociality model of optimal distinctiveness where group life 
must simultaneously provide for the need for distinctiveness and inclusion of the 
individual (see Brewer, 1991; Brewer, Manzi & Shaw,1993). Outcome interdependence 
of individuals remains an integral aspect of this model, as Brewer, Weber and Carini 
(1995, see also Brewer & Harasty, 1996) suggest: 
Motivation to perceive an out-group as a social entity may arise from the existence of various 
forms of behavioral or outcome interdependence between the perceiver (or the perceiver's in-
group) and the out-group, (p.38) 
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While social identity has become an important mediating variable in this model, 
cooperative or competitive outcome interdependence of individuals continues to occupy 
a central role. 
Building on Brewer and Miller's analysis of reducing intergroup bias through 
focusing on cooperative interpersonal interactions, Gaertner and colleagues (Gaertner, 
Mann, Dovidio, Murrell & Pomare, 1990) asked: "How does cooperation reduce 
intergroup bias?" and proposed that cooperation reduces the salience of intergroup 
boundaries. Their findings support the conclusion that "intergroup cooperation 
increased the extent to which subjects adopted a one-group representation, and 
intergroup cooperation also decreased intergroup bias" (p. 702). However, while their 
results offer support for a social identity model they "do not believe that intergroup 
cooperation reduces bias solely by modifying members' representations of aggregates" 
(p. 702). This early work has led to the development of the Common Ingroup Identity 
Model (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasion, Bachman & Rust, 1993) which they argue is an 
additional model to Brewer's, which can explain the reduction of intragroup bias (sec 
Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman & Anastasio, 1995). More recently this group of 
researchers state that: 
From our perspective, intergroup cooperation toward the achievement of superordinate goals 
among Sherif and Sherif's (1969) groups of summer campers, reduced the intensity of 
intergroup bias by altering members' representations of the memberships from "us" and "them" 
to a more inclusive "we". (Anastasio, Bachman, Gaertner & Dovidio, 1996, p. 239) 
In other words, cooperation produced the group. Their model proposes that cognitive 
representations mediate the relationship between intergroup cooperation and the 
reduction of ingroup bias. This analysis also defines group relationships in terms of 
outcome interdependence and thus the interdependence structure shapes the intergroup 
relations, with cooperation producing the group, or collective representation. 
Anastasio, Bachman, Gaertner and Dovidio (1996) summari7~ five studies that 
lend empirical support to the model, the first four of which are relevant here. The first 
study (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell & Dovidio, 1989) demonstrated, as expected, the ability 
of recategorization and decategorizatjon to reduce ingroup bias. The second study 
(Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell & Pomare, 1990) examined the hypothesis that 
"cooperation may work in part through cognitive means: by inducing members of two 
separate groups to conceive of themselves as one superordinate entity or as sharing a 
common ingroup identity" (p.7). 
147 
An experimental design, which manipulated cooperation (presence or absence) 
with aggregation (one or two groups), operationalized cooperation through participation 
in a common task versus listening to a recording of a third group's discussion. 
Aggregation was operationalized in several ways; through seat arrangements (AAA BBB 
vs ABABAB), differentiated or inclusive group names, and other structural factors. The 
results supported the hypothesis that a cognitive re-definition of the group mediates the 
relationship between cooperation and the reduction of ingroup bias. Studies 3 and 4 
(Bachman, 1993; Bachman, Gaertner, Anastasion & Rust, 1993; Gaertner, Dovidio, 
Rust, Bachman & Anastasio, 1994) examined this relationship using natural groups and 
confirmed the results of the laboratory study: cooperative equal status contact 
significantly predicted the degree of inclusiveness of the cognitive representations of the 
group and the degree of intergroup bias. An inclusive cognitive representation predicted 
lower intergroup bias. These findings were replicated in the fourth field study that 
surveyed bank employees who had just undergone an interbank merger. In each of these 
studies a cognitive re-definition of the group seemed to be a primary mediating variable. 
To summarize, the Common lngroup Identity Model predicts that "equal status, 
cooperative interdependence, interaction and egalitarian norms reduce bias, in part, 
because they alter cognitive representations of the [group structure] from different 
groups to a more inclusive ingroup." (p. 232, 1996). In other words, just as Deutsch 
(1949) would predict cooperative (or promotive) interdependence produces the group. 
The group is understood in terms of its objective interdependence, or as stated by 
Gaertner and colleagues the "objective condition of contact" (p.23). 
These studies, as with research done by Deutsch and colleagues, clearly find that 
social cooperation between individuals can lead to enhanced harmony within and 
between groups. There is clear evidence that some type of group level process enhances 
the level of cooperative behaviour significantly. 
The importance of group processes, over outcome interdependence, has also 
been emphasized by Tyler and colleagues (1996). They draw similar conclusions, finding 
that if the procedural justice within the group is normatively fair, the resource outcomes 
to the individual become secondary. 
The findings of the social dilemma and procedural justice literatures both suggest that the 
concept of egoism become problematic when we are talking about the members of groups. 
These findings suggest a need to fundamentally rethink the concept of self-interest as an 
explanation for people's evaluations and behaviors. (Tyler and Dawes, 1993, p 100) 
148 
Perhaps, through stressing the outcome structure of group life we miss important aspects 
of the nature of intergroup relations, we miss out on developing a fuller understanding of 
the nature of social relationships and the process of social identification with others. For 
while the above studies draw on and support a social identity analysis, they are in essence 
hybrid models of the two theoretical approaches, as they manipulate identity within a 
situation of objective interdependence. This thesis aims to develop the self-
categorization analysis of social cooperation, wherein identity, over interdependence, 
becomes the primary variable. The emergent property of groups, that is the process of 
social identification, will be at the forefront of this analysis of group life. This analysis, as 
Tyler and Dawes highlight, allows us to re-think the concept of self-interest. 
6.4 Rabbie' s critique of the social identity analysis of group life 
While many researchers are developing hybrid analyses of social cooperation 
through integrating these two approaches, they are inherently incommensurable in a 
number of significant ways. It is thus interesting that after 10 years of development, in 
which time consistent evidence for the social identity analysis of group lile has been 
building, Rabbie and colleagues (Horwitz & Rabbie, 1989; Rabbie, 1991; Rabbie & 
Horwitz, 1988; Rabbie, Schot & Visser, 1989) present the only systematic attempt by 
interdependence theorists to refute the social identity and self-categorization perspectives 
on group formation. In a recent reply to Rabbie, Turner and Bourhis (1996) highlight 
the two most significant rejections of the social identity perspective that are raised in his 
critique: (a) that social categories and social groups have not been diJierentiated; that is, 
a fundamental distinction has not been made between social categories of similar 
individuals and social groups as interacting dynamic wholes and (b) that the findings of 
the minimal group paradigm, that led to the development of social identity theory and 
self-categorization theory, can be accounted for through an interdependence analysis of 
group life; that is, that behavior in the allocation tasks is purely motivated by individual 
self-interested that is driven by instrumental means to increase the utility value that 
accrues to individuals. Each of these points will now be addressed. 
Rabbie and colleagues argue for a distinction to be made bet ween social 
categories and social groups. Rabbie and Horwitz (1988, p. 117) argue that a "social 
group can be considered as a 'dynamic whole' or social system, characterized by the 
perceived interdependence among its members, whereas a social category can be defined 
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as a collection of individuals who share at least one attribute in common" (p. 117). In 
contrast, social identity and self-categorization theorists argue that the conceptual 
psychological understanding of social categories and social groups are one and the same. 
This is interesting in light of the fact that throughout the development of social 
psychology, researchers have made distinctions between societal groups and 
psychological groups (e.g. see Deutsch, 1949a, Chapter 2), and, following in this same 
manner, social identity and self-categorization theorists have never denied the reality of 
both psychological groups and societal groups. However, it is the groups that have 
psychological reality for individuals, that is psychological reference groups or groups that 
individuals identify with, which defines the focus and whole essence of the work of self-
categorization theory. In other words, social groups that become psychologically self-
relevant -- groups that individuals categorize themselves in terms of-- are the groups 
that self-categorization theory argues are the important perceptual constructs for 
understanding intergroup relations. It is argued that the mind is socially structured in 
terms of social reality of groups for individuals (see Turner & Oakes, 1996). The theory 
takes an interactionist approach to the study of group life and processes, and it is the 
processes of identification with a group that is at the core of self-categorization theory. 
This emphasis docs not deny the reality of societal groups. 
As such, a descriptive analysis of groups has never been the f(Jcus of either social 
identity or self-categorization theories. Tajfel (1978, p. 63) explicitly avoided a 
descriptive analysis of what 'is' identity; for this was not what was important and in the 
end would lead to "endless and often sterile discussions." In contrast, Tajfel and his 
colleagues were interested in the origins and processes of identity formation. For social 
identity defines an individual's place in the world, not in a passive sense but in an active 
sense. As such, a social identity "is a guide to action" (Tajfel, 1972, p. 298) for 
individuals, and collectives, in society. It is this process of identification that guides 
social change, as well as social stability. In other words the process of social 
identification defines the essence of social conflict and social cooperation. 
This emphasis was made clear when Tajfel and colleagues first presented the 
findings of the minimal group studies. Rather than redescribing the independent variable, 
that is the division of subjects into minimal socially imposed categories, Tajfcl and others 
were interested in explaining the psychological process underlying behavior in terms of 
these minimal categorizations. The data showed that individuals did not passively accept 
the imposed social category and subsequently discriminate against the outgroup. The 
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point was that if an individual did identify with the minimal group, individuals created 
social distinctiveness through adopting the maximum difference strategy and thus 
brought comparative social meaning to the situation. The motivational process of social 
identification and the psychological process underlying identification thus became the 
focus of future research. Individuals don't just accept categories, they identify with 
social groups and categories. And this is the process that accounts J(Jr social conflict 
and social cooperation. As Turner (1975) stated: 
whilst it is true empirically that under certain conditions categorization per se is sufficient for 
intergroup discrimination, the proposition may be theoretically misleading to the extent that it 
suggests that 'acceptance' by subjects of a categorization is automatic and its use inevitable 
rather than indicating that 'acceptance' itself is to be explained in terms of how the category is 
used. (p. 17) 
In other words, in contrast to Rabbie and colleagues, categories and groups play an 
active role in the conduct of intergroup behavior and do not merely act as a passive 
category of group membership that serves instrumental needs of individuals. 
The Behavioral Interaction Model (BIM; Rabbie eta!., 1989) represents Rabbie 
and colleagues' proposal to refute the social identity account of behavior in the minimal 
group paradigm. In reporting their study they state: "The main aim of this paper is to 
show that in the standard MGP [minimal group paradigm], there 11! a rational !ink 
between economic self-interests and the two major allocation strategies which are often 
found in the MGP experiments: the strategy of ingroup favouritism and the 'inlluential 
strategy of fairness' (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 39): to give the ingroup about as much as 
the outgroup" (Rabbie et a!., 1989, pp. 175-176). In line with this argument Rabbie ct 
a!. (1989) manipulated the outcome interdependence structure of individuals and found 
that discriminatory behavior varied as a function of the interdependence structure. Their 
primary hypothesis states: "the greater the perceived interdependence of outcomes on the 
ingroup, the more ingroup favouritism will be observed. Similarly, the greater the 
perceived outcome interdependence on the outgroup, then outgroup favouritism will 
occur." (p. 179). 
Using an adapted version of the minimal group paradigm, within a 2 (sex) x 3 
(interdependence structure) design, this hypothesis was tested. The three 
interdependence conditions were: ingroup dependence (!D); outgroup dependence (OD); 
and in and outgroup dependence (IOD). The findings are, by and large, consistent with 
the prediction. Participants' allocation behaviour favoured the group that they were most 
dependent on. In other words, interdependence structure can have an effect on 
allocation behaviour in the minimal group paradigm. 
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Based on this one empirical study it is proposed that group based processes, such 
as cohesion, identification, discrimination, favouritism and cooperation, are all products 
of the mutual interdependence of individuals pursuing the satisfaction of their individual 
needs through maximizing their utility levels. They maintain that perceived positive 
interdependence of individuals " ... is a crucial pre-condition for the formation of social 
groups from which other processes may follow such as the emergence of specific group 
norms, interpersonal attraction, ingroup-outgroup differentiation, group identification" 
(Rabbie et a!., 1989, p. 175). In line with other interdependence theorists they maintain 
that behavior of individuals is a function of both the objective interdependence structure 
and the psychological orientation of individuals. 
Social identity theory and self-categorization theory do not discount the potential 
influence of objective interdependence in determining group level processes; however, 
the point is that objective interdependence, per se, can not account for the necessary and 
suftlcient conditions of group based behavior. Identification with the social group is the 
intervening mechanism that accounts for group based behavior. 
In response to the arguments presented in the Behavioral Interaction Model, 
Gagnon and Bourhis (1996) tested these two accounts of behavior in the minimal group 
paradigm in a study that explicitly manipulates the objective interdependence of 
individuals in a minimal group paradigm. Gagnon and Bourhis (1996) make the point 
that these: "authors assert that interdependence and self-interest are the main factors 
that account for discriminatory behavior in the MGP" (p.l291). Recall that these were 
the two motivational factors that were questioned in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Thus, in 
response Gagnon and Bourhis examine "how in-group identification and social identity 
needs (SIT) combine with interdependence and self-interest (BIM) as complementary 
explanations of discrimination in the MGP" (p. 1292). It was predicted that, in line with 
social identity theory and self-categorization theory, interdependence would only 
contribute to the extent that members first identify with their category of membership in 
this minimal group setting. 
Gagnon and Bourhis' (1996) study was presented as a decision making task 
under conditions of minimal information, using the standard minimal group paradigm. 
Tajfel matrices were used to assess the allocation strategies that participants used when 
distributing points to anonymous others only defined by their group affiliation. All 
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participants, that is members of both groups, were outcome interdependent l(,r their 
individual reward of receiving an extra five course credits for taking part in the study. 
This standard procedure was labelled the "interdependence" condition, A second 
condition was created by secretly telling participants that they would be given the full 
five credit points regardless of the distributions that were chosen. Given this. individuals 
would no longer be outcome interdependent for the outcome they would receive. This 
was labelled the "autonomous" condition. In line with the interdependence argument, 
this "autonomous" condition should produce no ingroup favouritism, as a consequence 
of ingroup reciprocity conditions, as participants had no reason to act in terms of group 
affiliations, as their individual self-interest was now maximally satisfied. In other words, 
now that individuals would no longer experience mutual common fate, ingroup 
reciprocity expectations would no longer be evoked and lead to ingroup cooperation and 
favouritism. Specifically, interdependence theorists would not expect tacit intragroup 
cooperation in the "autonomous" condition, as there is no mutual dependency. As 
Mlicki (1993) summarizes: 
On the basis of perceived interdependence and normative considerations subjects formulate 
certain expectations as to the way others will allocate points. These expectations can influence 
subjects' allocations just as real feedback about allocations of others docs. In this way subjects 
develop tacit, instrumental co-operation with members of the group they perceive themselves to 
be most dependent upon. The co-operative behaviour is based on the assumption that members 
of the rewarded group will reciprocate this favour. (p. 63) 
In other words, interdependence theorists argue that cooperation is a product of 
instrumental ingroup reciprocity expectations in situations of interdependence. 
On the other hand, social identity theorists would argue that the process of 
categorizing oneself in terms of a group membership, albeit arbitrary in this case, is the 
basis for the psychological formation of "us" and "them." It is categorization processes 
that lead to identity formation and thus the basis for intragroup cooperation. In other 
words, the formation (salience) of a psychological group is the intervening mechanism 
and the basis for cooperative behavior. Thus, regardless of functional outcome 
interdependence of individuals, participants will act in terms of their salient group 
identification, as such intragroup favouritism and intergroup discrimination were 
expected in both the autonomous and interdependent conditions. 
The results of Gagnon and Bourhis' study supported a social identity perspective. 
Regardless of condition (autonomous or interdependent) individuals showed intragroup 
favouritism on the standard minimal group paradigm measures, adopting the 
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discriminatory strategies of ingroup favouritism and maximizing the difference. To 
maintain consistency with the Rabbie et al. (1989) study, identification was measured 
post hoc. Based on this measure, participants were divided into high identifiers and low 
identifiers with their respective groups which, together with the experimental conditions, 
produced a 2 x 2 design: interdependent/autonomous with high/low identification. The 
results are in line with a social identity analysis: high identifiers showed more ingroup 
favouritism than the low identifiers. Recall that social identity theory predicts that 
individuals are motivated to positively differentiate their own group from other groups 
and use ingroup favouritism and maximum difference strategies to aid in this process. 
Tajfel (1972) argued that through participant's allocation behaviour they create 
distinctions between the comparative groups, thereby investing the situation with 
comparative meaning. It is in this manner that social distinctiveness is achieved in a 
minimal group situation. The results of Gagnon and Bourhis' study clearly supported 
social identity theory, over interdependence theory. There was no effect for outcome 
interdependence; that is, regardless of objective interdependence individuals acted in 
terms of their comparative group memberships and created comparative social meaning 
through discrimination. 
In discussing their results Gagnon and Bourhis concluded that interdependence of 
fate, without ingroup identification, can not produce the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for intergroup discrimination. Their findings clearly show that individuals in 
the autonomous condition, that is those individuals who had no interdependence of fate, 
discriminated in favour of their ingroup, just as those in the interdependence condition 
did. The objective for the participants seemed to be to achieve a meaningful dimension 
of social distinctiveness in terms of their comparative group membership, discrimination 
strategies achieved this for the individuals involved. As Bourhis, Turner and Gagnon 
(1996) summarize: 
We are not suggesting that social identity is the sole principle at work in intergroup relations. 
Social identity theory was always meant to complement realistic conflict theory to help account 
for ... intergroup situations in which there was a lack of an objective conflict of interests 
between groups but intergroup attitudes and behaviours were still antagonistic; and ... 
intergroup situations in which an actual conflict of group interests did not lead to antagonistic 
intergroup attitudes and behaviours .... Similarly, self-categorization theory provides a detailed 
analysis of the relationship between group formation and perceived interdependence. (p. 294) 
In summarizing their reply to Rabbie et al., Turner and Bourhis (1996) stress 
three points in response to the Behavioral Interaction Model. Briefly these relate to: (a) 
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the conceptual understanding of common fate; (b) the relationship between common fate 
and perceived interdependence; (c) the development of the Lewinian conceptual 
understanding of the group. Each of these points will now be discussed in more detail. 
For self-categorization theory, common fate is in essence a similarity variable, 
that is individuals perceive themselves to be similar because they share common fate 
(positive or negative). Together the individuals involved will sink or swim, share the 
same outcome, and thus through their similarity of circumstance achieve a sense of 
common fate. In general when individuals perceive themselves to be similar in some 
relevant sense this is the basis for self-categorization with others; and, it is the feeling of 
togetherness or belongingness that is the precondition for experiencing common fate. As 
Turner and Bourhis (1996) explicitly state: "Common fate is not outcome 
interdependence" (p. 38). 
Following on from this, Turner and Bourhis raise their second point: to remain a 
distinct theory, BIM must show that perceived interdependence follows directly from the 
common fate or outcome interdependence of individuals and this process is necessary 
and sufficient for group formation, that is, it must specify an ontology that does not 
replicate the social identity analysis of group life. The Behavior Interactional Model has 
failed to do this. 
Finally, and somewhat ironically, it is self-categorization theory that is actually 
more parsimonious with Lewin's analysis of group life, and it has subsequently 
developed a systematic analysis of many of the points that Lewin stressed. It is Rabbie 
and other interdependence theorists who have moved away from the original Lewinian 
analysis through the descriptive outcome interdependence analysis of group life. In 
conclusion, Turner and Bourhis use Rabbie et al.'s own data to make their point and 
conclude that the "data (and other more recent data) demonstrate that social 
categorization per se under certain conditions can produce ingroup bias irreducible to 
personal self-interest" (p. 60). In other words, there is little evidence for the primacy of 
the psychological motivation to maximize personal self-interest. In the final analysis, 
Turner and Bourhis mount strong evidence that Rabbie and colleagues are victims of 
"semantic confusion," just as Tajfel (1982) had argued when Rabbie et al. first mooted 
the idea that social identity theory reduced groups to simple categories. 
Recently, building on the work of Rabbie et al., Mlicki (1993) has recommended 
the use of an alternative manipulation of interdependence to contrast the BIM and social 
identity theory. The study builds on the original Rabbie et al. study, using a minimal 
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group paradigm in a 3 (IOD vs OD vs ND - no dependence) x 2 (points vs money) x 2 
(order of task: identification vs allocation) design. The design of the study introduced a 
no dependence condition to act as a control and, as with the previous study, it was 
predicted that degree of interdependence would predict the degree of discrimination. 
The study also hypothesized that money allocation would enhance ingroup identification 
over points (or symbolic) allocation, making a distinction between relational and 
instrumental interdependence on the process of social identification (see p. 61 ). The final 
hypothesis stated that initial identification, in comparison to post hoc identification, 
would lead to higher levels of discrimination, while at the same time producing a weaker 
identification with the ingroup. The fmdings by and large support the hypothesis. 
Discrimination was linked to degree of interdependence, with the highest degree of 
interdependence inducing the most discrimination and the no dependence condition 
inducing the least (IOD > OD > ND). Also allocation of money, versus points, induced 
higher levels of discrimination. It was concluded that: "when allocating monetary points 
people perceive some rational link between economic self-interests and the strategies of 
ingroup favouritism and fairness. This link shows nevertheless much more in behavioural 
tendencies and normative expectations than in actual allocation behaviour" (p.87). 
However, the predictions regarding social identity were not supported: both induced 
equal amounts of discrimination and identification. To explain these results, it was 
concluded that there are both "cognitive" [identification] and "behavioural" 
[discrimination] ways to express group belongingness. Ellemers and Mlicki ( 1991) 
concluded that these responses might reflect: 
two different ways in which people express their group affiliation: at the cognitive 
(identification) or at the behavioural (differentiation) level. It turns out that these two responses 
to one's group membership do not necessarily occur simultaneously, so that we may not 
conclude that the overt expression of in group identification is a necessary condition for 
intergroup discrimination to occur. Nevertheless, both types of responses do influence each 
other, in that group members may not feel the need to discriminate against outgroup members 
when they already have expressed their group affiliation by showing strong identification as a 
cognition response, because their group affiliation is not apparent from the behaviour they have 
displayed. {pp. 25-26) 
Thus, as in the previous study, Mlicki finds evidence in support of social identity theory, 
while expressing these findings within an interdependence framework. Mlicki (1993) 
concludes "that the processes of development of ingroup identification and ingroup bias 
can also be related in a different way than described in SIT (Mlick~ 1988)" (p. 85). Yet 
as stated above, it remains that social identity and self-categorization theories would not 
deny that interdependence can play a role in psychological group formation, however as 
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Mlicki highlights, identification with the group is an inherent process involved in group-
based behavior. The comments raised by Turner and Bourhis remain uncontested. 
6.5 Social identity and social cooperation: Further development 
In summary, there is mounting evidence in the social dilemma literature, and 
related areas, of the importance of group processes and social identity. These 
arguments, in part, follow from the social identity analysis that arose from the early 
minimal group studies, which as highlighted remain influential, contentious and highly 
debated today. The social identity analysis of groups contends that above and beyond 
resource based links of individuals to groups, it seems that groups provide something 
distinct to the lives of individuals. However, do group level processes necessitate, as 
Brewer and Schneider (1990) argue, "a double-edged sword" in social dilemmas, given 
that they argue that a salient group identity increases intragroup cooperation at the 
expense of a objectively interdependent superordinate collective? The relationship 
between social identification, interdependence and social cooperation will now sustain 
the remaining empirical work of this thesis. However, unlike the studies reported here, 
identity will become the primary variable of analysis, interdependence secondary; for in 
line with self-categorization theory it is argued that social cooperation, and 
interdependence, is the byproduct of a salient social identity. In other words, social 
cooperation, in line with the social identity analysis of social change and stability, is an 
active process of the pursuit of mutual interests by individuals in a given context. 
Further, the seli~categorization analysis of social cooperation broadens our 
conceptual definition to include other prosocial acts such helping behavior, and even 
altruism. It is argued here that our formal definition of social cooperation within the 
social dilemma paradigm is too narrowly conceived and restricts our conceptual 
development. An appropriate metaphor would be to define the conceptual understanding 
of social inlluence, solely in terms of conversion, ignoring the important conceptual links 
with conformity and compliance. The social identity approach allows conceptual links to 
be made with helping behavior and altruism. Finally, a very important distinction 
between the interdependence and social identity approaches is that cooperation does not 
involve self-sacrifice, as the self, and self-interest, can be defmed at both the individual 
and the group level. 
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To resolve the incommensurable aspects of these two approaches the following 
empirical strategy will be used. Given that the interdependence literature conceptualizes 
cooperation as a function of objective interdependence structures and transJ(,rmational 
processes of individuals (as seen in Chapter 2), the necessity and sufficiency of these 
constructs will be examined within a social identity analysis of group life. At the same 
time, these studies also aim to draw out the dynamic emergent properties of group life. 
A first study will replicate and extend Gagnon and Bourhis' (1996) study that 
responds to Rabbie and colleagues' retort to social identity theory. The aim is to build 
consistent evidence that group life and processes are a function of social identification, 
rather than objective interdependence of individuals as presented by the Behavior 
Interactional Model. This study thus examines the necessary precondition of objective 
interdependence as upheld by interdependence theorists. 
The second study examines the second important construct of interdependence 
theory, specifically the transformational process of social value orientation. Social value 
orientation represents the most systematic attempt by interdependence theorists to 
account for variance in level of cooperation within any given situation of inter-
dependence. This study will examine the stability of this intrapersonal construct within a 
given situation of objective interdependence over time. 
Given that interdependence theorists argue that objective interdependence is a 
necessary precondition for social cooperation to emerge (a condition present in the two 
previous studies), the third study will examine if cooperative relations between groups 
will emerge as a product of a salient social identity, despite the lack of objective or 
functional interdependence of individuals. 
Studies two and three will be conducted as longitudinal field studies in the same 
setting to examine systematically the correlational nature of variables important to the 
analysis of social cooperation, such as perceptions of similarity, interdependence, as well 
as cooperation. These field studies, in particular, highlight the dynamic emergent 
properties of groups. 
In study four interdependence will be examined again, however this time it will be 
experimentally manipulated in a naturalistic setting. The aim will be to show that despite 
the objective interdependence of individuals in an environmental dilemma, individuals' 
cooperative behavior will vary as a function of salience of social identity. Further, the 
study aims to show that perceptions of interdependence vary with social identificaiton. 
The final study will exclusively develop the social identity analysis within the 
same naturalistic setting as study four. The study will examine if, in line with self-
categorization theory, social cooperation will vary with the salience of the social 
identification in an environmental dilemma situation. 
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In conclusion, this thesis aims to test and develop the self-categorization analysis 
of social cooperation. The primary hypothesis to be tested is that social cooperation is 
the product of a salient social identity. At the same time, constructs important to the 
interdependence analysis will be addressed, specifically the necessity and sufficiency of 
the constructs of objective interdependence of individuals and social value orientations. 
Finally, just as social identity theory was always meant to complement and build on 
Sherif's field study which manipulated the outcome interdependence of participants, this 
thesis aims to build on previous work as well. In particular, this thesis aims to develop 
the conclusion reached in the social dilemma literature that identification with the group 
is the key principle involved in increasing the level of social cooperation. The processes 
of social identification put forward by self-categorization theory will be used to develop 
this principle finding in the social dilemma literature. 
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-Chapter 7-
Determinants of intragroup cooperation and intergroup competition: 
7.1 Introduction 
Examining the functional interdependence 
and social identity analyses of group life 
Experiment 1 
This chapter will examine the psychological basis of defining "us and them," that 
is group memberships, and the derivative processes of intragroup cooperation (and 
favouritism) and intergroup competition (and discrimination). Specifically, group level 
processes will be examined in regard to the two theoretical positions outlined in the 
previous chapters: functional interdependence and social identity. This is an important 
step in developing a systematic understanding of social cooperation, as our conceptual 
understanding of the psychological group is fundamental to our understanding of group 
level processes. i\s Sumner (1906) has indicated, cooperation with the ingroup 
(intragroup cooperation and favouritism) and competition against (and discrimination 
towards) the outgroup has long been taken as a functional aspect of intergroup relations. 
The question is asked: by what psychological mechanism does this occur? In other 
words, what is the psychological basis for group behavior: functional interdependence or 
social identity? 
Interdependence theorists argue that intragroup cooperation is a function of 
rational, instrumental processes that derive from the interdependence structure that 
defines the objective relations of individuals. As such, the interdependence perspective 
argues that a collection of individuals form a social group when they perceive and 
experience an interdependence of common fate. In other words it is the functional 
interdependence of individuals that produces the group. 
Seli~categorization theorists argue that intragroup cooperation and favouritism is 
a product of a salient social identity, whereby the psychological conceptualization of the 
group may not necessarily match the objective state of affairs. While objective 
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interdependence can lead to psychological group formation and thus intragroup 
cooperation (and favouritism) and intergroup competition (and discrimination), this is 
not a necessary precondition of group based behavior. In other words, objective 
interdependence can be sufficient but is not necessary. Self-categorization theorists 
would argue that identification with the group is the necessary intervening process that 
allows for group-based behavior. 
The main point of this study is to test these two analyses of group based 
processes and behaviour. The question to be addressed is: What is the basis for 
perceived group membership? Do individuals act in terms of a group because they are 
objectively interdependent for outcomes they will receive as individuals? Or, do 
individuals act in terms of group memberships because they are subjectively meaningful 
social identifications which motivate them to achieve social categorical distinctiveness in 
terms of the salient selt~categorization? This is a fundamental question underlying the 
nature of group life and processes, such as intragroup cooperation and intergroup 
discrimination. Thus while this study does not examine cooperation, per se, we are 
examining a much more basic underlying process: the nature of the psychological group. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Rabbie and colleagues (Horwitz and 
Rabbie, 1989; Rabbie, 1991; Rabbie and Horwitz, 1988; Rabbie, Schot and Visser, 1989) 
present the only systematic attempt by interdependence theorists to refute the social 
identity and self-categorization perspectives of group formation. They argue that: 
A group becomes a compact 'we-group' or 'social group' to the extent that individuals are 
subjected to the experience of a common fate, perceive themselves to be interdependent with 
respect to their common goals and means to attain those goals, view themselves (and are also 
considered by others) as a distinctive social unit, can directly communicate with one another 
and engage in cooperative face-to-face interactions in an effort to achieve a group product or a 
common outcome which contributes in some way to the desired outcomes of each of the 
individual members and of the group as a whole. (Rabbie, 1991, p. 238-239) 
Rabbie and colleagues present their behavioral interaction model (BIM) (Rabbie, 1987; 
Rabbie, Schot and Visser, 1989) and argue: "Consistent with the interdependence 
perspective of Lewin (1948), a group is conceptualized as a social system or 'dynamic 
whole,' ranging from a 'compact' social unit to a 'loose mass' whose members are 
defined, not by their similarity to each other but by their perceived goal interdependence 
with each other and with the group as a whole" (p. 238). As such, Rabbie and 
colleagues' arguments are consistent with the interdependence arguments presented in 
Chapters 2 and 3; however, they remain distinct as they are the only theorists to directly 
address the social identity analysis and findings of group-level processes from an 
interdependence perspective. 
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Rabbie and his colleagues argue that the findings of the minimal group studies 
(described in Chapter 5) are consistent with the interdependence analysis of their 
behavioural interaction model (Rabbie eta!., 1989). They maintain that perceived 
interdependence for the satisfaction of self-interest "is a pre-condition for the formation 
of social groups from which other processes may follow such as the emergence of 
specific norms, interpersonal attraction, ingroup-outgroup differentiation, group 
identification and shared social identities" (p. 175). Thus, in contrast to self-
categorization theory, they argue, in line with the arguments presented in earlier 
chapters, that behavior is a function of the structural interdependence of the individuals 
and individuals' respective intra personal orientations. 
An important aspect of psychological orientations that Rabbie and colleagues 
(1989) discuss is ingroup-reciprocity expectations. They argue that individuals will 
reasonably assume that: "By giving more to their ingroup members than to the outgroup 
members -- in the expectation that the other ingroup members will reciprocate this 
implicit cooperative interaction -- they will increase their chances of maximizing their 
own outcomes .... They tacitly seem to coordinate their responses with each other ... in 
trying to maximize their own individual self-interest and probably the interests of their 
group as a whole" (p. 176). Overall, in line with other interdependence theorists, they 
argue that there is a rational link between objective outcome interdependence and 
discriminatory behavior in the minimal group paradigm. 
Gagnon and Bourhis' (1996) study, reported in the previous chapter, addressed 
the issues raised by the behavioral interaction model and social identity theory and found 
greater support for the latter theoretical approach. The study showed that while the 
manipulation of outcome interdependence of individuals showed no effect, there was a 
clear effect for social identity. Specifically, high identifiers discriminated more than low 
identifiers on a post hoc measure in a minimal group situation. Thus, the results of this 
study supported the hypothesis "that discrimination contributed to positive social identity 
only to the degree that individuals identified with their own group membership" (p. 
1299). Thus degree of identification has been established as an important moderating 
factor in group-based behavior. Gagnon and Bourhis then argue for the "heuristic value 
of distinguishing between degree of ingroup identification and quality of social identity" 
(p. 1229). The study to be presented aims to develop this distinction of quality of 
identification through a replication and extension of the Gagnon and Bourhis study. 
Thus, the study to be presented addresses the interdependence approach to group 
formation from the perspective of the behavioral interaction model, as presented by 
Rabbie and colleagues (Rabbie et al., 1989; Rabbie, 1991). 
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The primary aim of the present study is to replicate these findings, that is 
compare the interdependence and identity analysis of group formation. Three 
modifications will extend and validate the general findings of the Gagnon and Bourhis 
study. Importantly, the study will be extended to the analysis of an established social 
group. This is important in light of recent evidence that has found some differences 
between discrimination behavior in minimal and established social groups (sec Jetten, 
Spears and Manstead, 1996; Long and Spears, 1997; Mullen, Brown and Smith, 1992), 
which may affect both intragroup and intergroup processes. Further, in this present 
study a different interdependence manipulation is also introduced, in line with the work 
of Fiske and colleagues (Ruscher and Fiske, 1990; Ruscher, Fiske, Mild and Manen, 
1991). Finally, allocations are made in reference to a monetary reward which, as argued 
by Mlicki (1993), tends to increase individuals' concerns for fulfilling personal self-
interest. 
The second aim is to assess the influence of quality of social identification on 
intergroup processes; specifically, distinctiveness of identification is addressed. Recall 
that social identity theory predicts that individuals are motivated to positively 
differentiate their own group from other groups and thus use ingroup favouritism and 
maximum difference strategies to aid in this process. Tajfel (1972) argued that 
discrimination in the minimal group paradigm invested the situation with comparative 
social meaning, in other words, this process enhanced category distinctiveness. Indeed, 
the very fact that the situation was "minimal" left participants with limited means of 
creating social distinctiveness; discrimination, it seems, was the only means available. 
More recently, normative dimensions of group membership have been cited as an 
important mediating factor in group level processes such as discrimination (Diehl, 1989; 
Vivian and Berkowitz, 1992, 1993) and other intergroup processes (Hogg and Hains, 
1996; Hogg and Hardie, 1992; Oakes, Haslam, Morrison and Grace, 1995; Oakes, 
Haslam and Turner, 1994, 1996). Recently, Jetten, Spears and Manstead (1996) have 
shown that, on the basis of the fit hypothesis and the meta-contrast principle, group 
norms are influential in defining and differentiating the group identity more clearly. In 
summarizing their study they state: 
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One popular interpretation of the social identity explanation of discrimination in minimal 
groups is that ingroup bias is a fairly universal feature of intergroup relations. However, even a 
cursory analysis of relations between real world groups reveals that this is far from the case (cf. 
van Knippenberg & Ellemers, 1990). The evidence of the impact of group norms revealed in 
the present research provides one powerful reason why this may be so, and suggests that group 
norms may play an important role in moderating ingroup bias. (p. 429). 
This study also demonstrated interesting differences between minimal groups and 
established social groups. Jetten et al., (1996) found that while incongruent, that is 
distinguishing, norms between the two groups resulted in greater use of differentiating 
allocation strategies in minimal groups, the opposite e!Iect was found with established 
social groups. Specifically, congruent norms, those that fail to distinguish the two 
groups, resulted in higher levels of discrimination. Jetten et al. 's study makes two 
important points that are relevant to the present study: it illustrates the importance of 
ingroup norms in moderating individuals' allocation behavior and provides further 
evidence that the effects found in minimal group situations can not always be generalized 
to established group settings. Thus, unlike minimal groups, it seems that established 
social groups have other means by which to create comparative category distinctiveness. 
Recall that early in the development of social identity theory Tajfel and Turner (1979, 
1986) discussed the process of social creativity in identity formation, which relates to the 
normative dimensions by which we define ourselves. 
The study to be presented will build on these findings and manipulate the quality 
of the identification through (false) feedback (see also Hogg & Sunderland, 1991) that 
indicates to a subject how normatively consistent (or representative) they arc of an 
ingroup norm. The relevant ingroup norm will be chosen so as to maximally differentiate 
highly representative ingroup members from highly representative outgroup members. 
As such, participants who are given feedback that they are not highly representative of 
the group will have achieved less category distinctiveness based on this normative 
dimension. It is predicted that if participants' social distinctiveness is not achieved on a 
normative dimension, further distinctiveness could be achieved through discrimination 
against the outgroup. This, of course, this will only be the case when the group is a 
positive reference group for the participants. 
To this end, the study to be presented will give systematic differential feedback to 
participants with reference to their level of individual representativeness of the group 
psychology students. The aim is to manipulated their social distinctiveness in respect of 
this relevant category of membership. As the fit hypothesis involves both normative and 
comparative dimensions that act in unison, an explicit social comparison is used: 
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psychology students as compared to economics students. These two groups could be 
normatively differentiated from each other on many dimensions, however, the specific 
dimension of comparison chosen is decision-making strategy. In line with this, 
participants are told that psychology and economics students use different strategies in 
decision making tasks. Thus decision making strategy becomes a relevant basis for 
group differentiation. 
Specifically, participants are given feedback in terms of one of three categories of 
normative representativeness: highly, moderately and slightly. It is thus predicted that 
slightly representative participants will discriminate more than moderately representative 
participants, who in turn will discriminate more than highly representative participants, 
given that relative degree of group distinctiveness is threatened for the two illfmer 
conditions. 
Taken together, the empirical study to be presented in this chapter builds on the 
work of Gagnon and Bourhis and addresses the critique of social identity theory as put 
forward in the behavioral interaction model; however, as well as manipulating the 
objective interdependence of participants, social distinctiveness is also manipulated. This 
second manipulation is important given that the achievement of positive social 
distinctiveness is a fundamental aspect of social identity theory and self-categorization 
theory. Thus the design of this study tests key principles of both theoretical positions 
orthogonally: objective interdependence and social distinctiveness. 
In summary, this study replicates and extends Gagnon and Bourhis' study in 
several important ways. Overall the analysis is extended from a minimal group setting to 
an established group setting. Further, a different interdependence manipulation is used in 
line with another established method in the literature (e.g. Ruscher and Fiske, 1990) and 
a monetary reward task is utilized. Finally, quality of identity is manipulated a priori 
through false feedback that threatens the distinctiveness of social identity -- a important 
aspect of the social identity approach. 
Following Gagnon and Bourhis (1996) two sets of predictions are put forward: 
(a) In line with the behavior interaction model autonomous participants should not act in 
terms of group memberships, as individuals are not outcome interdependent; thus, no 
group based behavior would be expected; (b) Self-categorization theory would predict 
that: (i) both autonomous and interdependent subjects would act in terms of group 
memberships, as it is argued that self-categorization, that is identification with the group 
membership, is the basis of group behavior; (ii) further, in line with underlying identity 
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processes it is argued that subjects who identify highly with the group but who are given 
feedback that they are only slightly representative of the group will discriminate more 
than subjects who identify highly with the group and are given feed back that they are 
highly representative. In other words, degree of normative representativeness will have 
an inverse relationship to the degree of discrimination that individuals exhibit. 
7. 2 Method 
Participants and Design: Participants were 147 (82 female; 65 male; age: M = 
24.51) psychology students from the Australian National University enrolled in a first 
year psychology course. They participated in the study as part of their weekly class 
tutorial. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions. 
The 2 (interdependent/autonomous) x 3 (level of representativeness) design 
investigated the effect of these manipulations on a resource allocation task (Tajfel 
matrices). Ostensibly on the basis of their conflict resolution style, students were given 
(false) feedback as to how normatively representative (slightly, moderately, highly) they 
were of psychology students. Interdependence was manipulated in an initial instruction 
that indicated that they were either autonomous or interdependent in their chances to win 
a lottery (see Ruscher and Fiske, 1990; Ruscher, Fiske, Mild and Manen, 19Yl). 
Thus, the 2 x 3 factorial design consisted of two levels of interdependence (autonomous 
or interdependent) with three levels of representativeness (slightly, moderately or 
highly). Eight participants were dropped from the analysis, as they did not complete the 
entire questionnaire, leaving 139 students to be included in the analysis. 
Procedure: The experiment was introduced as an investigation of different 
decision-making styles used by different groups of people -- in this case psychology and 
economic students. The participants initially filled in a conflict resolution style 
questionnaire (see Johnson & Johnson, 1991) ostensibly to assess how normatively 
representative the students were of psychology students. The students were told that it 
had previously been found that psychology and economics students used different 
decision-making strategies when dealing with conflict and the researchers were interested 
in exploring this finding. Students were also told that both psychology and economics 
students would be participating in this study. 
After the questionnaire had been completed, it was collected and the 
experimenter left the room under the guise of scoring and collating the questionnaire. 
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During this time students were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental groups 
and a letter, which indicated which category of representativeness, was hand written onto 
the top left hand corner of their questionnaire. While the experimenter was gone, the 
students participated in another unrelated study. Upon return, the experimenter 
distributed the questionnaire booklets according to a code number written on the top of 
the previous worksheet. The task instructions in the questionnaire booklet read: 
Past research has shown that psychology students and economics students use different 
strategies when dealing with conflict. However, within these two groups some students use 
their respective strategy more consistently than others. The more consistent you are in the 
strategy that you use, the more representative you are of your respective group. 
Thus, people are normally graded into three categories within these two groups: those highly 
representative, moderately representative and slightly representative of psychology or economic 
students. On the basis of your responses on the previous task, you have been graded as to how 
representative you are of a psychology or an economics student. 
Participants then received feedback as to how representative they were of their 
respective group by means of the hand written letter on their questionnaire. This letter 
related to information in a table in the questionnaire and a frequency distribution graph 
that was presented on an overhead. Instructions on how to interpret this information 
were also given (see appendix 7.1.1). The graph showed the bi-modal distribution of 
three respective representativeness categories in the two groups (see Figure 7.1). The 
graph was designed to provide an explicit comparative context for the participants, with 
highly representative participants achieving the most social group distinctiveness (e.g. 
categories A and F). 
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Figure 7.1 
Distribution graph used in representativeness manipulation of group identity 
After reading the instructions, participants completed the allocation tasks and 
questions in the questionnaire booklet. The last information that the participants 
received before filling out the matrices was the interdependence manipulation. In the 
interdependent condition they were told: 
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For participating in this study, you have the opportunity to win a prize of $20.00. Everyone is 
receiving points from other players. For every point that you receive, your name will be entered 
into the draw. The more points you get the more chances you have to win. The person whose 
number is drawn will win a prize of $20.00. 
In the autonomous condition they were told: 
For participating in this study, you have the opportunity to win a prize of $20.00. Everyone 
who completes the task will be entered in a draw. The person's number drawn will win a prize 
of $20.00 
Dependent variables: The dependent variables were measured in the following 
order: matrices (6- random order); zero-sum distribution; identity measures; follow-up 
questions and manipulation checks. The point distributions attained by the Tajfel 
matrices were the main dependent measures, assessing both the strategy adopted and the 
absolute amount of points distributed between the ingroup and the outgroup. As 
described in Chapter 5, the Tajfel matrices assess the usc of four basic strategies (see 
Bourhis et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1979): parity (P); maximum ingroup profit (MIP); 
maximum differentiation (MD); and maximumjoint profit (MJP). Parity exists when an 
equal number of points is awarded to the ingroup and the outgroup. When a choice is 
made that awards the highest absolute number of points to the ingroup member, 
regardless of awards made to the outgroup members, this represents a strategy of 
maximizing ingroup profit. A strategy of maximum differentiation, the so-called 
discrimination strategy 'par excellence', aims to maximize the difference in points 
awarded to the ingroup and outgroup member, in favour of the ingroup. This strategy 
overrides the aim of maximizing ingroup profit, and thus is not an economically rational 
strategy, but aims to maximize the relative gain. The strategy of maximizing joint profit 
aims to maximize the total profit of both group members collectively. 
Three matrix types are used to examine the relative "pull" (or strength) of each of 
these strategies, as re11ected by participants choices (see Bourhis et al., 1994: Brown et 
al., 1980): Type A compares ingroup favouritism (FAVor MIP +MD) with maximum 
joint profit (MJP); Type B compares maximum difference in favour of ingroup (MD) 
with a combination of absolute ingroup profit (MIP) and maximum joint profit (MJP); 
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Type C compares parity (P) with ingroup favouritism (FAY) (see Bourhis, Sachdcv and 
Gagnon, 1994). Each matrix type has two versions, so that the pull of each of the two 
strategies can be assessed. For example, for the first matrix type one matrix would test 
the pull o[ parity on favouritism, while the other would test the pull of favouritism on 
parity. Thus, six different matrices are used to test the pulls of six strategies. Each pull 
has a theoretical range of -12 to + 12. Positive pulls indicate psychological congruence 
with the membership group, while negative pulls indicate psychological antagonism with 
the membership group. For example, in terms of assessing the strategy of favouritism, a 
negative pull scor.e would indicates outgroup favouritism, whereby more points were 
awarded to the outgroup than the ingroup. The six matrices were presented in random 
order to control for any order effects. 
As with the Gagnon and Bourhis experiment, two other dependent measures 
were also used. The first again uses the Tajfel matrices but this time assessed the 
absolute total number of points awarded to the ingroup and outgroup members, and the 
difference between these scores. Further, following the matrices, a 100-poinl zero-sum 
distribution was used to independently measure the distribution strategy. Each of these 
measures was taken to examine the validity of the Tajfel matrices pull scores. 
In line with both the Rabbie et a!. study and the Gagnon and Bourhis study, post 
hoc identification measures were taken as follows: (1) How much do you like being a 
member of your own group (psychology or economics)?; (2) How much do you feel 
comfortable, confident, happy and satisfied as a member of your own group? ; (3) How 
much would you rather be a member of your own group than the other group? Each 
question was assessed on a eight point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 8 = very much so). 
Follow-up questions and manipulation checks used similar scales to assess the success of 
the interdependence and representative manipulations, as well a perceptions of similarity. 
A fmal group of questions was included to measure participants' expectations of 
reciprocity and cooperation for psychology students as compared to economics students. 
For example, participants were asked: "Which group of students do you think gave you 
the most points?". For each of these questions, students responded on an eight point 
Likert scale with psychology (1) at one end of the scale and economics (8) at the other. 
Students were fully debriefed at the end of each experimental session and 
cautioned to not discuss the study with other students. Given that students were led to 
believe that they would be taking part in a lottery, the students were assured that this 
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would take place. Each student had an equal chance to win the draw. The lottery took 
place after the experiment was complete and a presentation was made in class. 
7. 3 Results 
The data were initially screened for level of identification: 73.4 % of the subjects 
highly identified with psychology students. To a large extent the students that did not 
identify highly with psychology were studying both psychology and economics, and are 
problematic because of potential conflicts of identity. These students were dropped from 
the analysis (n = 1 02; the cell sizes remained relatively equal). Specifically, the students 
who indicated five or greater on a composite eight point Likert scale made up of the 
three identification measures were included in the analysis. The composite scale showed 
high internal reliability (alpha= .88). Thus, only those students who identified relatively 
highly with the group psychology students, were included in the following analysis. 
Manipulation checks: The manipulation checks for operationalizing the 
autonomous and interdependent outcome conditions indicated that the manipulation was 
successful. A 2 x 3 analysis of variance (ANOV A) for dependence on psychology 
students for receiving a fair chance in the draw found only a main effect for the 
autonomous/interdependence manipulation (f = 3. 75, p < .05). Autonomous subjects 
fell less dependent (M = 4.44, SD = 2.27) than the interdependent subjects (M = 5.65, 
SD = 2.04). Interestingly, when this analysis was applied to economic students no eiiect 
for dependence was found for receiving a fair chance in the draw (overall: M = 4.05, SD 
= 2.27); that is, while participants were objectively interdependent with both groups they 
only felt dependence on their ingroup, psychology students. 
The representativeness manipulation was also confirmed to be equally effective 
across conditions. A 2 x 3 ANOV A found a significant effect for participants' perceived 
representativeness (E = 4.36, p < .05): highly representative (M = 6.24, SD = 2.01 ); 
moderately representative (M = 5.13, SD = 1.87); slightly representative (M = 3.65, SD 
= 2.29). There was no main effect for interdependence, nor an interaction effect. 
Participants' confidence in the correctness of the assessed level of representativeness was 
also measured. A 2 x 3 AN OVA found no effect for representativeness or inter-
dependence, each level of representativeness was seen to be equally valid: highly 
representative (M = 4.50, SD = 2.09); moderately representative (M = 4.53, SD = 2.06); 
slightly representative (M = 4.65, SD = 1.79). Interestingly, all participants were only 
moderately confident in their assessment. It should also be noted that participants, 
across conditions, equally wanted a chance to win the $20.00 draw (M = 6.16, SD = 
2.02). 
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Resource allocation strategies: The strategies that participants adopted in 
resource distribution and the subsequent award structure are reported in terms of three 
measures: Tajfel matrices "pull" scores; Tajfel matrices total scores; and the 100 point 
zero-sum distribution. There was no effect for experimental session or sex (see also 
Bourhis, 1994; Bourhis and Gagnon, 1996). 
Tajfel matrices "pull" scores: The Tajfel matrices assess the use of specific 
strategies (see Turner, 1978; Turner, Brown and Tajfel, 1979). These strategies were 
assessed using the three classic matrix types. Following Gagnon and Bourhis (1996), 
two sets of analysis, within and between experimental condition, were conducted to 
assess the strategies adopted by participants. 
Within experimental condition strategy assessment: The mean pull scores for 
each of the strategies are reported in Table 7.1 for each of the experimental conditions. 
The significance levels reported within the top half of the table represent the significance 
of one strategy being used over another within any one condition (significance levels 
should thus be read across the rows). As each of the three matrix types has a matched 
pair of outcome scores (that is the pull of P on FAV can be compared with the pull of 
FAV on P), Wilcoxon matched-pairs tests were used to determine which strategy was 
used significantly more than by chance within each experimental condition. 
The pull of parity (P on FAV) was significant across all conditions, indicating that 
this was a utilized strategy for participants regardless of experimental group. 
Discrimination was assessed using three measures (FAV on MJP, MD on MIP + MJP, 
FA V on P) and the findings show that this strategy was used significantly by participants 
that received feedback that they were moderately and slightly representative of 
psychology students. The highly representative subjects did not discriminate as much as 
the moderately and slightly representative subjects. Interestingly, the maximum joint 
profit strategy was utilized primarily by the participants who were given feedback that 
they were highly representative of their group. 
Between experimental condition strategy assessment: A 2 x 3 multivariate 
analysis of variance (interdependence x representativeness) was conducted using the six 
matrix pull scores as dependent measures. The overall MAN OVA indicated no 
significant interaction effect (Wilk's lambda= 0.909 = E (12, 184) = .748, p = .703). 
Table 7.1 
Mean pull scores of subjects' matrix distribution strategies, as a function of degree of 
ingroup identification and interdependence 
STRATEGIES 
PARITY DISCRIMINATION JOINT PROFIT 
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CONDITIONS P/FAV FAV/M.IP MD/MIP+MJP FA VIP MIP+MJP/MD M.IP/FA V 
lllGHLY 
REPRESENT 
Autonomous 7.89*** -0.105 - 0.21 -0.63 1.68* -0.32 
Interdependent 9.11*** 0.529 0.29 1.00 - 2.53* - 2.65* 
MODERATELY 
REPRESENT 
Autonomous 5.19** 1.75* 2.06* 2.44* 2.19* 1.13 
Interdependent 5.61 ** 3.39** 2.00* 3.39** .33 -0.50 
SLIGHTLY 
REPRESENT 
Autonomous 3.88** 4.25** 2.56* 3.00** 1.44 - 0.13 
Interdependent 5.56** 3.88** 3.94* 3.19** 1.44 - 1.13 
COLUMN MEANS 6.27 2.22 1.71 2.00 0.75 - 0.61 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (for Wilcoxon's within experimental strategy comparisons) 
MAIN EFFECTS 
Representativeness 4.17* 5.93** 4.44* 3.68* 1.69 2.62 
E (2, 97), p (.018) (.004) (.014) (.029) (.189) (.078) 
Interdependence 0.926 0.468 0.461 0.861 4.81 * 6.47* 
!:'.(1, 97), p (.338) (.495) (.499) (.356) (.031) (.013) 
INTERACTION 
EFFECTS 0.100 0.384 0.213 0.175 1.75 0.352 
(.905) (.682) (.809) (.839) (.178) (.704) 
*p<.05;** p < .01; *** p < .001 (for ANOVA's on between experimental conditions) 
Note. Mean pull score for each matrix distribution strategies rages from -12 to +12. P =Parity; FAV = 
Ingroup Favouritism (MIP + MD); MD= Maximum Differentiation; MIP = Maximum Ingroup Profit; 
M.TP =Maximum Joint Profit. 
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There was only a main effect for group representativeness (Wilk's lambda= 0.795 = f 
(12, 184) = 1.863, l? < .05) but not for interdependence (Wilk's lambda= 0.895 = f (12, 
184) = 1.805, l? = .107). These overall findings suggest that within this study the degree 
of group representativeness, that is quality of social identity, is a better predictor of 
group members' resource distribution strategies than outcome interdependence. 
Univariate analyses were then conducted on each of the six pull scores (summary 
statistics are reported in Appendices 7.2.1 to 7.2.6). In each case there was no 
interaction effect. The univariate analysis confirmed that interdependent and 
autonomous subjects did not differ in their use of the parity and discrimination strategies; 
that is, there was no main effect for the use of these strategies in terms of objective 
interdependence of participants. However, interdependence did have an effect on the use 
of joint profit strategies. 
Interestingly, the strategies that showed main effects for normative 
representativeness were not the strategies that showed main effects for interdependence, 
and these main effects were never found together. There were significant main effects 
for normative representativeness for parity and discrimination strategies, while not for 
joint profit strategies, where interdependence effects were found. Examination of the 
means across conditions shows that use of parity increases as individuals receive 
feedback that they are more representative of the group, while the use of discriminatory 
strategies increases as individuals are told that they are less representative of the group. 
The trend is less clear for the joint profit strategies. 
Tajfel matrices total scores: The total ingroup and outgroup allocation was 
determined by adding up the choices across the six matrix presentations. The frrst two 
scores presented in Table 7.2 represent the mean number of points allocated to ingroup 
and outgroup recipients respectively (summary statistics are reported in Appendices 
7.2.7 to 7.2.9). An ingroup favouritism measure was also obtained for each experimental 
condition by calculating the difference between the ingroup and outgroup allocation. A 
2 x 3 x 2 ANOV A (interdependence by representativeness by repeated measure 
in/outgroup allocation) was used to assess if there was a significant difference between 
the ingroup and outgroup allocation. The results show a significant main effect for 
allocation (f (1, 93) = 26.32, l? < 0.001) and an interaction effect for representativeness 
and allocation f (2, 93) = 5.76, J? < 0.01 only. As can be seen by the 
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Table 7.2 
Mean total number of points allocated to ingroup and outgroup members across six 
experimental conditions using the results obtained from the Tajfel matrices and the zero-
sum allocation task. 
TOTAL POINTS ALLOCATED 
TAJFELMATRICES ZERO-SUM TASK 
CONDITIONS INGRP OUTGRP DIFFGRP !NAIL OUTALL DIFFALL 
HIGHLY 
REPRESENT 
Autonomous 85.47 85.88 - 1.12 56.21 ** 43.79** 12.42 
Interdependent 80.82 76.94 3.88 55.88* 44.12* 11.76 
MODERATELY 
REPRESENT 
Autonomous 93.60** 81.75** 12.53 59.19*** 40.81 *** 18.38 
Interdependent 93.72** 74.78** 18.94 65.76*** 34.24*** 31.52 
SLIG!ITLY 
REPRESENT 
Autonomous 96.75*** 75.44*** 21.31 64.50*** 35.50**' 29.00 
Interdependent · 96.56*** 74.63*** 21.93 60.73*** 39.27*** 21.46 
COLUMN MEANS 90.91 78.23 12.81 60.17 39.83 20.35 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (for Wilcoxon's within experimental strategy comparisons) 
~~----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAIN EFFECTS 
Representativeness 7.65 *** 1.69 5.76 *** 1.63 1.63 1.63 
.!' (2, 98), ll (.001) (.190) (.004) (.201) (.201) (.201) 
Interdependence 0.274 3.90 0.63 0.06 0.06 0.06 
f(1, 98), ll (.602) (.051) (.428) (.812) (.812) (.812) 
INTERACTION 
EFFECTS .273 .740 .120 .743 .743 .743 
(.762) (.480) (.899) (.478) (.478) (.478) 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (for ANOVA's on between experimental conditions) 
Note: INGRP, OUTGRP & DIFFGRP represent the total number of points allocated to the ingroup/ 
outgroup/difference between groups in the Tajfel matrices. INALL, OUT AIL & DIFFAIL represents 
the same comparisons using the zero-sum allocation task. 
means presented in Table 7.2 the difference between ingroup and out group allocation 
becomes larger as group representativeness decreases. A simple analysis of variance 
across each of these three dependent measures derived from the Tajfcl matrices found 
only a main effect for group representativeness for the ingroup allocation measure and 
the differential measure (f (2, 98) = 7.65,12 < 0.001 and f (2, 98) = 5.76, 12 < .o1 
respectively). 
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These results corroborate the fmdings from the results of the Tajfel matrices pull 
scores in terms of both the effects of representativeness and interdependence. There is 
no overall effect found for interdependence, while feedback on the degree of 
representativeness of the group predicts the amount of discrimination in favour of the 
ingroup. Again, participants in the slightly representative condition discriminate more 
than the highly representative condition. The results of the repeated measures AN OVA 
indicated that the interdependence by allocation interaction was not significant (f (1, 93) 
= .63, 12 = 0.428). In other words, contrary to the interdependence analysis autonomous 
participants discriminated just as much as interdependent participants in their resource 
allocations. 
Zero-sum distribution: The results of the analysis of the 100-point zero-sum 
distribution further corroborate the general pattern of results found with the pull scores 
and in/outgroup allocation obtained from the Tajfel matrices (see Table 7.2). While the 
ANOV A's are not significant for each of the three allocation measures, the Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs test showed that ingroup favouritism occurred across all conditions, with 
more favouritism occurring in the slightly representative condition(ingroup: M = 62.62; 
outgroup: M = 37.39) over the highly representative condition (ingroup: M = 56.05; 
outgroup: M = 43.96). 
Quality of Identification: Based on the three measures of quality of identification, 
all participants identified highly with psychology students in comparison to economics 
students. Quality of identification did not vary with degree of representativeness 
(composite score: M = 6.45). 
Expectations of Reciprocity: As discussed in the introduction, ingroup 
reciprocity expectations are an important motivating factor for the behavioral interaction 
model. Rabbie et a!., (1989) state that "although subjects in the standard MGP cannot 
directly allocate money to themselves, they can do so indirectly, on the reasonable 
assumption that the other ingroup members will do the same to them" (p. 176). 
Specifically, the behavioral interaction model predicts a significant and positive 
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relationship between participants degree of ingroup favouritism, that is the number of 
points that they allocate to the ingroup, and the number of points that they expect from 
interdependent others. In line with this latter expectation participants were asked: 
"Which group of students do you think gave you the most points?" Students responded 
on an eight point bipolar scale with psychology (1) at one end of the scale and economics 
(8) at the other end. Across conditions participants thought psychology students would 
give them more points (M = 2.88; SD = 1.51). This trend was accentuated by 
interdependence as shown in a 2 x 3 AN OVA The analysis showed a significant effect 
for interdependence (f = 4.84 p < .05; Autonomous: M = 3.21; SD = 1.68; 
Interdependent: M = 2.55; SD = 1.30). Thus interdependent subjects had a higher 
expectation than autonomous subjects that psychology students would give them more 
points. This result furtt.er confirms that the interdependence manipulation was 
successful. 
A further analysis showed that there was no significant correlation bet ween how 
many points interdependent participants expected to receive from ingroup members and 
respondents' actual use of the discrimination strategies. FAY on P, r(48) = .17, n.s.; 
FA V on MJP, r( 48) = .23, n.s.; and total number of points allocated to in-group 
members using the Tajfel matrices, r( 48) = .15, n.s. Further, there was no significant 
correlation between respondents' actual use of the parity strategy (P on FA V) and the 
number of points they expect to receive from in group members r( 48) = .12, n.s. 
Expectations of Cooperation: As with the expectations of reciprocity, 
expectations of cooperation followed the same pattern of results. In general, students 
expected more cooperation from psychology students (1) than economics students (8) on 
a bipolar scale (M = 2.90; SD = 1.42). However, in this case, the MAN OVA showed no 
overall e!Iects; that is, objective interdependence did not have a main effect on the levels 
of expected cooperation. 
Similarity measure: Measures of perception of similarity to other psychology 
students were also taken. Collapsing across group representativeness, perceptions of 
similarity to other psychology students varied with interdependence. Interdependent 
subjects perceived themselves to be more similar to psychology students (M = 5.62, SD 
= 1.39) than autonomous participants (M = 4.87, SD = 1.54). This difference was found 
to be significantly different in a 2 x 3 MANOV A, with a main effect only for 
interdependence (f = 5.68, p < .01). In contrast participants did not feel similar to 
economics students across conditions (M = 2.92, SD = 1.61). 
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7.4 Discussion 
Overall, the results of this study provide support for social identity and seH~ 
categorization theory over the behavioral interaction model. In line with predictions 
from self-categorization theory, regardless of interdependence condition (autonomous or 
interdependent) participants discriminated in favour of their ingroup. In other words, 
participants in the autonomous conditions continued to act in terms of their group 
membership as psychology students in comparison to economics students even though 
they were not outcome interdependent. In terms of the behavioral interaction model, 
tacit intragroup cooperation would not be expected in the autonomous condition as 
individuals were not interdependent for outcomes received. In other words individuals in 
both conditions acted in terms of their group memberships regardless of objective 
interdependence or common fate between players. Interdependence theorists continually 
stress the importance of mapping the objective interdependence structure; however, the 
findings of this study suggest that social identification is more predictive of group based 
behavior, as the identification provides individuals with a subjectively meaningful sell~ 
category of membership. 
Individuals acted in terms of group memberships that embodied comparative 
subjective reality, specifically in this situation as psychology students. This is important, 
not only because autonomous participants acted in terms of this group membership but 
also because participants were, in fact, objectively interdependent with both economics 
students and psychology students in their chances to win places for the draw. Given this, 
and in line with the reciprocity explanation of the behavioral interaction model, tacit 
intragroup cooperation would be expected to occur across group memberships. If this 
was the case then it would be expected that the maximum joint profit strategy would be 
the most utilized. The findings of this study do not support a behavioural interaction 
model analysis. 
Interestingly, the only effect for interdependence was found in the analysis of the 
maximum joint profit strategy, and more so for highly representative than slightly 
representative subjects. These results are intriguing in light of the findings of the 
representative manipulation. The findings seem to indicate that social group 
distinctiveness has been achieved by some means in the highly representative condition 
and once achieved participants then considered joint profit to be an effective strategy, 
especially when objective interdependence is explicit. This is speculative though and 
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further study is necessary. However, an important point can be made here. It is not 
surprising that interdependence does have some effect, the point that sell~categorization 
theory is making is not to discount that fact that objective interdependence can affect 
intergroup behaviour as found in Sherif's classic field studies. The point is that 
interdependence, per se, can not account for the necessary and sufficient conditions to 
explain group level processes, such as social cooperation. Psychological identification 
with the group is the necessary intervening process. The gaming research that led to the 
development of the social dilemma paradigm points to this fact as well -- structural 
outcome interdependence did not lead to high levels of cooperative behavior. Recall 
(Chapter 2), when this paradigm was first established researchers were surprized at the 
low (30%) levels of cooperative behavior; yet, the paradigm, and its inherent 
assumptions about the nature of group life remained. However, the evidence found in 
this study, like that of Gagnon and Bourhis, presents strong evidence that outcome 
interdependence is not a su!Iicient explanation for group-based behavior. 
The results also supported the normative representativeness predictions made by 
social identity theory and self-categorization theory in reference to the importance of 
achieving social distinctiveness. The degree of normative representativeness of 
participants had an effect on allocation behavior; participants who were given feedback 
that they were not highly representative of the group psychology students, discriminated 
more than those who were told that they were highly representative of this group. In 
other words the evidence implies that discrimination against the outgroup served to 
increase their social distinctiveness, and thus self-esteem, in terms of their salient group 
membership (see also Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Branscombe, Wann, Noel & 
Coleman, 1993; Chin & McClintock, 1993; Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Long & Spears, 
1997; Oakes & Turner, 1980). While there was a general overall tendency to favour the 
ingroup in the reward allocation task, thus supporting the classic finding of the early 
minimal group paradigm studies (see Tajfel & Turner, 1986), this etTect was mediated 
through normative feedback to participants that implied differential levels of 
representativeness of their group. Thus the functional aspect of group norms, inherent to 
group life, are drawn out in this analysis. Self-categorization theory provides a 
systematic analysis of group life that acknowledges the importance of both normative 
and comparative aspects of the social group. This perspective is fundamentally different 
from a perspective that understands group behavior as a function of interdependence 
structure and intrapersonal variables. 
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While this thesis is not specifically examining discriminatory behavior, it is 
prudent to comment further on the findings of this study that relate to discrimination as it 
contributes further insights into the social identity analysis of group life, Gagnon and 
Bourhis (1996) reiterate Turner (1984) by highlighting two ongoing questions that arise 
out of the social identity theory analysis: "Do people discriminate because they strongly 
identify with their own group, or does discrimination contribute to a stronger 
identification with the in-group? Do people discriminate because they already have a 
positive social identity, or do they discriminate to achieve a more positive social 
identity?" (p. 1299- 1300). For reasons of comparability with the original Rabbie et a!., 
(1989) study the study presented here, like the Gagnon and Bourhis study, measured 
identification after the allocation task was complete. Thus, it is not clear if ingroup 
identification was cause ur effect of social discrimination; that is, did participants who 
highly identified with the ingroup discriminate, or did discrimination lead to high levels of 
identification? This was particularly problematic for the Gagnon and Bourhis study, as 
the identity division was post hoc. While in this study the identity measures were again 
taken after the completion of the allocation tasks, there were a priori manipulations of 
group representativeness carried out that were predicted to affect the quality of the 
identification. Further, the findings showed that this manipulation had a moderating 
effect on discrimination behaviour which varied systematically with the self-
categorization predictions. Thus, it is interesting to further examine the results of this 
normative manipulation of representativeness in light of the questions raised by Turner 
(1984) and Gagnon and Bourhis (1996). 
The results show that individuals' degree of discrimination behavior was inversely 
related to the degree of normative representativeness; that is, individuals who were told 
that they were highly representative of the group discriminated signil"icantly less than 
those who were told that they were slightly representative of the group. The results are 
interesting to discuss across the three conditions of group representativeness as well as 
the three strategies (parity, discrimination and joint profit) assessed. 
Across the representativeness conditions there are interesting differences found: 
highly representative participants primarily adopted parity and joint profit strategies, 
while moderately and slightly representative participants adopted discrimination 
strategies as well as parity strategies. Thus, the strategy of discrimination was only 
adopted when participants believed they were not highly representative of the group as a 
whole. Interestingly, highly representative subjects did not tend to adopt a 
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discrimination strategy but still reported that they identified highly with the group. Thus 
in terms of this condition, high identification did not lead to discrimination. In other 
words, individuals did not discriminate because they highly identified with the group. 
Likewise, Long and Spears (1996) have also found that individuals with high collective 
self-esteem did not necessarily discriminate in an allocation task. Participants in the 
other two representative conditions also reported that they highly identified with the 
group; however, these two groups also discriminated, thus, causal direction is less clear 
but still interesting to speculate upon. 
It seems reasonable to argue that individuals in these two conditions 
discriminated because they highly identified with the group. They discriminated to gain 
further social distinctiveness that had not been achieved in terms of this normative 
dimension that defined the group. This argument would then be in line with the findings 
of the highly representative condition and it also seems reasonable to conclude that given 
that students had voluntarily enrolled in psychology that they would identify fairly highly 
with other psychology students. Further, the graph that was used in this manipulation 
explicitly shows that individuals in the highly representative condition had achieved high 
levels of distinctiveness from economics students while individuals in the other two 
conditions had achieved this to a lesser extent. These findings then raise the question: 
can social distinctiveness be achieved on normative dimensions alone? Does high 
identification with a group not necessarily lead to discrimination against an out group? 
These questions require further systematic investigation. 
This analysis is also borne out when examining each of the strategies across 
conditions. Parity was mostly used by those who were told that they were highly 
representative of psychology students and used significantly less by those who were told 
that they were slightly representative. However, in terms of the three discrimination 
strategies, the inverse relationship was found: slightly representative participants used 
significantly more discrimination strategies. And interestingly the only effect for 
interdependence was found in the analysis of the joint profit strategy, with primarily 
highly representative participants using this strategy. 
The zero-sum scores are important as they by and large support the validity of 
the pull scores which have been questioned in the past (see Bornstein, Crum, 
Wittenbraker, Harring, Insko & Thibaut, 1983). The total ingroup and outgroup 
allocations attained through the Tajfel matrices supported the predictions. The 
difference between the ingroup and the outgroup allocation was least in the highly 
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representative condition and greatest in the slightly representative condition. Indeed a 
significant main e!Iect of group representativeness was found, with slightly representative 
participants discriminating significantly more than highly representative participants. 
While the results are less clear in the 100-point zero-sum allocation task, the same 
general pattern of results remains: participants in the highly representative condition 
favouring their ingroup the least, while participants in the slightly representative 
condition favoured their ingroup the most. However, what is interesting here is the 
finding that highly representative subjects did favor their ingroup more than is reflected 
in the Tajfel matrices total point scores. 
The measures of reciprocity, cooperation and similarity also support a self-
categorization analysis. In terms of reciprocity expectations, psychology students 
thought other psychology students would give them more points, and this was 
accentuated by interdependence. In line with earlier arguments made, the behavioural 
interaction model would predict reciprocity expectations to arise with respect to 
interdependent others which in this case includes both psychology students and economic 
students. Interdependence theorists, including Rabbie and colleagues, would not then 
expect this effect. In line with this, psychology students expected more cooperation 
from psychology students than economics students. Further, in line with the similarity 
measure that is important to the self-categorization analysis, psychology students 
perceived themselves to be more similar to other psychology students than economics 
students and this perception was accentuated by the interdependence manipulation. 
As Gagnon and Bourhis point out discrimination contributes to achieving a 
positive social identity where group membership is important to an individual. Given 
that all individuals identified highly, at least following the allocation task, and that 
identification did not vary systematically with the representative manipulation the data 
indicates that not only is degree of identification important, so is quality of identification. 
The data indicates that the feedback that we receive from our respective reference 
groups gives us information about the quality of our identification, which, in turn, 
influences our group based behavior. Thus our perceived social reality in terms of our 
group memberships gives us important information about our place in the world, and this 
relates to our behavior towards both in and out group members. A~ such, there is a 
constant dynamic between individual and group life. How representative an individual is 
of their respective groups, reflects one dimension of this functional dynamic. 
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Norms have also been found to be influential in other studies using resource 
allocation tasks. For example Jetten, Spears and Manstead (1996) found that 
discrimination decreases when an ingroup norm of fairness is established. They conclude 
that participants are motivated to act in terms of the normative content of the salient 
social identity. While the effect of the comparative group norms of psychology and 
economic students was not specifically examined in this study, Jetten et al. (1996) found 
evidence that the normative expectation of both ingroup and outgroup norms were 
important to understanding intergroup behavior. This is also reflected in a concluding 
comment by one participant in the present study, who stated: "I gave more points to 
psychology students in an attempt to influence the prize to a psychology student 'cause I 
do not believe that economic students should be given money for nothing as it will just 
encourage their greed". This implies that while economic students are greedy, by 
contrast, psychology students may be fair. Many other participants openly stated that 
they were biased towards their own group of psychology students, not to increase their 
individual changes of winning but because, by comparison, they wanted a psychology 
student to win the prize. Thus, regardless of outcome interdependence structure, 
participants were acting in terms of their group membership, specifically as psychology 
students. 
This point raises an interesting question; perhaps, in comparison to economic 
students, it is normative to be fair as a psychology student. Thus, the highly 
representative subjects may have been acting in terms of a fairness norms and thus were 
being normatively consistent by comparison to economic students. Indeed the findings 
did show that psychology students did expect more cooperation from psychology 
students than economics students. This remains to be seen, as self-categorization theory 
would predict that cooperative expectations are a product of psycho logical group 
formation, which may be accentuated by this normative dimension. 
To some extent the latter explanation seems more plausible in light of the finding 
that there was no difference on the expectation of cooperative behavior across 
conditions. One could argue that psychology students who received feedback that they 
were only slightly representative of this group, yet highly identified with the group, 
would try to act more in terms of the group and be more fair to achieve positive group 
distinctiveness. However they do not, in fact individuals in this condition discriminated 
more to achieve positive social identillcation. The point remains that perceived 
normative representativeness of group-level processes is an important moderating factor 
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in intergroup behavior. In the study to be presented in the next chapter of this thesis 
group representativeness is specifically measured in terms of the emerging group norm to 
examine if normative representativeness is predictive of cooperative behavior in an 
intragroup setting of objective interdependence. 
Together, these findings provide further evidence for the importance of achieving 
social distinctiveness in intergroup situations, specifically the importance of norms in 
category formation (see Oakes, Turner & Haslam, 1991). Thus, all in all, this study 
provides overall support for the social identity analysis of group formation over and 
above the interdependence analysis of group formation. Group life, as a determinant of 
varying self-definitions, clearly does guide behavior of the individual. Self-categorizing 
establishes certain motivational forces for individuals; in line with the meta-contrast 
principle of self-categori?11tion theory, that individuals are motivated to achieve social 
distinctiveness within a given frame of reference. The finding here suggests that 
perceived knowledge of group representativeness of the relevant group norm aid in this 
process. 
In summary this study replicates and extends the Gagnon and Bourhis study in 
the following way. To begin with, both studies found no effect for objective 
interdependence of individuals, despite the objective state of affairs individuals 
discriminated in favour of their own group. The manipulation was extended in two 
ways: through a lottery that established interdependence of individuals and through a 
monetary reward. However, the monetary reward did not increase individuals' utilitarian 
motivation, as Mlicki would predict. Further, a priori measures were used to manipulate 
quality of identification in terms of normative category distinctiveness. The results were 
in line with predictions. 
While this study is conceptually limited in its ability to further specify the 
underlying properties of identity processes, it has established some initial evidence that 
quality of identity, in establishing distinctiveness, is an important factor. These factors 
include both the normative and the comparative processes of psychological group 
formation, which will be examined in more detail in later chapters. The main point of this 
chapter is that interdependence, per se, can not account for the necessary and suiTicient 
conditions of group-based behavior. The intervening mechanism seems to be attaining 
social distinctiveness in terms of a salient social identity. As such, there is preliminary 
evidence that it is not the objective state of affairs that determines social cooperation and 
conflict but identification processes that place individuals in the social world. 
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The aim of this thesis is to establish this mechanism as the underlying process that 
is predictive of social cooperation. The question to be continually at the forefront of 
this thesis: Is social cooperation a product of a salient social identity. If so, then by 
examining the identity mechanism, as specified by seli~categorization theory, these 
determinants should be predictive of cooperative behavior. While there is still much to 
be established, the findings of this study are important as they make a fundamental point: 
objective interdependence, per se, does not account for group based behavior. As such 
the emphasis that interdependence theorists place on the interdependence structure is 
brought into question, as is the structure of paradigm that we use to study social 
cooperation. 
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-Chapter 8-
The emergent properties of groups: Normative representativeness, 
intrapersonal transformational processes and intragroup cooperation 
Experiment 2 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed whether objective interdependence is the basis of 
psychological group formation, a construct emphasized in interdependence theory. 
Indeed, interdependence has always been understood as the primary mechanism in group 
formation and social cooperation, as refected in the following statement: "According to 
interdependence theory, prosocial behavior in ongoing relationships is strongly shaped by 
the broader interdependence structure underlying a relationship (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; 
Rusbult and van Lange, 1996)" (van Lange, Agnew, Harinck & Steemers, in press, p. 5-
draft). However, while the functional interdependence of individuals is the core of the 
theoretical approach, recall that interdependence theorists argue that behavior is a 
function of both the interdependence structure and transformational processes of 
individuals. This chapter will examine the transformational processes of individuals 
within a given situation of objective interdependence. Transformational processes, 
within any given context, are argued to be relatively stable over time (see McClintock & 
Liebrand, 1988; Rusbult & van Lange, 1996; van Lange eta!., in press). In other words, 
it is argued that behavior in situations of interdependence is "moderated by pre-existing 
individual differences in social value orientations (i.e. prosocial, individualistic, or 
competitive orientation" (van Lange et a!., in press, p. 2 - draft). Given this, the level of 
cooperation by any given individual should remain relatively stable over time within a 
given situation of interdependence. In line with this analysis, pre-existing individual 
differences arc argued to be !he moderating variable that establishes individuals' 
willingness to sacrifice for the group. 
Recall that social dilemmas are characterized in terms of the problem of 
interdependence; that is, when individuals are confronted with a conllict between their 
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own interest and the interest of the collective as a result of interdependence, this leads to 
a deficient outcome for the individuals involved, unless an individual is prosocially 
inclined, Individuals are prosocially inclined if they value the outcomes of others. 
Typically, the degree to which individuals value the outcomes of others is measured 
through decomposed games, such as the ring measure, whereby a vector is plotted on the 
self-other outcome plane (see Chapter 2). 
Given this emphasis in the social dilemma literature, the study to be presented in 
this chapter will examine individual differences within a stable structure of 
interdependence over time. The aim of the study is to test the strength of variables 
important to interdependence and self-categorization theories in predicting social 
cooperation in situations of objective interdependence. Specifically, social value 
orientations and normative measures of how representative an individual is of the 
emergent group norm will be examined. This latter measure builds on the work of 
normative representativeness found important to categorization processes and intergroup 
discrimination behavior, as seen in Experiment 1. Taken together, this study examines 
the emergent properties of groups and the dynamics of intragroup cooperation in relation 
to social value orientations and normative dimensions of group life and behavior. 
However, the conventional measure of social value orientations will not be used, 
as a previous study carried out in the same context as the study to be presented found no 
systematic differences when using the measure. Specifically, in an earlier attempt to 
follow conventional practice the present author (Morrison, 1994) carried out a study, in 
the context of an Outward Bound course, using the ring measure to examine how 
allocation behavior in self-other comparisons would change over time, and with 
comparison other. The results were interesting as the measure did not pick up the range 
of individual differences normally present in the population: 45 - 55 % cooperators; 30 -
40% individualists; 10- 20% competitors. Instead, in a precourse measure 91% of 
participants were found to be cooperators and 9% were individualists. No competitors 
were found. The measure was also distributed at two other times during the course, and 
comparison other was also varied. While some changes were found over time, and 
comparison other, for each individual, these differences were not found to be significant. 
Thus, the use of this instrument was problematic in this setting and necessitated the 
development of a more sensitive measure of cooperation. 
To this end, it was decided that group members' perceptions of individuals' 
behavior would be an effective measure of overall cooperation within the group as this 
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measure would be less vulnerable to response biases and ceiling effects. This was based 
on some early studies examining the robustness and measurement of social value 
orientations by McClintock and colleagues. They showed that "actors can detect or 
learn another's value orientations by observing other's choice behavior" (McClintock, 
1978, p. 129). In other words, their studies showed that individuals were accurate at 
predicting the behavior of cooperators, individualists and competitors, the three most 
common social value orientations. Thus, it could be assumed that the participants in 
these small interactive groups could also accurately perceive the overall level of 
cooperativeness across group members. 
These results have the potential to be very revealing given that social value 
orientations are expected to account for a significant amount of the variance in 
cooperative behavior in situations of interdependence (see Grezlak, 1994). The question 
then is: can we account for further systematic variation in this sample. For the sample is 
indeed unique, with two possibilities for the ceiling effect of cooperation being evident. 
Firstly, because of the self-selected nature of participation on an Outward Bound course, 
the course may predominantly attract cooperators. Secondly, the normative expectations 
of an Outward Bound course may induce high levels of cooperative behavior. Recall 
Kerr (1995; see also McClintock & van Avermaet, 1982) found that group norms do 
influence social value orientations. To some extent at least, the latter explanation seems 
more plausible. Either way, this initial study aims to examine if it is possible to show 
further systematic variation in this extreme sample (or situation). If systematic variation 
can be found then we may be able to further develop our understanding of predicting 
subtle changes in cooperative behavior. 
Seli~categorization theory argues that social cooperation is an emergent product 
of psychological group formation. Thus, as the psychological group becomes salient for 
the group members, perceptions of cooperation should vary as a product of this salient 
category of membership. As such, cooperation is not a static product of intra-personal 
differences within a given interdependence structure, it is an emergent product of group 
life, understood here in terms of a cognitive re-definition of the self. Further, groups are 
defined in terms of normative dimensions as well, the more normatively consistent an 
individual is perceived to be of a group, the more cooperative that individual should be 
perceived to be in reference to the group. Simply, the greater the typicality of the 
individual in reference to the group, the more the person fits the salient categorization 
and thus the more cooperative they are perceived to be. 
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This study builds on an earlier field study (Oakes et a!., 1995) carried out in the 
same context where the cohesiveness of the group was expected to .increase over time. 
Specifically, both this study and the study to be presented took place within the context 
of small interacting groups (summer Challenge Courses) at Outward Bound Australia. 
Participants are divided into autonomous groups of approximately 10 - 15 members, who 
spend 22 days (the course length was shortened from the previous study by 4 days) on 
expedition through the Australian wilderness. The focus of the courses is highly group 
oriented; that is, individuals are highly interdependent in regard to their ability to achieve 
the course goals. This context thus provides the ideal opportunity to examine intragroup 
processes in highly interactive groups which operate autonomously, and in relative 
isolation, over a period of 22 days. 
The aim of the published study was to investigate the relationship bet ween 
familiarity and perceived ingroup homogeneity. In contrast to current (e.g., Park, Judd, 
& Ryan, 1991) and longstanding (e.g., Lippmann, 1922) research that argues that 
increasing familiarity should decrease perceived homogeneity within the group, it was 
predicted that in this context the opposite would be the case. The findings confirmed the 
latter prediction, showing that over time these highly interactive groups were perceived 
to be more homogenous and that group members were more likely to be described in 
terms of stereotypic ingroup norms. Thus, in line with self-categorization theory, it was 
argued that the salient self-stereotype was in terms of group membership and that the 
salience of this self-stereotype increased over time, thus capturing the emergent 
properties of group life. 
It was concluded from this study that "change in subjects' responses over time 
accurately ret1ected the process of their becoming an ingroup -- a process through which 
a collection of disparate individuals became a coherent social-psychological entity" 
(Oakes eta!., 1995, p. 58). These findings suggest that individuals were acting in terms 
of a salient social category of membership, and the extent to which this category of 
membership was salient increased over time. In line with this it would be expected that 
group members would exhibit increasing degrees of social cooperation, that is, behave in 
a manner which is increasingly normatively consistent with the pursuit of group goals. 
The experiment to be presented in this chapter will examine social value 
orientations and ingroup representativeness as determinants of social cooperation within 
a given structure of objective interdependence. Building on the former study, this 
present study will utilize a time-series design, such that the emergent properties of 
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groups can be examined. Specifically, from the perspective of the social value theory 
(see McClintock & Liebrand, 1988) expectation that social value orientations are 
relatively stable intrapersonal differences, previous levels of cooperation should predict 
subsequent levels of cooperation within the same situation of interdependence. On the 
other hand, self-categorization theory would predict that perceptions of social 
cooperation would increase as a function of the increasing salience of the collective self-
category of membership, as reflected in the increasing homogeneity on the stereo typic 
ingroup norm in the initial study. Further, social cooperation is argued to be a product 
of the degree to which another individual is perceived to share the same self-category of 
membership. Thus, perceived group representativeness should predict perceived 
intragroup cooperation at any given time. 
Taken together, it is predicted, in line with self-categorization theory, that 
perceived group representativeness, at any given time, will predict perceptions of social 
cooperation in reference to the group, over and above previous levels of perceived social 
cooperation. Social value theory would predict that previous levels of cooperation 
would predict future levels of cooperation within the same situation of interdependence. 
Further, in line with self-categorization theory, given that the initial study found that 
perceived homogeneity on the stereotypical ingroup norm increased over time, overall 
the level of perceived social cooperation in pursuit of group goals should increase over 
time. This should be reflected in individuals' perceptions of group members individual 
and general level of intragroup cooperation. On the other hand, if cooperation is a stable 
intra-personal state, then previous levels of cooperation should predict subsequent levels 
of cooperation and the overall level of cooperation should remain relatively stable over 
time. 
8.2 Method 
Subjects and Design: The subjects in this study consisted of 100 members (61 
males, 39 females, 16- 32 years of age, M = 21.16; SD = 3.77) of the general public 
who were participanting in a 22-day Outward Bound Challenge course. The 
participants were members of one of eight different groups [namely: (Sturt: n = 13; 
Gunn: n = 13; Cottee: n = 13; and Mawson: n = 12), (Bass: n = 9 and Gilmore: n = 10), 
(Cook: n = 15 and Franklin: n = 15); groups within brackets were run concurrently, 
while remaining autonomous, within the same course]. Each of these groups were 
independent and took part in an Outward Bound course of the same structure and 
nature, specifically a Challenge Course conducted in the Australian Capital Territory. 
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Within each group, participants were not known to each other and thus had no 
direct social experience with their respective group members. Immediately upon arrival 
participants were assigned to a group, with each course consisting of two or more 
groups. While concurrent groups had knowledge of each other's existence, for the most 
part interaction was primarily at the intragroup level. Three subjects dropped out of 
their respective courses and were thus excluded from the analysis. 
Measures of perceived normative representativeness and cooperativeness of 
group members were obtained at four stages during the course. Group members sell~ 
selected normative measures of their respective groups on Day 1 and 3. Based on the 
self-relevant normative data collected, measures of individuals' representativeness and 
cooperativeness followed on Days 9, 12, 16 and 22. The study thus employed an 8 
(group) x 4 (time) factorial design with repeated measures on the second factor. 
Procedure: The course of events was the same for each of the eight groups. 
Upon arrival, participants were divided into groups to ensure that across concurrently 
running groups, each group had relatively the same sex ratio, age range and socio-
economic background. One Outward Bound instructor (who was blind to the details of 
the study) was assigned to each group. The course began with a three day preliminary 
training program at the Australian Capital Territory national base of Outward Bound 
Australia. Each group then departed for a 12 day wilderness expedition, under the 
guidance of their instructor. On day 15 each participant began a three-day "solo" period 
-- a time for participants to think about their life in relation to experiences on the course. 
Either directly before or after the "solo" period each group participated in a day of 
rockclimbling or abseiling. Each group was then divided into two smaller groups. Each 
of these smaller groups planned and executed a unaccompanied 4 day expedition. The 
final leg back to national base, where fmal group activities occur, was an individual 
activity, whereby each individual completed a 12-kilometer run. 
At an introductory briefing to the course on Day 1, all groups were told that 
research will be an aspect of the course. This briefing was given by the experimenter and 
participants were told that participation in the research was voluntary and confidential. 
The participants did not meet with the experimenter again until the last day of the course, 
when they were fully debriefed. At the prearranged times during the course, each 
instructor distributed the relevant questionnaires and asked participants to complete the 
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sheets in the order provided in a private, thoughtful and honest manner. No particular 
rationale for the research was given to the participants or instructors until the end of the 
course. 
Normative Rating Measures: Initially, participants filled out a questionnaire to 
ascertain sell~ relevant normative expectancies of the group. Following Haslam, Turner, 
Oakes, McGarty and Hayes (1992; following Katz & Braly, 1933), participants were 
asked to read through a list of 50 adjectives that would complete the sentence: How 
important is it to (be) on this course? Participants were then asked to rate 
each adjective on a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 7 (very important). Following 
this general task, participants were asked to choose from this list "the five most 
important attributes that will be important to the overall success of your course." The 
purpose of this first questionnaire was to get the participants thinking about these 50 
different attributes and become familiar with the questionnaire design. As the 
experimenter was present during the completion of this first questionnaire, questions 
could also be responded to as appropriate. On day 4 of the course, once on expedition, 
the participants filled in this same questionnaire again. It was thought that this second 
measure would better reflect the emergent group norm, rather than reflect the 
expectations that participants brought to the course on Day 1. These questionnaires 
were left by the instructor at a designated spot on the expedition route and retrieved after 
the group had continued on their expedition. 
Individual ratings: Based on the group members' overall responses, five 
adjectives were identified for each group that were most consensually chosen within each 
of the eight groups (e.g., members of Sturt chose supportive, positive in attitude, aware 
of others' needs, committed and responsible most consistently; see appendix 7.1 for the 
normative dimensions of all eight groups). Using the most consensually defining 
adjectives, a questionnaire was designed such that each participant rated how much each 
of these five adjective described the individual members of their group. The ratings were 
made on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so). Participants were presented 
with a questionnaire which listed across the top of the page the five adjectives and the 
names of the individuals in their group down the left side. Participants were also asked 
to rank the group members from most to least representative of the group on these five 
adjectives. Finally, on this same questionnaire, participants also rated the same five 
words on a 7-point scale which measured how important each item was to the success of 
their course at each point of measurement. This was to ensure that the items remained 
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important to the group members, as a whole, throughout the course. This questionnaire 
was presented at four times during the course (Days 8, 11, 15 and 22). 
On a second questionnaire, also presented four times, participants were asked to 
rate group members on a number of statements on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much agree). For example the first question read: "This person cooperates with others 
to achieve success for the group". The other questions are not relevant here (they were 
in fact gathering pilot information for a study on leadership). Follow up questions asked 
about the importance of group membership, general cooperation in the group and 
similarity to other group members. Finally, participants were asked to rank each 
individual in the group from most cooperative to least cooperative member of the group 
in working towards the achievement of a successful course. 
8.3 Results 
Individual Ratings: The participants' ratings of intragroup representativeness 
were averaged across the five consensual dimensions for each group, such that for each 
individual a mean level of perceived group representativeness was calculated across 
individuals and across the five adjectives. Mean levels of perceived group 
representativeness were entered into an 8 (group) x 4 (time) analysis of variance with 
repeated measures on the second factor. As anticipated, a main effect for time was 
found; participants' perceptions of individuals' group representativeness increased over 
time (E (3, 267) = 23.28, 12 < .001; Ms: T1 = 4.9; T2 = 5.12; T3 = 5.55; T4 = 5.65). 
Orthogonal contrasts confirmed these means to be significantly different in the predicted 
order: T1 with T2 (E (1, 89) = 2.65,12 < .05); T2 with T3 (E (1, 89) = 6.32,12 < .001); 
T3 with T4 (E(1, 89) = 2.12, 12 < .05). 
Participants also rated each of the five words that were initially chosen to 
represent the group norm to ensure that these dimensions remained important to the 
group over time. Collapsing across adjectives, an 8 x 4 MANOVA revealed only a main 
effect for the repeated measure of time (E (3, 228) = 4.27, 12 < .01). Thus, the normative 
descriptors, on average, not only remained important to the group as a whole but also 
increased in importance over time (see Table 8.1 ). Further, as Oakes et al.(l995) have 
shown, the standard deviations ret1ect increasing homogeneity over time, indicating that 
the importance of these dimensions became more consensual over time. 
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Table 8.1 
Standard measures of the importance of the five selected group adjectives at four times. 
Time 1 Time2 Time 3 Time 4 
Adj M SD M SD M SD M .s..Q 
A 6.35 1.12 6.39 1.13 6.61 0.67 6.67 0.73 
B 6.37 1.17 6.31 1.25 6.63 0.62 6.57 0.90 
c 6.22 1.21 6.23 1.12 6.44 0.90 6.54 0.92 
D 6.22 1.07 6.13 1.16 6.46 0.88 6.46 0.85 
E 6.24 1.05 6.26 1.15 6.56 0.75 6.65 0.71 
The item on the second questionnaire assessing the groups' ratings of individuals 
level of perceived intragroup cooperation also increased over time. Again, mean levels 
of perceived intragroup cooperation were entered into an 8 (group) x 4 (time) analysis of 
variance with repeated measures on the second factor. As predicted, a main effect for 
time was found; participants' perceptions of individuals' level of cooperation within the 
group increased over time (f (3, 267) = 23.28, 11 < .001; Ms: T1 = 5.26; T2 = 5.54; T3 
= 5. 78; T4 = 5.88). Orthogonal contrasts confrrmed these means to be significantly 
different in the predicted order: T1 with T2 (E (1, 89) = 2.33, 11 < .05); T2 with T3 (E (1, 
89) = 4.04, 11 < .001); T3 with T4 (f(1, 89) = 4.44, 11 < .001). These results together 
with the group ratings for group representativeness are shown in Figure 8.1 to emphasise 
the emerging relationship between these two variables over time. 
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Figure 8.1 
A Coop 
+ Rep 
Perceptions of intragroup cooperativeness and group representativeness at four times 
over the course of 22 days. 
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The general rating of overall cooperation within the group confirmed this finding 
of the individual ratings. Perceptions of intragroup cooperation increased over time (f 
(3, 234) = 6.38, p = .000; Ms: T1 = 5.66; T2 = 5.82; T3 = 5.99; T4 = 6.08). 
Orthogonal contrasts confirmed these means to be significantly different in the predicted 
order: T1 with T2 (f (1, 78 = 2.41, p < .05); T2 with T3 (f (1, 78) = 1.04, p < .05); T3 
with T4 (f(1, 78) = 0.43, p > .05). 
In line with self-categorization theory, perceptions of similarity to other group 
members also increased significantly over time, producing a pattern of results similar to 
that of the cooperation data. Only a main effect for time was found when this measure 
was entered into an 8 (group) x 4 (time) analysis (f (3, 231) = 5.23, p < .01; Ms: T1 = 
5.06; T2 = 5.22; T3 = 5.59; T4 = 5.60). The univariate tests found the first two of these 
comparisons to be significantly different: T1 with T2 (f (1, 77) = 2.06, p < .05; T2 with 
T3 (f (1, 77) = 4.04, n < .01); T3 with T4 (f(l, 77) = 0.12, n > .05). The summary 
statistics for these results are reported in Appendix 8.2. 
Finally, the importance of group membership was measured. The results 
confirmed that the group remained important to the individual group members over time 
and did not change significantly (Ms: T1 = 6.25; T2 = 6.12; T3 = 6.08; T4 = 6.17). 
Predicting cooperation: A regression analysis was used to address the question 
of the stability of intrapersonal orientations within a given interdependence structure, in 
comparison to the normative dimension of psychological group formation, which then 
predicts individuals' cooperative behavior. Perceptions of individual group members' 
level of cooperation and group representativeness were used to predict intragroup 
cooperation over time within an ongoing situation of objective interdependence. On the 
basis of participants' ratings of individual group members, mean scores were computed 
for each individual on the dimensions of perceived representativeness and 
cooperativeness at each of the four different times. These scores were then entered into 
a hierarchical regression analysis. This procedure was also completed for the ranking 
data. The results are reported in Table 8.2. 
At each of the three times of analysis, and using both the rating and the ranking 
data, group representativeness predicted cooperation over and the above previous levels 
of cooperation. While degree of perceived level of representativeness has a higher 
predictive value, it should also be noted that previous level of cooperation is also highly 
correlated. However, in four of the six regression analyses the significant relationship 
between previous levels of cooperation and subsequent levels of cooperation disappears 
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Table 8.2 
Hierchical regression of perceived intragroup cooperation and group representativeness 
on subsequent measures of perceived intragroup cooperation 
A) Predicting Perceived Cooperation T2: 
Variables CoopT2 CoopT1 B Beta sr 
(DV) (incr) 
Ranked 
Step 1 Coop T1 .911 .434 .458* .83** Mult R = .95 
Step 2 Rep T2 .919 .871 .556 .520** .07** R= .89 
-.086 (Int) Adj. R = .89 
Rated 
Step 1 Coop T1 .766 .163 .229 .59** Mult R = .89 
Step 2 Rep T2 .881 .707 .674 .707** .21 ** R = .80 
1.229 (Int) Adj R = .78 
B) Predicting Perceived CooQeration T3: 
Variables CoopT3 CoopT2 B Beta sr 
(DV) (incr) 
Ranked 
Step 1 CoopT2 .838 .064 .075 .70** Mult R = .95 
Step 2 Rep T3 .948 .864 .856 .883** .20** R = .90 
.590 (Int) Adj R = .89 
Rated 
Step 1 Coop T2 .891 .331 .402* .79** Mult R = .95 
Step 2 Rep T3 .922 .832 .619 .587** .11* R = .90 
.517 (Int) Adj R = .89 
C) Predicting Perceived CooQeration T4: 
Variables CoopT4 CoopT3 B Beta sr 
(DV) (incr) 
Ranked 
Step 1 CoopT3 .896 .262 .222 .80** Mult R = .94 
Step 2 Rep T4 .939 .915 .784 .735** .09** R= .89 
-.370 Adj R = .88 
Rated 
Step 1 Coop T3 .908 .415 .382 .82** Mult R = .96 
Step 2 Rep T4 .938 .867 .619 .607** .09* * R = .92 
-.023 (lnt) Adj R = .91 
** p < .001 * p < .005 
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when degree of group representativeness is entered in the regression equation. In 
contrast, in each of the six regression analyses degree of representativeness remains a 
strong predictor of degree of perceived social cooperation, the ranking data (beta = 0.52; 
0.88; 0.74, ll < .001 in each case) and the rating data (beta= 0.71; 0.59; 0.61, ll < .001 
in each case) at time 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
8.4 Discussion 
The results of this study support the self-categorization theory analysis of social 
cooperation, over and above a social value theory analysis. These findings were 
supported across 8 different groups, within which different norms emerged, as well as 
two different measures of social cooperation and group representativeness (ranking and 
rating measures). Within these small interactive groups, the overall level of perceived 
social cooperation and group representativeness increased over time. Further, group 
representativeness predicted social cooperation over and above previous levels of 
cooperation. Measures of perceived similarity and homogeneity on the group relevant 
norm also supported a self-categorization analysis; specifically, perceptions of similarity 
and homogeneity both increased over time. 
The findings were predicted on the assumption that individuals would 
increasingly self-stereotype in terms of the group over time and thus perceive themselves 
to be more cohesive over time (see Oakes et al., 1995). In other words, it was assumed 
that the sense of "we-ness" or "groupiness" would increase over time. Given this, it was 
predicted that perceptions of group representativeness and cooperativeness would also 
increase over time. Specifically, as predicted, the findings supported the primary 
hypothesis of this thesis, that social cooperation is a product of psychological group 
formation. That is, as the group becomes salient for the individual group members, 
social cooperation varies with this emergent property of group life. Across analyses and 
measures, the findings are consistent with self-categorization theory. 
In line with this theoretical analysis, as individual group members are perceived to 
be more normatively representative of the group, they are also perceived to he more 
cooperative, as they are perceived to share the same self-category of membership. 
Contrary to the findings of this study, social value theorists would predict that within any 
given context of interdependence, any given individual's cooperative behaviour should 
remain relatively stable over time. The findings clearly show that both normative 
representativeness and perceived cooperation increase over time within this enduring 
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structure of interdependence. Further, while these variables are highly correlated group 
representativeness is the more sensitive predictor of perceived social cooperation. 
In contrast to the interdependence analysis, we would argue that as a salient 
social identity emerges, group members perceive themselves and others as more 
homogeneous, in other words as more similar in terms of what defines them as a group. 
The psychological process of self-categorization works as a gauge, whereby judgements 
can be made on the degree to which group members are representative of the stereo typic 
ingroup norm. Social cooperation is then a product of the degree to which individuals 
are perceived to share the same self-category. A~ Turner and colleagues (1987) state, 
"the general process underlying mutually cooperative intentions and expectations is the 
extent to which players come to see themselves as a collective or joint unit, to feel a 
sense of 'we-ness', of being together in the same situation facing the same problems" (p. 
34). Self-interest can thus be expressed both at the individual and the group level. 
Having said this, it could be argued, as raised in the introduction, that individuals 
were converging to the cooperative normative expectation at Outward Bound. To a 
certain extent this would be true, given that perceptions of cooperation increase hand in 
hand with levels of normative representativeness of the group. However, the norms that 
were specified, and subsequently used as predictor variables, did not reflect a generic 
Outward Bound group norm of social cooperation; they varied with each group. The 
normative adjectives that were used by each group reflected the distinctive emergent 
stereotype of that group. The relevance of the specific group stereotypes was ensured 
through the initial self-selection process (see Haslam et al., 1992). Thus, there was high 
normative fit (Oakes, 1987) between the attributes of judgment for each individual and 
participants' identities as group members. Self-categorization theory specifics quite 
clearly the process by which norms become influential in individuals' perception through 
the ilt hypothesis. Interdependence theorists have acknowledged the importance of 
norms but do not systematically specify a predictive mechanism, in general there seems 
to be ambivalence over the role of norms in predicting behavior in social dilemmas (see 
Kerr, 1995). Group norms, and individuals' representativeness of these norms, has been 
shown to be an effective predictor of group behavior in self-categorization theory. 
Normative and comparative fit will be examined further in an experiment to he reported 
in Chapter 11. 
It could also be argued that interdependence, per se, produced the effects found 
in this study; that is, the interdependence structure induced cooperative behavior and 
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that, in turn, allowed for psychological group formation. This is difficult to argue here, 
given that this study emphasises the correlational nature of the variables. Further recall 
that the level of group representativeness and cooperativeness were highly correlated. It 
is difficult to know the causal direction of these result in this field study. Having said 
this, self-categorization theory would not deny that the interdependent nature of these 
small dynamic groups facilitated the identification with the groups; however, it would be 
argued that identification is the underlying process that allowed cooperative relations to 
emerge. The study to follow in the next chapter will examine the causal relationship 
between interdependence and cooperation systematically in an experimental design 
within this same context. 
An interesting aspect of the results of this study is the fact that measures 
systematically predicted levels of cooperative behavior in a sample that was already 
defined as highly cooperative, as specified by the ring measure. This is important given 
that a significant amount of attention has been given to the development of social value 
orientations in the literature. In fact this measure represents the most robust measure 
that is used in predicting variation in the level of cooperation in the social dilemma 
literature. However, as the results here show the measure only produced ceiling effects 
in this context, when other measures were used with more success. Perhaps, as Grzelak 
(1994) has suggested, the results of endless gaming studies in the lab can only be 
partially generalized into predicting behavior in everyday social dilemmas. 
An examination of the ring measure of social value orientation highlights some 
interesting differences between the interdependence theory approach and the self-
categorization theory approach. As already mentioned, the former approach assumes 
stable intrapersonal differences, while self-categorization theory emphasizes the emergent 
properties of individual and group life. Another important difference is that the ring 
measure assumes, as do other measures, that the self and others are perceived to be 
orthogonal entities, that is independent variables. Recall that the self-other outcome 
plane represents social value orientations in terms of a vector point on the self and other 
outcome place, where each is represented as being an orthogonal construct (see 
McClintock, 1978). In contrast, self-categorization theory defines the self along a 
continuum of abstraction -- individual to collective. At the collective level, the self 
becomes inclusive of others, as such individuals are understood as interchangeable 
exemplars of the salient category of membership. Given this conceptualization, the self 
and other are not conceived to be orthogonal entities or constructs but inclusive 
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conceptualizations of the self. Thus, for an individual group member to perceive a fellow 
group member as similar and cooperative, is to see the other in terms of a shared self-
category of membership. The nature of self-interest is re-defined. Acting in terms of the 
group can be defined as acting in terms of the self. 
This study also highlights another important distinction for the self-categori71ltion 
approach. This study measured perceived cooperative behavior of individuals and did 
not measure behavioral cooperation within the group, as the decomposed matrices of the 
ring measure aim to do. This is an important point, for one of the reasons that the social 
dilemma paradigm has become so established in the literature is because of the behavioral 
nature of the paradigm (see Pruitt and Kimmell, 1977). The paradigm defines what we 
are formally able to distinguish as social cooperation; as such, social cooperation is 
differentiated from helping and prosocial behavior. However, as others have noted, arc 
they really different psychologically (see Grzelak and Derlega, 1982)? Is it productive to 
our developing understanding of cooperative behavior to differentiate between these 
different classes of prosocial behavior? Many researchers have found a significant 
amount of overlap between cooperation and helping behavior. A relevant example here 
would be that social value orientations are also predictive of helping behavior 
(McClintock and Allison, 1989). This study highlights that it may be prudent to re-think 
the conceptual constructs that defme our analysis of social cooperation and the 
instruments we use. 
Having noted the limitations of this study, it remains that in terms of the 
constructs that were developed and measured, this study found that the degree of 
representativeness clearly predicted perceptions of cooperation, within this situation of 
objective interdependence. Further, the evidence clearly supports an analysis that 
acknowledges the emergent properties of groups and group processes. As such, in line 
with the theoretical analysis adopted by this thesis, it may well be that instead of 
cooperative behavior of individuals producing the group that cooperation is the product 
of psychological group formation and consequent perceptions of interdependence with 
others. 
In conclusion, it does not appear that the evidence presented here is 
compatible with other evidence which argues that the expression of an individual's social 
value orientation remains relatively stable over time within a given situation of 
interdependence (see Kuhlman et al., 1986; McClintock and Allison, 1986). While the 
ring measure may have found stability in this sample, there was no variance Jimnd. Most 
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individuals were classified as cooperators. The measures used here not only showed 
systematic variation in line with predictions, but this variation reflected an emergent 
propertiy of group membership and not a stable intrapersonal variable. The findings 
showed that there was an overall increase in levels of cooperation and group 
representativeness over time. While more work needs to be done to overcome some of 
the limitations of this study, in particular the correlational nature of the data, the 
evidence implies that social cooperation is an emergent property of psychological group 
formation. 
-Chapter 9-
The nature of group life and social cooperation: The relationship 
between interdependence and psychological group formation 
Experiment 3 
9.1 Introduction 
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The last two chapters introduced the self-categorization theory analysis of social 
cooperation in reference to the two propositions which together make up the 
interdependence approach to understanding social cooperation and solving social 
dilemmas. Specifically, the interdependence approach involves an analysis of the 
objective interdependence structure of the situation, together with the transformational 
properties of individuals within the interdependence structure. Study one of this thesis 
provided evidence that objective interdependence of individuals, per se, cannot fully 
account for group based behavior, such as intragroup cooperation and intergroup 
discrimination; specifically, objective interdependence had no effect on the behavior of 
participants. The quality or distinctiveness of social identity, as opposed to objective 
interdependence, accounted for group based behavior. 
Study two provided preliminary evidence that questioned the measurement and 
stability of the transformational process of social value orientations in a given situation 
of objective interdependence. Instead of levels of cooperative behavior remaining 
stable over time within a given situation, cooperation overall increased over time. In 
line with self-categorization theory, this is accounted for in terms of the emergence of 
the psychological group. As group members perceived themselves to be more similar 
and homogeneous over time, cooperation increased hand in hand with this effect. 
Together, these studies provided initial support for a self-categorization theory 
analysis of cooperative behavior; however for both Study 1 and Study 2 the measures 
were taken within a situation of objective interdependence. The study to be presented 
in this chapter will examine if social identificaion with a group can predict the level of 
cooperation over and above a situation objectively defined in terms of group 
memberships. 
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The following field study, carried out in the same context as Study 2, examines 
the emergent properties of perceived group membership in terms of three indices --
common fate, similarity, and interdependence -- and relates these indices of group 
formation to an analysis of cooperative behavior. Specifically, it is predicted that 
perceptions of similarity will predict cooperative behaviour over and above the objective 
common fate (or objective interdependence) of individuals. It is also predicted that 
perceptions of interdependence will co-vary with perceptions of similarity. The present 
study will build on the previous study and will examine perceptions of similarity and 
interdependence over time within the context of an Outward Bound course, wherein the 
objective common fate of individuals remains stable across course groups. In line with 
the previous study, it is also predicted that perceptions of similarity and interdependence 
will increase over time with the emergence of psychological group formation. 
In light of the literature that differentiates intragroup cooperation from intergroup 
cooperation (Insko eta!., 1987; 1988; 1993; Bornstein, 1992), this study also examines 
both intragroup and intergroup processes. The aim is to establish, in terms of self-
categorization theory, that the same perceptual index, specifically similarity, is predictive 
of both intragroup and intergroup cooperation. To this end this study will examine 
intragroup and intergroup cooperation within the same situational context. The aim is to 
provide a systematic account of intragroup and intergroup cooperation that aims to bring 
parsimony to this divergent literature. 
The Outward Bound structured expeditions offer an ideal medium to examine the 
constructs described above. The objective interdependence of these small autonomous 
interactive groups remains stable over time and in isolation from other groups, while at 
the same time these individual groups are pursuing common goals as Outward Bound 
participants and thus are similar on many relevant dimensions. Through the introduction 
of a group not associated with Outward Bound, the relevant similarities between the 
autonomous Outward Bound groups will be accentuated. Given this social comparison, 
it is predicted that participants would identify as Outward Bound participants and not in 
terms of their discrete objectively defined interdependent groups. To test whether social 
comparison is predictive of cooperative behavior, three comparison others are used in 
this study, each of whom are only described in terms of their group memberships: a 
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member of their ingroup, a member of another Outward Bound group and a member of 
the local bushwalking club. 
Building on the findings of the previous chapter, it is predicted that the salience 
of their collective identity as group members will increase over time, as evidenced by the 
increasing levels of perceived similarity. Further, based on normative and comparative fit 
each Outward Bound group will perceive themselves to be more similar to other 
Outward Bound groups in comparison to a group from the local bush walking club. As 
such, in both the intragroup and intergroup conditions participants will perceive 
themselves to be similar on comparative dimensions that define themselves as Out ward 
Bound participants and thus levels of cooperation are predicted to be similar in both the 
Outward Bound intragroup and intergroup conditions. By comparison, lower levels of 
cooperation are expected in the conditions where the comparison other is a member of 
the local bush walking club. Recall, as with the last study, that this sample had been 
predominantly identified as cooperators using the ring measure. Thus further systematic 
findings of levels of cooperation would be of significant interest to this literature, given 
that social value orientations currently account for most of the variance on levels of 
cooperation in situations of objective interdependence. 
Given that self-categorization theory argues that social cooperation is the product 
of a salient social identity, it is thus argued that cooperation will vary with perceptions of 
similarity and will not be constrained within the situation of objective interdependence as 
defined by these small interactive groups. As such, interdependence could not be argued 
as the precondition for cooperative behavior to emerge. This study aims to test self-
categorization theory's proposition, in line with Lewin, that objective interdependence is 
a sufficient but not necessary condition for group formation and cooperative behavior. 
On the contrary, perceptions of interdependence are argued to co-vary with perceptions 
of similarity. Further, perceptions of similarity will predict intentional cooperative 
behavior, with each of the three comparison others -- ingroup and outgroup. 
9. 2 Method 
Subjects: One hundred and sixty members of the general public (74 males and 
86 females) who had enrolled to take part in a 22-day Outward Bound course 
participated in the study. They participate in one of four different courses [course 1 (n 
= 61); course 2 (n = 33); course 3 (n = 40); course 4 (n = 26)]. Within each of these 
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courses participants were divided into independent groups of 12- 15 people [course 1 
(5 groups- Gunn, Sturt, Gilmore, Mawson, and Colter); course 2 (3 groups- Mawson, 
Gunn, and Cook); course 3 (3 groups- Chisholm, Bass, and Gilmore); course 4 (2 
groups- Flinders and Cotter)]. Thus 13 independent groups were used in this study. 
Subjects ranged in age from 16 to 38 years (M = 22.4; SD = 3.8). Nationality was 
noted for all subjects as the first course had a large enrollment of Singaporean 
participants (n = 33). Within each course, the independent groups were aware of each 
other's existence, but had minimal interaction with each other during the course. Each 
group developed autonomously. Following Outward Bound program policy, the groups 
were formed so as to ensure as much variety as possible in group members' age, 
education, and social background across group memberships in each course. Each 
group contained an approximately equal number of males and females, and in the 
instance of the first course an equal number of Singaporean students. Over all groups 
and courses, five participants dropped out of their groups for various reasons; data from 
these subjects were excluded from the analysis. 
Design: This study was conducted in two parts. The first part is a longitudinal 
design which measured individuals' perceptions of interdependence and similarity over 
three time periods; as such, the design of this aspect of the study is conceptually similar 
to the previous study. Specifically, all participants of these thirteen different groups 
completed measures of perceived similarity and interdependence in comparison with 
three different groups: Outward Bound ingroup, Outward Bound oulgroup, and the 
local bush walking club. These measures were taken at three different times: Day 1, 
13 and 22. Thus, the design is 13 (Outward Bound group) by 3 (comparison group) by 
3 (time), with repeated measures on the second and third factors. 
Within this longitudinal design a second group of measurements were taken on 
Day 17. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups in 
which the comparison other was a member of one of the following groups: Outward 
Bound in group (ingroup ), Outward Bound outgroup ( outgroup 1 ), or the local bush 
walking club (outgroup 2). Note that these conditions are congruent to the measures 
being taken longitudinally. Thus the design is 12 (Outward Bound group) x 3 
(comparison other). In each of these conditions participants were presented with a 
vignette in which they were asked to make a cooperative decision in reference to their 
comparison other. At this time, measures of perceptions of similarity, interdependence, 
common fate, familiarity, and other follow-up measures were also taken. 
Overview of course: The course proceeded in the same manner as the 22 day 
Outward Bound course described in the study reported in Experiment 2 (Chapter 8). 
Again the instructors, blind to the nature of the study, distributed the questionnaires at 
pre-arranged times during the course. An introductory briefing, as well as final 
debriefing, were given by the experimenter. 
204 
Longitudinal measures: These measures are very straightforward and aim to 
complement the measures of the previous study. Participants filled out a questionnaire 
that asked two questions: (1) "When on expedition in the bush, how interdependent 
(that is, mutually dependent or dependent on each other) do you think you would be 
with members of the following groups"; (2) "When on expedition in the bush, how 
similar do you think your needs and values regarding resources would be to members of 
the following groups". In each case participants responded in terms of three groups: 
(1) members of your own Outward Bound group on this course; (2) members of another 
Outward Bound group on this course; (3) members of the local bush walking club. 
Participants circled a number from (1) not at all interdependent/similar to (8) extremely 
interdependent/similar for each of the three groups. The order of the questions was 
counter balanced in two ways: the order of the two questions, as well as the order of the 
groups within each question. 
Cooperation measure: Depending on condition participants were given one of 
three vignettes to read. The vignette involved either a member of their ingroup, another 
Outward Bound group or the local bush walking club. The ingroup vignette read as 
follows, the others differed marginally (see Appendix 8.1 for other vignettes): 
You and the other members of your group are now on your final expedition back towards 
Tharwa. It is the first day of your expedition and after a long morning of hiking you have 
stopped for a break. You are looking forward to a good drink of water and a flapjack. Each 
member of your group has been given a limited number of flapjacks for the completion of your 
journey and this will be the first of those flapjacks. A• you get settled and bring out your 
flapjacks, one of the other members of your group tells you that their flar.jacks were still in 
the back of their backup vehicle when it drove away. So, they have no flapjacks for their 
expedition. 
Participants were then asked to circle the percentage of flapjacks that they would be 
willing to give to the other person; they could circle 0, 10%, .... 90%, 100%. Flapjacks 
(muesli bars) are a highly desired resource on expedition. Each group had made their 
own prior to expedition and this was the last collection point so no reciprocity could be 
expected in terms of flapjacks after this point. 
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To control for specific group biases in the Outward Bound outgroup condition, 
the comparison outgroup varied randomly from case to case. For example, participants 
in this condition on course 2, had an equal chance of having the outgroup member 
being from Mawson, Gunn or Cook. Participants then filled in follow up questions on 
perceptions of common fate, familiarity, similarity and interdependence. 
9. 3 Results 
The results arc straight forward and build on the previous study reported in 
Chapter 8 (see figures 9.1 and 9.2). In line with the previous findings, the longitudinal 
measures of perceptions of similarity increased over time for ingroup members (Ms: T1 = 
6.15; T2 = 6.30; T3 = 6.73), as well as Outward Bound outgroup members (Ms: Tl = 
·5.78; T2 = 6.05; T3 = 6.20). In contrast perceptions of similarity decreased over time 
for outgroup members that were members of the local bushwalking club (Ms: Tl = 4.63; 
T2 = 4.45; T3 = 4.23). The interdependence measures followed the same pattern of 
results; perceptions of interdependence increased over time for ingroup memhers (Ms: 
Tl = 6.41; T2 = 6.52; T3 = 6.83), and outgroup members who are also Outward Bound 
participants (Ms: Tl = 5.56; T2 = 5.49; T3 = 5.83). While perceptions of 
interdependence tend to decreased over time for members of the local bushwalking club 
(Ms: T1 = 4.01; T2 = 3.30; T3 = 3.50). 
These measures were entered into a 13 (Outward Bound group) x 2 (order!) x 3 
(order2) x 3 (time) x 3 (comparison other) MAN OVA, with repeated measures on the 
last two measures. The two order manipulations refer to the counterbalancing of the 
presentation of the similarity and interdependence questions, as well as the presentation 
of the comparison other within each set. As predicted, the results revealed a two way 
interaction effect for time and comparison other on both the similarity and 
interdependence measures (respectively: E (4, 344) = 10.54, p < .001; E (4, 344) = 7.37, 
p < .001 ), all other tests were not significant. Three planned comparisons were then 
carried out and each was found to be significantly different: collapsing across Outward 
Bound ingroup and outgroup comparisons, T1 was compared to T3 (E (1, 152) = 2.06, p 
< .05); Tl was also compared to T3 for the local bush walking club comparison (E (1, 
152) = 4.04, p < .01 ); at T3 Outward Bound in group and outgroup comparison was 
collapsed and contrasted with the local bush walking club (E 1, 77) = 0.12, p < .05. 
These results replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 2, showing that 
206 
perceptions of similarity not only increase over time for members of ingroups. but also 
other Outward Bound outgroups. Further, there is a very high correlation he tween 
perceptions of similarity and interdependence across the three times of measurement 
r(155) = .94. 
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Figure 9.1: Mean ratings of perceptions of similarity over 3 times for the social 
comparisons of ingroup members, other Outward Bound outgroup members (Outgroup 
1) and members of the local bush walking club (Outgroup 2). 
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Figure 9.2 Mean ratings of perceptions of interdependence over 3 times for the social 
comparisons of ingroup members, other Outward Bound outgroup members (Outgroup 
1) and members of the local bush walking club (Outgroup 2). 
Resource allocation task: A 13 (Outward Bound group) x 3 (comparison other) 
analysis of variance (ANOV A) was used on the resource allocation task which measured 
levels of cooperation. As predicted, a main effect for comparison other was found (f 
(2, 119) = 16.22, p < .001; Ms: Ingroup = 53.33; Outgroup1 = 53.07; Outgroup2 = 
41.92; see Appendix 8.2). Planned orthogonal contrasts found no difference between 
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Ingroup and Outgroupl (E < 1) but significant differences between lngroup and 
Outgroup 2, as well as between Outgroup 1 and Outgroup 2 (respectively: E (1, 152) = 
4.74, 12 < .001; E (1, 152) = 4.68,12 < .001). Thus, cooperation varied systematically 
across conditions as predicted. Participants were equally willing to cooperate with 
members of both objectively defined ingroups and outgroups, as long as they were 
Outward Bound participants. Thus it could be argued that participants' identity as 
Outward Bound participants overrode the objective interdependence structure defmed in 
this context. It is important to note that members of these independent groups had 
limited face to face contact, had no previous a!Iiliation, and no expected future 
affiliation. 
To confirm that the groups were genuinely not objectively interdependent a series 
of measures were taken: common fate, participants' dependence on other, others' 
dependence on participant, mutuality of dependence and familiarity with other. These 
measures were entered into a 13 (Outward Bound group) x 3 (comparison other) 
MANOV A The results showed only a main effect for comparison other ( E (11, 119) = 
71.03,12 < .001). As the consistency between these variables was high (Cronbach's 
alpha= .94) a composite measure across these variables was constructed for each 
condition (Ms: Ingroup = 6.51; Outgroup1 = 4.42; Outgroup2 = 3.65). Planned 
orthogonal contrasts found significant difference between Ingroup and Outgroup1 (f (1, 
152) = 5.05, 12 < .001) and lngroup and Outgroup2 (f (1, 152) = 11.65,12 < .001) but 
not between Outgroup1 and Outgroup 2 (E < 1). Thus, objective interdependence 
between groups was assured. 
Specifically, participants felt that the success of their expedition (common fate) 
depended on their ingroup members but not the members of either outgroup (Ms: 
lngroup = 7.00; Outgroup1 = 4.69; Outgroup2 = 3.72). Participants also felt that they 
knew and were familiar with their ingroup members but not members of either outgroup 
(Ms: Ingroup = 6.02; Outgroup1 = 4.11; Outgroup2 = 3.10). The three measures of 
dependence for resources (dependence on other, other's dependence on you, and 
mutuality of dependence) followed the same pattern of results (collapse across these 
three measures: Ms: lngroup = 6.52; Outgroup1 = 4.46; Outgroup2 = 4.10). 
Follow-up measures on willingness to give their flapjacks to others indicated that 
participants were more willing to do this for an ingroup member, or a member of another 
Outward Bound group, than for a member of the local bushwalking club (Ms: lngroup = 
6.83; Outgroup1 = 6.93; Outgroup2 = 5.69). A post hoc comparison between Ingroup/ 
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Outgroupl and Outgroup2 found this difference to be significant(! (I, 152) = 2.04,12 < 
.01). 
Interestingly, the flapjacks were found to be more important to participants when 
they were giving them to an outgroup member of the local bush walking club, whom 
they overall gave less to, as opposed to members of their ingroup or other Outward 
Bound group (Ms: Ingroup = 4.93; Outgroup1 = 4.46; Outgroup2 = 5.53). !\post hoc 
comparison between lngroup/ Outgroup1 and Outgroup2 found this difference to be 
significant (! (1, 152) = 1.84, 12 < .05). 
Finally, in line with the self-categorization analysis, participants felt more similar 
to both their ingroup and the other Outward Bound group than they did to members of 
the local bushwalking club group (Ms: Ingroup = 6.81; Outgroupl = 6.73; Outgroup2 = 
5.59). Planned orthogonal contrasts found no difference between lngroup and 
Outgroup 1 (f < 1) but significant differences between lngroup and Outgroup 2, as well 
as Outgroup 1 and Outgroup 2 (respectively: f (1, 152) = 2.44, p < .001; f (1, 152) = 
2.38, p < .001). 
Further, perception of similarity also predicted cooperation reliably across 
conditions. The analysis produced a correlation of .442 between the two variables (r2 = 
.196), which is significant (f (1, 149) = 36.26, p = 0.00). The regression equation is also 
significant (! (149) = 6.02, p = 0.00, beta = .42). Thus, perceived levels of similarity are 
associated with higher levels of social cooperation. 
9. 4 Discussion 
The findings are systematically clear across conditions and support a self-
categorization analysis: perceptions of interdependence vary with perceptions of 
similarity which in turn predicted cooperative behavior. Specifically, the evidence 
suggests, as predicted, that objective interdependence of individuals did not produce the 
group; the salience of the group membership produced the perception of interdependence 
with other individuals, and subsequent level of cooperative behavior. In other words, 
perceptions of similarity with other Outward Bound participants overrode the objective 
interdependence of the small interactive groups. As such, participants were willing to 
cooperate without prior face to face contact or dependence on the other individual or 
their group. Further perceptions of interdependence and similarity are not static 
objective distinctions, as interdependence theorists argue, but emergent properties of 
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psychological group formation, as the longitudinal data reveals. The results of these two 
aspects of this study will now be examined in more detail. 
As the data shows, perceptions of similarity increase over time for both members 
of the Outward Bound ingroup and the Outward Bound outgroup; however, perceptions 
of similarity decrease over time for a comparison other who was a member of the local 
bush walking club. There was no significant difference in perceptions of similarity 
between the two Outward Bound groups. Thus, the similarity data supports the 
emergence of a superordinate Outward Bound group that is inclusive of both, objectively 
defined, Outward Bound groups. In other words it could be argued in line with self-
categorization theory that participants' identity as Outward Bound participant was 
salient. Further, perceptions of interdependence show a similar pattern of results to the 
similarity data; in fact, there was a very high correlation between the longitudinal 
similarity and interdependence data. This data is theoretically important in light of the 
objective structure of this situation; that is, participants had no objective interdependence 
with either of the outgroups yet they perceived themselves to be interdependent with 
both the Outward Bound ingroup and outgroup. 
The longitudinal data aL~o highlights the emergent aspect of psychological group 
formation. In line with self-categorization theory, the individuals in the group came to 
see themselves less as individuals and more in terms of their group membership as 
Outward Bound participant; however, the evidence suggests that it was not the group 
that they were objectively interdependent with that became salient (e.g. Gunn, Sturt, 
Gilmore, Mawson, or Cotter) but the superordinate Outward Bound group, that is all 
Outward Bound particpants, that was salient. This analyses supports a self-
categorization analyses as it is the perceptual index of similarity that is predictive of 
group level processes over the common fate criterion of group membership. In line 
with the self-categorization analysis, levels of cooperation followed systematically in 
relation to these measures; specifically, cooperation varied with psychological group 
formation. Thus, given that the ring measure could not pick up on different levels of 
cooperation in this population, the systematic differences in levels of cooperation found 
in this study are quite significant. 
The comparative frame of reference, specifically Outward Bound ingroup, 
Outward Bound outgroup and the local bushwalking club, was induced across all 
participants through the course of this study. Within this frame of reference, the 
perceptions of similarity between the two Outward Bound groups would be 
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accentuated, in comparison to the local bush walking club. Thus through social 
comparison, it would be expected that the two Outward Bound groups would be self-
categorizing as Outward Bound participants in contrast to the local bush walking club. 
As such, the level of social cooperation would not be expected to be different across 
these two conditions. 
This prediction was confirmed with the measures taken on Day 17. As the results 
show, cooperation levels with both the Outward Bound ingroup and Outward Bound 
outgroup were not significantly different. Again, in line with self-categorization theory, 
it could be argued that the identity that is salient is participants' identity as an Outward 
Bound participant. Given that participants felt less similar to members of the local bush 
walking club over time, less cooperation was predicted with this group, as was found. 
The conceptual differences in how interdependence theorists and sell~ 
categorization theorists define social cooperation can also be highlighed here. The 
measure of social cooperation used in this study would formally be defined as helping 
behavior by interdependence theorists, as there is no mutuality of dependence. However, 
the point remains, as raised previously: what is the effective difference between 
cooperation and helping behavior (see Derlega & Grzelak, 1982)? Self-categorization 
theorists would make no distinction. Recall that interdependence theorists define 
cooperation in terms of a cost benefit analysis for the interdependent individuals, wherein 
the individual must experiences loss or sacrifice for the group (sec Boyd and Richardson, 
1991; Rabbie, 1991). Thus, cooperation is analogous with individual sacrifice. 
In line with this narrow concetualization of the self, a full understanding of the 
processes of identification underlying cooperation is restricted by the utilitarian principles 
underpinning the social dilemma paradigm. The paradigm restricts us to a very special 
class of cooperative behavior, in abstraction from the related fields of prosocial, helping 
and even altruistic behavior. More fundamentally, understanding cooperation through 
the use of gaming principles embeds us in notions of human rationality and self-interest 
that are driven by principles of utility maximization of outcomes that accrue to 
individuals. In the paradigm the individual is the primary unit of analysis; all behavior is 
explained and understood in relation to the sole reality of the individual, which in turn 
defines rationality. 
This study questions our contemporary understanding of self-interest. For no 
conl1ict of interest was apparent in this study; participants were very willing to give up 
their flapjacks for another individual who they did not know based solely on their group 
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membership. In line with self-categorization theory, the interchangeability of individuals, 
when a collective identity is salient is highlighted. Further, the more salient the collective 
identification the more willing they were to give a fair share away, that is at least an 
equal number of flapjacks to another individual. 
Similarity also predicted both intra and intergroup behavior. In each condition 
similarity was a reliable predictor for both intra and inter-group cooperative intentional 
behavior. Further, in line with Lewin (1939) there is still a "certain interdependence of 
members"; however, this is based on a similarity construct rather than an objective 
common fate construct, as conceptualized in terms of outcome interdependence of 
individuals, as outlined in the social dilemma paradigm. 
These findings suggest, in line with self-categorization theory , that cooperation 
is a product of a salient social identity. In this case the identity that is salient is the 
superordinate category of Outward Bound participant irrespective of objective social 
group, wherein ingroup members are outcome interdependent. The point is that each 
Outward Bound participant, regardless of group membership, perceived that they have a 
similarity of fate, and that is the basis of perceived group membership. The social 
dilemma paradigm rests on the premise that the individuals involved have objective 
common fate and are outcome interdependent. Thinking back to the prisoner's dilemma 
game, the matrix is said to define the objective outcome interdependence or common 
fate of players (see Deutsch, 1980). This data shows that objective outcome 
interdependence, or common fate, of individuals is not sufficient for a full understanding 
of cooperative behavior. 
In terms of our understanding of psychological processes underlying cooperative 
behavior, the importance of defining objective outcome interdependence of individuals, 
in terms of their interdependent outcomes, needs to be reassessed. The present data 
suggests that perceptions of interdependence led from perceptions of identification, 
which in line with self-categorization theory is based on perceptions of contextually 
based similarities and identity formation. The building evidence implies that social 
cooperation may be a product of a salient social identity -- in other words, contextually 
relevant self-categorizations. Given this the social dilemma paradigm restricts us from a 
full conceptual analysis of identification processes and properties. It also restricts us to a 
very narrow and utilitarian understanding of social cooperation and the self. 
-Chapter 10-
Social cooperation: Inclusive identities and perceived 
interdependence within a social dilemma 
Experiment 4 
10.1 Introduction 
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While the previous studies have developed some strong correlational measures of 
the relationship between social cooperation, social identification and interdependence, 
this study aims to examine the relationship between these variables experimentally in a 
naturalistic setting that involves an environmental dilemma. A dilemma situation is 
specifically used in this study to address the possibility that the prior studies could be 
interpreted as investigating helping behavior rather than cooperative behavior. To 
quickly recap the previous studies: Study 2 showed that social cooperation arose as a 
function of salient group membership within a situation of objective interdependence; 
Study 3 built on these results showing that objective interdependence of individuals was 
not a necessary precondition of social cooperation. This study also showed that 
perceptions of interdependence varied as a function of perceived group membership. 
This study aims to turn the social dilemma paradigm inside out. Instead of taking an 
objectively defined situation of interdependence and examining how social identity 
affects cooperative behavior, as mandated by the social dilemma paradigm, this study 
aims to show how a salient social identity affects the interdependence structure that is 
perceived. 
In particular the study attempts to demonstrate that social cooperation is a 
product of identity salience, which is in part determined by the frame of reference. In 
other words identity salience is a product of social comparison. This study builds on 
the previous study through now systematically varying the comparative frame of 
reference. Further, in that this study utilizes mutually inclusive frames of reference, 
some interesting comparisons can be made that make important points regarding the 
primacy of objective interdependence. For not only will we examine how a salient 
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social identity affects the interdependence structure that is perceived, given that the 
same objectively defined area can be framed in two different ways in this study, we can 
examine the effects of comparative frame of reference on level of social cooperation. 
In the study to be presented the social identities of 135 Papua New Guineans 
will be manipulated in the context of an environmental social dilemma. In terms of 
self-categorization theory, any one of the participants in this study can define 
themselves as a unique individual, differentiating themselves from others on many 
relevant dimensions. Yet, these same individuals can also define themselves based on 
relevant collective similarities, that is in terms of the social identities they share. As 
well as being a unique individual, each participant can also be defined in term of three 
increasingly inclusive identities: provincial, regional and national (see appendix 10.1). 
That is, each participant shares with other individuals any one of the 19 provincial 
identities. At the next level of abstraction, each participant also shares a regional 
identity, which is geographically inclusive of the provincial area but not necessarily 
definitive of this area, and still more inclusive they share their national identity as 
Papua New Guineans. And indeed with over 700 different language groups, Papua 
New Guineans carry with them many more potentially salient identities. And by no 
means are these identities seen as stable or rigid, they evolve and emerge in terms of 
self-categorizations that respond to the relevant comparative social structure that is 
perceived. 
Experimentally, we are interested in social identification and this study will 
examine three levels of identification, at increasingly inclusive levels of abstraction: 
provincial, regional and national. In Papua New Guinea, each region contains 4 to 5 
provinces, and the nation is made up of 4 regions. Within each of these three levels of 
abstraction, both intragroup and intergroup cooperation will be measured. In line with 
self-categorization theory measures of perceived similarity, shared needs and values, 
and interdependence will also be measured. 
Intragroup cooperation, or cooperation within a group, is defined as cooperation 
with other ingroup members. Intergroup cooperation, or cooperation between groups, 
is defined as cooperation with outgroup members. In other words, we will examine 
cooperation within provinces compared to cooperation between provinces, cooperation 
within regions compared to cooperation between regions, and cooperation within the 
nation compared with cooperation between nations. These six comparisons make up 
the six conditions of this study. Cooperation will be examined in three regards: 
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participants' level of cooperation; participants' expectation of ingroup members level of 
cooperation; and participants' expectation of outgroup members level of cooperation. 
This design enables some interesting comparisons to be made, given that 
provinces make up the regions and the regions make up the nation. The same 
geographical areas can be objectively defined in two different ways. For example, the 
area that is not shaded in Figure 10.1 can be defined in two ways: as the region Momase 
or the four provinces Morobe, Madang, East Sepik and West Sepik (Sandaun). Either 
way they define the same objective area. Thus for a given resource dilemma, it can be 
defined as a problem affecting these four provinces, or the region as a whole. Thus, 
this enables the comparison of provincial intergroup cooperation with regional 
intragroup cooperation and these make up the same objectively defined geographic 
area. Likewise, we will compare regional intergroup cooperation with national 
intragroup cooperation. 
Figure 10.1; Map used to induce the provincial identities of Morobe, Madang, East 
Sepik and West Sepik (Sandaun) within the region of Momase. 
In terms of this design, the following experimental predictions are made; a main 
effect for frame of reference (intragroup or intergroup) at all three levels of abstraction, 
with intragroup cooperation being greater than intergroup cooperation in ea~:h case. 
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The same pattern of results will be expected when the participants are predicting what 
they expect other ingroup members to do, given that, in line with self-categorization 
theory, they would be expected to be perceived as interchangeable perceptions of self. 
For example, when the Momase regional identity is salient participants will expect the 
people of Momase to be very willing to cooperate when it is an ingroup problem and 
less willing to cooperate when it is an outgroup problem. Finally, participants are also 
asked what they expect outgroup members to do. It is predicted that, if it is a perceived 
outgroup problem then they would expect high levels of cooperation within the 
outgroup. Likewise, if it is not a perceived outgroup problem then lower levels of 
cooperation will be expected within the outgroup. In other words, the pattern of results 
is inverted from what we would expect ingroup members to do for the same 
comparative frame of reference. 
In terms of the two planned comparisons, intergroup cooperation, when 
provincial identities are salient, will be compared to intragroup cooperation when 
regional identities are salient; and intergroup cooperation, when regional identities are 
salient, will be compared to intragroup cooperation, when the national identity is 
salient. Thus, for the same objectively defined geographical area, intragroup 
cooperation is predicted to be greater than intergroup cooperation. This same pattern of 
results is predicted for measures of similarity, needs and values and interdependence of 
individuals. 
10.2 Method 
Subjects and Design: Papua New Guinea students (n = 135; 75 males, 60 
females ) studying in Australia through the Australian International Development and 
Assistance Bureau (now AusAid) took part in this experiment, and were randomly 
assigned to experimental groups. The students were representative of 18 of the 19 
provinces and each region throughout PN G and ranged in age from 16 to 22 years (M = 
18.2). All students had a good understanding of English. The design involved a 3 
(Salient identity: Provincial; Regional; National) x 2 (Comparison frame of reference: 
Intragroup; Intergroup) analysis. 
Salience manipulation: Different geographic maps were used to induce a 
salient social identity (national, regional and provincial). Three maps were used in all 
(see appendix 9.1 ). The map used to induce the national identity included the south 
pacific countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, as well as Papua New Guinea. The 
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map used to induce the regional identity showed the four regions that make up the 
nation of Papua New Guinea: Papua, Highlands, Momase, and the Islands. Finaliy, 
there were four different maps used to induce the provincial identity, one representing 
each of the four regions. Within each region, the provinces making up that region were 
geographically defined. For example (see Figure 10.1), for the provinces within the 
region of Momase (the non-shaded area in the map), the provinces of Morohe, Madang, 
East Sepik and West Sepik (Sandaun) are outlined. 
Other maps were of the regions Papua [Western (Fly), Gulf, Central, Milne Bay 
and Northern (Oro)], the Highlands [Enga, Western Highlands, Chimbu (Simbu), 
Eastern Highlands, and Southern Highlands], and the Islands [West New Britain, East 
New Britain, North Solomons, New Ireland, Manus]. Given this range of identities, 
for the Papua New Guineans who took part in this study three levels of identification 
could be made salient: national; regional (four possibilities); and provincial (19 
possibilities). Thus, all in all24 different identifications were possible. 
Procedure: As a cover story participants were told that: "An independent 
research group has asked us to give you the following questionnaire. They believe you 
will be interested in what they have to tell you and would like your honest responses". 
Each participant was presented with the relevant questionnaire booklet for their 
condition, which included the relevant map that reflected their identity in that case. 
Participants first circled the relevant geographic area they were from, each area was 
framed in terms of the other areas defined on their map. Thus, taking the example 
above in Figure 10.1, the frame of reference would list the four provinces: Morobe, 
Madang, East Sepik and West Sepik (Sandaun). The order in which the provinces were 
presented varied systematically from condition to condition. This was also the case at 
the regional level. Participants were then asked how proud they were to be from this 
area. Participants responded by circling a number from (1) not at all proud to (8) 
extremely proud. Participants were then presented with a map of the relevant area and 
asked to colour in each of the areas presented with a different colour and name each 
area. 
Social dilemma stimulus: Participants were presented with one of the three 
dilemma vignettes, reflecting the three levels of abstraction (national, regional and 
provincial). The essence of the dilemma is in line with a temporal conflict of interests: 
short term benefits, long term loss (see van Lange, Leibrand, Messick and Wilke, 
1992). 
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Below is an example of the dilemma (see appendix 10.2 for examples of the specific 
vignettes for each of the three identity conditions). At the top of each page the frame of 
reference, as given on the front page, was again provided. 
An international/national/regional non-profit environmental agency has asked you to please 
consider the following: 
Rainforests are an important natural resource, as they are a vital part of a stable ecosystem. 
As well as other benefits, a rainforest aids in the purification of the air and water supplies. develops rich 
and fertile soil, and provides a habitat for a variety of animal and plant life. Rainforests have recently 
been listed as a natural world heritage. Environmental groups are celebrating; however, all the news is 
not good. This year an insect, that is rapidly destroying the rainforest, has been found in nation/region/ 
province. 
While this insect has only been spotted, at this time, in nation/region/province, the 
environmental impact could reach each of the other nations/regions/provinces listed at the top of the 
page. The only way of eradicating the insect, without further harming the rainforest, is to actually 
locate and destroy these populations of insects. This requires days, on end, in the dense rainforest. This 
environmental group is asking for your assistance; they require volunteers to join expedition teams that 
will scout the rainforest to locate these insects. These initial expeditions will take place in 
nation/region/province. 
In June and July of this year you will be going back home for your mid-year holidays, to spend 
time with family and friends. You will want to make the most of your time, as you won't have long 
before you have to return to school in Australia. While this is your holiday time, this international/ 
national/regional environmental group is asking you to spend some of this time helping to protect your 
future, by helping to protect the rainforest and stop further environmental impact. 
For each of the six conditions specific provinces, regions or nations were chosen 
to systematically act as the frame of reference. For example, if a participant was from 
Papua and in the regional intragroup condition, the frame of reference at the top of the 
page would read: Islands Papua Momase Highlands. And at each bolded point in the 
vignette the region "Papua" would appear. If this was an intergroup condition, the 
region Momase would appear at each of these points. In the intergroup condition, for 
each provincial/regional identity a constant comparative province or region was 
presented, these were consistent across frames of reference. For example, the region 
Momase was always the comparative outgroup for the region Papua, and this region 
was randomly chosen from the possible choices (see appendix 10.3 for a full listing). 
Participants then filled out three primary dependent measures. The three 
questions read: (1) How willing are you to contribute your time to the 
National/Regional/Provincial insect eradication project?; (2) How willing do you think 
people from National/Regional/ Provincial (lngroup - e.g. Paupuan) are to contribute 
their time to the National/Regional/ Provincial (Ingroup or Outgroup) insect eradication 
project?; (3) How willing do you think people from National/Regional! Provincial 
(Outgroup - e.g. Momase) are to contribute their time to the National/Regional/ 
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Provincial (Ingroup or Outgroup) insect eradication project'! Participants then filled in 
a number of follow-up questions that related to perceptions of similarity, shared needs 
and values and interdependence. Questions were also asked regarding who had 
responsibility for the rainforest. In each of the conditions, the questions were 
specifically tailored to match the salient identity, specific comparative outgroup and 
frame of reference. 
10.3 Results 
As predicted, levels of cooperation varied with social identity and comparative 
frame of reference: ingroup or outgroup. In each of the three identity conditions, 
intragroup cooperation was greater than intergroup cooperation. Initially, the 3 primary 
measures were entered into a 2 x 3 AN OVA and for each question only a main effect 
for comparative frame of reference (intragroup or intergroup) was found. Table 10.1 
reports the means and standard deviations for each condition across these three 
measures. Specifically, it was found the participants cooperated more in the intragroup 
condition than the intergroup condition (f (1, 129) = 4.20, p < .05; Intragroup: M = 
6.16, SD = 1.78; Intergroup: M = 5.48, SD = 2.02). When participants were asked 
what other members of their ingroup would do in the same situation, the same effect 
was found: anticipated intragroup cooperation was greater than intergroup cooperation 
(E (1, 129) = 11.00, p < .001; Intragroup: M = 6.42, SD = 1.57; Intergroup: M = 5.50, 
SD = 1.85). 
The results also supported the predictions for participants' anticipated outgroup 
members' response. When the resource dilemma was framed as an ingroup problem, 
participants did not expect as much cooperation from outgroup members; however, if it 
was an outgroup members' resource problem (that could affect them in the long term) 
they expected high levels of intragroup cooperation from the outgroup members (E (1, 
129) = 57.91, p < .001; Intragroup: M = 4.77, SD = 2.24; Intergroup: M = 7.25, SD = 
1.38). 
Planned comparisons were then carried out between provincial intergroup 
condition and the regional intragroup condition, as these were objectively 
interchangeable in terms of being at environmental risk. The same was done with 
regional intergroup condition and the national intragroup condition. All comparisons 
were significant, indicating that for the same objectively defined area the comparative 
frame of reference had a significant effect on social identification and thus level of 
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cooperation. In other words, interdependence may be best defined subjectively, rather 
than objectively. 
Table 10.1 
Mean ratings and planned comparisons of willingness to cooperate (8 point scale) 
across three levels of identification and two comparative frames of reference for the 
participant and their expectations of ingroup and outgroup members 
Level of Identification Planned Comparisons 
Provincial Regional National Comp 1 Comp2 
Frame of mean (s.d.) mean (s.d.) mean (s.d.) t(1, 40) t(1, 46) 
reference 
Individual 
Ingroup 5.86 (1.74) 6.00 (2.02) 6.50 (1.61) 1.72* 2.09** 
Outgroup 5.00 (1.72) 5.33 (2.25) 6.00 (1.92) 
lngroup Exp. 
Ingroup 6.76 (1.51) 6.27 (1.54) 6.30 (1.64) 1.68* 3.21 ** 
Outgroup 5.40 (2.04) 5.05 (1.89) 5.92 (1.64) 
Outgroup Exj2. 
lngroup 4.86 (2.01) 4.45 (2.39) 4.93 (2.33) 23.34*** 18.19*** 
Outgroup 7.55 (1.00) 7.33 (1.14) 6.96 (1.76) 
Note: Campi: Inter-provincial(Jntra-regional comparison; Comp2: Inter-provincial(Jntra-regional 
comparison;*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
Follow-up questions were entered into 2 x 3 ANOVAs and revealed interesting 
differences in line with the predictions. 
Perceptions of shared resources: To begin, the responsibility for the rainforest, 
as a common resource, was perceived differently across conditions. In line with the 
salient identity used across conditions, it was established that the rainforest was an 
important natural resource to the salient geographical area. No significant differences 
were found (M = 7 .42, SD = 1.02). However, when it was asked if the rainforest was a 
common resource that was shared by the superordinate geographical areas significant 
differences were found. For example, when a regional identity was made salient (e.g. 
Papua), the question was asked if the four regions (e.g. the Islands, Papua, Momase and 
Highlands) that make up the country share the responsibility for this resource. A main 
effect for level of identification was found (E (1, 129) = 3.29, p < .05). Across areas, 
participants judged provinces (M = 7.02, S.D. = 1.45) and regions to share common 
resources (M = 7.28, S.D. = 1.00) but nations to a lesser extent (M = 6.48, S.D. = 
1.45). 
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Perceptions of similarity: In line with the perceptual constructs important to this 
thesis, questions regarding perceived similarity were asked. The questions were asked 
at three levels: perceptions of similarity of the ingroup, outgroup and then in terms of 
the superordinate frame of reference. For example, in the salient regional condition of 
Papua, it was asked: In general, how similar are the people of Papua (ingroup ), Momase 
(outgroup) and the Islands, Papua, Momase and Highlands (superordinate frame of 
reference of the regions that make up the nation). No difference was found for the 
ingroup and the outgroup, across conditions, for perceptions of similarity: (ingroup: M 
= 6.21, S.D.= 1.50; outgroup: M = 5.19, S.D.= 1.76). In other words despite level of 
identification, participants perceived ingroup members to be similar and outgroup 
members to be similar. The result was different for the superordinate frame of 
reference, where a significant difference was found (E (1, 129) = 7.03, p < .001). 
Perceptions of similarity decreased with increasing levels of abstraction, as well as 
being lower overall (provincial: M = 4.78, S.D.= 2.10; regional: M = 3.44, S.D.= 1.66; 
national: M = 3.40, S.D. = 1.86). 
The similarity measures were also carried out in line with the planned 
comparisons done with the primary measures. Some interesting results are revealed. 
While the people of provinces that make up the regions are not perceived to be very 
similar when a provincial identity is salient (M = 4.78, S.D.= 2.10), the people of the 
same region are perceived to be similar when the regional identity is salient (M = 7.02, 
S.D. = 1. 78). This same pattern of results is borne out at the next level of abstraction. 
The people of the regions that make up the nation are not perceived to be very similar 
when a regional identity is salient (M = 3.44, S.D. = 1.66); however, they are perceived 
to be similar when the national identity is salient (M = 6.45, S.D. = 2.03). Each of 
these difference was found to be significantly different (1 (1, 40) = 19.59, p < .001; 1 (1, 
46) = 23.98, p < .001). 
Perceptions of common needs and values: The same pattern of results was found 
when participants were asked if the needs and values of the people of the salient 
ingroup, outgroup and superordinate frame of reference were the same. Participants 
reported that across salient ingroups the needs and values were the same (M = 6.45, 
S.D. = 1.27) as well as within their respective comparative outgroups (M = 6.05, S.D. = 
1.57). No significant differences were found. Again, the pattern was slightly different 
for the superordinate frame of reference. The degree of agreement decreased with level 
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of abstraction (provincial: M = 4.65, S.D.= 2.20; regional: M = 4.81, S.D.= 2.82; 
national: M = 3.90, S.D. = 1.87). Again these differences were found to be significant 
(E = (1, 129) = 4.68, 12 < .01). Drawing on the same planned comparisons that were 
used for the primary dependent measures, the same pattern of results is revealed. 
While the people of provinces that make up the regions are not perceived to 
share the same needs and values when a provincial identity is salient (M = 5.30, S.D. = 
1.32), the people of the same region are perceived to share the same needs and values 
when the regional identity is salient (M = 6.82, S.D.= 1.14). The same pattern of 
results is found at the next level of abstraction. The people of the regions that make up 
the nation are not perceived to share the same needs and values when a regional identity 
is salient (M = 4.79, S.D.= 1.67), however they are when the national identity is salient 
(M = 6.10, S.D.= 1.86). Both of these differences were found to be significantly 
different (1 (1, 40) = 3.12,12 < .01; 1 (1, 46) = 2.98, 11 < .01). 
Percentions of interdependence: Finally, the question was asked, at each of these 
same three levels, if the people of their respective ingroup, outgroup, as well as the 
people that made up the superordinate frame of reference, depended on each other to 
satisfy their individual needs. Interestingly perceptions of interdependence of 
individuals vary in terms of the same pattern of results as similarity and needs and 
values, as well as reflecting the cooperation measures. When the ingroup is salient 
perceptions of interdependence of individuals do not vary across conditions (M = 6.33, 
S.D.= 1.88); that is perceptions of interdependence varied with salient social identity. 
The same is found for the outgroup (M = 6.21, S.D. = 1.45). Again this changes for 
perceptions of interdependence with individuals in term of the superordinate frame of 
reference. Perceptions of interdependence decrease with each increasing level of 
abstraction (provincial: M = 5.25, S.D. = 1.91; regional: M = 5.30, S.D. = 2.04; 
national: M = 4.93, S.D. = 2.36). However in this case these differenues were not 
found to be significantly different. 
Again the planned comparisons are revealing. People of the provinces that 
make up the regions are perceived to be less dependent upon each other to satisfy their 
individual needs when a provincial identity is salient (M = 5.15, S.D.= 1.34), than 
when the regional identity is salient (M = 6.01, S.D. = 1.21). The same results were 
found at the next level of abstraction. The people of the regions that make up the 
nation are perceived to be less dependent upon each other to satisfy their individual 
needs when a regional identity is salient (M = 5.30, S.D.= 2.14) than when the national 
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identity is salient (M = 6.50, S.D. = 1.42). Both of these differences were found to be 
significantly different(! (1, 40) = 1.96, J2 < .01;! (1, 46) = 2.05, 12 < .01). 
10.4 Discussion 
The results are clearly in line with a self-categorization theory analysis: 
cooperation varied as a function of the level of abstraction of the self, that is in terms 
of a social identification that was salient. Specifically, it was found that intragroup 
cooperation was greater than intergroup cooperation at each level of abstraction: 
provincial, regional and national. Further, social cooperation varied systematically with 
level of identification. In particular the planned comparisons reveal some interesting 
results that are important to the social dilemma literature. Given that the same 
geographical area was defined in terms of one region or a number of provinces, or one 
nation or a number of regions, and the environmental dilemma related to this 
geographical region as a whole, the different results are illustrative of the point that 
level of identification impacts significantly on cooperative behavior in a social 
dilemma. Intergroup cooperation at the provincial level was significantly less than 
intragroup cooperation at the regional level. In the same manner, intergroup 
cooperation at the regional level was significantly less than intragroup cooperation at 
the national level. In terms of both comparisons, the dilemma was defined to affect the 
same geographical area. In other words objective interdependence was not the criterion 
for group based behavior; in fact, perceptions of interdependence arose in line with 
identity salience. 
When participants were asked what they would expect the other ingroup 
members to do, the same pattern of results was found. In other words, when a social 
identity is salient participants expect other ingroup members to do as they would do. 
This highlights the interchangeability of individuals when a collective identity is salient. 
Further, when participants were asked what they would expect outgroup members to do, 
the level of cooperation for both ingroup and outgroup was accentuated. When the 
dilemma was framed as an outgroup problem, in an intergroup context, expectations of 
cooperative behavior went down, and in an intragroup context expectations of 
cooperative behavior went up. In other words, its not our problem, it's their problem 
and they should do something about it. 
The follow up measures of perceived similarity, shared needs and values and 
interdependence are also interesting, with the same pattern of results being found. 
223 
Given the consistency of these results across these three measures they will he discussed 
together for reasons of parsimony. The findings clearly show that perceptions of 
similarity, needs and values, as well as interdependence vary with salient identity. In 
other words, for any given salient identity, these three measures varied with this 
identification. For example, if a participant's identity as a Papuan was salient other 
ingroup members were perceived to be similar, to share the same needs and values and 
to be dependent on each other. In contrast, as the planned comparisons reveal, 
participants did not feel they were similar, shared the same needs and values, and were 
dependent on each other for the same geographically defined area that defined the 
dilemma situation. 
The primary and follow-up results reveal remarkable consistency. Perceptions 
of similarity, shared needs and values and interdependence varied with category 
salience, and commitment to cooperate, regardless of level abstraction of the category. 
In line with these findings, each of these is argued to be a product of categorization 
processes of individuals. Thus, for any given salient category, perceptions of similarity, 
shared needs and values and interdependence will follow. The findings, in regards to 
interdependence, are particularly important given that interdependence theorists first 
emphasise the interdependence structure that objectively defines the social dilemma and 
then look at factors to increase the level of cooperation. Perhaps researchers should 
instead be examining the identities that arise for individuals within a social dilemma, as 
this better reflects individual perceptions of the relevant interdependence structure. 
Each individual can, of course define themselves to be interdependent with many 
different social groupings, the taxonomy of possibilities is endless. However, is it not 
more pertinent to take into account how the perceiver understands the interdependence 
structure of the social dilemma situation, rather than how the social scientist defines it -
- objectively. 
This study makes a further important point. As researchers we greatly restrict 
ourselves by defining social dilemmas in terms of conflicts of interest between the 
individual and the collective; while we know, through our own social experiences, that 
conflicts of interests encompass a m4ch wider range of situations. For example, we can 
experience a conflict of interest between our work and family life, and people of 
political office can experience (but not necessarily acknowledge) conflicts of interest 
between their ministerial portfolio and their economic interests. By adopting an 
identity based approach, a wider range of conflicts of interest can potentially be studied. 
In line with the theoretical proposition argued here, specifically that 
categorizations are comparative judgements, perceptions of the outgroup and their 
expected behavior vary systematically with ingroup judgements. Thus, just as the 
ingroup was perceived to be similar, to share the same needs and values, and be 
interdependent at each level of abstraction, so too do these perceptions reflect 
categorization of the outgroup. These, in turn, reflect the levels of expected 
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cooperation for the outgroup. In other words, categorization, and thus social 
cooperation, is a comparative process. As such, the frame of reference in which a social 
dilemma is framed contributes to the pattern of behavior that emerges. 
Taken together, cooperation varied in line with a salient social identity, 
regardless of face to face interaction or group size. This is contrary to Rabhie's 
conceptualization of the group, wherein "cooperative face-to-face interaction" is a 
necessary criterion of groups (see Rabbie, 1991, p. 239). Further, in discussing social 
dilemma tasks Rabbie (1991) states that: "The absence of direct communication and 
interaction between the players and the highly restricted choices they can make prevent 
the players in these laboratory tasks from becoming a social group as we have defined 
it" (p. 241 ). This study, and the previous one, have shown that psychological group 
membership can emerge despite the lack of communication and social interaction, and 
that psychological group membership is indeed predictive of cooperative behavior. 
Further, it is difficult to know how congruent these findings are with Brewer's 
(1991) optimal distinctiveness model. Recall that Brewer argues that her" model of 
optimal distinctiveness [proposes that] social identity is viewed as a reconciliation of 
opposing needs for assimilation and differentiation from others. According to this 
model, individuals avoid self-construals that are either too personalized or too inclusive 
and instead define themselves in terms of distinctive category memberships" (p. 475). 
When applying this theory to the social dilemma literature, Brewer concludes that 
individuals behave selfishly when there is no collective identity or the identity is too 
large and amorphous: "However, when an intermediate group identity is available, 
individuals are much more likely to sacrifice self-interest in behalf of collective 
welfare" (p. 479). However, despite the increasing group size across the three identity 
conditions in this study, this did not systematically affect the level of cooperation. That 
is, unlike the findings of Brewer and colleagues, group size had no affect. The term 
intermediate is relative, and it is not clear how this is defined for Brewer and 
colleagues, suffice to say here that the effect of group size on social cooperation needs 
to be re-examined. 
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However, a few points can be made. Brewer's analysis constrains the social 
identity perspective within an interdependence framework; in other words, her studies, 
as presented in Chapter 6, take interdependence as the necessary precondition, and 
manipulate identity within the given interdependence structure. Instead of "human 
social life [being] characterized as a perceptual juggling act -- maintaining the integrity 
of individual identity, interpersonal relationships, and collective interests 
simultaneously" as Brewer (1996, pp. 57-58) argues, the evidence here suggests that 
human social life varies systematically in terms of identification processes that reflect 
social structure (see Turner and Oakes, 1997). In this light, it is interesting to note that 
while participants were willing to state that the rainforest is a common resource that is 
shared across provinces and regions, they were less willing to state that nations share 
this common resource. This perception, it could be argued, directly ret1ects the way 
such a natural resource management is politically structured-- nations don't share 
resources. 
In conclusion, social dilemmas are traditionally defined in terms of discrete 
individuals interacting within a social system, wherein conflicts of interest between the 
individual and society are inherent. The paradigm clearly pits the individual against 
society. Yet, in terms of everyday life, we do cooperate to a remarkable degree and act 
in terms of a large number of social identities. These identities, so too, can come into 
cont1ict and define a cont1ict of interest. And while cont1icts of interest may always be 
an inevitable aspect of life, we often do not act in terms of our individual self-interest, 
often the interests of the collective and the individual, as this study has suggested, are 
one and the same -- there is no dilemma, as there is no cont1ict of interests. Self-
interest is collective interest. This study has demonstrated that social dilemmas may be 
best defiped from the point of view of the perceiver, for it is the perceiver who 
determines the interdependence structure that is relevant to them. 
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- Chapter 11 -
Social cooperation and category salience: A test of the fit hypothesis 
Experiment 5 
11.1 Introduction 
While the previous chapters developed the self-categorization analysis of social 
cooperation in relation to constructs important to the interdependence theorists account, 
this chapter aims solely to develop the self-categorization analysis. In particular, this 
study aims to explore the effects of a further determinant of category salience on social 
cooperation, beyond the role of comparative context developed in the last study. 
Specifically, this study will examine the effects of both normative and comparative fit on 
cooperative behavior. That is, given (hat social cooperation is the product of a salient 
social identity, does the degree of identity salience affect the degree of cooperative 
behavior. To this end this study will build on a previous study on the role of lit in the 
salience of social categorizations (Oakes, Turner and Haslam, 1991 ), which aimed to 
examine the conditions under which person's group memberships become salient. A~ 
Oakes and colleagues state: 
In order to predict when people will define themselves and others as group members, engage in 
stereotyping, intergroup behaviour and otherwise act as group members, we need to understand 
how and when people's social categorizations of themselves and others become salient. (p.l25) 
Self-categorization theory argues that category salience is a product of normative and 
comparative fit, as well as accessibility (see Turner eta!., 1994). The study by Oakes ct 
al. (1991) examines the role of fit. Building on the work of Bruner (1957) who 
suggested that salience was a function of both accessibility and fit to social reality, they 
argue that social categorizations become salient to the degree that the representation is 
veridical, that is, the representation captures the essence of social reality. The greater the 
lit, or veridical nature of the representation, the greater the salience of the category of 
membership. While accessibility is equated with perceiver readiness of individuals, it is 
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fit that accounts for the importance of acknowledging the role that social reality plays in 
the social cognition of categorizaion processes. In fact it is the principle of fit that truly 
captures the expression that "all cognition is social cognition, from the perspective of the 
mechanism of cognition" (Turner eta!., 1994, p. 462). In terms of Lewin's expression 
B=f(PE), the concept of fit captures the essence of the person and the environment being 
understood together, in unison, and not as abstract variables. 
A~ described in Chapter 5, comparative fit accounts for the comparative social 
relations between social groups which provides the basis for social comparison, while 
normative fit accounts for the normative content which differentiates one social category 
from the other. These two aspects of fit were manipulated orthogonally in the study 
presented by Oakes eta!. (1991). Undergraduate faculty membership, specifically arts or 
science, was used as the basis for categorization. Undergraduate science students 
watched a video presentation of six individuals (three arts and three science students) 
discussing their attitudes towards university life. Based on previous research, it was 
established that the student community expected arts and science students to disagree on 
this matter. Specifically, the normative expectancy was that while art students valued 
liberal education, which included extracurricular activities and an active social life, 
science students valued the hard work and discipline that would bring them good grades 
and an impressive career. Each of the six presenters were visually labelled as either a 
science student or an arts student. Normative and comparative fit were manipulated in 
terms of the attitude expressed by a target arts student (normatively consistent or 
inconsistent arts attitude) and overall agreement of the six students (consensus, conflict 
or deviance). In the consensus condition all six individuals agreed on the issue, in the 
conflict condition the arts and the science students collectively disagreed, and in the 
deviance condition the target individual disagreed with the rest. Taken together, this 
makes up a 2 x 3 factorial design (consistent/inconsistent x consensus/conflict/deviance; 
see Table 11.1 for configuration). 
Two primary hypothesis were tested, of which the first is relevant here. It was 
expected that the arts/science categorization would be most salient in the consistent/ 
conflict condition, given that this stimulus was providing the greatest "fit" with social 
reality. In other words the stimulus was veridical: the three arts students were in 
agreement on their normatively consistent view; in contrast, the three science students 
were in agreement on theirs. 
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This hypothesis received consistent support. Specifically, on measures of 
perceived similarity, the target was most similar to arts students and least similar to 
science students in this condition. Further this condition produced that highest levels of 
comparative likeability, agreement and favourableness. On these same measures, it was 
found that the arts/science categorization was least salient in the inconsistent/deviance 
condition, where the one arts student was expressing a science attitude and all others 
were expressing typical arts attitudes. In other words this stimulus did not capture the 
veridical nature of what the participants, as science students, knew to be "true" about the 
differences between them, science students, and arts students. As these researchers 
conclude: 
... it was where input fitted the comparative relations and the stereotypical content specified by 
the arts/science categorization that is properly explained and gave meaning to what subjects 
observed and so became salient. (Oakes eta!., 1994, p. 120) 
The study to be presented will use this same manipulation of salience, to predict 
variance in the level of cooperation with category salience. This is an important 
extension of the primary hypothesis of this thesis. Specifically it aims to show that not 
only is social cooperation the product of a salient social identity, social cooperation is the 
product of the degree of category salience. 
This study will endeavour to induce systematic variation in the salience of the 
category "Papua New Guinean," using a group of students of this nationality studying in 
Australia. Given this comparative circumstance, it is assumed that this category will be 
relatively accessible across participants, as it is generally found that our sense of 
nationality is heightened when we are abroad. Building on Oakes eta!., (1991) a video is 
used to induce category salience. The video introduces six individuals who were 
advocating a particular intervention approach to address the monopolization and 
destruction of the rainforest by multinational companies in developing countries such as 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. Three of the speakers are from Indonesia and three 
are from Papua New Guinea. One speaker, from Papua New Guinea, was the target 
individual. Earlier research (gathered at the conclusion of Experiment 4) indicated that 
while it was normative in Indonesia that the government and the military intervene in 
saving the rainforest, in Papua New Guinea the preference was for traditional and "grass-
roots" intervention by the relevant local constituents and stakeholders. Given this 
framework, the problem was presented as a national environmental issue that needed to 
be addressed. Intervention strategies were presented in terms of one of these two 
normatively consistent ways. Comparatively, Indonesians and Papua New Guineans 
make up the comparative frame of reference. Normatively, Indonesians would be 
expected to endorse government or military intervention, while Papua New Guineans 
would be expected to endorse traditional or "grass-roots" intervention. 
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In that participants are asked to assist in saving the rainforest, a common good, a 
typical social dilemma is induced. Like the study reported in the previous study, 
the dilemmas induces a conflict between long term and short term benefits to the 
individual. In other words, individuals could do nothing in the hope that the problem 
would be sorted out by others and thus not affect them, leaving themselves to enjoy their 
time in other ways. However, if no one did anything, this could lead to the depletion of 
the resource in the long term and potentially all involved would lose both economic and 
social capital. 
Normative fit, that is consistency of stimulus content with category, was varied 
across the target individual through the advocacy of an intervention program that was 
normatively consistent with either the Indonesian or Papua New Guinean approach. 
Comparative agreement, across the six individuals, on the intervention program 
(Indonesian or Papua New Guinean) constituted comparative fit and varied in three 
ways: consensus, where all individuals agreed; conflict, where the three individuals from 
each country expressed different opinions; and deviance, the target individual expressed 
an opinion that was different to the other five opinions. Thus, in line with the fit 
hypothesis it is predicted that salience will vary across the normative consistency (2 
levels) and comparative agreement (3 levels) of these messages. 
The comparative Indonesian/Papua New Guinean categorization was expected to 
be most salient where the Papua New Guinean target individual was expressing an 
opinion that was normatively consistent with the Papua New Guinean approach, as well 
as being in agreement with the two other Papua New Guineans but not in agreement with 
the three Indonesians, who were espousing their normative point of view-- the 
consistent/conllict condition. As in Oakes et al., (1991), category salience was expected 
to be least in the condition where the Papua New Guinean target individual was 
expressing an opinion that was normatively consistent with the Indonesian approach (and 
normatively inconsistent with the Papua New Guinean approach) and the target was the 
only person espousing this point of view (all others expressed a typically Papua New 
Guinean opinion; see Table 11.1) -- the inconsistent/deviance condition. 
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In line with self-categorization theory social cooperation was predicted to vary as 
a function of category salience; that is, the greater the degree of category salience, the 
greater the degree of social cooperation, and vice versa. As such cooperation with the 
target individual is predicted to be highest in the consistent/conflict condition, and least 
in the inconsistent/deviant condition. Other measures were predicted to vary in terms of 
this same pattern: similarity, favourableness of impression, quality of argument, and 
agreement. In summary, it is argued here that given cooperation is produced by 
identification through category salience, the degree of cooperation should also vary with 
the degree of salience. In other words, if the "fit" is good, individuals should feel more 
confident about who they are and what they should do. Cooperation, as such, is acting 
in terms of a collective identification with others. Self-interest is collective interest. It is 
a rational self defintion in that instance. 
11.2 Method 
Subjects and design: Papua New Guinean students (n = 118; 80 males; 37 
females; age: M = 18.13, range= 16- 20) studying in Australia through the Australian 
International Development Assistance Bureau (now AusAid) participating in this study. 
At the time that the study was run, the students had gathered from schools across 
Queensland to attend a camp over the Easter break. A 2 (consistency) x 3 (agreement) 
factorial design was utilized in which a target individual provided normatively (consistent 
or inconsistent) information within a context of comparative consensual, conllictual or 
deviant agreement. 
Stimulus materials: The manipulation was induced through the creation of six 
audiovisual stimuli tapes which were filmed and edited at the Australian N a tiona! 
University. Three students from Papua New Guinea (2 Males, 1 Female) and three 
students from Indonesia (2 Males, 1 Female) volunteered to act as the stimulus 
individuals, all were blind to the nature of the study until filming and editing were 
completed. Each individual was provided with two scripts; one script was nnrmatively 
consistent with a Papua New Guinean viewpoint on resolving an environmental problem, 
the other was normatively consistent with an Indonesian viewpoint. Through 
background research and interviews it was established that a stereotypical distinction 
between these two social groups is that the former advocates traditional and "grass 
roots" social intervention while the latter advocates government or military intervention. 
Each individual introduced themself, the country that they were from, and read one of 
their two scripts (the scripts are included in appendix 11.1 ). 
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The scripts were rehearsed until the point of view being advocated by the 
stimulus individual sounded natural. To ensure that each condition was consistent across 
stimulus individual each person was video taped reading their two scripts and then the 
footage was edited to form the six conditions described in Table 11.1 The final 6 videos 
all began and closed with a scene of all six individuals, each wearing casual clothing, 
sitting in a semi-circle talking amongst themselves. Each video, on average, lasted just 
over 10 minutes, and appeared genuine and natural. 
Table 11.1 
Stimulus individuals normative attitude to environmental intervention 
Stimulus individuals 
Indonesian P.N.G. 
Conditions 1(M) 2(F) 3(M) 4(M) 5(M) 6(F) 
Consistent/consensus p p p p p p 
Consistent/conflict I I I p p p 
Consistent/deviance I I I p I I 
Inconsistent/consensus I I I I I 
Inconsistent/conflict p p p I I I 
Inconsistent/deviance p p p I p p 
Note: P= Papua New Guinean stereotypical script (pro- traditional /grass roots intervention); I= 
Indonesian stereotypical script (pro-military/government intervention). 
Stimulus person 4, a Papua New Guinean, is the target individual in every condition. The consistency 
variable is defined in terms of the behaviour of this individual. M =male, F =female. 
Procedure: The experiment was introduced as follows: 
The rainforests are an important natural resource to the Island of New Guinea yet they are 
under threat by multinational companies who are now moving in. Both the Indonesians and 
the Papua New Guineans can no longer ignore the potential exploitation of their land. 
Various representatives have come forward with proposals on bow to best deal with this 
problem. They are asking for your cooperation to promote their policies. Please listen to each 
of the following speakers carefully but in order to keep this questionnaire as simple but 
detailed as possible you are asked to pay particular attention to person __ , --:---::-
and you will be asked to answer specific questions related to this person's proposal, as well as 
questions about the other speakers and more general information. 
In all cases "#4, Simon" was written, by hand, into the spaces provided. This 
procedure was used to create the impression that different people were being asked to 
pay particular attention to different target individuals. In fact, the target individual was 
always" #4, Simon." 
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Participants then circled the country that they were from (Indonesia or Papua 
N ewGuinea) and were asked how proud they were to be from that country. They 
responded by circling a number from (1) not at all proud to (8) extremely proud. The 
video was then played with all participants in one condition being run together. They 
were reminded of the following: 
Please pay careful attention to what each person is saying. Your answers are very important 
and will be used to establish new policies and you may be asked to assist with the policy 
chosen in the future. Listen to all the speakers. but in order to receive as much detailed 
information as possible you have been asked to pay particular attention to one person and will 
be asked questions specific to this person. 
Participants were then asked to fill in the number and name of that person in the space 
provided to insure that they were aware of the target individual that they were asked to 
pay particular attention to. 
After watching the video, participants were asked to fill in the questionnaire 
privately, thoughtfully and honestly. They were also reminded that the research was 
important to the future of the rainforest and their country, and to consider the questions 
carefully, as it would be their time that the policy makers would be asking for in the 
future. The aim of this paragraph was to highlight the dilemma nature of the situation. 
Dependent measures: All questions were answered by circling a number from 1 
to 8 on a bipolar scale. To give participants the further impression that each person in 
the video was a target person, "#4, Simon" was hand written into the questionnaire 
whenever the target person was referred to directly. 
Cooperation: Participants were asked how willing they were to contribute their 
time to the proposal offered by "#4, Simon". The scale ranged from (1) not at all 
willing to (8) extremely willing. 
Similarity: Two measures were asked with reference to how similar the target 
person's general beliefs, attitudes, values, etc. were to (1) Papua New Guineans/(2) 
Indonesians. The scale ranged from (1) not at all similar to (8) extremely similar. 
Impression: Three questions assessed the overall impression of the target 
individual: overall, favourability: (1) very unfavourable to (8) very favourable; quality 
of argument: (1) extremely bad to (8) extremely good; and agreement with opinion: (1) 
strongly disagree to (8) strongly agree. 
Manipulation check: Manipulations checks were carried out on both the 
normative and comparative dimensions. Two questions assessed the normative 
manipulation: were the target's opinions typical of most (a) Papua New Guineans'/(b) 
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Indonesians' attitudes to this issue: (1) not at all typical to (8) extremely typical. Three 
questions assessed the comparative manipulation of agreement: (a) degree of agreement 
between the Indonesians and Papua New Guineans: (1) disagreed completely to (8) 
agreed completely; degree of target persons agreement with (b) other Papua New 
Guineans/ (c) Indonesians. 
Dilemma: Two questions assessed the dilemma nature of the decision to 
cooperate: (a) the rainforest is an important natural resource to the future of Papua New 
Guinea and needs to be protected; (b) time at home with family and friends was 
important. Both questions were assessed on a scale from disagree strongly (I) to agree 
strongly (8). 
Commitment measure: Finally, participants were given a direct opportunity to 
assist with sustaining the rainforest in their country. They were told: "If you would like 
to help with one of the policies put forward by the 6 representatives, please fill in the 
information below." In the space provided, they were asked to name the person that 
they would like to contact them, the numbers of hours per week that they were willing to 
assist over the summer break, their name and contact details. Finally, participants were 
asked to write a short paragraph on why they would like to help and how they could 
help, and what they understood the purpose of the study to be. 
11.3 Results 
Manipulation checks: All participants believed that the speakers were genuine 
and that the purpose of the study was to develop strategies and policies to save the 
rainforest !Tom multinational companies. In fact, during the debrief, a large number of 
the students were disappointed that they were not going to be contacted by one of the 
speakers to participate with others in saving the rainforest. The experimenter pointed 
out that the students could get involved with an organization of their choice when they 
returned home. 
The five manipulation checks were also put into separate ANOV A's (see Table 
10.2). The results show that there was good evidence that the manipulation for 
normative consistency was effective (f(1, 112) = 13.23,12 < .001), overall participants 
perceived the target to express more typical Papua New Guinean attitudes in the 
consistent (M = 6.69, SD = 1.27) than in the inconsistent condition (M = 5.65, SD = 
1.73). 
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There was only moderate evidence that the manipulation for comparative 
agreement was effective. For while there was a main effect for comparative agreement 
on the policy across these conditions (E(1, 111) = 2.78, ll < .05) and target agreement 
with other Papua New Guineans (E(1, 111) = 3.56, ll < .05), this result was not found 
with respect to target's agreement with the Indonesians. In fact, a main effect for 
normative consistency was found (E(l, 111) = 6.30, ll < .10) for target's agreement with 
the Indonesians. In the consistent condition, the target individual was generaUy 
perceived to be consistent with Indonesians' position (M = 6.32, SD = 1.30), but less so 
in the inconsistent condition (M = 5.60, SD = 1. 71 ). There was no effect for 
comparative agreement across conditions for this measure, as one would expect if the 
manipulation was successful. An examination of the means across these three 
manipulation checks indicates that the pattern of results does not support the 
manipulation. For example, the consensus conditions does not yield the highest levels of 
agreement. 
Table 11.2 
Manijlulation checks across the conditions of normative consistenc)' (2) and comjlarative 
agreement (3). 
Consistent Inconsistent F ratios 
Manijlulation checks Cons Confl Dev Cons Coni1· Dev Norm Agree 2X3 
Typical PNG attitude 6.52 6.95 6.58 5.74 5.57 5.65 13.23 0.11 0.40 
Typical Indo attitude 5.47 5.90 5.16 5.37 4.90 5.70 0.44 0.00 2.28 
Policy agreement 6.42 6.90 6.63 5.94 6.29 7.15 0.61 2.78* 2.16 
Target with PNG 6.57 7.15 6.74 5.79 6.52 7.00 2.69 3.56* 1.92 
Target with Indo. 6.05 6.60 6.28 5.42 5.71 5.65 6.30** 0.74 0.09 
Note: *** p < .001; •• p < .01; * p < .05 
It seems that what was driving the effects was the comparative normative 
dimensions of Papua New Guineans and Indonesians not across agreement, hut across 
other comparative dimensions that define Papua New Guineans and Indonesians, such as 
physical appearance. This is revealed in a repeated measures analysis of the two 
normative manipulation checks: a 2 (normative consistency) x 3 (comparative 
agreement) x 2 (typical PNG/lndonesian) MANOVA with repeated measures on the final 
factor was used. This analysis examined if the target person's opinions were typical of 
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most Papua New Guineans or Indonesians. A main effect was found for the repeated 
measure factor of national typicality of the ideas expresses by the target person (F(1, 
111) = 23.41, !1 < .001). Across conditions, the participants thought that the target 
person's opinions were more typical of Papua New Guinean's attitudes (M = 6.13, SD = 
1.55) than Indonesian's attitudes (M = 5.42, SD = 1.66) regardless of the content 
agreement. Further, the follow-up question on agreement with Papua New 
Guineans/Indonesians was also entered into this same repeated measures analysis. 
Again, a main effect was also found on the repeated measure factor of the target persons 
agreement with the two national groups (f(1, 111) = 54.45, Jl < .001 ). In general, 
participants thought that the target person's attitude was in agreement with the Papua 
New Guinean's (M = 6.16, SD = 1.60) more so than the Indonesian's (M = 5.42, SD = 
1. 73), regardless of conditions. 
The measurements that assessed the important of the rainforest to the people of 
Papua New Guinea, as well as the importance of spending time with family and friends 
showed no overall effects. Across conditions, the rainforest was perceived to be 
important (M = 7.82, SD = 0.73) as well as their time with family and friends (M = 7.49, 
SD = 1.01 ). As such, a conflict of interests was assumed. 
The primary variables were entered into separate ANOV As and are presented 
below and in Table 11.3 
Willingness to cooperate: The analysis of this measure revealed only a main 
effect for normative consistency (f(1, 112) = 9.57, !1 < .01). There was no e!Iect for 
comparative agreement, as predicted. Nonetheless, means did vary in the predicted 
order with most cooperation in the consistent/conflict condition (M = 7.30, SD = 0.73) 
and least in the inconsistent/deviance condition (M = 5.95, SD = 1.82). 
Similarity: Perceptions of similarity also yielded a main effect for normative 
consistency (f(1, 112) = 9.57, Jl < .01). Again the consistent/conflict condition yielded 
the highest level of perceived similarity (M = 7.15, SD = 0.99) and inconsistent/deviance 
condition yielded the lowest level of perceived similarity (M = 5.60, SD = 2.19). 
Impression: In regard to the favourability of the impression gained, a main effect 
for normative consistency was found (f(1, 112) = 4.17, Jl < .05), as well as an interaction 
effect (f(1, 112) = 3.71, Jl < .05). The consistent/conflict condition yielded the highest 
level of favourability (M = 7.20, SD = 0. 77) and the inconsistent/deviance condition 
yielded the lowest level of favourability (M = 5.52, SD = 1.93). The quality of 
argument measure yielded a main effect for comparative agreement only (f(l, 112) = 
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3.67, 12 < .05), while the planned comparison bore out the same pattern of results as 
predicted. The quality of the argument was perceived to be higher in the 
consistent/conflict condition (M = 7.00, SD = 0. 79) than the inconsistent deviant 
condition (M = 5.32, SD = 1.57). Finally, main effects for comparative agreement (f(1, 
112) = 5.86, 12 < .05) and normative consistency (£(1, 112) = 3.95, 12 < .05) were found 
for agreement with target individual. Again, the consistent/conflict condition yielded the 
highest level of agreement (M = 7.30, SD = 0.80) and the inconsistent/deviance 
condition yielded the least level of agreement (M = 5.53, SD = 1.78). These five 
dependent measure were entered into one overall planned comparison: consistent/conflict 
with inconsistent/deviance with the overall result being significant (1 (1, 17) = 24. 78, 12 = 
0.00). 
Table 11.3 
Measures of categor~ salience and cooj2eration across the conditions of normative 
consistenc~ (2) and comparative agreement (3). 
Conditions 
Consistent Inconsistent F ratios 
Measures Cons Confl Dev Cons Confl Dev Norm Agree 2X3 
Cooperation 6.84 7.30 6.74 6.05 6.57 5.95 9.57** 2.21 0.01 
Similarity 6.68 7.15 6.53 6.05 6.33 5.60 9.57** 2.40 0.11 
Impression 6.11 7.20 6.94 6.50 6.57 5.52 4.17* 2.38 3.71 * 
Quality of argue. 6.26 7.00 6.22 6.55 6.38 5.32 2.13 3.67* 1.60 
Agreement 6.13 7.30 6.68 6.20 6.52 5.53 5.86* 3.95* 1.76 
Commitment to #4 3 11 9 4 9 3 
Hours committed 3 14.9 14.5 3.25 9 5 
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
Commitment: Seventy (of the 118 students) committed themselves to be 
contacted to assist in the recommendation put forward by the six different speakers. The 
data to be reported for each speaker will indicate the number of individuals that named 
that person as their contact person and, in brackets, the mean number of hours 
volunteered by those individuals. In terms of the three Indonesian presenters: speaker #1 
received no support; speaker #2 received the support of 6 individuals who, on average, 
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were willing to donate 15.7 hours of their time; speaker #3 received the support of 1 
person, donating 6 hours. Together the Indonesian presenters received the support of 7 
individuals. In contrast the Papua New Guinea presenters received the support of 63 
individuals. Across the three Papua New Guinean presenters: speaker #4 (Simon) 
received the support of 39 individuals, offering 10.17 hours on average; speaker #5 
received the support of 16 individuals, offering 4.06 hours on average; and speaker #6 
received the support of 8 individuals, offering 11.63 hours on average. 
As can be seen 88.57% of the students cooperated more with a Papua New 
Guinean representative than an Indonesian representative, with the target individual 
receiving the highest amount of votes. Given that Simon was the target individual for all 
participants this could have biased this result. However, interestingly, when the 
distribution of the target individual's results is compared across conditions, individuals 
were most willing to commit to time to the project in the consistent/conflict condition 
(11 persons), and they also committed the largest amount of time (14.9 hours on 
average) in this condition as well. In contrast, the target individual only received the 
support of 3 individuals in the inconsistent/deviant condition, who each offered 5 hours 
on average (see Table 11.3). 
11.4 Discussion 
The results reveal general support for the prediction that social cooperation is 
not only the product of a salient social identity; further, the degree of category salience 
is predictive of the degree of cooperative behavior. In particular the highest level of 
cooperation was found in the consistent/conflict condition, the condition expected to 
yield the greatest category salience, and the lowest levels of cooperation was found in 
the inconsistent/deviant condition, where category salience was expected to be least. 
These finding are interesting, particularly in light of the failed manipulation check of 
comparative agreement. 
The follow-up measures to confirm category salience further support the overall 
predictions. Specifically, perceptions of similarity, favourableness of impression, 
quality of argument and agreement with argument were all highest in the condition 
where the target person's message was consistent with the Papua New Guinea 
normative viewpoint, the Papua New Guineans had a consensual opinion on this 
viewpoint, and it contrasted with the viewpoint of the Indonesians. In contrast, the 
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condition where the target person's message was not normatively consistent and was 
different from the rest of the speakers produced the lowest levels of these measures. 
Together, these measures support the assumption that category salience was greatest in 
this condition and thus lend support to the argument that social cooperation is the 
product of underlying context specific identification processes. 
The measure of commitment also supports the primary measure of cooperation. 
In general, individuals showed more cooperation and support for the Papua New 
Guinean speakers than the Indonesian speakers. Particularly, when examining only the 
target person's commitment levels of cooperation, the findings suggest that there was 
more influence, and thus subsequent cooperation, in the high salience condition than in 
the low salience condition. An important point can be made here, as this study could 
just as much been a study of social influence. However, for self-categorization theory 
social inf1uence and social cooperation are both products of context specific social 
identification. The processes of depersonalization produces a qualitative transformation 
of the self, from which higher order emergent properties of intergroup behavior are 
produced. As well as social cooperation and social influence, this also includes social 
phenomena such as group cohesiveness and polarization. 
This account of group processes offers a much more dynamic and predictive 
account of social cooperation than the interdependence account that emphasizes 
objective interdependence structure and stable intrapersonal dispositions. Defining the 
ingroup and its relative importance to us is important to how we see ourselves and 
others, and how we act on these perceptions. Self-categorization theory offers a 
context dependent mechanism that responds to the environment in a functional, 
adaptive and systematic manner. Self-categorization defines who we are in any given 
instance, taking into account our background information about ourselves and the social 
context. They provide a reference for action, such as social cooperation. 
While this study in general offers support for these ideas, there are aspects of 
this final study that remain unclear. At some level or dimension it seems that 
comparative judgements were being 1Jlade; however, the dynamics of this comparative 
process are not on the basis of agreement as found in the Oakes eta!. (1991) study. To 
begin with, and to a significant extent, it seems that participants were being inf1uenced 
more by Papua New Guineans than Indonesians, particularly if the person was stating 
an opinion that was normatively consistent with the typical Papua New Guinea attitude. 
The evidence suggests that the physical and social distinctiveness of these two cultural 
groups overrode the comparative agreement manipulation. The importance of 
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normative fit has also been found in a number of other studies which examine 
stereotyping and the self-esteem hypothesis of social identity theory (see Experiment 1); 
however, it is beyond the scope of this study to further determine this precisely. 
There could also have been an effect for an inclusive identity as 
environmentalist, as both national groups were soliciting an environmental message. It 
could be that the participants in this study were generally responding to this identity and 
it is normatively consistent for this group that environmentalists act in terms of the 
attitudes that are similar to Papua New Guineans. Again this is speculation and further 
research would need to be carried out. 
The manipulation of normative fit could have also been stronger, as there was a 
high amount of consistency in agreement across experimental condition. This could 
have been as a result of the opening paragraph by speakers, which was consistent across 
conditions. While the aim of this was to provide a consistent message of the overall 
intent to save the rainforest from multinational companies, overall it could have 
weakened the comparative agreement effect which expressed the means by which this 
would be carried out. 
At the same time the results, specifically in terms of the planned comparisons 
are consistent with the fit hypothesis and the predictions that follow for this study. In 
retrospect it seems reasonable to assume that in this comparative context Papua New 
Guineans would identify more with Papua New Guineans than Indonesians, thus 
overriding the comparative agreement affect. The planned comparisons showed 
systematic support, indicating that participants knew who they were in comparison to 
the Indonesians, and what they would expect to hear from the respective group 
members. They were acting in terms of themselves as Papua New Guineans and this 
was most salient when the stimulus fit their expectations. In other words the stimuli 
was most veridical in the instance of highest fit. There was no cost benefit analysis of 
action, they were acting in terms of their veridical reality as Papua New Guineas-- a 
very real group membership, a very real aspect of the self. 
Social cooperation has been defined in the contemporary social dilemma 
literature as a sacrifice to the self for the benefit of the collective. This has heen 
contested in the course of this thesis. It has been argued that social identification 
transforms the nature of the self, such that self-interest can be collective interest. As 
such there is no sacrifice to the self. This study has systematically varied the social 
categorical perception of the self and thus highlighted the adaptiveness of this 
functional system. It has establish further support for the dynamic interaction between 
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the social and the psychological. Salience of group membership is a function of both 
the social and the psychological. As such, this approach fully acknowledges that groups 
are real, both socially and psychologically. It is now interesting to again reflect back 
upon Rabbic's retort to the social identity analysis of group life. One of Rahbie's key 
arguments was that this approach did not differentiate between social groups and social 
categories, but this has clearly never been the case. 
Social categories emerge from a functional, adaptive mechanism. They are 
veridical social representations of the our social relationships and they act in unison 
with the perceived social context. As raised in Chapter 1, it is in this manner that social 
cooperation is understood as a function of the normative and comparative aspects of the 
social context and categorization processes of individuals. Social categories are 
veridical because they emerge as a function of social reality, that is, in terms of real 
social groups and our memberships in them. The degree of salience of category 
membership increases as a function of the degree of fit between the stimulus and what 
we expect to the true in term of the category of membership. Social categories, thus, 
represent social phenomena that are shared and, as such, socially meaningful. By no 
means is this a passive processes but an emergent ongoing system of making sense of 
our place in the social world. Social identifications arc just as much a valid aspect of 
our self, as our personal self. 
Self-categorization, individual and group, become our reference point for social 
action. They have the potential to incite conflict and cooperation with others. They are 
the source of both social change and social stability. It is erroneous to define social 
cooperation as self-sacrifice. Social cooperation, just as competition, is a functional 
aspect of who we are as human beings. As Oakes et al., (1991) summarizes: 
What is being suggested is a sensitive, dynamic process of imputing meaning to action. 
Whether any social category fits behaviour depends on the specific social context and varies 
both with the relations between the people compared and the actual behaviour to be 
represented. The process is made all the more fluid by the fact that social and person 
categorizations are unique in that both the perceiver and the perceived can transform 
themselves: people can act as individuals in one situation, as group members in another, as 
members of different groups in yet others, varying the cues available for categorization and the 
current meaning of those cues. {p. 142) 
In conclusion, this study provides further evidence for the dynamic nature of individual 
and group life, and for the conceptual richness of categorization processes from which 
emerge a range, and degree, of identities that any one individual can act in terms of. 
With each being a veridical perception of the self, thus to act in terms of this self-
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perception is to act in terms of one's self-interest. To define social cooperation in terms 
of self-sacrifice is a historical artefact of the constructs and methodologies that we have 
adopted. 
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- Chapter 12 -
Human nature, self-interest, social identity and social cooperation 
12.1 Introduction 
Over the course of this thesis an analysis of social cooperation based on self-
categorization theory has been developed and contrasted with the interdependence 
approach. Broadly, two points have been developed: (a) the reality and distinctiveness 
of group-level phenomena and (b) a categorical perception of the self which re-defines 
the nature of self-interest. Taken together, this re-conceptualization of the social group 
and the self has been applied to the understanding of social cooperation. The aim has 
been to build a systematic understanding of the social psychological process underlying 
social cooperation. 
In line with self-categorization theory, it has been argued that social cooperation 
is the product of a salient social identity. In other words the psychological group is the 
basis of cooperative behavior. In contrast, interdependence theorists argue that 
cooperation produces the group, and that interdependence of individuals is the necessary 
precondition for cooperation. While social identity theorists have never argued that 
functional interdependence of individuals will not lead to cooperative relations (Sherif 
clearly showed this), the argument has always been that social identification is the 
necessary and sufficient process that allows cooperative relations to ensue. 
The findings of the work of this thesis develop the self-categorization 
perspective, in that the studies provide systematic support for the primary hypothesis that 
social cooperation is the product of a salient social identity. These studies were carried 
out with established social groups and in a naturalistic field setting (c.f. Grzelak,l994), 
wherein the relationships between objective interdependence, social identification and 
cooperation could be examined. There was good evidence that social cooperation varied 
with identification with the social group. It has further been shown that perceptions of 
interdependence arise from psychological group formation. Thus, in contrast to 
interdependence theory, not only is it argued that the group i~ the basis of cooperative 
behavior, it can also be argued that the social identification is the basis of perceived 
interdependence. 
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As such, not only has the thesis contributed to the development of self-
categorization theory, through the most systematic testing of the theory's analysis of 
social cooperation in the literature, this work has also re-established, in line with Lewin, 
the role that interdependence plays in the analysis of group life. Specifically, 
interdependence is related to feelings of belongingness in terms of group memberships. 
The findings show that while objective interdependence is not necessarily the basis of 
cooperative behavior, psychological group formation is the basis for perceptions of 
interdependence. The implication is that for progress to be made in the understanding of 
social cooperation, the role that the social dilemma paradigm plays in defining our formal 
approach to the study of social cooperation has to be re-considered. The paradigm 
establishes the necessary precondition of structural interdependence, however the work 
of this thesis suggests that functional interdependence is not a necessary pre-condition. 
Instead of first defining the objective situation of interdependence, it seems the basis of 
social identification which establishes the perceived interdependence structure, must first 
be defined. 
This final chapter begins by retracing the course that this thesis has taken: 
beginning with the theoretical roots of the social dilemma paradigm, moving to the 
definition of and solution to social dilemmas, challenging the self-interest and group 
based assumptions inherent in the theory and paradigm, and finally, presenting the 
theoretical and empirical analysis of social cooperation from the perspective of self-
categorization theory. The implications of the findings of this research for the social 
dilemma paradigm and our conceptual understanding of social cooperation are then 
discussed. The thesis concludes with suggestions for future research and some final 
comments. 
It is also important to note that while this thesis specifically examines social 
cooperation, the two broader points noted above are relevant beyond this analysis of 
social cooperation. Firstly, the work of this thesis has challenged the orthodox position 
of the conceptual relationship between the individual and the group, specifically in terms 
of the conceptual understanding of social identification, interdependence, and the 
psychological reality of the group. This is not only relevant to the study of social 
cooperation but also intergroup relations in general. This was noted by Turner (1987) in 
the development of sell'-categorization theory. He stated in his detailed review of the 
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psychological reality of the group: "Research on 'mixed-motive' games, in particular, 
the 'Prisoner's Dilemma Game' (PDG) is most relevant to this issue. The research 
directly tests the hypothesis that positive interdependence for the maximization of self-
interest leads to co-operation" (p. 31 ). As such, this thesis has contributed to the 
development of a our understanding of the psychological reality of social groups. 
Further, through self-categorization theory, a conceptual re-definition of sell~ 
interest has been presented. Thus, in contrast to deductive and economic rationalists 
conceptualizations of human nature, the evidence here suggests that human nature seems 
to reflect both individual and group level processes, each of which have a distinct reality 
of their own. Each of these points will be developed further in the remainder of this 
chapter, 
12.2 Recapitulation 
In contrast to the pervasive literature on the economic or subjective utility 
analysis of human nature, this thesis has developed a self-categorization analysis of the 
nature of group life. In particular the role and understanding of social cooperation has 
been developed. Through this analysis the dynamic role that group membership plays in 
shaping and being shaped by the social life of individuals in society has been drawn out 
In the opening chapter of this thesis it was noted that theories of social cooperation, as 
with those of conllict, have developed in line with the evolving zeitgeist of social 
psychology, in particular the conceptual understanding of the nexus between the 
individual and the group. It was also pointed out that the study of conllicts of interest 
have long preoccupied the pursuits of social theorists and others. Thus, while this thesis 
focuses on the work of social psychologists, it has important implications for other 
disciplines as well. The social psychological analysis of conflict of interest developed at 
the turn of the century, and many of the concepts and ideas first mooted then are still 
with us today. For example the work of Sumner (1906) is important for he introduced 
the terms ethnocentrism, ingroup and outgroup, each of which remain central to our 
conceptual understanding of social cooperation. For it was Sumner who first associated 
cooperation with the ingroup and competition with the outgroup. In different ways, we 
still believe this to be true today. 
In Chapter 1, a brief historical overview highlighted that while our conceptual 
understanding of cooperation has developed from how cooperation and competition 
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e!Iects individuals' behavior (May and Doob, 1937; Deutsch, 1949a) to accounting hlf 
the transformational processes which give rise to these outcomes (Deutsch, 1980), this 
research has continued to focus on the goal or outcome interdependence of individuals. 
The contemporary functional interdependence approach to the study of social 
cooperation, formalized through the social dilemma paradigm, continues in this vein. 
However, a more recent conceptualization of group life has challenged this view, 
through the development of social identity and self-categorization theories. 
These two distinct theoretical approaches to the study of groups and social 
cooperation were presented in detail in two different chapters (Chapters 2 and 5, 
respectively). These accounts were summarized as follows: (a) interdependence theorists 
understand cooperation in terms of outcome interdependence structures and 
transformational processes of individuals (see Kelley, 1991; Rusbult & van Lange, 1996); 
(b) self-categorization theorists understand cooperation in terms of the normative and 
comparative aspects of social context and categorization processes of individuals (see 
Turner et al., 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994). Interestingly, while 
both these approaches arose from the work of the early interactionists, the underlying 
assumptions and meta-theoretical principles are now fundamentally distinct. J\s such 
each analysis conceptually defines and approaches the problem in different ways. 
Interdependence theorist's conceptualization of the group carries on directly from 
Lewin's (1935) emphasis on the interdependence of group members (Chapter 2). In line 
with this, for many contemporary researchers a group is conceptually defined, and 
operationalized, in terms of the outcome interdependence of individuals. This analysis is 
reflected in the work of Lewin's students, Deutsch (1949a, b) and Thibaut and Kelley 
(1959; Kelley and Thibaut, 1978), each of whom have remained highly influential in the 
field. Deutsch's theory of social cooperation remains largely uncontested and Kelley and 
Thibaut's work on interdependence theory now grounds a large body of research in 
social psychology - from stereotyping to social cooperation. 
The paradigm through which interdependence theorists study social cooperation 
directly reflects this analysis of group life, with game theory aiding in the consolidation 
of the rational (economic) actor approach to the analysis of group life (see Chapter 3). 
Deutsch was clearly influenced by game theoretical constructs presented in the prisoner's 
dilemma game; likewise, interdependence theory includes some of the gaming matrices in 
their taxonomy of interdependence structures. The influence of game theory, that is the 
strategic analysis of outcome interdependence, has been so strong that cooperation is 
246 
now defined in terms of a cost benefit analysis of subjective utility to individuals. 
Specifically, cooperation is defined as situations in which individuals sacrifice their self-
interest for the welfare of the group. 
Of interest to the focus of this thesis, this same literature establishes evidence that 
identification with the group is a central aspect to increasing the levels of social 
cooperation within a situation of objective interdependence (see Dawes, van de Kragt 
and Orbell, 1990; Tyler and Dawes, 1993). These researchers ask: "The key 
psychological question is why this effect occurs. Is group membership important 
because they provide their members with a sense of social identity, or are groups 
important because they provide resources? (Tyler and Dawes, 1993, p. 93). They 
conclude that "there is more to group identity effects than expected resource gains from 
acting in the group's interests" (Tyler and Dawes, 1993, p. 94). 
At the same time, the longstanding finding to come out of this research is that 
individuals fail to cooperate to any significant degree in situations of objective 
interdependence. As such, this literature is defined as addressing the "problem of 
interdependence" and researchers have been endeavouring to find "solutions" to this 
problem, that is, to increase the level of cooperation in situations of interdependence. To 
restate the issue, while Sherif has shown that the functional or objective interdependence 
of individuals can induce cooperative behavior, this has not been the finding in a number 
of laboratory studies wherein a number of discrete individuals are brought together in a 
situation of objective interdependence. Interdependence of individuals, per se, does not 
necessarily lead to intragroup processes such as social cooperation. Given this finding, 
interdependence theorist accounted for variation in level of cooperation through the 
definition and measurement of transformational processes such as social value 
orientations. Still, the results remained inconsistent and ambiguous and researchers in 
this area are currently searching for explanations within interdependence theory itself and 
related fields, such as economics and computer simulations. 
In Chapter 4 an argument was presented that questioned the usefulness and 
validity of this pursuit. In contrast to the present surface approaches to the "problem of 
interdependence," it was argued that we must return to the very roots of this literature, 
in particular our conceptual understanding of the psychological reality of the group and 
the nature of self-interest. This review established that there is building evidence and 
argument that questions the primacy of the individual self as governor of rationality. 
Further, in the review of the work of the early interactionists it was determined that we 
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have conceptually moved away from the psychological reality of the group as these 
researchers understood it. This is particularly evident with the work of Lewin. For 
Lewin stressed interdependence only in the sense that individuals fell a certain 
interdependence of fate through feelings of belongingness with a group. Objective 
situations of interdependence would not necessarily have this effect. Further. Lewin 
stressed for psychology to develop, it must move from a descriptive classification 
approach, upheld through the development of taxonomies and typologies, to an approach 
that systematically builds an analysis of the mechanism underlying social behavior. 
This thesis has argued that the process of social identification is the intervening 
factor that allows group level processes to emerge (Chapter 5). While interdependence 
continues to have an important role in this analysis, it is understood as product rather 
than precursor of group formation. The social identity analysis of group life grew from 
the findings of the Sherif summer camp studies and was always meant to complement 
these findings. However, in subsequent development, the functional interdependence 
structure has been emphasised, over the discontinuity he established between individual 
and group life. 
Group life, for social identity and self-categorization theorists, is conceptualized 
not as an aggregate of interdependent individuals but as a cognitive re-grouping of the 
self which is systematically variable and always context dependent. It is a 
conceptualization of the self that varies in level of inclusiveness with others. This 
cognitive re-defining of the self, as "we" and "us" rather than "I" and "me," allows us to 
re-conceptualize our understanding of self-interest and social cooperation. This 
conceptualization of social cognition enables individuals to engage in meaningful and 
productive behavior at variable levels of abstraction of the self. Depersonalization of 
self-perception is the basic process underlying group phenomena. At the same time, 
neither the individual or the group is primary in this analysis, both act in unison and are 
necessary aspects of cognitive functioning. Together they establish the functional 
antagonism within the cognitive system. High order, inclusive, self-processes are argued 
to be the basis of social cooperation, prosocial and helping behavior, altruism and other 
forms of collective action. 
The empirical chapters of this thesis provided support for a social identity or self-
categorization analysis of social cooperation, which was contrasted with the inter-
dependence approach. In particular the role of establishing the outcome interdependence 
structure, as a necessary precondition of group based behavior, has been questioned in a 
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number of studies, as well as the stability of social value orientations. In line with self-
categorization theory a number of other variables have also been examined. The 
importance of group norms and individuals perceived representativeness of these norms 
to group behavior was established (studies 1, 2 and 5), as well as the importance of 
perceived interdependence in defining the relevant social structure from the perspective 
of the individual (studies 3 and 4). Finally, the emergent dynamic nature of identity 
formation was systematically analysed (studies 2, 3 and 5). Each of these studies will 
now be briefly summarized. 
The first study (Chapter 7) directly examined the two accounts of group-based 
behavior. The findings showed that while objective interdependence produced no 
effects, the importance of achieving social distinctiveness in terms of social identification 
processes showed systematic effects. The process of defining oneself in social 
categorical terms involved both normative and comparative dimensions. Specifically, the 
study showed that individuals' perceptions of normative representativeness on a relevant 
comparative dimension is predictive of social behavior, as the pattern of discrimination 
behavior showed. In line with social identity analysis, social discrimination aided in the 
processes of establishing social distinctiveness. 
The two studies that followed directly tested ideas relevant to both theoretical 
accounts and were carried out in the context of the objective interdependence established 
through groups participating in Outward Bound courses. This context was uniquely 
effective in teasing out variables important to the interdependence analysis of social 
cooperation in two ways: (a) not only does the course structure establish parallel 
situations of objective interdependence; (b) the population sample showed high levels of 
a cooperative social value orientation as found through the ring measure. Given that the 
ring measure of social value orientations is one of the most systematic tools used in the 
literature to establish variance in levels of cooperation, if further systematic variation in 
this population could be established, it would provide an important conceptual 
advancement in the literature. In both studies this was found to be the case. 
The first of these studies (Chapter 8) examined the constructs of social value 
orientations and group representativeness. In line with interdependence theorists social 
value orientations are argued to be stable interpersonal constructs within a given 
situation of interdependence and are argued to be predictive of cooperative behavior 
within a given objective situation. In contrast, self-categorizaion theory argues that 
perceived group representativeness is predictive of perceived levels of cooperative 
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behavior at any given time. The findings supported the latter theoretical account. This 
study further examined the emergent properties of group life, with the findings showing 
that the levels of cooperation and group representativeness increased over time. 
In this same context objective intragroup and intergroup cooperation was 
examined (Chapter 9). In line with self-categorization theory, cooperative behavior 
varied with perceptions of similarity and interdependence rather than the objective 
common fate of individuals. Further, the same perceptual index, specifically similarity, 
was predictive of both intragroup and intergroup cooperation. Thus, contrary to Insko 
et al. (1990), as well as Bornstein (1992), there is more of a basis for the reciprocal 
congruency of these processes rather than a differentiated account of intergroup 
behavior. 
The final two studies specifically utilize a resource social dilemma set in Papua 
New Guinea. The first study (Chapter 10) manipulated inclusive levels of social 
identities, predicting that social cooperation would vary with level of identification. The 
findings clearly supported this analysis: for the same comparable objective area of 
interdependence, cooperation was higher when an inclusive identity was salient. 
Perceptions of interdependence also varied with level of social identification. The final 
study (Chapter 11) examined if social cooperation varied with salience of the identity. 
Salience of identity predicted level of cooperation, specifically levels of cooperation 
varied with normative and comparative fit. The conditions of highest fit produce the 
greatest degree of salience and thus induced the highest level of cooperative behavior. 
Taken together there was consistent evidence that social cooperation is a product 
of a salient social identity. Further, the consistent evidence suggests that instead of 
objective interdependence producing the group, the group is the basis of perceived 
interdependence. Thus the evidence implies that the contemporary analysis of social 
cooperation, through the social dilemma paradigm, must be re-examined. 
12.3 Theoretical and methodological implications 
Theoretically, one of the principle contributions of this thesis has been to extend 
the analytical domain of self-categorization theory. Specifically a self-categorization 
analysis of social cooperation has been developed. The general hypothesis derived from 
the theory, namely that cooperation is the product of a salient social identity, has been 
empirically tested and the results support this analysis. 
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It has been argued that group life is not simply a situational aspect of individual 
behavior that is defined and mapped out in terms of an specific interdependence 
structure. Group life is an important and integral reality of the psychology of the 
individual. And it is this aspect of social cognition that critically shapes the way 
individuals perceive themselves and their social world, and thus the way that individuals 
interact in their social environment. The self, through the processes of depersonalization, 
is the mechanism through which individual and group-level perception is systematically 
regulated (see Turner et al. 1994). 
This position adopts distinct assumptions about the self and the nature of the 
group in comparison to the interdependence analysis. To begin, the self is no longer 
understood as a discrete entity, but through the processes of depersonalization can be 
understood to be inclusive of others. Thus, this conceptual analysis has implications for 
the conceptual understanding of self-interest. 
... it is argued that social co-operation reflects not an interdependence of separate, personal self-
interests, but a cognitive redefinition of self and self-interest and hence has a strong element of 
altruism, and that the effect of anonymity is often to privatize and hence personalize and not to 
de-individuate as is usually supposed (in other words, that it is individuation rather than de-
individuation which decreases the level of co-operation, see Colman, 1982). (Turner, 1987, p. 
66) 
For while it remains that we always act in terms of our self-interest, that nature of the 
self has been re-defined to vary on a continuum of inclusiveness with others. Thus, 
instead of self-interest and altruism being conceptualized as opposite poles of behavior, 
altruism now coincides with self-interest at a higher level of abstraction of the self. 
Likewise, self-interest (individualism) is no longer conceptualized as an orthogonal 
construct to altruism, as defined by the social value orientation literature; the self and 
other can be defined as interchangeable. In essence, the relationship between the self and 
the group is re-defined. It could be argued that "the problem of interdependence" is a 
conceptual problem of the understanding of the self. For in contrast to self-
categorization theorists, interdependence theorists define cooperation as acting in terms 
of the collective; however, this marks a disjuncture, for this is no longer acting in terms 
of self. Self-categorization theory reconciles this problem through re-defining the nature 
of self and self-interest. 
Recall (Chapter 3) that in the social dilemma literature social cooperation is 
defined as self-sacrifice. In other words, acting in terms of the self does not coincide 
with acting in terms of the collective; the self must sacrifice its interests for the good of 
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the group, albeit this may benefit the individual in the long term. Likewise, J(,r 
interdependence theorists, thinking of ourselves as group members and acting in terms of 
the collective is not a rational state of affairs. It is a biased and distorted reality that 
leads to poor outcomes for all involved (see Insko eta!., 1993; Hardin, 1995). Thus, 
the primacy of the individual rational self is argued for and distinguished from group 
level processes. In contrast to these negative conceptualizations of group life, for seu·-
categorization theorists, acting in terms of a group membership is a rational and normal 
aspect of social cognition. Thus rationality can be defined in terms of group 
memberships and vary systematically with identity formation. This is distinct to the type 
of rationality that game theory recognises, where rationality sits firmly in the realm of the 
discrete individual. 
For social identity and self-categorization theorists, intergroup and intragroup 
processes are argued as equally rational and the same perceptual index, namely similarity, 
is predictive of both intergroup and intragroup cooperative behavior. Perceptions of 
similarity is the index underlying categorization processes and categorization is a sense 
making process that defines an individual's place in the world. 
Inherent in the social categorical analysis of the self, wherein categorization is a 
primary mechanism, individuals will be motivated to achieve social distinctiveness in 
terms of the salient category of membership (social identity). This can be achieved in 
different ways. As Study 1 showed, where the normative dimension did not define the 
category distinctiveness, then discrimination aided in this process. This study also 
showed that objective interdependence of individuals did not account for group based 
behavior. The goal for participants in this study did not seem to be to increase their 
chances of winning the lottery, through ingroup reciprocity expectation, on the contrary 
the aim seemed to be to achieve comparative social distinctiveness in terms of a 
subjectively relevant group membership. 
This analysis thus has implications for our conceptual understanding of 
cooperation and competition. While self-categorization theory does not deny that social 
competition and cooperation can arise on the basis of some objective state of affairs, 
objective interdependence of individuals can not account for the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of cooperative and competitive intergroup relations. As such, social 
cooperation can not solely be defined in terms of some objective state of affairs but as a 
social comparative product that emerges out of the categorization process of defining 
"us" and "them". It is a relationaL not an absolute, judgment and outcome. Given this 
change in emphasis, this has implications for the methodology, that is the paradigm, 
through which we study social cooperation. 
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Given this theoretical analysis, together with the fact that researchers currently 
utilizing the social dilemma paradigm have concluded that identification is an important 
process underlying social cooperation and that these same researchers are concurrently 
seeking new direction to understanding the "problem of interdependence," perhaps the 
time is ripe for a paradigm shift. The "problem of interdependence" is a false pretence 
through which to understand the nature of social cooperation and group life. The 
paradigm pits the individual against society. However society and the individual are both 
necessary determinants of human nature. The real problem is how to systematically 
develop the conceptualization of the functional relationship between the individual and 
society. 
This thesis has provided evidence that perceived interdependence with others 
varies with individuals own self-categorizations. As such a corollary to the self-
categorization analysis is presented. For while self-categorization theory has always 
argued that the group is the basis of cooperative behavior (in contrast to cooperation 
being the basis of the group); this thesis has developed the argument that it is not 
interdependence of individuals that produces the group, the group is the basis of 
perceptions of interdependence. The argument put forward by self-categorization theory 
that the members of the same self-category are perceived as interchangeable could be the 
basis for social psychological interdependence, rather than social interdependence. For 
the evidence presented here implies that it is social psychological interdependence that is 
predictive of social behavior, over objectively defined social interdependence. 
Thus, while the socially defined interdependence structure can be an important 
variable, it does not establish the primary mechanism involved. Psychological group 
formation is the primary processes and social cooperation is a product of the degree to 
which an other individual is perceived to share the same self-category. Thus by 
understanding the way that individuals perceive their place in the world, we will 
understand the nature of interdependence and social cooperation. This is critical to our 
understanding of intergroup relations. We need to understand interdependence from the 
perceiver's point of view; that is, how the world is socially structured within the 
individual mind. Instead of examining situations of interdependence trom the point of 
view of "objective" social reality, we must examine interdependence from the 
"subjective" state of affairs of the perceiver. In other words, the social dilemma 
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paradigm establishes psychological processes through deductive reasoning, through first 
establishing the objective interdependence structure, and then examines individuals' 
cooperative behavior. And after years of studies, researchers have established that 
identification with the group is a key factor involved in promoting cooperative behavior. 
Given that identity formation leads to perceptions of interdependence, it seems 
reasonable to now examine cooperation from the perceiver's perspective in terms of 
identity formation. That is from the inside out; from the point of view of the perceiver, 
rather than vice versa. 
The social identity analysis does not deny the importance of interdependence 
within social structure, of course individual are interdependent with groups at many 
different levels of abstraction. Each of us can define ourselves in terms of a number of 
social groups: male or female; Canadian or Australian; cyclist or motorist. It is the 
nature of social identification that will be predictive of behavior in any given situation, 
not the objective state of affairs. By the nature of our group life we are increasingly 
interdependent with a wide range of individuals and groups. However on what bases can 
we delineate that interdependence? 
While individuals can be defined in terms of their objective interdependence, this 
does not necessarily mean that that they will perceive themselves to be interdependence 
within that particular group of people. For example, a group of individuals may be 
objectively interdependent of the basis of their membership in a particular department in 
a university. However, at a departmental meeting they may see themselves identifying 
with, and thus representing, other groups such as a women when discussing EEO (Equal 
Employment Opportunities) principles, or as an environmentalist when discussing paper 
usage in the department, or, more inclusively, as a member of the university when 
discussing higher education. We have the capacity of acing in terms of a myriad of 
group membership, however that group membership may not be the group defined in 
terms of the objective state of affairs. Given this, social cooperation is probably more 
often that not an intergroup problem rather than an intragroup problem, as defined by the 
commons and public goods dilemmas. Thus, it is understanding the nature of social 
identity and the process of identification that should be the focus of analysis. 
The concept of social identity was developed by Tajfel because he recognized 
that individuals share social representations of themselves that define their place in 
society in terms of group memberships. Tajfel (1974) argued for the importance of social 
structure, content and process in the development of social identity theory, he stated: 
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Any society which contains power, status, prestige and social group differentials (an they all 
do), places each of us in a number of social categories which become an important part of our 
self-definition. In situations which relate to those aspects of our self-definition that we think we 
share with others, we shall behave very much as they do ... They acted together, hut it was not 
because of any individual facts of their personal psychology. (fajfel, 1977, p. 66) 
Social identity theory drew our attention to the fact that we seek to evaluate ourselves 
positively in comparison to others, in terms of "the implicit and explicit ideologies" that 
constitute our variable group memberships (see Tajfel, 1981, p. 36). To act in terms of 
these group memberships does not constitute irrational behavior. Of course it is biased 
in term of a collective reality shared by group members but this does not necessarily 
mean that it is irrational. Rapoport (1991) has made similar claims: 
We are all human and all of our thinking is biased. Ideological commitments are a major factor 
in producing bias. In scientific work, bias should, of course, be guarded against hecause of the 
very nature of the scientific ethos. Since it cannot be eradicated, however, and neither can its 
principal source-- ideological commitments-- the best we can do is recognize those sources of 
bias in ourselves and admit them. The sociobiological discussions about "selfishness" and 
"altruism" (i.e., cooperation and competition in the living world) reveal more clearly than 
anywhere else the way ideological commitments have colored sociobiological thinking. (p. 99) 
Social identities, with their inherent ideologies, sustain our knowledge of ourselves in 
terms of our place in the world and appropriate behavior. Given then that our minds are 
socially structured, and that we can be functionally interdependent with a wide range of 
social groups, social identities are important to study as they are the psychological link 
between the social reality of the functional interdependence of individuals and social 
cooperation (or collective action) in terms of this identity. It is argued that this process 
also underlies acts of altruism, prosocial and helping behavior. As Tajfel has argued 
these are active not passive processes and can not be understood fully in terms of 
individual differences and other abstract or piecemeal variables. On a large scale, social 
cooperation and competition embody the essence of social stability and social change. 
They are relative to the subjective state of affairs not the objective state of affairs and, as 
such, are always in dynamic flux, as history has revealed. Rather than focusing on the 
outcomes that accrue to individuals through social behavior, it is now important to focus 
on process underlying social behavior. We must understand the process by which 
identities emerge and are constituted, and the process by which the mind regenerates the 
stale of affairs from the perspective of the perceiver. It is this process that determines 
social action such as cooperation and competition. 
The emphasis on process relates back to the aim of this thesis: to account for a 
social psychological mechanism underlying social cooperation. As such we must move 
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from a descriptive taxonomy of interdependence properties and transformational 
typologies to develop a systematic casual mechanism that accounts f(n cooperative 
behavior. This is in line with Lewin, whose aim was to move psychology from a 
Aristotelian approach to a Galilean approach in studying group processes. 
Instead of understanding group life in terms of an number of interacting abstract 
variables, this process must be understood as a dynamic whole. Taxonomies and 
typologies describe the differences between different entities. However, in the end this is 
not very satisfactory because as scientist we know nothing about how or why this entity 
has emerged and how it is psychologically meaningful. Therefore a typology is only a 
way station. It may be a necessary way station, but always the next step is toward 
"how". 
In summary, methodologically a paradigm shift must ensue. For the social 
dilemma paradigm pits the individual against the collective. Its roots are based on the 
economic rationalism of game theory. The inherent assumptions about human nature are 
in line with those of Adam Smith: 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, and the baker that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard of their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity 
but to their self-love and never talk to them of our necessities but of their advantages. Nobody 
but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly on the benevolence of his fellow citizens. (1776/1910, 
Vol. 1, p. 13) 
The belief that humans are individualistically selfish is now a common assumption made 
by social theorists examining social behavior, rationality and decision making. It is also 
a widely held assumption by lay people alike. The roots of this ethos emerge from our 
conceptualization of "homo economicus" through the influence of the early classic 
political economists such as Hobbes, Montesquieu, Hume, Smith and Tocqucville (see 
Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994). However, none of these models has successfully 
provided an explanation of prosocial behavior based on the rationality of individual self-
interest. 
Arguments based on individual self-interest quickly become circular. In the end 
they are not falsifiable. This is evident in Hobbes' explanation of his own behavior, after 
he had given sixpence to a beggar. True to his ideology he replied: "! was in pain to 
consider the miserable condition of the old man; and now my alms, given some relief, 
doth also case me" (Aubrey 1697/1982, p. 159). The argument that individuals always 
act in their self-interest is both true and false. It depends on how the self is defined. It is 
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false when the self is defined as a utility maximizing individual rational actor. In fact the 
conceptual utility of this concept is not sustainable. It quickly becomes tenuous. 
However, when the self is re-defined in terms of inclusive self-categorization, the 
prospect of finding parsimony in the social dilemma literature and working towards a 
fuller understanding of social relations and cooperative behavior becomes more tenable. 
12.4 Directions for future research 
Social cooperation is not about individuals acting in their individual self-interest, 
no matter how you define it. Social cooperation is about collective behavior of 
individuals acting in terms of their group memberships. Above all, we must continue 
work on defining the conceptual nexus between the individual and the group. and the 
research reported within this thesis highlights some interesting directions for future 
development. 
In particular the findings of Study 1 are intriguing as the individuals who highly 
identified with the group and were normatively distinctive (that is highly representative 
of the group psychology students in comparison to economics students) did not 
discriminate to the same extent as those individuals who highly identified and were not 
normatively distinctive. It seems that discrimination behavior further achieved social 
distinctiveness for those who were not highly distinctive in terms of the normative 
dimension of comparison. The evidence suggests that distinctiveness can be achieved 
through both normative and discrimination processes. Gagnon and Bourhis ( 1996) found 
in their study that high identifiers in a minimal group study discriminated significantly 
more than low identifiers. In this minimal situation it seems that discrimination was the 
only means available to achieve category distinctiveness. A further study currently 
underway (Morrison, 1995), replicates and extends these results in a minimal group 
setting. The study replicated the methodology of Study 1 of this thesis but used the 
minimal categorization of under and over estimators of dots as the basis of social 
categorization. In contrast to Study 1, this study found that high identifiers, who were 
highly representative, discriminated more than those who were slightly and moderately 
representative of groups. This work compliments the work of Jettsen, Spears and 
Manstead (1996) who have also found significant differences in discrimination behavior 
between minimal and established social groups in terms of normative and discriminatory 
processes. 
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These findings have implications for the understanding and analysis of social 
cooperation. For they seem to indicated different processes are emphasized for groups 
that are in the processes of defining themselves compared to socially established groups. 
In other words, defining the ingroup, is often not a straight forward state of affairs. The 
breakdown of the former Yugoslavia, in the aftermath of the cold war, highlights the 
variable nature of defining the boundaries that differentiate "us" and "them". As 
mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the social reality in the former Y ogoslavia is 
that Serbs and Croats, Serbs and Muslims, and Croats and Muslims have each defined 
the conflict of interests at times. It is clear that the basis for a superordinate self-
categorization is not readily accessible with the breakdown of social structure. The 
social structure that will emerge must be re-negotiated. The processes of negotiating the 
new social structure through which sustainable intergroup relations will be established 
seems an important area of research. It seems that the social psychological processes 
that are at play at the early stage of development when normative social consensus has 
not been reached in what defines a group, are somewhat distinct from those when 
normative dimensions have been negotiated. The cognitive role and process underlying 
the building of normative social consensus seems an important area of theoretical 
development, for much of the meaning we invest in our pursuits as individuals is 
normatively derived. 
Tajfel (1972) argued that subjects in the minimal group paradigm invested the 
situation with meaning through their allocation behavior; that is, they created distinctions 
between their own group and the other group. An important point that he made was that 
social categorization informs the perceiver, and guides appropriate actions, through 
structuring the individual's relevant social environment. The process of 
depersonalization provides an adaptable system of self-reference that can vary with 
social context and define an individual's place in society, in relation to a variable array of 
personal and social identities. The individual and the group are integral aspects of our 
cognitive system. As Tajfel states: 
Membership in groups is not an idle affair. It establishes orientation and bounds for our 
transactions with other human beings, for good or for evil. It builds favourable or unfavourable 
images of ourselves and others which are more than momentary and situational. It defines 
aspirations, claims, and superiority-inferiority-equality arrangements between us and other 
groups that have unmistakable consequences on how we view and how we actually deal with 
the individuals in these other groups. (p. 149) 
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Of course, groups are not static. If we look closely enough, we easily find that the human group 
is not merely a collection of discrete individuals. Nor does it drop fully formed from nowhere. 
Every group, small or large, takes shape when its eventual members interact with mutual 
concerns. 
Given the arguments resented in this thesis for the relevance of groups to social 
cognition, perhaps instead of the fundamental motivational aspect of human nature being 
to maximize self-interest, as it has long been understood, it may be that "the fundamental 
human process is the formation of social norms" (Sherif, 1966, p. 153). Further, it may 
be that the fundamental human process is for us to affiliate ourselves with others and 
define ourselves in terms of some normative distinction. What is suggested here is that 
instead of the fundamental nature of human beings to secure our utility as individuals; 
perhaps the most fundamental nature of human beings is to form groups (or disassociate 
ourselves from groups) and define ourselves normatively in terms of those group 
memberships. It is this affiliation that provides individuals with a sense of security in the 
world. As Sherif (1967) stated it is norms that provide our yardstick in the world. As 
such we must look further at the development of social norms and our propensity to seek 
out consensus in terms of relevant group memberships. 
If psychological group membership does provide a sense of security llJr us and is 
as psychologically relevant and real as individual life, this has implications for the 
conceptual understanding of intergroup negotiation. This is particularly the case where 
an inclusive superordinate identity is not socially defined or is not normatively consistent 
with the expectations of individual actors. If we take, for example, the former 
Yugoslavia, this nation was formed through a union of a number smaller nations in 
response to a common enemy. However, with the fall of communism this superordinate 
identity, of Yugoslavia, was no longer relevant. Regional identities were salient in the 
minds of individuals again and their security as smaller distinct nations had to be re-
defined. Social conflict ensued. If social cooperation is a product of an inclusive and 
salient social identity, what would be the basis of cooperative behavior in this context? 
To bring peace, it seems that, in line with self-categorization theory, the best 
practice would be to first bring security to the most relevant identity: Serbs, Croats and 
Muslims. Only through the security of these relevant identities could effective 
negotiations proceed. This is interesting in light of the existing literature on negotiation 
which, in different ways, seeks to de-emphasize group boundaries to resolve conflict (see 
Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Fisher & Ury, 1981). It could very well be the case that the 
most promising principle of negotiation to be put into practice is for group boundaries, in 
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terms of relevant social identities, to be recognized and addressed. For there is good 
theoretical and practical reason to believe that social identification, a collective 
perception of self, is the psychological motivation underlying the con11ict and, as such, 
the appropriate level to direct the intervention process in resolving the conflict. 
However, in theory and practice this is not often the case. Typically, the practice is to 
threaten the social identity at stake. So begins the escalation of the conflict. 
In the context of the conflict in Northern Ireland, it was only recently that the 
IRA were invited to the negotiation table, and only because other options had been 
exhausted. Whether or not this will be effective, short and long term, remains to be seen. 
Nevertheless, given this analysis of the importance of group life, and its psychological 
reality, for the well-being and security of the individual, it is important to further develop 
our understanding of these individual and group level processes in negotiation. The 
implications for our broader understand of con11ict and cooperation, social justice and 
peace are striking in comparison to conventional approaches. 
Group life has always been an important aspect of our lives as individuals. 
However, within the contemporary literature reviewed here groups have been 
conceptualized as a negative influence on our lives as individuals. Further, the primacy 
of the individual has also been heedfully adopted in conjunction with this growing 
perspective. It just could be that both the individual and the group are primary to our 
cognition and social systems. Further work needs to be done to develop the conceptual 
nexus between the individual and the group, in terms of the normative dimensions and 
emergent aspects of group life. 
At the same time, a certain amount of pragmatism is in order. For as Lewin has 
argued there is nothing as practical as a good theory. Thus, as theory is developed its 
practical relevance should also be promoted. The social psychology of social 
cooperation provides a foundation for the study of sustainable intergroup relations. A 
recent analysis on the current state of global affairs states that there has been a continued 
"failure of the old conceptual frameworks to guide timely analysis and effective 
multilateral intervention .... Much remains to be done but there can be no more 
intellectually satisfying task than working out how to move the world from systems 
based on coercion and threat to ones based on trust and cooperation. This is the task of 
the twenty-first century" (Clements and Ward, 1994, p. 1/26). 
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12.5 Final comments 
This thesis has presented a theoretical analysis of social cooperation which has 
sought to account for the social psychological mechanism underlying cooperative 
behavior. It has argued against, and presented an alternative to, the interdependence 
perspective of the social group. Early in the thesis two arguments were raised against 
this approach: (a) the conceptualization of self, narrowly conceived in terms of discrete 
individuals; (b) the conceptualiztion of the group, solely defined by the outcome 
interdependence structure of individuals. Rather than groups being an abstract entity to 
the self, wherein rationality is distorted and self-sacrifice made for the group, the self has 
been re-defined such that the individuals can act rationally along a continuum of self-
perceptions that can be inclusive of others. Likewise, social cooperation has been re-
defined as acting in terms of a group membership. In terms of this analysis, it is argued 
that we always act in terms of our self-interest and cooperative with others when a 
collective identity is salient. 
In some respects the arguments presented here have been difficult to tease out, 
for the interdependence account has not been fully discounted and the theoretical roots 
and inherent ideology of this approach are entrenched in the history that we share. 
Indeed they provide a deep foundation for the contemporary structure of society. 
Having said this, this thesis has continued the course of science and built on theoretical 
constructs and empirical findings of earlier literature. This includes the findings of 
interdependence theory. The broad aim has been to provide a parsimonious approach to 
addressing the problem of specifying a functional mechanism that underlies social 
cooperation. It is my hope that this approach will provide a productive avenue to the 
study of social cooperation. This is in line with Bohm (1993), who stated: "Science 
consists not in the accumulations of knowledge, but the creation of fresh models of 
perception" (p. 42). It can be argued that we have catalogued enough "solutions" to 
social dilemmas, perhaps the time is ripe for a new perspective that builds on what we 
have established. This thesis presents a perspective that has gathered support through 
the course of the empirical work presented herein. Only future work will determine its 
fruition. Of course we can define social cooperation in terms of economic 
rationalizations; however, for a truly social psychological understanding of these process 
to become clearer, the research presented here suggests that we must look beyond the 
economic parameters that may now constrain us within the social dilemma paradigm. 
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In conclusion, for at least the last four centuries we have lived with the doctrine 
of the primacy of individual self-interest; however, it seems today that individuals and 
society still have much to learn about "human nature". The evidence, across disciplines, 
suggests that we not only require a paradigm shift in the social psychological study of 
social dilemmas, we, as a society, are in urgent need of a "paradigm shift" -- a shift that 
is necessary for sustainable intergroup relations to be tenable possibility. 
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General Appendices 
Appendix 7.1 
Experiment 1 (Chapter 7): Instructions to participants 
On the top left hand corner of this page is a letter (A to F). This letter indicates which 
group you are in and the extent to which you are representative of your group. Listed 
below are the letters and groups that they represent: 
ECONOMICS 
A) HIGHLY REPRESENTATIVE OF ECONOMICS STUDENTS 
B) MODERATELY REPRESENTATIVE OF ECONOMICS STUDENTS 
C) SLIGHTLY REPRESENTATIVE OF ECONOMICS STUDENTS 
PSYCHOLOGY 
D) SLIGHTLY REPRESENTATIVE OF PSYCHOLOGY STUDENTS 
E) MODERATELY REPRESENTATIVE OF PSYCHOLOGYSTUDENTS 
F) HIGHLY REPRESENTATIVE OF PSYCHOLOGY STUDENTS 
The following overhead shows the frequency distribution of economics and 
psychology students for this study. Have a look at the general pattern and distribution 
of A. B, C, D, E, F's and see where you are in the distribution. The numbers along the 
horizontal axis represent standardized scores which relate to the degree to which certain 
strategies are used. As is normally the case the distribution is bi-modal, reflecting the 
two distinct groups: psychology students (vertical lines-on the right) and economics 
students (horizontal lines-on the left) and the colours indicate the degree to which the 
different strategies are used and thus how representative individuals are of each group. 
Highly representative RED, 
Moderately representative GREEN, 
Slightly representative BLUE. 
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Appendix 8.1 
Experiment 2 (Chapter 8): Group's adjective listings of self-stereotyped group norms 
Gunn Cottee Sturt 
positive in attitude aware of others needs supportive 
supportive positive in attitude positive in attitude 
persevere motivated aware of others needs 
able to organise supportive committed 
determined trusting responsible 
Mawson Cook Franklin 
aware of others needs positive in attitude supportive 
positive in attitude supportive communicate clearly 
trusting persevere aware of others needs 
supportive considerate trusting 
persevere determined encouraging 
Bass Gilmore 
motivated positive in attitude 
committed supportive 
adaptable determined 
communicate clearly trusting 
encouragmg encouraging 
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Appendix 9.1 
Experiment 3 (Chapter 9): VigneUes used in the cooperation measure 
Intragroup vignette: 
You and the other members of your group are now on your final expedition back towards 
Tharwa. It is the first day of your expedition and after a long morning of hiking you have 
stopped for a break. You are looking forward to a good drink of water and a flapjack. Each 
member of your group has been given a limited number of flapjacks for the completion of your 
journey and this will be the first of those flapjacks. As you get settled and bring out your 
flapjacks, one of the other members of your group tells you that their flapjacks were still in 
the back of their backup vehicle when it drove away. So, they have no flapjacks for their 
expedition. 
Outward Bound outgroup vignette: 
You and the other members of your group are now on your final expedition back towards 
Tharwa. It is the first day of your expedition and after a long morning of hiking you have 
stopped for a break. You are looking forward to a good drink of water and a flapjack. Each 
member of your group has been given a limited number of flapjacks for the completion of your 
journey and this will be the first of those flapjacks. As you get settled and bring out your 
flapjacks. another group happens by --it is a group from Flinders. Their flapjacks were still 
in the back of their backup vehicle when it drove away. So, they have no flapjacks for their 
expedition. 
Note: Depending on course Flinders could also read Gunn, Sturt, Gilmore, Mawson, Cook, 
Chisholm, Bass or Cotter. 
Local bush walking club vignette: 
You and the other members of your group are now on your final expedition back towards 
Tharwa. It is the first day of your expedition and after a long morning of hiking you have 
stopped for a break. You are looking forward to a good drink of water and a flapjack. Each 
member of your group has been given a limited number of flapjacks for the completion of your 
journey and this will be the first of those flapjacks. As you get settled and bring out your 
flapjacks. another group happens by ··it is a group from the local bush walking club. Their 
flapjacks were still in the back of their backup vehicle when it drove away. So, they have no 
flapjacks for their expedition. 
Appendix 10.1 
Experiment 4 (Chapter 10): Maps and Frames of reference information (originals A4 
size) 
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1 0.1.1 - Map used to induce national identity within a frame of reference that includes 
Papua New Guinea, Australia, Indonesia and Malaysia 
~. 
0 
· ... 
<;:::."" 
10.1.2 - Map used to induce regional identity within a frame of reference that includes 
the Islands, Papua, l'vfomase and Highlands 
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Appendix 10.2: Specific comparisons of dilemma conditions 
National -stimulus map international (x1 ·including the following nations) 
Intragroup 
Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia. 
Intergroup 
Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia. 
Region -stimulus map national (x1 ·including the following regions) 
Papua_ 
Highlands 
Momase 
Islands 
Papua 
Highlands 
Momase 
Islands 
Intragroup 
1) Papua, Highlands, Momase, Islands 
2) Papua, Highlands, Momase, Islands 
3) Papua, Highlands, Momase, Islands 
4) Papua, Highlands, Momase, Islands 
Intergroup 
1) Papua, Highlands, Momase, Islands 
2) Papua, Highlands, Momase, Islands 
3) Papua, Highlands, Momase, Islands 
4) Papua, Highlands, Momase, Islands 
Province- stimulus map regional (x4- including the following provinces) 
Western 
Gulf 
Central 
Milne Bay 
Northern 
Western 
Gulf 
Central 
Milne Bay 
Northern 
Morobe 
Madang 
East Sepik 
West Sepik 
Intragroup • Papua 
1) Western (Fly), Gulf, Central, Milne Bay, Northern (Oro) 
2) Western (Fly), Gulf, Central, Milne Bay, Northern (Oro) 
3) Western (Fly), Gulf, Central, Milne Bay, Northern (Oro) 
4) Western (Fly), Gulf, Central, Milne Bay, Northern (Oro) 
5) Western (Fly), Gulf, Central, Milne Bay, Northern (Oro) 
Intergroup • Papua 
1) Western (Fly), Gulf, Central, Milne Bay, Northern (Oro) 
2) Western (Fly), Gulf, Central, Milne Bay. Northern (Oro) 
3) Western (Fly). Gulf, Central, Milne Bay, Northern (Oro) 
4) Western (Fly), Gulf, Central, Milne Bay, Northern (Oro) 
5) Western (Fly), Gulf, Central, Milne Bay, Northern (Oro) 
Intragroup • Momase 
1) Morobe, Madang, East Sepik, West Sepik (Sandaun) 
2) Morobe, Madang, East Sepik, West Sepik (Sandaun) 
3) Morobe, Madang, East Sepik, West Sepik (Sandaun) 
4) Morobe, Madang, East Sepik, West Sepik (Sandaun) 
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Morobe 
Madang 
East Sepik 
West Sepik 
Intragroup - Momase 
1) Morobe, Madang, East Sepik, West Sepik (Sandaun) 
2) Morobe, Madang, East Sepik, West Sepik (Sandaun) 
3) Morobe, Madang, East Sepik, West Sepik (Sandaun) 
4) Morobe, Madang, East Sepik, West Sepik (Sandaun) 
Intragroup - Highland 
Enga 1) Enga, Western Highlands, Chimgu (Simbu), Eastern Highlands, 
Southern Highlands 
W Highlands 2) Enga, Western Highlands, Chimgu (Simbu), Eastern Highlands, 
Southern Highlands 
Chimgu 3) Enga, Western Highlands, Chimgu (Simbu), Eastern Highlands, 
Southern Highlands 
E Highlands 4) Enga, Western Highlands, Chimgu (Simbu), Eastern Highlands, 
Southern Highlands 
S Highlands 5) Enga, Western Highlands, Chimgu (Simbu), Eastern Highlands, 
Southern Highlands 
Intergroup - Highlands 
Enga 1) Enga, Western Highlands, Chimgu (Simbu), Eastern Highlands, 
Southern Highlands 
W Highlands 2) Enga, Western Highlands, Chimgu (Simbu), Eastern Highlands, 
Southern Highlands 
Chimgu 3) Enga, Western Highlands, Chimgu (Simbu), Eastern Highlands, 
Southern Highlands 
E Highlands 4) Enga, Western Highlands, Chimgu (Simbu), Eastern Highlands, 
Southern Highlands 
S Highlands 5) Enga, Western Highlands, Chimgu (Simbu), Eastern Highlands, 
Southern Highlands 
Intragroup - Islands 
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W N Britain 
EN Britain 
N Solomons 
N Ireland 
Manus 
1) West New Britain, East New Britain, North Solomons, New Ireland, 
W N Britain 
EN Britain 
N Solomons 
N Ireland 
Manus 
2) West New Britain, East New Britain, North Solomons, New Ireland, 
3) West New Britain, East New Britain, North Solomons, New Ireland, 
4) West New Britain, East New Britain, North Solomons, New Ireland, 
5) West New Britain, East New Britain, North Solomons, New Ireland, 
Intergroup - Islands 
1) West New Britain, East New Britain, North Solomons, New Ireland, 
2) West New Britain, East New Britain, North Solomons, New Ireland, 
3) West New Britain, East New Britain, North Solomons, New Ireland, 
4) West New Britain, East New Britain, North Solomons, New Ireland, 
5) West New Britain, East New Britain, North Solomons, New Ireland, 
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Appendix 11.1 
Experiment 5 (Chapter 11): Scripts used by the six video stimuli 
Person No. 1 (Indonesian) - Introduction 
We are all concerned for the environment and the well being of our people. We want 
our countries to continue to develop but some of the multinational companies that come 
to our countries are taking advantage of us, exploiting our natural resources and our 
people. The plantations that have been established are important to our economic 
development, however we also need the land for other uses. We must take care of the 
land. It is our future. These multinational companies have no respect for the land. We 
must teach them respect. 
Person No. 1 (Indonesian) - Consistent condition 
I propose that strict guidelines must be implemented and enforced through a stronger 
military presence. The youth of our nations need to join the national military reserves 
as part time volunteers. As part of the military reserves they will be trained as officers 
of the land and then patrol the areas under threat of being exploited. The officers will 
uphold the guidelines that the government will dictate. I urge you all to join, and 
encourage others to join, the national military reserves - these multinationals must be 
made to respect the land. 
Person No. 1 (Indonesian) - Inconsistent condition 
I propose that guidelines need to be established and implemented that can be effectively 
adopted by the people who own the land. As free and independent citizens of our 
countries we need to take care of the land that is ours, for now and for the future. 
Educators must train the people of the land how look for the signs of potential 
exploitation of the land. We must also educate the youth to know the land as our 
parents have. These multinational companies have no respect for the land. The 
traditional respect for the land must come from us and we must teach others respect for 
the land, as is our tradition .. 
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Person No. 2 (Indonesian) - Introduction 
Farming of the land and agriculture are essential to our well being, as well as for our 
economic growth and development. We are developing new technology every day to 
make the most of the land and prosper from it. This is all good. The multinational 
companies that are coming to our country are capitalizing on our natural resources. This 
will be of benefit to our growth and development. But, they can take advantage of us, 
as a nation, and we can't allow this to happen. They must remember that it is our land 
and we must benefit and use it as our own. 
Person No. 2 (Indonesian) - Consistent condition 
The government needs to control them more. We have no power to control them and 
we do not want to be exploited like so many other Asian nations. At the same time we 
have many mouths to feed and we need to keep producing large quantities of food -
extensive farming is necessary. We need to lobby the government and support them for 
more government control of the land. Help by supporting your local politician who will 
bring in stronger government control to protect the natural environment from the 
multinational companies. 
Person No. 2 (Indonesian) - Inconsistent condition 
Traditional land owners need to maintain control of their land. Strong and democratic 
government is needed so we can be self sustained. It is the traditional land owners that 
know what is best. The government and these multinational companies can not know 
what is best for the land. We have lived on the land for many years - we know the land 
and how to sustain it. We can not over extending our resources by extensive 
agricultural and farming practices. They must recognize that we need control of the 
land to manage it well. 
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Person No. 3 (Indonesian) - introduction 
The nature of the relationship between the people and the land is changing. People are 
no longer staying in one spot - there is significant migration between villages and to the 
cities. Because of this we are losing traditional local knowledge of the land and how to 
sustain it for the future. When multinational companies move into areas they can take 
advantage of this, and do what they want, because traditional knowledge is diminishing. 
This can lead to the land being exploited and ruined for the future. They will take from 
us, and then leave us, when there is nothing left to take. Leaving us with nothing. 
Person No. 3 (Indonesian) - Consistent condition 
Land owners are no longer able to care for their land. With the promotion of 
transmigration within the countries, such as that from Western Indonesia into Iran Jaya, 
there now needs to be more control of the land by the government. The land needs to 
be surveyed and measured so that the government can monitor the situation. Volunteers 
must join with government officials to help map the country, so the government knows 
what it has to work with and maintain control of the land. Please assist us in the 
promotion of, and action of, volunteers helping the government map the land. 
Person No. 3 (Indonesian) - Inconsistent condition 
Land owners need to maintain control of their land or there is no want for them to stay. 
They need to be given the control of the land, so that they may practice traditional 
farming. People are no longer staying in their homelands - the government is pushing 
them elsewhere. We are hardworking people who respect and know the land. 
Determining how the land should be used through agriculture, farming, etc must be kept 
at the local level. We have cared for the land for many years and have not 
overextended the land. Land matters to us we must to be self sustained in small rural 
villages. Help to promote traditional village life. 
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Person No. 4 (Papua New Guinea)- Introduction 
The rainforest is an important natural resource yet many multinational corporations are 
disrupting this fragile ecosystem and the subsistence traditional lifestyle. The land 
owners must be educated to make effective decisions on how land is to be used. More 
than 85% of people in Papua New Guinea rely on agriculture for their livelihood. As a 
whole, the production of traditional food crops has kept pace with population growth. 
With the incoming multinational corporations, they may disrupt this balance that we 
have achieved in sustaining our country. 
Person No. 4 (Papua New Guinea) - Consistent condition 
The people of the country need to maintain control of the land. It is important that 
landowners are educated so that they can make effective decisions. As the population 
grows the problem of over using the land by farming etc will become more of an issue. 
By over extending local farming practices, farmers may extend their crops into 
unoccupied land. This could lead to further land rights conflicts. We must keep 
subsistence farming and modern farming practices in balance. We must promote 
sustained development through a democratic process - to keep our nation growing as 
one nation in peace. 
Person No. 4 (Papua New Guinea) - Inconsistent condition 
Industry and government must search for alternative ways to use the land and advise us 
on how to use new technology and crops to get more from the land. As the population 
grows, intensifying farming methods must be considered, as well as extending our 
growing areas. We will have to move production into unoccupied land- the 
government will have to take control of this land for development and to sustain 
economic growth. The government can work with these multinational companies, 
using the land as they see fit. This will provide many benefits for all people. We need 
to give land to the government for our common good. 
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Person No. 5 (Papua New Guinea) - Introduction 
New Guinea contains one of the largest intact rainforests left on earth. An amazing 
relic of unique and exquisite biodiversity. With these multinational companies coming 
in they are showing a general disregard for the needs of sustainable forestry practice. 
Further they fail to provide adequate assessment of biodiversity and conservation values 
thus reinforcing the unsustainable notion of economy before ecology. We must not 
overuse our land resources, we depend on the rainforest and other natural resources for 
our survival. 
Person No. 5 (Papua New Guinea)- Consistent condition 
We must maintain the land in the traditional sense- self-government and self-
determination are important to us. These multinational companies alienate traditional 
landowners in favour of government and multi-national interests. They take our power 
of self-determination away. We can not let them have this control. I urge each of you, 
when you return to your villages to help to educate the others in how to sustain the land 
and keep it in the hands of the traditional villagers - the people that know the land and 
how to use it for the future. Help us to promote this policy for our future. 
Person No. 5 (Papua New Guinea)- Inconsistent condition 
We must maintain the land- government intervention is important to help us do this 
effectively. These multinational companies are in favour of government and multi-
national interests. We must work with them, as it is our hope for the future. I urge each 
of you, when you return to your villages to help to educate the others in how to sustain 
the land, by giving the government some control in determining future land use. The 
government will be able to keep the multi-national companies in hand. We need to 
educate the more traditional villagers into a different way of thinking for the future. 
Help us to promote this policy for our future. 
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Person No. 6 (Papua New Guinea) · Introduction 
Hunting, fishing and agriculture are part of our life- they always have been; we have 
viably sustained our resources for years. We have respected the land and used it well. 
In return it has always provided for us. Ninety seven percent of the land in PNG is 
traditionally owned· this is part of our heritage. Yet we are still developing and we 
must increase our economic growth. Is it multinational companies that can help us with 
this? In what way will they become part of our future? What impact will they have on 
our natural resources, such as the rainforest? 
Person No. 6 Papua New Guinea· Consistent condition 
The land is vital to our existence· it provides for us. We need to care for it so that it 
can continue to provide for us. Papua New Guinea's economy is unique in that two 
distinct economies exist side by side· the traditional economy and the modern 
economy. The traditional economy supports 72% of the population and is based on 
subsistence farming, as it has been for many generations. The worry is that 
multinational companies will come in and not respect the traditional ways that have 
sustained us for many years. We must fight to maintain our traditional ways. Help us 
to educate others before we are exploited by multinationals any further. 
Person No. 6 (Papua New Guinea) • Inconsistent condition 
Papua New Guinea's economy is unique in that two distinct economies exist side by 
side· the traditional economy and the modern economy. In the past, this system has 
worked. But presently the government is subsidising much of the exports and this can 
not continue. The government must take more control of the economy by taking more 
control of the land and its development. This is the only way for eC<Jnomic growth and 
development to occur for us. There is little immediate potential for growth through our 
traditional ways. Resource development, through the government, should focus on 
reform of existing industries. We must help change peoples attitudes to land and 
development. 
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Statistical Appendices 
7.2 Experiment 1 (Chapter 7): Summary Statistics from Analysis of Between Subjects 
Eiiccts 
7.2.1 Parity strategy: The pull of P on FAV: Group representativeness 
(High/Med/Slight) X Interdependence (Interdependent/Autonomous) 
Sources of variation df MS f p 
Main Eiiects 3 102.43 3.02 .03 
Group rep. 2 141.07 4.17 .02 
Interdep. 1 31.36 .93 .34 
2-way Interaction 2 3.39 .10 .91 
Group Inter. 2 3.39 .10 .91 
Explained 5 62.87 1.86 .11 
Residual 96 33.88 
7.2.2 Discrimination strategy- the pull of FAY on MJP: Group representativeness 
(High/Med/Slight) X Interdependence (Interdependent/Autonomous) 
Main Effects 3 90.23 4.16 .008 
Group rep. 2 128.73 1.69 .19 
Interdep. 1 10.17 0.47 .50 
2-way Interaction 2 8.35 .38 .68 
Group Inter. 2 8.35 .38 .68 
Explained 5 57.84 2.66 .03 
Residual 96 21.71 
7.2.3 Discrimination strategy- the pull of MD on MIP+MJP: Group representativeness 
(High/Med/Slight) X Interdependence (Interdependent/Autonomous) 
Main Effects 3 63.68 2.64 .05 
Group rep. 2 89.63 1.69 .19 
Interdep. 1 9.31 4.81 .03 
2-way Interaction 2 4.30 1.76 .18 
Group Inter. 2 4.30 1.76 .18 
Explained 5 39.74 2.32 .05 
Residual 96 20.19 
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7.2.4 Discrimination strategy- the pull of FAY on P: Group representativeness 
(High/Med/Slight) X Interdependence (Interdependent/Autonomous) 
Sources of variation df MS f p 
Main Effects 3 70.56 2.81 .04 
Group rep. 2 92.43 3.68 .03 
Interdep. 1 21.65 0.86 .36 
2-way Interaction 2 4.41 0.18 .84 
Group Inter. 2 4.41 0.18 .84 
Explained 5 44.99 1.79 .12 
Residual 96 25.14 
7.2.5 Joint profit strategy- the pull of MIP+MJP on MD: Group representativeness 
(High/Med/Slight) X Interdependence (Interdependent/Autonomous) 
Main Effects 3 56.99 2.64 .05 
Group rep. 2 36.61 1.69 .19 
Interdep. 1 103.86 4.81 .03 
2-way Interaction 2 37.94 1.76 .18 
Group Inter. 2 37.94 1.76 .18 
Explained 5 50.14 2.32 .05 
Residual 96 21.61 
7.2.6 Joint profit strategy- the pull of MJP on FAY: Group representativeness 
(High/Med/Slight) X Interdependence (Interdependent/Autonomous) 
Main Effects 3 39.97 3.73 .01 
Group rep. 2 28.05 2.62 .08 
Interdep. 1 69.29 6.47 .01 
2-way Interaction 2 3.77 0.35 .70 
Group Inter. 2 3.77 0.35 .70 
Explained 5 25.72 2.40 .04 
Residual 96 10.71 
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7.2.7 Total ingroup matrix allocation: Group representativeness (High/Med/Siight) X 
Interdependence (Interdependent/ Autonomous) 
Sources of variation df MS f l2 
Main Effects 3 1165.81 5.15 .002 
Group rep. 2 1733.01 7.65 .001 
Interdep. 1 61.99 .27 .602 
2-way Interaction 2 61.77 .27 .76 
Group Inter. 2 61.77 .27 .76 
Explained 5 719.77 3.18 .01 
Residual 96 226.58 
7.2.8 Total outgroup matrix allocation: Group representativeness (High/Med/Siight) X 
Interdependence (Interdependent/Autonomous) 
Main Effects 3 482.58 2.43 .05 
Group rep. 2 335.59 1.69 .19 
Interdep. 1 775.59 3.90 .03 
2-way Interaction 2 147.04 0.74 .48 
Group Inter. 2 147.04 0.74 .48 
Explained 5 353.84 1.78 .12 
Residual 96 198.67 
7.2.9 Difference between total outgroup and total ingroup matrix allocation: Group 
representativeness (High/Med/Siight) X Interdependence (Interdependent/Autonomous) 
Main Effects 3 2547.12 4.07 .01 
Group rep. 2 3603.12 5.76 .004 
Interdep. 1 397.04 .64 .43 
2-way Interaction 2 73.56 0.12 .89 
Group Inter. 2 73.56 0.12 .89 
Explained 5 1564.15 2.50 .04 
Residual 96 625.36 
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8.2 Experiment 2 (Chapter 8): Summary Statistics from Analysis of Between Subjects 
E!Iects 
8.2.1 Intragroup representativeness over time: Repeated measures of intragroup 
cooperation over time ( 4) X group (8) 
Sources of variation df MS f 
Between Subjects 
Within cells 89 2.91 
Condition 7 1.83 .63 .730 
Within Subjects 
Within cells 267 .20 
Rating dimension 3 4.69 23.28 .000 
Condition x rating dim. 21 .27 1.32 .162 
8.2.2 Adjective homogeneity over time: Repeated measures of adjective descriptiveness 
over time ( 4) X group (8). Note 12 cases rejected because of missing data. 
Sources of variation df MS f p 
Between Subjects 
Within cells 76 2.05 
Condition 7 2.65 1.29 .267 
Within Subjects 
Within cells 228 .53 
Rating dimension 3 2.25 4.27 .006 
Condition x rating dim. 21 .70 1.32 .162 
8.2.3 Intragroup cooneration over time: Repeated measures of intragroup cooperation 
over time (4) X group (8) 
Sources of variation df MS f 
Between Subjects 
Within cells 89 1.96 
Condition 7 .78 .40 .901 
Within Subjects 
Within cells 267 .14 
Rating dimension 3 7.39 51.47 .000 
Condition x rating dim. 21 .16 1.11 .338 
315 
8.2.4 Perceived similarity to group over time: Repeated measures of individuals 
perceived similarity to the group over time (4) X group (8). Note 11 cases rejected 
because of missing data. 
Sources of variation 
Between Subjects 
Within cells 
Condition 
Within Subjects 
Within cells 
Rating dimension 
Condition x rating dim. 
df 
77 
7 
231 
3 
21 
MS 
6.73 
8.73 
1.27 
6.65 
1.41 
1.30 
5.23 
1.11 
.263 
.002 
.339 
9.2 Experiment 3 (Chapter 9): Summary Statistics from Analysis of Between Subjects 
Efiects 
9.2.1 Cooperation with other: Measure of cooperation by Outward Bound group (13) 
and comparison other (3) 
Sources of variation 
Between Subjects 
Within cells 
Comparison other 
OBgroup 
Comp. other x group 
df 
119 
2 
12 
22 
MS 
147.80 
2396.81 
129.20 
156.62 
16.22 
.87 
1.06 
.000 
.567 
.400 
10.2 Experiment 4 (Chapter 10): Summary Statistics from Analysis of Between Subjects 
Effects 
10.2.1 Willingness to cooperate: Measure of willingness to cooperate: salient identity 
(3) by ingroup/outgroup comparison other (2) 
Sources of variation 
Between Subjects 
Within cells 
Identity 
Comparison 
Identity x comp. other 
df 
129 
2 
1 
2 
MS 
3.57 
8.53 
14.97 
0.37 
2.39 
4.20 
0.10 
.095 
.043 
.902 
10.2.2 Expected cooperation of other ingroup members: Measure of expected 
cooperation: salient identity (3) by ingroup/outgroup comparison other (2) 
Sources of variation df MS f 
Between Subjects 
Within cells 129 2.92 
Identity 2 2.61 0.90 
Comparison 1 32.07 11.00 
Identity x comp. other 2 3.36 1.15 
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12 
.410 
.001 
.319 
10.2.3 Expected cooperation of outgroup members: Measure of expected cooperation: 
salient identity (3) by ingroup/outgroup comparison other (2) 
Sources of variation df MS E 12 
Between Subjects 
Within cells 129 3.64 
Identity 2 1.14 0.31 .731 
Comparison 1 210.90 57.91 .000 
Identity x comp. other 2 2.40 0.66 .519 
11.2 Experiment 5 (Chapter 11): Summary Statistics from Analysis of Between Subjects 
E!Iects 
11.2.1 Willingness to cooperate: Measure of willingness to cooperate: normative 
consistency (2) by comparative agreement (3) 
Sources of variation 
Between Subjects 
Within cells 
Consistency 
Agreement 
Consistency x Agreement 
df 
112 
1 
2 
2 
MS 
1.83 
17.39 
4.02 
0.01 
9.57 
2.21 
0.01 
.002 
.. 114 
.993 
11.2.2 Similarity: Measure of similarity: normative consistency (2) by comparative 
agreement (3) 
Sources of variation 
Between Subjects 
Within cells 
Consistency 
Agreement 
Consistency x Agreement 
df 
112 
1 
2 
2 
MS 
1.83 
18.46 
4.62 
0.21 
9.58 
2.40 
(J.11 
.002 
.096 
.895 
317 
11.2.3 Impression: Favourability of impression measure: normative consistency (2) by 
comparative agreement (3) 
Sources of variation df MS .E n 
Between Subjects 
Within cells 112 2.15 
Consistency 1 8.96 4.17 .044 
Agreement 2 5.11 2.38 .098 
Consistency x Agreement 2 7.98 3.71 .027 
11.2.4 Quality of agruement: Measure of quality of arguement: normative consistency 
(2) by comparative agreement (3) 
Sources of variation 
Between Subjects 
Within cells 
Consistency 
Agreement 
Consistency x Agreement 
df 
111 
1 
2 
2 
MS 
2.33 
4.97 
8.56 
3.73 
2.13 
3.67 
1.60 
.147 
.029 
.207 
11.2.5 Agreement: Measure of agreement with message: normative consistency (2) by 
comparative agreement (3) 
Sources of variation df MS .E n 
Between Subjects 
Within cells 111 2.00 
Consistency 1 11.71 5.86 .017 
Agreement 2 7.90 3.95 .022 
Consistency x Agreement 2 3.52 1.76 .177 
